Carbon markets, carbon prices and innovation: Evidence from Interviews with Managers
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Transcript of Carbon markets, carbon prices and innovation: Evidence from Interviews with Managers
Carbon markets, carbon prices and innovation:Evidence from Interviews with Managers∗
Ralf Martin†, Mirabelle Muûls ‡and Ulrich Wagner§
Preliminary
Abstract
Based on interviews with almost 800 manufacturing firms in six Europeancountries, this study develops a firm level indicator of “clean” that is climatechange related innovation and explores the impact of the EU Emissions Trad-ing System on such innovation. We find that the majority of firms engagein some form of climate change related innovation although this is primarilyprocess rather than product innovation. We also find significant differences inthe propensity to innovate between countries, even after controlling for poten-tially different industrial structures. Further, we find that firms expecting lessgenerous allocations of free permits in the third phase of the EUETS tend toinnovate more. We explore if this a causal effect of variations in allocationsacross sectors by devising a regression discontinuity design. We find a discretedrop in innovation effort around the thresholds - in terms of carbon and tradeintensity - implied by EU Commission rules for free allocation. This suggeststhat allocating permits for free causes a reduction in clean innovation. Thiscontradicts the hypothesis that permit allocation has only a distributional butno effect on real behaviour. We suggest that requiring firms to buy permitsin an auction has an important signalling effect for senior management, whichdoes not occur under free allocation.
JEL Classification: D22, O31, Q48, Q54
∗The authors thank Morgan Bazilian and Karsten Neuhoff for useful comments and suggestions.†Centre for Economic Performance and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and
the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, LondonWC2A 2AE, phone: 020 7955 6975, email: [email protected]‡Grantham Institute for Climate Change, Imperial College London, South Kensington Campus,
London SW7 2AZ and Research Associate, Centre for Economic Performance, London School ofEconomics and Political Science, phone: 020 7594 8452, email: [email protected]§Universidad Carlos III Madrid, Department of Economics, Calle Madrid, 126 28903 Getafe,
Spain and Research Associate, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economicsand Political Science, phone: +34 (0) 916 24 8488, email: [email protected]
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1 Introduction
In advanced economies, the industrial sector is directly responsible for about a thirdof greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IEA, 2009). Understanding the drivers andbarriers that affect company behavior related to climate change is therefore essentialto design effective policies for reducing emissions, to prevent dangerous levels ofglobal warming. At the same time, private-sector firms are also the key players whenit comes to investments in research and development (R&D); “clean” innovationis critical for achieving the transition to a low-carbon economy. The relationshipbetween “clean” R&D investments and climate change policy becomes all the morerelevant if the fruits of these investments spill over across international bordersand help to reduce emissions in countries with few or no climate change policies.Currently, some view this possibility as the main justification for European climatechange policy, given that EU emissions reductions alone would not be sufficient toprevent dangerous global climate change from occurring.
To date, the empirical evidence on what firms are doing (or not) to curb GHGemissions is rather limited and has been collected through either mail surveys orcase studies (McKinsey and Ecofys (2005), Kenber et al. (2009)). This paper exam-ines the link between climate change regulation, investment and innovation, usingdetailed survey data for a representative sample of firms. The data were collectedby interviewing managers on climate-change and energy related issues using a novelmethod that circumvents various types of bias that plague more traditional surveyformats. We applied this approach to a sample of approximately 800 manufacturingfirms in six European countries from August to October 2009.
Based on this dataset, we obtain a number of new descriptive results regardingthe behavior of businesses related to climate change. It appears that most (70%)firms are engaged in some formal or informal R&D, with the aim of curbing emis-sions and/or energy consumption (“clean process innovation”). A smaller proportion(40%) is also pursuing “clean product innovation”; i.e. R&D with the aim of de-veloping products that can help customers to reduce their emissions. There aresignificant differences between countries when it comes to clean innovation. Ac-cording to our study, most active on product innovation is Germany, on processinnovation is France with lowest levels of innovative activities observed in Hungaryand Poland. Also, this study shows that firms expect carbon prices to be consider-ably higher in the future, compared with current levels in the EU ETS. We find anaverage expected carbon price of €40 for the post-2012 trading period. And finally,ompared to the current trading period (Phase II, from 2008 to 2012), firms expectthe imposition of tighter caps for Phase III, starting in 2013. The proportion offirms reporting that their allowance allocation does not imply a binding emissionslimit falls from 40% in Phase II to less than 10% in Phase III.
Apart from descriptive statistics, we use regression analysis to analyze the effectof climate policy on innovation at the firms in our sample. We provide two piecesof evidence in support of a causal link between company-specific caps – i.e. theamount of allowances companies receive for free in the EU ETS – and “clean” R&D
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by firms. First, we find a significant positive association between the expectationsfirms hold about the future stringency of their cap and “clean” innovation. Thisrelationship is robust to including a broad range of control variables.Second, wefind that firms within the EU ETS which are just below the thresholds establishedfor free allowances are engaging more strongly in climate change related productinnovation than firms that are just above the threshold (and thus will continue toreceive free allowances). There is a discontinuity in both expected stringency aswell as “clean” innovation at the thresholds that are implied by the latest set ofcriteria that the European Commission has proposed for allocating free emissionsallowances after 20121. This result suggests that the ongoing practice within theEU ETS, of generously allocating allowances for free to manufacturing sectors leadsto less innovation than would otherwise be the case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the process ofinterviewing managers about various aspects of company behavior related to climatechange. Section 3 provides summary statistics of our innovation measures as wellas regarding future expectations. Section 4 examines the link between innovation,future expectations and climate policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 Interviewing managers
2.1 Interview Methodology
Our survey builds upon and substantially extends previous work on climate changepolicies and management practices by Martin et al. (2010). We conduct structuredtelephone interviews with managers at randomly selected manufacturing facilitiesin Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the UK. The interview setupfollows the management survey design pioneered by Bloom and van Reenen (2007),in that the interviewer engages interviewees in a dialogue with open questions thatare meant not to be answered by “yes” or “no”. On the basis of this dialogue, theinterviewer then assesses and ranks the company along various dimensions. Notethat our setup adopts a double-blind strategy: interviewees do not know that theinterviewers are scoring their answers and interviewers do not know performancecharacteristics of the firm they are interviewing. This interview format is designedto avoid several sources of bias common in conventional surveys (Bertrand andMullainathan, 2001). For instance, experimental evidence shows that a respondent’sanswers can be manipulated by making simple changes to the ordering of questions,to the way questions are framed, or to the scale on which respondents are supposedto answer. By asking open-ended questions and by delegating the task of scoring theanswers to the interviewer, we seek to minimize cognitive bias of this type. Possiblecognitive bias on the part of the interviewers can be controlled for using interviewer-fixed effects in the regression analyses. Another common observation with survey
1The Commission takes this decision for each sector based on whether it is sufficiently (i) carbonintensive, (ii) trade intensive or (iii) both.
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Table 1: Interview response rates by country
Refused
Belgium 134 131 85 46 178 47 0.74France 141 140 92 48 238 98 0.59Germany 139 138 95 43 337 199 0.41Hungary 69 69 37 32 90 21 0.77Poland 78 78 57 21 140 62 0.56UK 209 205 63 142 468 264 0.44Total 770 761 429 332 1451 691 0.52
# of Interviews
# of Firms Interviewed
# of ETS Firms
Interviewed
# of Non ETS Firms
Interviewed
Total Firms Contacted
Response Rate
Notes: There are more interviews than interviewed firms as we conducted severalinterviews with different partners in a small number of firms.
data is that respondents are tempted to report attitudes or patterns of behaviorthat are socially desirable but may not reflect what they actually think and do.This problem may be exacerbated in situations where respondents do not have adefinite attitude toward the issues they are asked about but are reluctant to admitthat. Our research design addresses this issue in two ways. First, the interviewerstarts by asking an open question about an issue and then follows up with morespecific questions, or asks for some examples in order to evaluate the respondent’sanswer as precisely as possible. Second, the results of the interviews are then linkedto independent data on economic performance, as a validation exercise.
2.2 Interview Practice
Using the ORBIS database maintained by Bureau Van Dijk we obtained contact de-tails for 44,605 manufacturing firms in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Polandand the UK2. We randomly selected companies from that list to solicit an interview.To ensure sufficient coverage of firms subject to the EU ETS (hereafter, EU ETSfirms), we also sampled manufacturing firms at random from the Community Inde-pendent Transaction Log (CITL) in these countries. Interviewers made “cold calls”to production facilities (not head offices), gave their name and affiliation with theLondon School of Economics and then asked to be put through to the environmentalmanager. In the case of EU ETS firms, interviewers asked for the person responsiblefor the EU ETS, as it is listed in the CITL. Table 1 reports the number of calls madeand various statistics about the response rates.
An ordinal scale of 1 to 5 was adopted to measure various management practicesrelated to climate change. For each aspect of management ranked in this way, inter-viewers were instructed to ask a number of open questions. Questions were orderedsuch that the interviewer started with a fairly open question about a topic andthen probed for more details in subsequent questions, if necessary. The goal was tobenchmark the practices of firms according to a few common criteria. For instance,
2For more details on the survey, see Anderson et al. (2011)
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rather than asking the manager for a subjective assessment of the management’sawareness of climate-change issues, we gauged this by how formal and far-reachingthe discussion of climate-change topics is in current management. To verify the con-sistency of the interviewer’s scoring, a subset of randomly selected interviews wasdouble-scored by a second team member who listened in. The interviews seeks togather information on both the effectiveness and the competitiveness effects of cli-mate change policies, particularly of the EU ETS, in a random sample of Europeanmanufacturing firms. The questionnaire (see appendix) is divided in four sections.The first section examines the current and anticipated future effects of the EU ETS.The second section deals with prices for energy and CO2, competition and otherexternal drivers of climate-change related management practices. The third sec-tion inquires about specific measures that were adopted by firms and others whichwere considered but eventually discarded. The last section gathers information onrelevant company characteristics.
3 Descriptive evidence from interviewing managers
3.1 Clean Innovation
An important path for firms’ future GHG emissions abatement is to innovate: thecompany can either invest in finding cleaner production processes or develop newand cleaner products, thereby reducing their customers’ future emissions. Figure1 shows the distribution of the scores for clean process and product innovation3.An example of clean process innovation could be the development of a less energy-consuming way to transform limestone into quicklime. Clean product innovationwould for example be the invention of a new tyre with which cars consume lesspetrol. We see that almost 70% of firms are engaged in some form of clean processinnovation; only 40% engage in clean product innovation. Figure 2 shows that cleanproduct innovation is most likely to occur in firms that are also conducting cleanprocess innovation.
