CAMBODIA BETWEEN CHINA AND

THE UNITED STATES

By

TEM OUDOM

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

BACHELOR OF ARTS IN

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

at the

ROYAL UNIVERSITY OF PHNOM PENH

DEPARMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

2014

Permission-to-Copy Page for Bachelor of Arts in

International Studies

I hereby grant the Royal University of Phnom Penh the

nonexclusive right to use this work for the University’s own

purposes and to make single copies of the work available to

the public on a not-for-profit basis if copies are not

otherwise available.

___________________

TEM OUDOM

i

The thesis of Tem Oudom is approved by the Thesis Examining Committee:

___________________________________

Lecturer An Sokkhoeurn (Supervisor)

___________________________________

Lecturer Mey Punlok (Examiner)

ii

Table of Contents

Abbreviation v

List of Figures vii

Acknowledgement viii

Abstract of the Thesis x

Chapter One: INTRODUCTION 1

1.1. Background Information 1

1.2. Research Objective and Research Questions 3

1.3. Research Methodology 4

1.3.1. Study Design 4

1.3.2. Data Analysis 4

1.3.3. Sampling 5

1.3.4. Measurement Procedures 6

1.4. Scope and Limitations 7

1.5. Significance of the Study 8

1.6. Report Structure 9

Chapter Two: Literature Review 10

2.1. Sino-Cambodia Relations 10

2.2. US-Cambodia Relations 13

Chapter Three: The Prime Minister and Cambodia’s Relations

with China and the U.S 17

3.1. Cambodian Leader’s Reaction to China 18

iii

3.2. Cambodian Leader’s Reaction to the U.S 21

3.3. The Roles of Hun Sen’s Background, Personality,

and Perceptions in Cambodia’s Relations with

China and the United States 23

Chapter Four: Sub-state Actors, Contexts, and Cambodia’s Relations

with China and the U.S 30

4.1. The Impacts of Bureaucrat and Interest Groups on

Cambodia’s Relations with China and the U.S 31

4.1.1. The Leverage of Cambodian Bureaucrat 32

4.1.2. The Leverage of Cambodian

Interest Groups 34

4.2. Cambodia’s Contexts and Its Bilateral Relations

with China and the U.S 40

Chapter Five: Intensity of Interactions and Cambodia’s Relations

with China and the U.S 46

5.1. Economic Links 46

5.1.1. Economic Interactions between

Cambodia and the U.S 47

5.1.2. Economic Interactions between

Cambodia and China 52

5.1.2. The Impacts of Different Intensity

of Economic Interaction 57

iv

5.2. Exchange of Visits 60

5.2.1. Cambodia and the U.S.

and their Exchange Visits 60

5.2.2. Cambodia and China

and their Exchange Visits 63

5.2.3. The Impacts of Intensity of Exchange Visits 69

Chapter Six: Conclusion 73

References 84

v

Abbreviation

AMCHAM American Chamber of Commerce

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BTA Bilateral Textile Agreement

CCC Cambodia Chamber of Commerce

CDC Council for the Development of Cambodia

CICP Cambodian Institute for Peace and Cooperation

CNRP Cambodia National Rescue Party

CPP Cambodian People’s Party

CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies

EAS East Asia Summit

ECCC Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FUNCINPEC National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,

Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GMAC Garment Manufacturer’s Association in Cambodia

GPOI Global Peace Operations Initiative

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus

JI Jemaah Islamiyah

LDC Least Developed Country

LMI Lower Mekong Initiative

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

vi

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO Non-governmental Organization

ODA Official Development Assistance

PM Prime Minister

RCAF Royal Cambodian Armed Forces

RFA Radio Free Asia

RGC Royal Government of Cambodia

SCA Cambodia Airports

TB Tuberculosis

TIFA Trade and Investment Framework Agreement

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USAID United States Agency for International Development

U.S. the United States

VOA Voice of America

WTO World Trade Organization

vii

List of Figures:

Figure One: Cambodia’s Trade with the U.S. 49

Figure Two: Cambodia’s Trade with China 54

Figure Three: Exchange Visits of Cambodia to U.S. 61

Figure Four: Exchange Visits of U.S. to Cambodia 63

Figure Five: Exchange Visits of Cambodia to China 64

Figure Six: Exchange Visits of China to Cambodia 69

viii

Acknowledgment

Writing thesis not just channels herculean efforts but also is a challenging and

occasionally tedious process, which cannot be completed by the author alone. It is

therefore my sheer pleasure to extend my wholehearted thanks to scores of people

whose support and encouragement deserve panegyric and must never go unnoticed.

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my thesis

supervisor, Lecturer AN Sokkhoeurn, who has guided me throughout the entire

process of my thesis writing by providing me with constructive feedbacks and advice,

in which has shaped the quality of the thesis itself. Despite his hectic schedule, his

tremendous efforts together with his regional expert have shed lights, allowing me to

yield fruitful outcome of the writing.

My deep appreciation would also go to Ms. HOUT Thavy who has always

spent her precious time being my peer editor, and aesthetically providing me with

technical assistance and mental support, despite her very busy schedule.

My sincere thanks would also be extended to Mr. ING Veasna and Mr. KIET

Raksmey, who have provided me with technical assistance.

I also would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to Dr. LAO Monghay, Dr.

CHHEANG Vannarith, Dr. DETH Sok Udom, Mr. SEAN McIntosh, who agree for

an interview with me, which enormously contributes to the significant findings of the

thesis, and the Documentation Center of Cambodia which provides me with a great

number of useful information for my thesis writing.

I also wish to thank the Department of International Studies, whose academic

staff are highly knowledgeable and whose coordinators have been constantly and

ix

immensely helpful throughout the entire four-year of my academic life at the

Institute of Foreign Languages. In tandem, I also want to extend sincere thanks to my

beloved classmates who have spent time going through both harrowing and

exhilarating experiences together, which to me is unforgettable.

Most importantly, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my parents,

Mr. IM Tem and Mrs. SRORN Dany, who have provided me with all kinds of

support to ascertain that I live my life without worry, but to solely focus on education.

I thereby would like to dedicate this piece of writing to them.

x

Abstract of the Thesis

Cambodia between China and the United States

By

TEM Oudom

Bachelor of Arts in International Studies

Royal University of Phnom Penh, 2014

Supervisor Lecturer AN Sokkhoeurn

Capriciously, China appears to shift its policy towards Hun Sen and the

Cambodian People’s Party in the wake of Phnom Penh tussle on July 5 and 6, 1997.

At a short notice, Cambodia under the leadership of Hun Sen discernibly has

burgeoned relations with Beijing emphatically. Some even suggest this bilateral

relation has reached its peak in the last few years. Concurrently, the relations

between Phnom Penh and Washington remain strained, despite strenuous efforts

aimed for diplomatic revitalization since the mid1990s. It is perceptible that

Cambodia has undertaken foreign policy that apparently takes side with Beijing,

rather than the Washington between 1997 and 2013. While economic interests have

been attributed to this move, this paper aims to explore motivations that exhort

Cambodia to be more supportive to China, rather than the United States during the

unfolded period. The findings of the thesis postulates that five catalysts serve as the

motivating forces, including the personality perception, and background of the Prime

Minister Hun Sen, the influences of the bureaucrats and Cambodian interests groups,

Cambodia’s contexts between 1997 and 2013, different intensities of economic

interdependence and exchange visits between Cambodia and the two countries.

1

Chapter I: Introduction

____________________________________________________________

I. Background

Historical wound and grievance did not impede Cambodia‘s attempt to develop

good relations with other nations in other parts of the world. With China and the

United States, sour relations in the old days, particularly during the second and the

third Indochina wars, did not constitute any major impediment to the relationship

amelioration. Markedly, in the post-Cold-War era, the starting premise of diplomatic

restoration between Cambodia and the U.S. dated back to September 1993 (An,

2011). In tandem, shift of China‘s support for Hun Sen administration and the

Cambodian People‘s Party (CPP) took place in 1997 in the aftermath of 05-06-July

incident, considered coup d‘état by many Western countries (Ciorciari, 2013).

Despite Cambodia‘s normalized relationship with the U.S., Cambodia did not strike a

balance in its relation between China and the U.S. That was to say Cambodia was

more supportive to China than to the U.S. Evidentially, markers to such a view were

discernible in two main facets.

First, the explication could lucidly be entailed in the domain of the case-based

display. In November 2009, for instance, Cambodia decided to send to Beijing

administration twenty Uighurs who fled to Cambodia to seek political asylum after

they were accused of attempted terrorist acts in Xinjiang (An, 2011). In light of this

deportation, the U.S. reacted quickly by the halt of its military assistance to

Cambodia, while China immediately handed in 1.2-billion-U.S.-dollars loan to

2

kingdom (An, 2011). More recently, in the case of Phnom Penh fiasco which

illustrated the ASEAN‘s failure to issue the joint communiqué, the first time in

ASEAN‘s 45-year history, it amply demonstrated the striking influence of China on

Cambodia when this country, as a chair, refrained from placing the South China Sea

dispute into the Joint Communiqué of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Heng, 2013).

Apart from that, after the death of Cambodian King, Prince Sihanouk, former

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao ―lauded his role in building a profound

traditional friendship between the two states‖ (Ciorciari, 2013). In this case, it

convincingly signified considerable speculation of China towards Cambodia in their

future relation despite the death of the king.

Second, the account of the Prime Minister Hun Sen‘s s expression towards China

and the U.S. could be another obvious pointer. Very often, this Cambodian

strongman praised China‘s attitude towards Cambodia, emphasizing that China was a

good friend, had her own way of doing thing, and fully respected Cambodia‘s

sovereignty. For example, based on the People‘s Daily, ―Prime Minister Hun Sen

often hailed China for its unselfish and unconditional assistance to four major

priority areas of Cambodia‘s development: water, road, electricity, and human

resources‖ (As cited in An, 2013). More remarkably, in 2006 the prime minister also

claimed that China was the most trusted friend (Ciorciari, 2013). In connection with

the U.S., however, the prime minister was discerned to adopt different demeanor.