Figure 3 examines whether there are differences in clean innovation between coun-tries in our sample. There is clearly a gap between Western and Central/EasternEuropean countries, with Poland and Hungary lagging behind, both in terms ofprocess and of product R&D. France emerges as the leader in process, Germanyin product R&D. The second panel of Figure 3 explores whether these differencesare driven by differences in the specialization of the various economies across sec-tors. The figures report average differences between countries while controlling forthe 3-digit sector4. This makes the differences found in the first panel even more
3The clean process and product innovation measures are throughout this paper taken from thesurvey responses and we hereafter use interchangeably the term innovation and R&D.
4We use the NACE rev. 1.1 classification of the ORBIS data
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Figure 1: Distribution of the Clean Innovation Scores
(a) Clean Process Innovation (b) Clean Product Innovation
Notes: The figures show a histogram of the scores for each of the two types of cleaninnovation reported by interviewed firms.
Figure 2: The relative frequency of clean process and product innovation
Notes: The figure shows a histogram of the types of clean innovation reported by inter-viewed firms.
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Figure 3: Differences in clean innovative activities between countriesNo industry controls
(a) Process Innovation (b) Product innovation3-digit industry controls
(c) Process Innovation (d) Product innovationNotes: Each graph shows the average difference - conditional on noise controls - between firms fromdifferent countries in terms of the interview scores for process and product innovation describedin Figure 1. Stars indicate if these deviations are statistically significant and at what significancelevel: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.
pronounced, suggesting that they are not driven by differences in industrial com-position.
Figure 4 reveals sizeable differences in clean innovation across sectors and betweentypes of innovation. In Table 2, we use this information to group sectors accordingto their focus on clean technologies. Only three sectors – Glass, Other Mineralsand TV & Communication – have above-average scores in both product and processinnovation.
3.2 What firms expect
Investment decisions depend on the expectations held by investors. In order to elicitthis information, the interview included a number of questions on expectations.This section reports on our findings, starting with an examination of differences in
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Figure 4: Differences in clean innovative activities between industries
(a) Process Innovation (b) Product innovationNotes: Each graph shows the average difference - conditional on noise controls - between firmsfrom different sectors in terms of the interview scores for process and product innovation describedin Figure 1. Stars indicate if these deviations are statistically significant and at what significancelevel: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.
Table 2: Sectors according to their focus on clean innovation
Clean Product Innovatonbelow average above average
below average
above average
Clean Process Innovaton
- Ceramics; - Fabricated Metals- Food & Tobacco- Publishing - Textle Leather
- Machinery & Optcs;- Other Basic Metals;- Vehicles
- Cement; - Chemicals & Plastc;- Fuels;- Iron & Steel; - Wood & Paper
- Glass- Other Minerals- TV & Communicaton
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Figure 5: Distribution of price expectations
Notes: The figure shows a histogram of the price of a tonne of CO2 that interviewed firmsexpect on the EU ETS market.
these expectations between firms, countries and sectors. Subsequently, we discussexpectations about the future of the EU ETS.
3.2.1 Prices
Figure 5 reports the distribution of the expected price of emitting one tonne ofcarbon dioxide in 2020. Forecasts range between 0 and 500. The median pricereported is €30, the mean €40. There are substantial differences, not only betweendifferent firms but also between countries and sectors, as shown in Figure 6. Frenchfirms expect a much higher price, of €50 on average, whereas UK firms expect amore modest €28, on average. Across sectors, the highest price is expected by firmsin TV and Communication, with an average of €78, the lowest by firms in the Fuelssector, at close to €23. There is also a sizeable variation across sectors and countrieswith respect to the mere existence of a price expectation. Figure 7 shows that morethan 80% of interviewed Polish managers actually have a carbon price expectationversus less than 5% of the Hungarian managers that we interviewed. At the sectorlevel, the highest proportion of firms with an expectation occurs in the Glass sector(55%), whilst the lowest percentage is only 18%, in Machinery and Optics. We alsoasked interviewees about their knowledge of the current price of a tonne of CO2 onthe EU ETS, as a way of gauging their awareness of the market and the potentialintegration of this price in investment and trading decisions. Again, there is a lot ofvariation between sectors and countries, as shown in Figure 8, with Poland and theFuels industry exhibiting the largest shares of managers aware of the carbon price.
3.2.2 Expected stringency of EU ETS
We also asked firms about their expectations regarding the stringency of the cap onemissions implied by their participation in Phase III of the EU ETS. Put differently,we wanted to know how hard it would be for them to limit their future emissions to
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Figure 6: Price expectations across industries and countries
(a) Across countries (b) Across sectorsNotes: The figures show average carbon price expectations for 2020 for all interviewed firms thatreported price expectations (i.e. both EU ETS and non EU ETS firms).
Figure 7: Existence of Price expectations
(a) Across countries (b) Across sectorsNotes: The figures show what proportion of firms in a country or a sector reported a carbon priceexpectation in our sample.
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Figure 8: Knowledge about current prices
(a) Across countries (b) Across sectorsNotes: The figures show what proportion of firms in a country or a sector knew the current carbonprice in the EU ETS.
the amount they receive in free allowances (or how expensive if they do not reducetheir emissions, and need to buy allowances). A firm’s response to this questionwould depend on (i) how costly it would be to reduce its emissions, on (ii) howmany allowances it receives for free and on (iii) the price they expect on the marketand therefore the expected overall allocation. We asked a similar question regardingthe stringency of the cap imposed by the current Phase II of the trading system.Figure 9 reports on the resulting scores. Firms clearly expect more stringent capsfor Phase III. The proportion of firms answering that the cap they receive will allowthem to continue under business-as-usual terms declined, from almost 40% to lessthan 10%. That said, few firms expect, even for Phase III, that fundamental changeswould be needed in order to meet their cap.
4 What is driving investment in climate-change re-lated innovation?
Having described in section 3 firms’ investment in R&D related to climate changeand their expectations for the future, this section, examines whether there is a linkbetween the two . Table 3 reports results from regressions of the process innovationscore whereas Table 4 reports the equivalent regressions for product innovation.
In column 1 we start first by regressing the innovation scores on a set of dummyvariables indicating whether a firm is part of the EU ETS in either Phase II or IIIor both. For process innovation this does not lead to a significant coefficient. Forproduct innovation we find a coefficient that is significant at 10%, however only forparticipation in Phase 2. Hence there is no strong evidence that ETS firms in generaldiffer in their innovativeness from non-ETS firms. In column 2 we add both priceexpectations and expectations about the future stringency of the firm level cap asexplanatory variables. We find positive coefficients for both variables and with both
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Figure 9: Expected stringency and current perceived stringency
(a) Trading Phase II (b) Trading Phase IIINotes: The figure for Trading Phase II shows how stringent firm-specific caps are perceived tobe. The figure for Trading Phase III shows what stringency firms expect for the Trading Phasestarting in 2013
types of innovation. However, we only get significant coefficients for the expectedstringency of the cap. Thus it seems that the stringency of the emissions cap is morerelevant for R&D decisions than the price. This is an interesting suggestion, as asimple model of company behavior would tend to predict the opposite: since the EUETS is a cap-and-trade system the only thing that should matter for firms’ alloca-tion and investment decisions is the (expected) emissions price. Company-specificcaps should only be relevant for determining the distribution of rents that emergefrom imposing scarcity on a formerly free good (GHG pollution). The notion thatallocation decisions are independent of the distribution of allowances has been re-ferred to as the “independence property” of emissions trading (?, Hahn and Stavins,2010).
An alternative explanation for the correlation between stringency and innovationcould be that we are picking up reverse causality or biases due to omitted variables.For example, a firm’s perception of stringency is certainly influenced by the avail-ability of cheap technological solutions to reduce emissions. When cheap solutionsare not available, a firm is likely to respond that the cap is more stringent. There-fore, such a firm might be more likely to conduct some R&D in response to highercarbon prices. In this case, a positive relationship between R&D and stringencymight emerge due to unobserved heterogeneity. We proceed by accounting for thisin a number of ways: First, by adding more control variables. Second, by examiningwhat happens when we include current (i.e. Phase II) perceived stringency, ratherthan future stringency. Third, we use process innovation as a control for un-observedfactors in the product innovation regressions. Fourth, rather than using the surveybased stringency measures we exploit variations in cap stringency implied by theEU Commission rules for continued free allocation – instead of the requirement topurchase allowances through auctioning. We discuss each approach in turn.
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Table 3: Regressions of process innovation score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)Dependent Variable. Process Innovation ScoreAnticipation of ETS Stringency in Phase 3 0.177** 0.107 0.122 0.144**
(0.079) (0.079) (0.076) (0.071)ETS Stringency in Phase 2 0.093* 0.078* 0.125**
(0.049) (0.046) (0.057)
0.100 -0.041 0.038 0.015
(0.074) (0.063) (0.063) (0.094)
0.064 0.115*** 0.071 0.078 0.139*** 0.103**
(0.048) (0.038) (0.051) (0.049) (0.037) (0.046)Multinational Enterprise 0.140 0.161 0.339 0.172 0.184 0.379*
(0.148) (0.132) (0.228) (0.144) (0.130) (0.228)R&D Intensive Facility 0.140 0.171* 0.039 0.166 0.197** 0.076
(0.106) (0.091) (0.147) (0.107) (0.095) (0.146)Employment 0.244*** 0.199*** 0.162** 0.254*** 0.213*** 0.187***
(0.046) (0.036) (0.072) (0.047) (0.037) (0.067)In ETS in Phase 2 -0.237 -0.285 -0.316 -0.129 . -0.490* -0.317 .
(0.198) (0.198) (0.241) (0.235) . (0.275) (0.278) .In ETS in Phase 3 0.225 -0.064 0.046 0.061 . 0.322 0.308 .
(0.304) (0.340) (0.350) (0.345) . (0.329) (0.357) .In ETS in Phase 2 and 3 0.388 0.128 -0.053 0.004 . 0.109 0.185 .
(0.359) (0.401) (0.392) (0.380) . (0.381) (0.378) .Observations 732 732 731 731 342 731 731 342
0.28 0.31 0.40 0.30 0.33 0.38 0.28 0.32Cluster 153 153 153 153 91 153 153 913-digit sector controls yes yes yes no no yes no noNoise Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
CO2 Price expectation by 2020
ln(CO2 Price)
CO2 Intensity in 2008
ln(CO2/EMP)
ln(emp)
R2
Notes: All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors are in parentheses under coefficientestimates clustered by sector. The dependent variable is the interview score for process innovation.CO2 intensity data are derived from the CITL database while employment is taken from ORBIS. Allother variables are derived from the interviews. Noise controls include interviewer, country, time,day and month of the interview and manager background fixed effects. Stars indicate statisticalsignificance level: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.
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Table 4: Regressions of product innovation score
Notes: All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors are in parentheses under coefficientestimates clustered by sector. The dependent variable is the interview score for product innovation.CO2 intensity data are derived from the CITL database while employment is taken from ORBIS. Allother variables are derived from the interviews. Noise controls include interviewer, country, time,day and month of the interview and manager background fixed effects. Stars indicate statisticalsignificance level: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.
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4.1 More control variables
Column 2 in Tables 3 and 4 already includes 3-digit industry dummies. In column3 we add further controls, such as the size, CO2 intensity, foreign ownership, etc.of a firm. We note that the stringency coefficient remains positive and significantfor product innovation. For process innovation it remains positive but is no longersignificant. For completeness we also examine what happens when we drop industrycontrols in column 4 and when we restrict the sample to only firms that are particip-ating in Phase III5. For product innovation, the stringency-innovation relationship isrobust in all of these specifications. The results for process innovation are less clear-cut. The stringency coefficient remains insignificant when dropping sector controlsbut becomes significant when restricting to the ETS sample.
4.2 Using current stringency
Up until Phase II emission allowances have by and large been allocated for free toemitters. Current plans for Phase III stipulate that some firms will have to purchasean increasing fraction of their allowances through an auction or on the open market.Hence, if the relationship between stringency and innovation is driven by variationsin the cap rather than abatement cost heterogeneity, we expect that the relationshipis weaker or non-existent with current stringency. Again, this turns out to be thecase for product innovation where the current stringency coefficient is not significantin columns 6 to 8. For process innovation, the reverse seems to be the case with thecurrent stringency coefficient being positive and significant.
4.3 Using process innovation as a control variable
Product innovation should be less affected by any confounding variation that mightaffect the relationship between stringency and innovation. This is because producingand researching the design of wind turbines, for example, does not necessarily gen-erate knowledge that helps to reduce the emissions from producing wind turbines.Even so, we cannot rule out that there are complementarities in conducting processand product R&D. To account for that, Table 4 includes an additional column wherewe include process R&D as an additional regressor6. The future stringency relation-ship remains significant at 10% in column 9 and leads to an estimate comparable insize when including process R&D as an additional control variable7.
5Note that we have the expected stringency score variable only for firms that are regulated bythe EU ETS in Phase III. Thus in all columns the stringency effect is identified only from thosefirms. Including the other firms can be useful, however, to identify the impact of variables oninnovation that are relevant for all firms, such as sector, size or noise controls.
6If variations in the cap are driving both process and product R&D, this would likely lead toa downward bias in the estimated coefficient on stringency. But if the "cap" effect is stronger forproduct R&D, we should still be able to detect an effect.
7The results of Tables 3 and 4 are robust to including a control of whether the firm is tradingon the EU ETS or not.
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Figure 10: Placebo and real thresholds
Notes: The Figure plots interviewed firms in the Value at Stake (y-axis) and Trade Intensity(x-axis) space according to the industry they belong to. The three lines correspond to theEU criteria for exemption of auctioning in Phase III and to two placebo threshold linesused in our analysis.
4.4 The effect of the EU Commission rules
As a further check of the robustness of the relationship between stringency andinnovation, we exploit the link between exogenous variations in free allowance al-location, rather than relying on the self-reported stringency score8. As mentionedbefore, Phase III will see radical changes in the number of allowances that are al-located for free to firms. Under current proposals, the European Commission willexempt certain 4-digit industries from allowance auctioning, based on two statistics,trade intensity (TI) and CO2 intensity (VaS) 9. Firms in a 4-digit industry will beexempt if the industry’s TI or VaS rates exceed 30%, or if the sector simultaneouslyexceeds a 10% threshold for TI and a 5% threshold for VaS. Figure 10 plots the firmsin our sample in the VaS-TI space, along with a line (labeled “actual”) indicatingthose thresholds.
However, in Tables 5 and 6, we examine whether there is a discrete jump in both thereported expected stringency as well as innovation as we move over the thresholds
8Of the three factors underlying a firm’s perception of stringency (see Section 3.2.2), we focushere on point (ii), the amount of permits the firm receives for free.
9The Value at Stake is defined as the ratio between the sum of the direct and indirect costs offull auctioning and the gross value added of a sector. The direct costs are calculated as the valueof direct CO2 emissions (using a proxy price of €30/t CO2), and the indirect costs capture theexposure to electricity price rises.
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implied by the European Commission criteria10. We also test if such discrete jumpsare a feature of our data rather than the cause of exemptions from auctioning,by defining two “placebo” thresholds, which are also indicated in Figure 10. Onethreshold is slightly lower, the other slightly higher than the actual threshold. Weexperimented with a range of values here. The specific lines in Figure10 are definedso as to ensure that 5% of firms fall within the band on either side of the differentcut-off values. Let us consider first the regression results reported in Table 5, wherefuture stringency – derived from our survey - is the dependent variable. In column1, we include indicator variables that are equal to 1 if a firm exceeds any of thesethresholds as explanatory variables. We see that there is a negative and significantcoefficient for exceeding the actual threshold (“Exempt after 2012”) and a positivecoefficient for exceeding the upper threshold. In column 2, we include trade intensity(TI) and CO2 intensity (VaS) in addition as explanatory variables. This has littleeffect on the threshold parameters. As we include quadratic terms, however, incolumn 3, the actual threshold effect becomes stronger and more significant, whereasthe placebo effect becomes smaller and loses significance11. Moreover, we find incolumn 4 that there is no such threshold effect when looking at the current stringencyscore.
Table 6 shows the results from similar regressions for the innovation variables. Wefind a negative point estimate of passing the actual threshold for process innovation,but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. On the other hand, we finda very clear and statistically significant threshold effect for product innovation. Thecoefficient estimate implies that passing the threshold for free allowance allocationimplied by the EU criteria leads to a drop in innovation on the order of 1 score point,on our score scale ranging from 1 to 5. As this corresponds roughly to 1 standarddeviation, we conclude that the effect of stringency on product innovation is alsoeconomically significant. In column 5, we see that this result is robust to includingonly the actual threshold. Column 6 reports negative point estimates for the placebothreshold when the actual threshold is excluded from the regression. This reflectsbias from omitting the relevant threshold as well as more noisy estimates, as theactual threshold is measured with error. Figure 11 illustrates the results of theregression in column 5: there is a clear discontinuity in product innovation impliedby the thresholds that define free allocation of allowances.
In sum, we find robust evidence that product innovation responds to the expectedstringency of the EU ETS. There is no clear evidence that the same is true forprocess innovation. An explanation for this could be that having to pay for allrequired emissions allowances has an important signaling function for companies indrawing the attention of more senior management levels to the issue of emissions. Itis only then that firms would take the more strategic decision to engage in productlines that are climate-change related, as opposed to process innovation, which is
10It is easy to think of reasons why trade and energy intensity might be correlated with thedegree of innovation a firm is undertaking, irrespective of these criteria. Indeed, in Figure 11 wefind that there is an inverse u-shaped relationship with respect to energy intensity for both productand process innovation.
11We also experimented with higher order terms, which gave similar results.
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Table 5: What drives expectations?
Notes: All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors are in parentheses under coefficientestimates clustered by sector. The dependent variable is the interview score for expected stringencyin columns (1) to (3) and for current stringency of EU ETS in column (4). Sectoral CO2 intensityand trade intensity are derived from EUROSTAT data. CO2 intensity data are derived from theCITL database while employment is taken from ORBIS. All other variables are derived from theinterviews. Stars indicate statistical significance level: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.
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Table 6: The effect of exemptions on innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Dependant Variable Process Innovation Score Product Innovation ScoreExempt after 2012 -0.294 -0.301 -1.106** -1.229** -0.927***
(0.291) (0.305) (0.454) (0.468) (0.340)Placebo Exempt (lower) 0.445** 0.390* 0.249 0.255 -0.240
(0.194) (0.226) (0.188) (0.256) (0.340)Placebo Exempt (upper) 0.120 0.195 0.664 0.424 -0.212
(0.288) (0.299) (0.521) (0.513) (0.404)
0.393 0.696 0.666 5.237 6.475* 2.498(0.740) (2.501) (0.560) (3.439) (3.517) (3.617)
Sectoral Trade Intensity (TI) -0.716 -1.964 -0.140 2.244 3.946* 2.238(0.432) (1.754) (0.609) (2.250) (2.284) (2.285)
VaS x VaS -1.563 -5.155 -6.642 -2.710(3.312) (4.303) (4.335) (4.680)
VaS x TI 4.299 -7.068* -7.297* -4.131(4.073) (3.628) (3.994) (3.782)
TI x TI 1.457 -1.968 -3.322 -2.285(1.688) (2.101) (2.285) (2.193)
0.098 0.094 0.032 0.013 0.009 0.010
(0.062) (0.063) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059)Multinational 0.446* 0.423* 0.564*** 0.547*** 0.520** 0.530**
(0.233) (0.240) (0.191) (0.201) (0.202) (0.211)Site does R&D 0.041 0.046 0.173 0.140 0.128 0.133
(0.171) (0.174) (0.133) (0.130) (0.133) (0.125)0.192*** 0.187*** 0.112 0.113 0.117 0.120(0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.069) (0.071) (0.074)
Share of Competitors outside EU 0.288 0.338* 0.176 0.178 0.186 0.182(0.194) (0.202) (0.246) (0.231) (0.229) (0.234)
Observations 342 342 342 342 342 342R2 0.28 0.28 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.22
Sectoral CO2 Intensity (VaS)
Firm level CO2 Intensity
[lnCO2/EMP]
Employment [lnEMP]
Notes: All columns estimated by OLS with standard errors are in parentheses under coefficientestimates clustered by sector. The dependent variable is the interview score for process innovationin columns (1) to (3) and for product innovation in column (4). Sectoral CO2 intensity andtrade intensity are derived from EUROSTAT data. CO2 intensity data are derived from theCITL database while employment is taken from ORBIS. All other variables are derived from theinterviews. Stars indicate statistical significance level: ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.