Despite the fact that Cambodia-U.S. relation has been improved in recent years, the

positivity of the Prime Minister Hun Sen‘s attitude towards the U.S. was violated in

some occasions. For example, on August 2013 after the election in Cambodia, the

prime minister called on the U.S. congress to cut off the aid to Cambodia after this

3

U.S. legislative body conducted a public hearing in June, considering the financial-

aid cut to Kingdom provided that the July election was so-called not free and fair. In

relation to the same issue, the prime minister, seen in a harsh retort, even told the U.S.

Congress that ―don‘t talk so much—cut it off,‖ citing that fund to Cambodia could

easily be superseded by that of China (Vong & White, August 5, 2013).

In light of the aforementioned accounts, it appeared that Cambodia was

increasingly more supportive to China than to the US. In such an atmosphere, it was

of great importance to explore the motivations of Cambodia‘s move.

II. Research Objective and Research Questions:

This paper aims to explore the motivations pushing Cambodia to be more

supportive to China than to the U.S. To this end, this study will be conducted in a

direction given by the below questions.

1. Do the Prime Minister Hun Sen‘s personality, perception, and background

shape Cambodia‘s foreign policy towards China and the U.S.?

2. Do the bureaucrats and interest groups in Cambodia shape Cambodia‘s

foreign policy towards China and the U.S.?

3. Do a series of domestic issues, between 1997 and 2013 shape Cambodia‘s

foreign policy towards China and the U.S.?

4. Do the different intensities in the exchange visits of the officials shape

Cambodia‘s foreign policy towards China and the U.S.?

5. Does the economic links of Cambodia shape its foreign policy with China

and the U.S.?

4

III. Research Methodology

3.1. Study design

In light of the complexity of the issue, case-study and retrospective

approaches are invited for the entire study.

3.2.Data Analysis

Given the fact that this study is qualitative in nature, the methods to be employed

will be document analysis and non-random interview. On the count of document

analysis, retrospective approach and case-study approach will be used.

Predominantly, the application of retrospective approach is of tremendous

importance owing to the fact that the analysis of this study will be based on the past

events from July 1997 to December 2013. Also, given that the study aims to

investigate crisis and other potential issues happening to Cambodia which are

believed to contribute to the different patterns of relation of Cambodia with China

and with the U.S., the case-study approach invites its significance in this respect. In

this regard, secondary data will be utilized throughout the entire study process. Aside,

in respect to non-random interview, a few prominent scholars, who are the experts on

the relations of Cambodia with China and with the United States.

3.3.Sampling

With regard to the document analysis, secondary data will be utilized throughout

the entire study process, citing that the retrospective and case-study approaches are to

be used. Scholarly publications, including journals, articles, news, and books, are to

5

be derived from selective institutions, such as Cambodian Institute for Peace and

Cooperation (CICP), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Journal

of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, the Congressional Research Service, Council on

Foreign Relations Press, Jstor, the Diplomat, Foreign Policy Journal, Economic

Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, and other research institutions and

news agencies with relevant focus. As the issue of the study is at the regional expert

of these institutions, it is believed that these institutions will provide credible and

critical sources for the finding of the study. Of great significance for the latest

updates, news and state press releases are also arrested for a detailed investigation.

Notably, news will be extracted from both local and international news agencies,

including the Phnom Penh Post, the Cambodia Daily, Voice of America, Radio

France International, Radio Free Asia, Xinhua, BBC, Channel News Asia, CNN,

Reuters, Strait Time, Asia Time, New Mandel, the South East Asia Weekly as well

as other news agencies whose sources are provided with accountability and

credibility.

In respect to the non-random interview, given the matter of time constraint,

approachability, and finance, only four interviewees are listed, namely Dr. Lao Mong

Hay, Dr. Chheang Vannarith, Dr. Deth Sok Udom, and Mr Sean McIntosh, the U.S.

Embassy Public Affairs Officer and also a spokesperson.

3.4.Measurement Procedures

This study is hypothesized that Cambodia‘s foreign policy is more supportive to

China than to the U.S. In light of this, it is of sheer vitality to define the term

6

―supportive‖. In fact, ―supportive‖ comes from the term support, literally meaning

―to help somebody by saying that you agree with them or it, and sometimes giving

practical help‖ (Oxford Student‘s Dictionary, 2007). Similarly, Cambridge

Dictionaries Online defines ―supportive‖ as ―giving help and encouragement‖ (n.d.).

In the spectrum of international relations, to state that Cambodia‘s foreign policy is

more supportive to China means that the Cambodia‘s demeanor in its foreign affairs

is conducted in favor of China, which can be indicated by Cambodian government

policy, the leader‘s expression, and particular events. In line with this, to bring

insight for this investigation, the indicators will be drawn upon the influence of

Prime Minister Hun Sen‘s personality, perception, and background, influences of

bureaucrats and interest groups, contexts in Cambodia between July 1997 and

December 2013 and, the intensity of diplomatic interactions and the different levels

of economic links between Cambodia with these two countries.