19
Figure 11: Discontinuity in Product Innovation
Notes: The figure gives a graphical impression of the regression results in column 5 of Table 6. Thehorizontal plane represents the CO2 and Trade Intensity Space. The vertical axis measures theinnovation score. We see that innovation responds to both Trade and CO2 intensity with a positivelinear and negative quadratic form. The figure shows the discontinuous decline in innovation thatis implied by the thresholds which allow for free allocation of allowances.
arguably more gradual. In such a scenario there could be information barriers thatprevent senior management from seeing these opportunities unless the issuance oftight, company-specific emissions caps forces them to focus on climate change issues.
5 Conclusion
This paper investigates climate-change related investment behavior among manufac-turing firms in Europe on the basis of approximately 800 interviews with managersin six European countries. We start by looking at climate-change related innovationand find that most (70%) firms are equally engaged in formal or informal R&D withthe aim of curbing emissions and/or energy consumption. A smaller proportion(40%) is also pursuing “Clean product innovation”; i.e. R&D with the aim of devel-oping products that can help customers to reduce their emissions. Almost all firmsthat report product R&D also report process R&D. We find that firms expect futurecarbon prices to be considerably higher than current levels in the EU ETS, averaging€40 in 2020. Compared to the current 2nd trading period, firms expect the impos-ition of tighter caps for the post-2012 EU ETS period. Whereas in Phase II 40% offirms reported that the EU ETS cap imposed on them was not binding, this propor-tion reduces to less than 10% for the post-2012 period. Firms that expect a morestringent EU ETS cap in Phase III are more likely to engage in product innovation.Such a correlation could potentially imply that in a trading system the allocationof emissions allowances might not be independent of other real factors, such as theinvestment in R&D. We examine this hypothesis further by examining whether there
20
is a discontinuity in innovative activity at the thresholds implied by the EuropeanCommission criteria for exemptions from auctioning post-2012. We find that firmsthat narrowly qualified for exemption from auctioning were conducting significantlyless product innovation than firms that narrowly missed being exempted from auc-tioning. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that having a tight carbonbudget has an important signalling effect for firms in that it draws the attention ofhigher levels of management to the matter of GHG emissions. This in turn might bethe trigger of the decision to engage in climate-change related product R&D. On thewhole, our results support the view that allocating fewer allowances for free wouldlead to a stronger innovation response in an otherwise identical emissions tradingsystem.
ReferencesAnderson, B., Leib, J., Martin, R., McGuigan, M., Muuls, M., de Preux, L., and
Wagner, U. J. (2011). Climate change policy and business in europe: Evidencefrom interviews with managers. Technical report.
Bertrand, M. and Mullainathan, S. (2001). Do people mean what they say implica-tions for subjective survey data. American Economic Review Papers & Proceed-ings, 91(2):67–72.
Bloom, N. and van Reenen, J. (2007). Measuring and explaining management prac-tices across firms and countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXXII(4):1351–1406.
Hahn, R. W. and Stavins, R. N. (2010). The effect of allowance allocations on cap-and-trade system performance. Social Science Research Network Working PaperSeries.
Kenber, M., Haugen, O., and Cobb, M. (2009). The effects of eu climate legislationon business competitiveness: A survey and analysis. Climate & Energy PaperSeries, The German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Martin, R., Muûls, M., De Preux, L. B., and Wagner, U. J. (2010). Anatomy of aparadox: Management practices, organizational structure and energy efficiency.CEP Discussion Paper Series, 1039.
McKinsey and Ecofys (2005). Review of emissions trading scheme: Survey high-lights. Technical report, European Commission Directorate General for Environ-ment, Brussels.
21
1 App
endix: Que
stionn
aire
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
I. Introd
uctio
n 1. A bit ab
out y
our b
usiness
(a) Is y
our firm
a m
ultin
ationa
l? If yes, w
here is th
e he
adqu
arters?
(b) O
n ho
w m
any prod
uctio
n sites do you op
erate (globa
lly)?
(c) H
ow m
any of th
ese sites are situated
in th
e EU
? (d) H
ow m
any of th
ese sites are situated
in th
e UK/B/FR
/...?
no, list of cou
ntrie
s, dk, rf
“No”, if n
ot a m
ultin
ationa
l; cou
ntry whe
re headq
uarters is located
if a
multin
ationa
l nu
mbe
r, dk, rf
numbe
r, dk, rf
Num
ber o
f site
s globa
lly (a
pproximate if un
sure)
Num
ber o
f site
s in the EU
numbe
r, dk, rf
Num
ber o
f site
s in curren
t cou
ntry
2. A bit ab
out y
ou
(a) Job
title
text
(b) T
enure in com
pany
numbe
r, rf
(c) T
enure in current post
numbe
r, rf
(d) M
anagerial backgroun
d commercial, techn
ical, law
, other
3. EU ETS involvem
ent
As you
might kno
w, the
Europ
ean Union
Emiss
ions Trading
System
(referred to as E
U ETS, h
ereafter) is a
t the
heart of
Europe
an clim
ate chan
ge policy.
(a) Is y
our c
ompa
ny (o
r parts th
ereo
f) regulated un
der the
EU
ETS?
(b) Since whe
n?
(c) H
ow m
any of you
r Europ
ean bu
siness s
ites a
re covered
by the
EU ETS?
no, list of years 200
5-‐20
09, yes dk
year, d
k, rf
numbe
r, dk, rf
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
4. Site
locatio
n For single plan
t firm
s and
interviewees b
ased at a
produ
ction site:
Could you tell me the po
stcode
of the
business s
ite whe
re you
are
based?
For m
ulti-‐plan
t firm
s where th
e interviewee is located at a non
-‐prod
uctio
n site:
Some of th
e qu
estio
ns I am
going to
ask you
next a
re sp
ecific to a
prod
uctio
n site with
in you
r firm
. Please choo
se a particular
prod
uctio
n site an
d an
swer m
y qu
estio
ns fo
r the
particular site
througho
ut th
e interview. The
site sh
ould be the on
e you know
be
st, the
largest o
ne, o
r the
one
nearest to
you
. If you
are in th
e EU
ETS, p
lease pick a site covered
by the EU
ETS. Co
uld you tell
me the po
stcode
of the
cho
sen site?
text
Records the
postcod
e
II. Im
pact of E
U ETS
5. EU ETS strin
gency (If not an EU
ETS firm
, con
tinue
with
que
stion 9)
(a) H
ow to
ugh is the em
issions cap
/quo
ta currently im
posed by th
e EU
ETS on your produ
ction site?
(b) C
an you
describe some of th
e measures y
ou put in place to
comply with
the cap?
1-‐5, dk, rf, n
a Low
Cap is at business a
s usual.
Mid
Some ad
justmen
ts se
em to
have taken place, how
ever nothing which
led to fu
ndam
ental cha
nges in practices; e.g. insulation, etc.
High
Measures w
hich led to fu
ndam
ental cha
nges in produ
ction processes;
e.g. fu
el sw
itching; rep
lacemen
t of e
ssen
tial plant and
machine
ry.
(c) W
hat is the
ann
ual cost b
urde
n of being part o
f the
EU ETS?
For e
xample, m
onito
ring, verificatio
n an
d tran
saction costs; th
e cost
of buying pe
rmits or red
ucing em
issions.
If the man
ager does n
ot und
erstan
d the qu
estio
n:
Imagine your installatio
n was not part o
f the
EU ETS th
is year, w
hat
cost sa
ving wou
ld you
r firm
do?
numbe
r
percen
tage
Absolute num
ber
Or p
ercentage of ann
ual ope
ratin
g cost
6. EU ETS m
anag
emen
t Ask on
ly m
ulti-‐plan
t firm
s:
site, other site, n
ationa
l firm
,
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
Is EU ETS com
pliance man
aged
on the prod
uctio
n site or
elsewhe
re?
europe
an firm
, dk, rf, n
a
7. ETS trad
ing
(a) In March of this y
ear (i.e. b
efore the compliance process), w
hat
was you
r allowan
ce position
on this site?
(b) W
ere you short o
r lon
g in allowan
ces?
long, sho
rt, b
alan
ced, dk, rf, n
a text
If the man
ager hap
pens to
men
tion the de
tailed nu
mbe
r of a
llowan
ces, m
ake a
note of it in this fie
ld.
(c) B
efore the compliance process in Ap
ril, d
id you
buy or sell
allowan
ces o
n the market o
r over the
cou
nter from
other firm
s?
(d) If n
ot, w
hy not?
buy, se
ll, both, no: only trad
ing
durin
g compliance pe
riod, no: no
need
, no: im
age concerns, n
o:
tran
saction costs, no: other, d
k, rf,
na
(e) If yes, h
ow freq
uently?
daily, w
eekly, m
onthly, q
uarterly,
bi-‐ann
ual, yearly, d
k, rf, n
a
(f) In
April this yea
r, wha
t was you
r position
after
the compliance process?
If an
swers "
long
": Did you
ban
k pe
rmits fo
r future
years? W
hy?
banking to emit more in fo
llowing
years, ban
king to
sell at a highe
r ETS pe
rmit price in fu
ture, b
anking
dk why, lon
g for p
ooling, dk, rf, n
a
Banking reason
.
If an
swers "
balanced/com
pliant" or "short": D
id you
bo
rrow
permits from
next y
ear's allowan
ce? Why?
borrow
ing to emit less in fo
llowing
years, borrowing to buy at a
lower
ETS pe
rmit price in fu
ture,
borrow
ing to be compliant,
borrow
ing dk why, rf, dk, n
a
Borrow
ing reason
. Note: Only choo
se "bo
rrow
ing to be compliant" if the
man
ager is very short sighted and
doesn't seem
to und
erstan
d he will
eventually have to eith
er emit less or b
uy permits
If an
swers "
short": W
hy did you
remain short?
short for poo
ling, sh
ort a
nd paid
fine, other, rf, dk, n
a Short reason.
text
If “other”: why?
(g) H
as th
is site exchan
ged em
ission pe
rmits with
other
installatio
ns belon
ging to
you
r com
pany th
at are part o
f the
EU
ETS? (p
ooling)
yes, no, rf, d
k, na
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
8. Rationa
lity of m
arket b
ehaviour
(a) H
ow do you de
cide
how
man
y pe
rmits to
buy or sell or trade
at
all?
(b) D
id you
base this de
cisio
n on
any fo
recast abo
ut pric
es and
/or
energy usage?
(c) D
id you
trad
e pe
rmit revenu
e off a
gainst emiss
ion redu
ction
costs in your plann
ing on
this iss
ue?
1-‐5, dk, rf, n
a Low
Take th
eir p
ermit allocatio
n as a ta
rget to
be met as s
uch an
d do
not
take into accou
nt th
e price of permits or the
cost o
f aba
temen
t. Just se
ll if there is a surplus o
r buy if th
ere is a de
ficit.
Mid
Are in th
e process o
f learning ho
w th
e market w
orks and
in th
e first
years d
id not have an
y market d
riven
attitu
de, b
ut now
have someo
ne
in cha
rge of m
anaging the ETS so as to minim
ize compliance cost. This
person
has experience in fina
ncial m
arkets and
sometim
es interacts
with
the prod
uctio
n man
ager.
High
Compa
ny has a th
orou
gh und
erstan
ding of the
site-‐spe
cific CO2
abatem
ent cost curve. Trading is used as a to
ol to
redu
ce com
pliance
cost and
to gen
erate extra revenu
es from
excess a
batemen
t. Moreo
ver,
compa
ny fo
rms e
xpectatio
ns abo
ut permit price an
d re-‐optim
izes
abatem
ent cho
ice if ne
cessary. Trade
r resorts to
futures a
nd derivatives
to m
anage ETS pe
rmits as a
fina
ncial asset.
9. Anticipation of pha
se III
(a) D
o you expe
ct to
be pa
rt of the
EU ETS from
201
2 on
wards?
If no
t, continue with
question 10
yes, no, dk, rf, n
a
(b) H
ow strin
gent do you expe
ct th
e ne
xt pha
se of the
EU ETS (from
2012
to 202
0) to
be?
(c) W
ill it be tough for y
our firm
to re
ach such a ta
rget? Ca
n you
describ
e some of th
e measures y
ou wou
ld have to put in place?
(d) D
o you be
lieve th
e allowan
ces w
ill be distrib
uted
through an
au
ctioning m
echa
nism
? (e) Is it likely that sa
nctio
ns fo
r non
-‐com
pliance will becom
e more
strin
gent?
1-‐5, dk, rf, n
a Low
Cap for p
hase III is a
nticipated
to be compa
rable to business a
s usual.
The man
ager believes the
re will be no
add
ition
al sa
nctio
ns and
that
they will re
ceive the pe
rmits fo
r free.
Mid
Phase III is likely to
trigger som
e ad
justmen
ts, h
owever nothing th
at will
lead
to fu
ndam
ental cha
nges in practices. O
nly a sm
all part o
f permits
will be au
ctione
d an
d sanctio
ns are not expected to be very high.
High
The presen
ce of stron
g sanctio
ns, exten
sive use of auctio
ning and
more
strin
gent ta
rgets in Ph
ase III is anticipated
. It is likely to im
ply the
adop
tion of m
easures w
hich will lead
to fu
ndam
ental cha
nges in
prod
uctio
n processes. It m
ight also
imply the closure of th
e plan
t, or
redu
ndan
cy of m
ore than
20%
of e
mploymen
t.
(f) Do you expe
ct to
tran
sfer unu
sed (ban
ked) ERU
s or C
ERs from
Phase II to Pha
se III ?
EUAs, ERU
s, CER
s, EUAs and
ERU
s,
EUAs and
CER
s, ERU
s and
CER
s, all
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
Note: ERU
s are Emiss
ion Re
duction Units stem
ming from
Joint
Implem
entatio
n projects. C
ERs a
re Certified Em
ission Re
ductions
stem
ming from
Clean
Develop
ment M
echa
nism
projects.
three, no, dk, rf, n
a
10. A
waren
ess
(a) A
re clim
ate chan
ge to
pics disc
ussed with
in you
r business? Can
you give examples?
(b) A
re clim
ate chan
ge re
lated iss
ues formally disc
ussed in
man
agem
ent m
eetin
gs? Ca
n you give examples?
(c) D
o your strategic ob
jectives m
entio
n clim
ate chan
ge?
(d) D
id you
com
miss
ion repo
rts o
r studies on ho
w clim
ate chan
ge
will affe
ct you
r business?
1-‐5, dk, rf, n
a Note: Give minim
um sc
ore of 3 to
ETS firm
s and
probe dire
ctly fo
r 4 or 5
, skipping
(a) a
nd (b
). Low
Don't k
now if th
reat or o
pportunity. N
o aw
aren
ess.
Mid
Some aw
aren
ess b
acked up
by eviden
ce th
at th
is is be
ing
form
ally disc
ussed by m
anagem
ent.
High
Eviden
ce th
at clim
ate chan
ge is an im
portan
t part o
f the
bu
siness s
trategy.
Men
tione
d po
sitive im
pact:
yes, no
III. Prices
11a En
ergy price expe
ctations
By how
man
y pe
rcen
t do you expe
ct ene
rgy prices to
go up
or d
own
by 202
0?
percen
tage, d
k, rf
percen
tage, d
k, rf
percen
tage, d
k, rf
Expe
cted
pric
e chan
ge in percent of tod
ay's price.
Note: This p
rice includ
es th
e effect of current and
future clim
ate chan
ge policies
on th
e energy price.
Upp
er bou
nd on expe
cted
pric
e chan
ge – re
cord only if interviewee m
entio
ns
it.
Lower bou
nd on expe
cted
pric
e chan
ge – re
cord only if interviewee m
entio
ns
it.
11b Ca
rbon
price expe
ctations
(a) A
s you
might kno
w, the
EU has com
mitted
to re
ducing
greenh
ouse gas emiss
ions by 20
%-‐30%
over the
next d
ecad
e. W
hat
price do
you
expect to pa
y for e
mitting on
e tonn
e of CO2 in 202
0?
percen
tage, d
k, rf
Expe
cted
pric
e in Euros per to
n of CO2.
percen
tage, d
k, rf
Or e
xpected price chan
ge in percent of tod
ay's price.
yes, no, rf, d
k Kn
ows tod
ay's price of CO2.
(b) W
hat p
rice do
you
expect in the worst-‐case scen
ario?
Upp
er bou
nd in Euros per to
n of CO2.
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
(c) W
hat p
rice do
you
expect in the be
st-‐case scen
ario?
Lower bou
nd in Euros per to
n of CO2.
12. Future im
pact of carbo
n pricing
(a) D
o you expe
ct th
at governm
ent e
fforts to pu
t a pric
e on
carbo
n em
issions will fo
rce you to outsource parts of the
produ
ction of th
is bu
siness s
ite in th
e foreseeable future, o
r to close do
wn completely? 1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
No im
pact of this k
ind.
Mid
Significant re
duction (>10
%) in prod
uctio
n/em
ploymen
t due
to
outsou
rcing.
High
Complete close-‐do
wn.
(b) W
hat carbo
n price do
you
associate with
this
scen
ario?(Assume that you
wou
ld have to pay fo
r all allowan
ces.)
Note: The price relates to the scenario given und
er (a
). If an
swered
"no im
pact" un
der (a), skip this qu
estio
n.
numbe
r, dk, rf, na
Eu
ros p
er to
n
(c) H
ow wou
ld you
r answer to
the previous que
stions cha
nge, if you
received
a free allowan
ce fo
r 80%
of you
r current emiss
ions?
Note: If answered "no
impa
ct" un
der (a), skip this qu
estio
n.
1-‐5, dk, rf, n
a Low
No im
pact of this k
ind.
Mid
Significant re
duction (>10
%) in prod
uctio
n/em
ploymen
t due
to
outsou
rcing.
High
Complete close-‐do
wn.
(d) N
ote: Only ask if an
swered "no
impa
ct" un
der (a).
At wha
t carbo
n price level w
ould you
be forced
to close you
r plan
t dow
n?
If the man
ager has no idea
or say
s it w
ould need to be very high,
try differen
t pric
es, starting high
, for example: If you
had
to pay
200 Eu
ros/ton of carbo
n, wou
ld you
need to close dow
n?
numbe
r, dk, n
a Eu
ros pe
r ton
(e) H
ow did you
reach this conclusio
n?
(f) How
con
crete are the plan
s for outsourcing or c
losure?
1-‐5, dk, rf, n
a Low
Gut fe
eling of th
e man
ager.
Mid
Respon
se is based
on a plau
sible argum
ent. For e
xample, interviewee
discusses a
vailable techno
logical options and
associated cost and
relates the
m to
profit m
argins.
High
Commiss
ione
d a de
tailed stud
y of aba
temen
t options and
associated
cost (in-‐ho
use or externa
l).
(g) W
hat fraction of an en
ergy pric
e or carbo
n price increase can
you pa
ss on to you
r customers?
percen
tage, d
k, rf
IV. C
ompe
tition and custom
ers
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
13. Com
petitors
(a) C
an you
tell me the nu
mbe
r of firm
s in the world which
compe
te with
you
in one
or m
ore local m
arkets?
Note: For m
ulti-‐prod
uct m
ulti-‐plan
t firm
s refer to
the market for
the prod
ucts created on the current site
referred to
during this
interview. For instan
ce, for m
ulti-‐plan
t firm
s start th
e qu
estio
n with
"For the produ
cts p
rodu
ced at th
e prod
uctio
n site, can
you
tell me ..."
numbe
r, dk, rf
(b) H
ow m
any of th
em are located with
in th
e EU
? nu
mbe
r, dk, rf
(c) H
ow m
any of th
em are located in you
r cou
ntry?
numbe
r, dk, rf
(d) Location of m
ain compe
titor (cou
ntry)
list o
f cou
ntrie
s, dk, rf, n
a
(e) D
o you know
in which cou
ntry you
r main compe
titor doe
s most o
f its produ
ction?
same, EU, n
on-‐EU, list of
coun
tries, dk, rf, n
a
14. Location of Customers
(a) Sha
re of sales exported (to the EU
and
the rest of the
world)
percen
tage, d
k, rf
(b) Sha
re of sales exported to EU cou
ntrie
s pe
rcen
tage, d
k, rf
(c) A
re you
r produ
cts s
old mainly to con
sumers o
r to othe
r bu
sinesses?