In this connection, the assessment will be conducted on the basis of the levels of

analysis. First, the individual level of analysis, which ―involves understanding how

the human decision-making process—people making decisions (as species, in groups,

and idiosyncratically)—leads to policy making, will be employed to assess Prime

Minister Hun Sen‘s personality towards China and the U.S. Second, state level of

analysis is also to be applied in hoping of ascertaining the effects of domestic issues

happening in Cambodia between July 1997 and December 2013 and the border

conflict with Thailand since 2008 as well as the influence of bureaucracy and interest

groups on the decision-making process in Cambodia. Third, system level of analysis

will also be applied to examine how the intensity of diplomatic, exchange visits in

7

particular, and economic interactions between Cambodia with China and the U.S.

affect such a foreign policy of Cambodia. (Rourke, 2003)

IV. Scope and Limitations

This study is limited to the investigation on five factors which are hypothesized

to motivate Cambodia to move closer to China than to the U.S. The timeline of this

research is scoped to the period between July 1997 and December 2013. Notably,

1997 is a turning point of Cambodia foreign policy when China seizes opportunities

to set its diplomatic opening with the government of Cambodia under the leadership

of Hun Sen and with the Cambodian People‘s Party after the 5-6-July factional

fighting in Cambodia. In the same year, in the aftermath of the 5-6-July event, the

U.S. also exhibited its harsh reaction through imposing the congressional ban on

direct assistance to Cambodia. Also, in 2013 after the U.S. congress conducted the

public hearing on the consideration on financial-aid cut to Cambodia, the Prime

Minister Hun Sen made a verbal response by calling on the U.S. congress to cut off

the aid. In the same year, immediately after the Cambodian People‘s Party was

publicly announced to win the election, China was the first country to endorse the

triumph of the ruling party.

V. Significance of the Study

This study is of great significance for three major reasons. Preponderantly, the

focus of the study on the motivations behind Cambodia's moving closer to China

than to the U.S. will fill in the loophole existing in the previous literature. Previous

studies tend to focus on economic interests only. Apart from that, the employment of

8

the level-of-analysis theory will provide a more critical analysis greatly important to

bring insight for the discussion over this issue. This study will examine the motives

for Cambodia in such a relationship, bringing in new and insightful knowledge

through ascertaining the roles of the personality, perception, and background of

Cambodia‘s leader, the roles of bureaucrats influencing decision-making process, the

contribution from Cambodia‘s contexts between 1997 and 2013, and the different

intensities of economic links and exchanges visits. With that being said, the

knowledge will help wipe out the misunderstanding on the decision of Cambodia in

its relation with China and the U.S, and guide readers to understand about the foreign

policy making process of Cambodia in its relations with China and the U.S.

VI. Report Structure

The paper will be divided into different sections and subsections:

1. Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Background

1.2 Research Objective and Research Questions

1.3 Significance of Study

1.4 Research Methodology

1.5 Scope and Limitation

2. Chapter Two: Literature Review

3. Chapter Three: The Prime Minister and Cambodia‘s Relations with China

and the U.S.

3.1 Cambodian Leader‘s Reaction to China

3.2 Cambodian Leader‘s Reaction to the U.S.

9

3.3 The Roles of Hun Sen‘s Background, Personality, and

Perception in Cambodia‘s Relations with China and the U.S.

4. Chapter Four: Substate-actors, Contexts, and Cambodia‘s Relations with

China and the U.S

3.1 The Impacts of Bureaucrat and Interest Groups

3.2 Cambodia‘s Contexts and Its Bilateral Relations with China

and the U.S.

5. Chapter Five: Intensity of Interactions and Cambodia‘s relations with China

and the U.S.

4.1 Economic Links

4.2 Exchange of Visits

6. Chapter Six: Conclusion

10

Chapter II: Literature Review

____________________________________________________________

I. Sino-Cambodia Relations

Historically speaking, the early contact between Cambodia and China, coined by

the visit of Chinese officials to the Angkor city, was traced back to 1296 (Heng,

2012). The inception of their diplomatic relations was in 1958 when King Sihanouk

expressed his recognition of the People‘s Republic of China, and in tandem it was

also sharply intensified by the personal relations between Sihanouk and Zhou Enlai

who was the Chinese premier during that period (As cited in Phou, n.d.). In line with

this, various scholars and commentators shared a consensus view that China and

Cambodia moved so close to one another.

Discussing the Sino-Cambodia relation issue, for example, Heng, a doctoral

researcher at the VU University Amsterdam, examined the role of China in the

Cambodia‘s socio-economic development, the controversy of Chinese aid and

investment, China interest in Cambodia, and the pattern of relations whether it was a

positive-sum game. More importantly, Heng suggested the bond of their relation at

the present time was stronger than ever, adding that Cambodia‘s interests in its

relation with China appeared in two main aspects. Politically, it was said that due to

its no string attached, financial aid of China to Cambodia was warmly welcomed by

the Hun Sen government. For example, in the early of its diplomatic opening with

the Hun Sen adminstration in the wake of the July 1997 coup, China not just only

recognized the result of the coup but also provided huge financial aid, despite the

condemnation made by the international community including the U.S. Economically,

11

Heng further conceded that China presented the biggest source of foreign direct

investment in Cambodia, seen in the areas of garment, natural resources and energy

sector, small-scale manufacturing, and beyond that China was among the top trading

partners with Cambodia. (Heng, 2012)