B2B, fina
l customer, d
k, rf
15. Customer pressure
(a) A
re you
r customers c
oncerned
abo
ut you
r GHG emiss
ions?
(b) H
ow do they voice th
is concern?
(c) D
o your customers req
uire hard da
ta on your carbo
n em
issions?
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
"B2C
" -‐ N
ot aware that emiss
ions perform
ance is of significan
t con
cern
to con
sumers o
f the
ir prod
uct.
"B2B
" -‐ N
ot aware that businesses the
y supp
ly to
are con
cerned
abo
ut
the em
issions of the
plant; q
uality an
d price are the on
ly con
siderations.
Mid
"B2C
" -‐ T
he business is a
ware of th
e im
portan
ce of clim
ate-‐chan
ge
issue
s in gene
ral and
so are con
scious th
at th
eir c
ustomers m
ay
consider GHG perform
ance to
be im
portan
t, althou
gh th
ey do no
t expe
ct or req
uire data as proof.
"B2B
" -‐ C
ustomers s
et ISO 140
01 as a
precond
ition
to su
ppliers.
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
Eviden
ce of e
nviro
nmen
tal com
pliance is requ
ested, but details of
emiss
ions figures a
re not re
quire
d.
High
"B2C
" -‐ B
eing se
en to
redu
ce GHG emiss
ions is th
ought to be
impo
rtan
t in th
e pu
rcha
sing de
cisio
ns of the
firm
's consum
ers. This h
as been
determ
ined
by market research or con
sumers h
ave voiced
their c
oncern
through othe
r means. C
ustomers a
lso ask fo
r certified da
ta on
emiss
ions during prod
uctio
n or usage. A
customer-‐friend
ly sy
stem
to
recognize the be
st produ
cts in term
s of e
nergy efficiency is often
available in th
e market (e.g. EU ene
rgy efficiency grad
e for h
ome
appliances).
"B2B
" -‐ C
ustomers a
sk fo
r evide
nce of externa
l validation of GHG
figures. C
ustomers req
uest inform
ation on
carbo
n em
issions as p
art o
f their o
wn supp
ly cha
in carbo
n au
ditin
g. Customers c
onform
to PAS
20
50 or o
ther nationa
l stand
ard in carbo
n foot-‐prin
ting an
d so re
quire
de
tailed inform
ation on
a re
gular b
asis.
16 Clim
ate chan
ge re
lated prod
uct inn
ovation
(a) G
loba
lly, is y
our c
ompa
ny currently trying to
develop
new
prod
ucts th
at help your customers to redu
ce GHG emiss
ions?
(b) C
an you
give exam
ples?
(c) W
hat fraction of you
r Research & Develop
men
t fun
ds are used
for tha
t? (Less tha
n 10
%, m
ore than
10%
?)
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
No efforts to de
velop clim
ate chan
ge re
lated
prod
ucts.
Mid
Some efforts b
ut it is not th
e main ob
jective of
the firms R
&D efforts.
High
The firm is fo
cusin
g all produ
ct R&D efforts
on clim
ate chan
ge.
V. M
easures
17. Ene
rgy mon
itorin
g
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
(a) H
ow detailed is your m
onito
ring of ene
rgy usage?
(b) H
ow often
do you mon
itor y
our e
nergy usage? Since whe
n?
(c ) De
scrib
e the system
you
have in place.
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
No mon
itorin
g ap
art from looking at th
e en
ergy bill.
Mid
Eviden
ce of e
nergy mon
itorin
g as opp
osed
to looking at th
e en
ergy bill,
i.e. the
re is so
me consciou
sness a
bout th
e am
ount of e
nergy be
ing used
as a business o
bjectiv
e. How
ever, d
iscussio
ns are irregular a
nd not part
of a structured
process and
are m
ore freq
uent with
pric
e rises. Not
more than
qua
rterly m
onito
ring of ene
rgy.
High
Energy use is m
easured an
d mon
itored constantly and
is on the agen
da
in re
gular p
rodu
ction meetin
gs. Ene
rgy use in th
e plan
t is d
ivided
up in
space (by prod
uctio
n line, m
achine
or sim
ilar) and
mon
itored over time
(daily, h
ourly
or c
ontin
uously). Th
e am
ount of e
nergy rather th
an th
e cost is fo
cused on
.
2000
and
earlier, list o
f years
2001
-‐201
0, dk, rf, n
a Start d
ate (put “na
” if score is “1”)
18. Targe
ts on en
ergy con
sumption for m
anag
emen
t (a) D
o you ha
ve any ta
rgets o
n en
ergy con
sumption which
man
agem
ent h
as to
observe? (e.g. kWh of electric
ity)
no ta
rgets, re
lativ
e qu
antity
targets, absolute qu
antity targets,
absolute and
relativ
e qu
antity
targets, only expe
nditu
re ta
rgets,
dk, rf
Type
(b) C
an you
describe some of th
e challenges you
face in m
eetin
g the
targets?
(c) H
ow often
do you meet the
se ta
rgets? Do you think they are
tough?
Note: If th
e man
ager re
plies they ha
ve EU ETS/CCA
targets, ask
"have these been tran
slated into internal ta
rgets for m
anag
ement?"
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
No targets.
Mid
Targets e
xist but se
em easy to achieve.
High
Eviden
ce th
at ta
rgets a
re hard to achieve. D
etailed.
(d) B
y ap
proxim
ately ho
w m
uch do
es th
is requ
ire re
ducing you
r curren
t ene
rgy consum
ption in th
e ne
xt 5 years (1
0%, 25%
, 50%
)?
Note the tim
etab
le fo
r the ta
rget (e
.g. 5 years or o
ther num
ber g
iven by
interviewee).
percen
tage, d
k, rf, n
a nu
mbe
r, dk, rf, na
Horizon
(num
ber o
f years)
(e) Since whe
n do
you
have these targets?
2000
and
earlier, list o
f years
2001
-‐201
0, dk, rf, n
a
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
19. G
HG m
onito
ring
(a) D
o you explicitly mon
itor y
our G
HG emiss
ions? Since whe
n?
(b) H
ow do you estim
ate your GHG emiss
ions?
(c) A
re you
r GHG estim
ates externa
lly validated
?
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
No specific GHG m
onito
ring.
Mid
Detailed en
ergy m
onito
ring with
clear evide
nce for carbo
n accoun
ting
(at least firm
level). M
anager is aware that ene
rgy fig
ures need to be
scaled
by carbon
intensity
. High
Carbon
accou
nting of both direct and
indirect emiss
ions (sup
ply chain
emiss
ions). External validation of GHG figures.
20
00 and
earlier, list o
f years
2001
-‐201
0, dk, rf, n
a Start d
ate (put “na
” if score is “1”)
20. Targe
ts on GHG
emission
s for m
anag
emen
t (a) D
o you ha
ve any ta
rgets o
n GHG emiss
ions which
man
agem
ent h
as to
observe?
no ta
rgets, dire
ct emiss
ions,
indirect and
dire
ct, d
k, rf
(b) C
an you
describe some of th
e challenges you
face in m
eetin
g the
targets?
(c) H
ow often
do you meet the
se ta
rgets? Do you think they are
tough?
Note: If th
e man
ager re
plies they ha
ve EU ETS/CCA
targets, ask:
Have these be
en tran
slated into internal ta
rgets for m
anagem
ent?
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
No targets for GHG emiss
ions.
Mid
There is some aw
aren
ess o
f the
con
tribution of differen
t ene
rgy sources
and prod
uctio
n processes to em
issions, b
ut th
is is a second
ary
consideration to cost focused
ene
rgy targets. The
re is so
me de
gree of
difficulty
in th
e targets.
HIgh
There are sepa
rate ta
rgets for GHGs, distinct from
ene
rgy use. GHG
emiss
ions are a KPI (K
ey Perform
ance In
dicator) fo
r the
firm
. The
contrib
ution of each en
ergy so
urce and
the prod
uctio
n process to GHG
emiss
ions is kno
wn an
d suggested im
provem
ent p
rojects for th
e prod
uctio
n are assessed
on their p
oten
tial impa
ct on carbon
as w
ell as
energy efficien
cy.
(d) B
y ap
proxim
ately ho
w m
uch do
these targets req
uire you
to re
duce
your emiss
ions in th
e ne
xt 5 years (1
0%, 25%
, 50%
) com
pared their
curren
t level?
Note the tim
etab
le fo
r the ta
rget (e
.g. 5 years or o
ther num
ber g
iven by
interviewee)
percen
tage, d
k, rf, n
a nu
mbe
r, dk, rf, na
Horizon
(num
ber o
f years)
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
(e) W
hen did you start h
aving targets o
n GHG emiss
ions?
2000
and
earlier, list o
f years
2001
-‐201
0, dk, rf, n
a
21. Targe
t enforcemen
t (a) W
hat h
appe
ns if ene
rgy consum
ption or GHG emiss
ion targets
are no
t met?
(b) D
o you pu
blicize targets a
nd ta
rget achievemen
t with
in th
e firm
or to
the pu
blic? Ca
n you give examples?
(c) A
re th
ere fin
ancial con
sequ
ences in case of n
on-‐achievemen
t?
(d) Is the
re a bon
us fo
r target a
chievemen
t?
1-‐5,dk,rf
Low
No targets o
r miss
ing targets d
o no
t trig
ger a
ny re
spon
se.
Mid
Both ta
rget achievemen
t and
non
-‐achievemen
t are internally and
externally com
mun
icated
.
High
Target non
-‐achievemen
t leads to
fina
ncial con
sequ
ences interna
lly
and/or externa
lly; including pen
altie
s, e.g. staff do
es not get bon
us.
22. Emission
-‐red
ucing mea
sures
(a) C
an you
tell me wha
t measures y
ou have ad
opted in order to
redu
ce GHG emiss
ions (o
r ene
rgy consum
ption) on this site?
DO NOT PR
OMPT
with
the list if d
oesn't ha
ve an idea, rathe
r ask:
Have you bo
ught any new
equ
ipmen
t, or have you chan
ged the way
you prod
uce?
List of tickboxes
I. Heatin
g an
d cooling:
1-‐ Optim
ised use of process heat
2-‐ M
odernisatio
n of coo
ling/refrigeration system
3-‐ Optim
isatio
n of air cond
ition
ing system
4-‐ Optim
isatio
n of exhau
st air system
and
/or d
istric
t heatin
g system
II. M
ore clim
ate-‐friend
ly ene
rgy gene
ratio
n on
site:
1-‐ In
stallatio
n of com
bine
d he
at and
pow
er (C
HP) plant / cogene
ratio
n 2-‐ Biogas feed-‐in in local com
bine
d he
at and
pow
er plant or d
omestic gas grid
3-‐ Switching to
natural gas
4-‐ Exploita
tion of re
newab
le ene
rgy source
III. M
achine
ry:
1-‐ M
odernisatio
n of com
pressed air system
2-‐ Other indu
stry-‐spe
cific produ
ction process o
ptim
isatio
n/machine
upgrade
3-‐ Produ
ction process inn
ovation
IV. Ene
rgy man
agem
ent:
1-‐ In
trod
uctio
n of ene
rgy man
agem
ent system
2-‐ Sub
metering / u
pgrade
of a
n existing en
ergy m
anagem
ent system
3-‐ (E
xterna
l) En
ergy aud
it 4-‐ In
stallatio
n of timers a
ttache
d to m
achine
ry
5-‐ In
stallatio
n of (d
e-‐)cen
tralise
d he
ating system
s
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
V. Other m
easures o
n prod
uctio
n site:
1-‐ M
odernisatio
n of lightin
g system
2-‐ Ene
rgy-‐efficient site exten
sion/im
proved
insulatio
n/introd
uctio
n of building
man
agem
ent
3-‐ Employee awaren
ess c
ampa
igns and
staff trainings
4-‐ Non
-‐techn
ical re
organisatio
n of produ
ction process
5-‐ In
stallatio
n of ene
rgy-‐efficient IT-‐system
6-‐ Im
proved
waste m
anagem
ent/recycling
VI. B
eyon
d prod
uctio
n on
site:
1-‐ In
trod
uctio
n of clim
ate-‐friend
ly com
muting sche
me
2-‐ Con
sideration of clim
ate-‐related aspe
cts in investmen
t and
purchase
decisio
ns
3-‐ Con
sideration of clim
ate-‐related aspe
cts in distrib
ution
4-‐ Customer edu
catio
n prog
ramme
5-‐ Participation in carbo
n offsettin
g sche
mes
(b) W
hich one
of the
se m
easures a
chieved the largest carbo
n saving?
measure cod
e Fill in th
e code correspon
ding
to th
e measure in (a
) (e.g. II-‐4 fo
r “Exploitatio
n of
renewab
le energy source”).
(c) B
y ho
w m
uch did this measure re
duce you
r total ene
rgy
consum
ption?
percen
tage, d
k, rf, n
a
(d) B
y ho
w m
uch did this measure re
duce you
r total GHG
emiss
ions?
percen
tage, d
k, rf, n
a
(e) W
hat m
otivated
the ad
optio
n of th
ese measures?
EU
ETS, ene
rgy cost sa
ving / high
profita
bility, pollutio
n redu
ction,
repu
tatio
n, customer pressure,
employee initiative, pub
lic
investmen
t sup
port, com
pliance
with
regulatio
n, com
pliance with
expe
cted
future re
gulatio
n, other,
dk, rf, na
Main motivation (select o
nly ONE)
text
Other m
otivation (if not in tick boxes, o
r secon
d)
(f) How
did you
learn ab
out this m
easure?
consultant, governm
ent,
custom
er, sup
plier, em
ployee,
R&D project, compe
titor, o
ther,
Tick m
ore than
one
option, if differen
t sou
rces m
entio
ned
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
dk, rf, na
(g) W
hen did you im
plem
ent this m
easure?
2000
and
earlier, list o
f years
2001
-‐201
0, dk, rf, n
a
VI. Inn
ovation, barrie
rs to
investmen
t and
managem
ent
23. Clim
ate chan
ge re
lated process inn
ovation
(a) D
o you de
dicate staff tim
e an
d/or fina
ncial resou
rces to fin
ding
new ways o
f red
ucing the GHG emiss
ions at y
our facility? Did you
commiss
ion an
y stud
ies for th
at purpo
se?
(b) C
an you
give exam
ples?
(c) W
hat fraction of you
r firm
's glob
al Research & Develop
men
t fund
s are used for tha
t? (less tha
n 10
%, m
ore than
10%
?)
Note: This d
oes n
ot includ
e expenses fo
r staff training
s or e
nergy
mon
itorin
g, but actua
l inn
ovation.
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
No R&
D resources c
ommitted
to re
ducing GHG emiss
ions.
Mid
Eviden
ce of R
&D projects to
redu
ce emiss
ions.
High
Eviden
ce th
at th
is kind
of R
&D is an
impo
rtan
t com
pone
nt in th
e compa
ny's R&
D po
rtfolio (5
or h
ighe
r).
24. B
arrie
rs to
ado
pting en
ergy-‐efficiency investmen
ts
(a) C
an you
give on
e exam
ple of a m
easure to
enh
ance ene
rgy
efficiency which was con
sidered
, but eventua
lly not ado
pted
? List of tickboxes
Same list a
s for que
stion 22
a.
(b) W
hich payba
ck time was re
quire
d in th
e econ
omic evaluation
of th
is measure?
numbe
r, dk, rf, na
“Years”; if in m
onths, put equ
ivalen
t in years, e.g. record 6 mon
ths a
s 0.5.
(c) Is this p
ayba
ck time longer or sho
rter th
an th
e on
e ap
plied to
non-‐en
ergy re
lated measures to cut costs?
1-‐5, dk, rf, n
a Low
Longer, i.e. m
uch less strin
gent
Mid
Equa
l
High
Shorter, i.e. m
uch more strin
gent
(d) If d
ifferen
t: why?
text
(e) W
as uncertainty abo
ut fu
ture pric
es or regulation im
portan
t for the
decision
to re
ject?
no, yes_p
rices, yes_regulation,
yes_bo
th, d
k, rf, n
a
(f) W
hat o
ther fa
ctors w
ere influ
entia
l in the de
cisio
n?
text
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
(g) H
as th
e curren
t econo
mic dow
nturn affected
you
r investm
ent
crite
ria fo
r clean
techno
logies? How
? no
, favors c
lean
, favou
rs other,
more strin
gent overall, less
strin
gent overall, dk, rf, n
a
25. Further re
ductions
(a) B
y ho
w m
uch (in
percentage po
ints) cou
ld you
-‐ at current
energy pric
es -‐ furthe
r red
uce your current GHG emiss
ions
with
out com
prom
ising you
r econo
mic perform
ance? (i.e. how
much more em
ission redu
ction could be
achieved with
out
increasin
g costs)
percen
tage, d
k, rf
(b) If so, why have you no
t implem
ented these measures y
et?
text
(c) W
hat further GHG emiss
ion redu
ction (in
percentage po
ints)
wou
ld be techno
logically possib
le (a
lthou
gh not necessarily at no
extra cost)?
percen
tage, d
k, rf
Notes: A
ssum
ing that produ
ction stays c
onstan
t and
that no processes a
re
being ou
tsou
rced
. This s
hould no
t include
emiss
ion redu
ction achieved
by
switching to
rene
wab
le electric
ity. Include
emiss
ions re
ductions th
rough
combine
d he
at and
pow
er how
ever.
26. M
anag
er re
spon
sible for C
limate Ch
ange
issues
(a) A
t the
man
agem
ent level, w
ho is re
spon
sible fo
r dealing with
clim
ate chan
ge policies a
nd ene
rgy an
d po
llutio
n redu
ction in th
e firm nationa
lly? Wha
t is the
official job title?
Note: If se
veral, ask for h
ighest-‐ran
king
. If n
obod
y, put title
“no
clear respo
nsibility”.
text
Job title of the
man
ager
(b) H
ow fa
r in the man
agem
ent h
ierarchy is th
is man
ager below
the CE
O? (figure out th
rough sequ
entia
l que
stioning if necessary)
CEO, n
umbe
r, no
clear
respon
sibility, d
k, rf
No of peo
ple be
tween CE
O and
Man
ager, e.g. if rep
orts dire
ctly to
CEO
, put 0
(c) H
as th
ere recently been a chan
ge in re
spon
sibilitie
s for clim
ate
chan
ge issues? Whe
n?
(d) H
ow fa
r in the man
agem
ent h
ierarchy was th
is man
ager below
the CE
O? (figure out th
rough sequ
entia
l que
stioning if necessary)
no cha
nge, list of years 200
0-‐20
10,
yes d
k year, d
k, rf
CEO, n
umbe
r, no
clear
respon
sibility, d
k, rf
text
Record past m
anager title
if m
entio
ned, but do no
t prompt fo
r it.
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
VI. Firm
Characteristics
27. Firm/Plant Details
(a) H
ow m
any pe
ople are employed
in th
e firm globa
lly (including
this coun
try)?
Note: If a m
ultin
ationa
l, ask for the who
le group
's nu
mber.
numbe
r, dk, rf
(b) H
ow m
any pe
ople doe
s the
firm
employ in you
r cou
ntry?
numbe
r, dk, rf
(c) H
ow m
any pe
ople are employed
at the
current site?
numbe
r, dk, rf
(d) A
nnua
l Ene
rgy Bill-‐An
nual:
numbe
r, dk, rf
percen
tage, d
k, rf, n
a pe
rcen
tage, d
k, rf, n
a
Do not ask, but in case interviewee does n
ot kno
w th
e ab
solute num
ber a
nd
answ
ers w
ith one of the fo
llowing:
Energy cost a
s percentage of tu
rnov
er
Energy cost a
s percentage of c
osts
(e) T
otal ann
ual run
ning costs (w
age cost + m
aterials, includ
ing
energy):
numbe
r, dk, rf
Answered
(d) a
nd (e
) at the
site level or a
t the
com
pany level?
site, com
pany, n
a
(f) Doe
s you
r com
pany purchase rene
wab
le pow
er?
yes, no, dk, rf
Note: Do no
t include electricity
generated on site.
(g) D
oes this s
ite do an
y prod
uct R
& D?