The notion that the ties between China and Cambodia was so strong was also

embraced by John D. Ciorciari. Literally, Ciorciari took patron-and-client approach

to explain Cambodia-China relation, citing that their relations fell into clientelistic

fashion. At the heart of his discussion on Sino-Cambodia relation, the forms of

Chinese patronage in the context of Cambodia presented its accessibility through the

lenses of development assistance, political consolidation and neopatrimonial state,

the diplomatic payoff from Chinese aid, and a modest military dimension. To support

his argument, Ciorciari utilized scores of indicators. In relation to development

assistance, for instance, China aids to Cambodia, as he argued, provided economic

and political benefits favorable for Cambodian governing elites, allowing them to

seek opportunities for development assistance, personal enrichment, and political

entrenchment. In relation to this, his article was also written that the complicated

condition of the development assistance provided by Japan and Western donors made

the Cambodian official weary. In the lens of political consolidation and

neopatrimonial state, the Prime Minister Hun Sen achieved dominance through

patronage network, and it was he who praised the relationship with China. For

instance, the prime minster said that ―China talks less but do more‖ after receiving

600 million dollars pledge of aid. In term of diplomatic payoff, the evidence could be

seen in the case of Phnom Penh incident in July 2012, which Cambodia, as the chair

of the ASEN Ministerial Meeting, refused to place South China Sea dispute into a

12

Joint Communiqué. Aside, China could also gain diplomatic support from Cambodia

on the key issue concerning China, such as the condemn on bombing on Chinese in

Belgrade by NATO in 1999 and the withdrawal of support for Japan‘s bid to be a

permanent member of UNSC in 2005. In the military dimension, Ciorciari raised the

case of Cambodian-Thai border conflict, citing that China provided military support

though it would not help Cambodia due to its long-standing partnership with

Thailand. Also, this author argued that ―China provided aid and reliable political

defense for Cambodia in exchange for resource access and deferent issue concern of

Beijing.‖ With considerable deliberation, it appeared that the bond with China not

just brought considerable economic benefit to the Cambodian governing elites, but

also provided political defense to the Hun Sen administration in its domestic politics.

(Ciorciari, 2013)

Likewise, Jeldres who was the former senior private secretary to King Sihanouk,

through his article ―China-Cambodia: More than just a Friend‖, also shared his

support to the aforementioned notion. In fact, Jeldres extensively discussed the issue

by starting with the very early time of Sino-Cambodia relation which was in 1958

and continuing his discussion until the early 2000s. During the Sihanouk

administration, due to the personal relation that Sihanouk established with the

Premier Zhou Enlai and his recognition of the People‘s Republic of China that made

Sino-Cambodia relation so close, citing that to China, the help of Cambodia in

breaking the isolation of China never went unnoticed. During the Lon Nol regime,

Jeldres said that ―China treated Sihanouk with honor by providing sanctuary and

means against Lon Nol.‖ Further going on his scholarship, Jeldres explained that in

1975, China sent thousands of its technicians to help the Khmer Rouge, and also

13

taught Vietnam a lesson when Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in 1979. In

1997, moreover, this former private secretary of King Sihanouk also pointed out that

―China was not just the first country to recognize the Hun Sen government after the

coup in 1997, but also further provided the government with military assistance in

December of the same year. It was conceded that ―China‘s policies toward Cambodia

have been singled out by one fact: Beijing did not care who run Cambodia, as long as

the ruler was amenable to helping China maintain its strategic position in the region.‖

(Jeldres, 2003)

Aside, another scholar discussing the relations between Cambodia and China was

Dahles. In his article, Dahles vividly endeavored to explain four motivations that

encouraged China to charm Cambodia. Apparently, the first motivations was the

―Cambodia‘s controlled labor for Chinese state-owned firms.‖ Also, Dahles gave an

explication that it was due to the China‘s expectation that ―Cambodia could brokers

the restrict for China‘s export to the west.‖ The third reason was because Cambodia

could provide China with access to energy, resource, and agriculture sectors, while

the other motivation was the strategic position of Cambodia which China believed

that it was at the String of Pearls which could help secure military access of China.

(Dahles, 2013).

II. US-Cambodia Relations

The discussion over the issue of US-Cambodia relation could be found in scores

of literatures. Clymer (2004), for example, focused on the relation in the period

between 1969 and 2000, starting with the Nixon administration. His conclusion was

that the role of the US in the relation with Cambodia was a troubling one, citing a

number of indicators. For instance, in the presentation of the US policy towards

14

Cambodia in the period of 1970 and 1975, Clymer viewed that it was an ignominious

failure due to its refusal to convene a direct negotiation with Sihanouk despite his

various offers and the advice from the embassy in Phnom Penh, arguing that the

intervention of American troops in the Cambodia‘s territory ordered by Nixon in

1970 had brought this country into the orbit of Vietnam war, which consequently

intra-state war took places between Lon Nol and Khmer Rouge. Likewise, it was in

his elucidation that ―during Jimmy Carter administration, he betrayed his

commitment to human rights when it came to Cambodia‖—Cambodia that 2.2 to 2.5

million innocent Cambodians were reported to be killed. In the post Khmer Rouge

regime, Reagan and Bush administrations respectively supported Khmer Rouge, yet

later Bush was forced to withdraw the support due to international pressure and

public opinion. Nevertheless, during the Clinton administration, the relations, Clymer

argued, had been ameliorated when diplomatic relation was normalized and trade

embargo was lifted after 1993 election. Clymer went on saying that ―by the end of

the century, relations between the two countries were better than they had been

during most of the time when Sihanouk ruled the country.‖ (Clymer, 2004)

Aside, An (2011) also presented the bilateral relations between Cambodia and the

United States, in the period of June 2009 to November 2010, by assessing the

interests of these two countries in their bilateral relations as well as the recent

development in their relations in the dimension of trade, defense, and development

assistance. In his assessment, An listed three main motivations that encouraged the

U.S. to engage with Cambodia, including the growing influence of China in this

country, oil resources, and its strategic importance which could serve the U.S.

objectives in the areas of democracy and human rights promotion, counter-terrorism,

15

trade, anti-human trafficking, diseases, civil society, and fiscal policies. In tandem,

the interests of Cambodia in its relation with the US were also seen in the dimensions

of development and poverty alleviation. Apart from this, An also divulged a number

of events that indicated recent development of the US-Cambodia relation. For

instance, the removal of Cambodia from the status of Marxist-Leninist country

provided Cambodia with opportunity to promote its development through increasing

trade and attracting the US investment in the kingdom. Also, the Lower Mekong

Initiative established in 2009, as An put, would help strengthen human security of

Cambodia on the health and education sectors, while correspondingly it served as a

platform to promote diplomatic and strategic interests of the United States in this

region. However, their relation was disturbed by the case of Uighur, which the U.S.

decided to halt its military assistance to Cambodia in response to the deportation of

the twenty Uighur to Beijing. Later, however, the relations burgeoned better,

exemplified by the conduct of the multinational peacekeeping exercise which was

called Angkor Sentinel 10 in July 2010 and the increasing presence of Peace Corps

in Cambodia in 2010. (An, 2011)

Also, Carlyle Alan Thayer, through his article published in 2012, argued that

both domestic and international factors exerted influence on the US relations with

Cambodia. Domestically, Thayer demonstrated that ―US Congress adopted partisan

approach by taking side in Cambodia‘s domestic politics while the administration

preferred to remain neutral.‖ Aside, while viewing the international factors, this

author categorized the US-Cambodia relations into four fashions. In term of trade

relation, it was postulated that U.S. was the largest trading partner of Cambodia.

Related to China, Thayer raised an instance demonstrating that Cambodia had

16

worked in hand with other developing nations in order to persuade the US to impose

the safeguard on the import of Chinese textile which gave threat to the Cambodia‘s

textile products imported to the US market. In the spectrum of counter terrorism,

―regional approach to counter terrorism motivate the US to improve relation with

Cambodia as it had poor law enforcement, giving favorable condition for Jemaah

Islamiyah to set up an operation base.‖ In term of rapprochement, the lift of ban on

direct assistance to Cambodia gave its indicator. In light of this, Thayer expressed:

―US political rapprochement reached peak in September 2008 when

Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte visited Phnom Penh and

announced 24 million in aid at improving public health, a reversal of

US policy towards the Khmer Rouge tribunal, which up to 2008, US

decline to directly contribute to the tribunal due to concern over

independence and ability to meet justice.‖

Apart from that, commenting on the defense cooperation, Thayer viewed that the

relation on this sector had been improved significantly between 2008 and 2009.

According to Thayer, ―the highpoint of military rapprochement reached in 2009 with

the opening of Cambodian Defense Attaché office and the visit of Teach Banh to

Washington.‖ Despite the heat given by the deportation of Uighur in November 2009,

which made rapprochement questionable during that time, the defense relations was

seen being on improvement as indicated by the Cambodia-US co-hosted the Angkor

Sentinel or GPOI capstone exercise in 2010. Addressing two obstacles to the

rapprochement which included human rights and governance issues, Thayer

suggested that ―US rapprochement was likely to continue due to self-sustaining

momentum in the area of counter-terrorism and defense cooperation, investment on

discovered offshore oil and gas reserve, and Lower Mekong Initiative.‖ (Thayer,

2012)

17

Chapter III: The Prime Minister and Cambodia’s Relations

with China and the United States

____________________________________________________________

Predominantly, the fashion of foreign policy decision-making in Cambodia was

reportedly not so democratic, indicating that output of this process was at the hand of

the top leaders, remarkably the prime minister Hun Sen. In fact, after the 1997 clash,

it was divulged by the officials from the Cambodian People‘s Party that their party‘s

power was at peak, unqualified (Peou, 1998). Basically, the tussle taking place in 5

and 6 July 1997 was an internal conflict between Hun Sen or CPP faction with that

of Rannaridh, which led to the breakout of exchanges of fire along the Phnom Penh

street. Interestingly, CPP officials and a few others, including Tony Kevin, an

Australian Ambassador and Michael Vickery, an independent researcher, elucidated

that ―the fighting was CPP‘s pre-emptive strike for FUNCINPEC‘s planned attack‖

(Deth, 2014). Antithetically, most Western countries fiercely castigated that the CPP

was staging a coup d‘état. At the end of the street fighting during the two days, CPP

claimed victory and Hun Sen in a jiffy gained a nickname as a strongman of

Cambodia. In relation to the prime minister, in a view of a senior CPP official, Hun

Sen‘s power was incontestable, arguing that his influence was at its ultimacy (Peou,

1998). Even more noticeable, Chea Sim, the Chairman of the Cambodian People‘s

Party, ―was said to fear Hun Sen as he feared a tiger‖ (Peou, 1998). Intriguingly, the

prime minister was said to start consolidating power after the July-1997 clash

(Osborne, 2000). Given that he was the final decision-maker, his undisputed power,

18

and the lack of democratic decision-making process in Cambodia, Hun Sen became

the most influential key decision maker in foreign policy of Cambodia. In this

connection, this chapter will explore the personality, perception, and background of

the Prime Minister, all of which potentially shape Cambodia‘s foreign policy towards

both China and the United States.