Note: Do no
t dwell on this qu
estio
n, m
ake a judg
ement from first
answ
er.
yes, no, dk, rf
(h) Is M
arketin
g for y
our p
rodu
cts d
one from
this site?
Note: Do no
t dwell on this qu
estio
n, m
ake a judg
ement from first
answ
er.
yes, no, dk, rf
(i) Doe
s this s
ite have an
enviro
nmen
tal m
anagem
ent system (ISO
14
000)?
yes, no, dk, rf
VII. Co
untry-‐specific po
licies
UNITED KINGDOM
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
UK.1 Participation in voluntary governm
ent clim
ate change policies
(a) A
re you
aware of volun
tary governm
ent schem
es to
help
busin
esses red
uce GHG pollutio
n?
(b) W
hich one
s?
(c) A
re you
participating in any?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, d
k, rf,
na
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, d
k, rf,
na
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, d
k, rf,
na
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, d
k, rf,
na
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, d
k, rf,
na
Carbon
Trust Online To
ols (Be
nchm
arking Too
ls, Action Plan
Too
l) Whe
n?
Carbon
Trust Ene
rgy Au
dit o
r Advice? (C
Taud
it)
Inno
vatio
n gran
ts from
the Ca
rbon
Trust? Whe
n?
Carbon
Trust Stand
ard
Enha
nced
Cap
ital A
llowan
ce sc
heme? (E
CA)
UK.2 Participation in Clim
ate Change agreement
(a) Is y
our com
pany (o
r parts th
ereo
f) subject to a UK Clim
ate
Chan
ge Agreemen
t?
(b) Since whe
n?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, d
k, rf,
na
(c) H
ow strin
gent is th
e target im
posed by th
e CC
A?
(d) C
an you
describe some of th
e measures y
ou had
to put in place
to com
ply with
the cap?
1-‐5, dk, rf, n
a Low
No targets.
Mid
Targets e
xist but se
em easy to achieve.
High
Eviden
ce th
at ta
rgets a
re hard to achieve. D
etailed de
scrip
tion of
serio
us problem
s in achieving targets.
((e) D
id you
buy or sell emiss
ion rig
hts v
ia th
e UK ETS?
no becau
se of image concerns, n
o be
cause no
cap
acity
, no othe
r, bo
ught, sold, both, dk, rf, n
a
BELGIUM
B.1 Participation in indu
stry agreemen
ts (a
ccords de
Bran
che/Be
chmarkcon
vena
nten
) (a) Is y
our c
ompa
ny (o
r parts th
ereo
f) subject to an
indu
stry
agreem
ent?
(b) Since whe
n?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, d
k, rf,
na
(c) H
ow strin
gent is th
e target im
posed by th
e agreem
ent?
1-‐5, dk, rf, n
a Low
No targets.
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
(d) C
an you
describe some of th
e measures y
ou had
to put in place
to com
ply with
the cap?
Mid
High
Targets e
xist but se
em easy to achieve.
Eviden
ce th
at ta
rgets a
re hard to achieve. D
etailed de
scrip
tion of
serio
us problem
s in achieving targets.
B.2 Do
you
ben
efit from
any ta
x redu
ction from
the Fede
ral
governmen
t becau
se of investm
ents th
at re
duce ene
rgy
consum
ption/loss? If yes, whe
n?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
B.3 Brussels: H
ave you ha
d a gran
t for an en
ergy aud
it or advice
finan
ced by th
e Brussels region
? If yes, whe
n?
Walloon
: Have you ha
d an
y en
ergy aud
it (AMURE
) or a
dvice
finan
ced by th
e Walloon
region
? If yes, whe
n?
Flan
ders: H
ave you received
any advice or ene
rgy au
dit finan
ced
by VLA
O (V
laam
s Agentscha
p Ond
erne
men
)? If yes, w
hen?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
B.4 Brussels: H
ave you be
nefited
from
an investmen
t sub
sidy
from
the Brussels region
for improving your building's o
r prod
uctio
n process's
ene
rgy efficiency ? If yes, whe
n?
Walloon
: Have you ha
d a gran
t from th
e en
ergy fu
nd of the
Walloon
region
for improving your building's o
r produ
ction
process's
ene
rgy efficiency? If yes, w
hen?
Flan
ders: H
ave you received
an ecolog
ical grant (E
cologiprem
eie)
of th
e Flem
ish re
gion
for improving your building's o
r produ
ction
process's
ene
rgy efficiency? If yes, w
hen?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
B.5 Flan
ders: D
o you ha
ve a heat a
nd pow
er certificate from
the
Flem
ish re
gion
(warmtekrachtcertificaat)? If yes, since whe
n?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
FRANCE
F1. A
re you
part o
f the
AER
ES (A
ssociatio
n de
s entreprise
s pou
r la
rédu
ction de
l'effet d
e serre) and
have sig
ned up
to volun
tary
GHG emiss
ion redu
ctions? If yes, since whe
n?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
F2. H
ave you ha
d a gran
t for an en
ergy aud
it or advice fin
anced by
ADEM
E? If yes, w
hen?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
F3. H
ave you be
nefited
from
a “FO
GIM
E” gua
rantee fo
r loa
ns you
ha
ve ta
ken to invest into ene
rgy efficiency im
provem
ents or
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
emiss
ion redu
ctions ? If yes, w
hen?
F4. H
ave you be
nefited
from
a grant from
ADE
ME for improving
your building's o
r produ
ction process's
ene
rgy efficiency ? If yes,
whe
n?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
GERM
ANY
G.1 Renewable Energy Sources Act
(a) In previous year, ha
ve you
been gran
ted a discou
nt on your
energy cost w
hich re
duces the
ene
rgy cost app
ortio
nmen
t em
bodied
in th
e Re
newab
le Ene
rgy Sources A
ct?
no, yes, d
k, rf, n
a
(b) H
ave you ap
plied for the
disc
ount (a
lso) in 20
09?
no, yes, d
k, rf, n
a
(c) D
id th
e certificatio
n process req
uire you
to upgrade
you
r en
ergy m
anagem
ent system?
Note: Since 200
9 the ap
proval of the disc
ount is su
bject to the
certificatio
n of you
r energy man
agem
ent system by 30
June 200
9.
yes, no up
grad
e ne
cessary, no ha
d certificate before, dk, rf, n
a
G.2 Public support program
mes
Have you pa
rticipated
in pub
lic su
pport p
rogram
s aim
ed at saving
energy or a
t red
ucing GHG emiss
ions?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a Clim
ate initiative
no
, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a ER
P En
vironm
ent a
nd Ene
rgy Efficiency Prog
ramme
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a Grant fo
r ind
epen
dent ene
rgy au
dit from fo
nds for ene
rgy efficiency in SME
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a Provision
of cut-‐rate investmen
t credit from fo
nds for ene
rgy efficiency in SME
to im
plem
ent ide
ntified
ene
rgy-‐saving m
easures
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a Supp
ort schem
e of a fe
deral state
text
Other
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
HUNGARY
H1. Have you received
governm
ent sup
port fo
r any of you
r investmen
ts to
redu
ce emiss
ions or implem
ent e
nergy efficiency
measures o
r increase the use of re
newab
les? If yes, w
hen?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a Kö
rnyezetvéd
elmi A
lap Cé
lelőirá
nyzat
H2.(a) H
ave you received
EU fu
nds to supp
ort a
ny of you
r investmen
ts to
redu
ce emiss
ions or implem
ent e
nergy efficiency
measures o
r increase the use of re
newab
les? If yes, w
hen?
(b) If yes, for which Ope
rativ
e Prog
ram; which call for propo
sal?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
KEOP, KIOP, ERF
A, dk, rf, n
a
H3. Have you received
fund
ing from
the Norwegian Fund
for
supp
ort? If yes, w
hen?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a EG
T és Norvég Fina
nszírozási Mecha
nizm
usok program
POLAND
P.1 Do
you
use th
e sectoral inform
ation brochu
res p
ublishe
d by
the Ministry of E
nviro
nmen
t tha
t include
the inform
ation ab
out
the be
st available techno
logies fo
r differen
t econo
mic activity
? Since whe
n?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
P.2 Have you ever ta
ken a techno
logical credit p
rovide
d by th
e Techno
logical Credit F
und? If yes. w
hen?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
P.3 Have you ever been co-‐fina
nced
or h
ave taken a preferen
tial
cred
it from
the Nationa
l Fun
d of Enviro
nmen
tal Protection an
d Water M
anagem
ent, Ba
nk of E
nviro
nmen
tal Protection an
d EkoFun
d? If yes, w
hen?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
P.4 Have you ever ben
efite
d from
the subven
tions and
tax
redu
ctions from
the go
vernmen
t for enviro
nmen
tal purpo
ses? If
yes, whe
n?
no, list of years 200
1-‐20
09, yes dk
year. d
k, rf, n
a
VIII. Post Interview
Interview duration (m
ins)
numbe
r Minutes
Que
stions
Values
Coding
descriptio
n
Interviewers' im
pressio
n of interviewee's reliability
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
Mid
High
Some know
ledge ab
out h
is site, and
no know
ledge ab
out the
rest of the
firm.
Expe
rt kno
wledge ab
out h
is site, and
some know
ledge ab
out the
rest of
the firm.
Expe
rt kno
wledge ab
out h
is site an
d the rest of the
firm
.
Interviewee se
emed
con
cerned
abo
ut clim
ate chan
ge
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
Mid
High
Not con
cerned
. Somew
hat.
Very con
cerned
.
Interviewee se
emed
skep
tic abo
ut action on
clim
ate chan
ge
1-‐5, dk, rf
Low
Mid
High
Not sk
eptic at a
ll.
Somew
hat skeptic.
Very sk
eptic.
Men
tione
d othe
r clim
ate chan
ge re
lated po
licies
text
Moa
ned a lot a
bout high en
ergy pric
es
no, a little, a lot
Num
ber o
f tim
es interview neede
d to be resche
duled
numbe
r
Seniority
of interview
ee
Director, V
P/Gen
eral M
anager,
Plan
t/Factory Man
ager,
Man
ufacturin
g/Prod
uctio
n Man
ager, (En
vironm
ental), Health
& Safety Man
ager, Techn
ician
Age of interviewee
Note: Do no
t ask, guess!
numbe
r
Gen
der o
f interview
ee
male, fe
male
Interview langua
ge
English
, French, German
, Dutch,
Hun
garia
n, Polish