I. Cambodian Leader’s Reaction to China

At a historical notification, Beijing and Hun Sen had been mortal adversary

during the 1970s and 1980s. As a matter of fact, Beijing was not just a key ally, but

also a main supporter of Khmer Rouge regime. Contrastively, based on Mehta and

Mehta (1999), Hun Sen said that he had strong antipathy for Khmer Rouge to the

greatest. Likewise, the main allies of Hun Sen were Vietnam and Soviet Union,

which strategically, militarily, diplomatically, and financially had supported his

government during the struggle in civil war from 1977 till the end of 1980s. During

the Cold War era, both Vietnam and Soviet Union which had been in bond of

alliance were the adversaries of China. According to O‘Dowd (2007), after Vietnam

defeated the Khmer Rouge in the very early of 1979, war between Vietnam and

China broke out in February the same year following China staged lightning and

token strike over Vietnam in the Sino-Vietnamese border. Despite the defeat of the

Khmer Rouge, China not just retained its unswerving support for the exiled Coalition

Government of Democratic Kampuchea comprising the factions of Sihanouk, Khmer

Rouge, and Son Sann, but also joined hand with ASEAN and other Western

countries, including the United States, vehemently condemned the Vietnamese-

restored government and regarded it as illegitimate. In return, such an act of China

had been filled with acrimony from Hun Sen.

19

However, in the current days, Hun Sen‘s demeanor towards China surfaced

radical change. According to Phou, ―Hun Sen buried the past, and embraced China,

satisfied with China aid‖ (n.d.). In consistent with the fact that the China‘s action in

1997 pleased the prime minister by serving as the first country to recognize the Hun

Sen government, affording to give immediate loan of 10 million US dollar and

military aid worth 2.8 million US dollars, and not joining hand to condemn the

Phnom Penh government in time of its overriding need for military, financial, and

diplomatic support, diplomatic revitalization between Beijing and Hun Sen

administration invited its sudden appearance (Ciorciari, 2013). Endearing China‘s

action, the prime started to build his connection with this Asian rising star (Jeldres

2003). Incontrovertibly, Beijing‘s political support not just arrested sheer vitality for

wielding legitimacy of democratic image of Hun Sen administration but also

engendered fulcrum for conflict resolution in light of mounting crisis in the kingdom

(Long, 2009). Apparently, after July 1997, the Phnom Penh administration was not

just under the pressure of international condemnation, publicly considered a coup

d‘état, but also failed to acquire the ASEAN membership. Given such catastrophic

climax for his legitimacy, Hun Sen was by no means but to try playing China card in

hoping of achieving the breakthrough for the political and diplomatic impasse

(Jeldres, 2003).

In sequel, this Cambodian leader evinced his effort to instill China‘s confidence

in his government when he addressed Chinese community in Phnom Penh in July 25,

1997 (Pou, Wade, & Hong, 2012). Two days before this, the prime minister gave an

executive order to close the Taiwanese representative office in Cambodia, citing that

it helped FUNCINPEC to access weapon purchase (Pou, Wade, & Hong, 2012).

20

Indubitably, such an act signified a deliberate attempt that Phnom Penh robustly

supported one-China policy, aiming to obtain China‘s trust, and this continued ever

since. Apparently, the positive attitude of Hun Sen towards the one-China policy

became even more obvious after the erroneous conduct by Phnom Penh government

officials in late 1998. To elaborate, the request to reopen the Taipei Economic and

Cultural Representative Office, which was signed by governor He Kan in November

20, 1998, was publicly rejected by the prime minister in the later day by claiming

that the request was unauthorized (Saing & Saito, 1998). Instantaneously, the solid

support for one-China policy was reiterated by Hun Sen in 2000 (Cambodia Daily,

2000). Later in May 2003, Taiwan‘s request to open representative office in capital

failed again when Hun Sen said, ―I would like to say briefly ‗No‘; we have supported

only the one-China policy only,‖ and this firm stance was declared again by the

prime minister in June 2011 (Thet & Barron, 2003 & People‘s Daily Online, 2011).

Above all, the Cambodian strongman frequently embraced bond of friendship

with China. In 2006, Hun Sen acclaimed China as the most trusted friend of

Cambodia for its no string attached or complicated condition and for not imposing I-

say-you-do approach on Cambodia (Ciorciari, 2013). According to Hun Sen praises

(2010), ―Prime Minister Hun Sen often hailed China for its ‗unselfish and

unconditional assistance to four major priority areas of Cambodia‘s development:

water, road, electricity and development, and human resources‖ (As cited in An,

2011). Proceeding a pledge of 600 million US dollar assistance from Beijing, the

premier publicly said, ―China talks less but does a lot‖ (Ciorciari, 2013). The huge

flow of zero-conditioned assistance to Cambodia results in the prime minister‘s

public announcement in 2008 that Cambodian people were well aware of the

21

overriding importance of Chinese aid (Phou, n.d.). Furthermore, the Cambodian

strongman managed to arrive at an agreement with China counterpart to lift their

bilateral relations up to a comprehensive strategic partnership in his December 2010

trip (People‘s Daily Online, 2010). This agreement would signify their ―increasing

political and strategic mutual trust, expanding pragmatic cooperation, involving each

other‘s major concerns and common interests,‖ and further enhance greater joint

collaboration between the two countries to promote peace and prosperity to deal with

challenges in light of complicated regional and international situation (People‘s

Daily Online, 2010). In line with this, visiting Hainan in April 2012, the Cambodian

premier told Xi Jingping that ―enhancing the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,

signed with China in 2010, is his country's political choice‖ (Xinhua, 2013)

II. Cambodian Leader’s Reaction to the U.S.

In 1970, Hun Sen joined maquis to stand against American invasion, which a

number of its troops were sent in Cambodia to fight against Vietcong guerilla.

Between 1975 and 1977, he served as a Khmer Rouge soldier as an Appointed Chief

of Special Regimental Staff (Mehta & Mehta, 1999). From his perception, the prime

minister indignantly asserted that ―without ASEAN and the America invasion in

Cambodia, there would be no Pol Pot,‖ and continued to express that the human

rights violation and the destruction in the country were the responsibility of this

regional organization and this Western country. Pertinent to this, it was emphatically

stated that ―Hun Sen had a low level of tolerance for preachy Westerners.‖ (Mehta &

Mehta, 1999)

Due to this past antagonism, propinquity between the premier and Washington

found its way hardly to burgeon better. After the factional fighting in 1997, his

22

negative demeanor evincing towards the United States was succinctly elucidated. For

example, in July 10, 1997, four days after the exchange of fires in the capital was put

to an end, the most powerful man of Cambodia denied charge by Western countries,

which accused CPP of mounting coup d‘état (CNN, 1997). On December 6, 1997,

moreover, the prime minister rejected a meeting with an American delegation:

―Today, I have rejected a meeting with an American delegation

because I don‘t want to be advised. Or else, I will advise them in

return. It is better not to have any strong words against each other. It

is better not to meet each other…Why do they advise us about

human rights? When we realized that there no good word from

Washington, I just cancelled the meeting. I am a nation. I cannot

listen to anyone‘s advice. I am not a tripartite coalition that seeks

advise from ASEAN‖ (Mehta & Mehta, 1999).

Indubitably, the strongman was seen acrimonious about being taught or advised

by the American over the human rights issues. In the wake of the clash in Phnom

Penh in July 1997, Washington instantaneously decided to impose ban on direct

assistance to Cambodia (Project Muse, 2010). More noticeably, in November 2012,

Obama was the first US president to come to Cambodia in the form of working visit.

Regrettably, however, the talk between the leaders of Washington and Phnom Penh

apparently resulted in tense, despite the fact that it was said to be a frank exchange

conversation. According to Kuch and Peter (2012), the US president touched upon

the issue of human rights in Cambodia, which met denial from the Cambodian prime

minister, who said that in relation to human rights issues Cambodia had better record

than any other countries in the Southeast Asian region. Taking this opportunity, Hun

Sen also made a request to Obama to relieve the Cambodia‘s debt during Lon Nol

regime which was worth over 370 million US dollars (Spetalnik, 2012). More

recently, on August 2013 after the election in Cambodia, the prime minister called on

23

the U.S. congress to cut off the aid to Cambodia after this U.S. legislative body

conducted a public hearing in June, giving consideration of the financial-aid cut to

Kingdom provided that the July election was not free and fair. Pertinent to the same

issue, the prime minister, seen in a harsh retort, even told the U.S. Congress that

―don‘t talk so much—cut it off,‖ citing that fund to Cambodia could easily be

superseded by that of China (Vong & White, August 5, 2013).

III. The Roles of Hun Sen’s Background, Personality, and Perception in

Cambodia’s Relations with China and the United States

Assiduously, it pertained to a high degree of certitude that Cambodia was more

supportive to China than to the U.S since 1997. Meticulously, several occasions

manifested solid support for this thesis. For example, in the case of Uighur in 2009, it

was beyond doubt that Phnom Penh took side with Beijing when it sent the 20

asylum seekers back to China in the face of strident castigation from Washington.

Given that Hun Sen was the ultimate decision maker, the decision, which was

political in nature, more or less was at Hun Sen‘s calculation. Unequivocally,

motivations that encouraged the prime minister to opt for such a foreign policy of

Cambodia were discernable.

Perceptibly, his background could be brought into consideration. Theoretically, it

was conceded that experiences of leader wielded tremendous and direct impact on

policy output (Rourke, 2003). Also, Breuning (2007) claimed that how leader viewed

a particular event was shaped by the historical antipathy, the past relations, and the

escalated disputes. In line with this, Breuning further asserted that knowledge of past

experience was utilized by leader so as to carry out an analysis of the ongoing issues

(2007). Pertinent to the Premier Hun Sen, the strongman was experienced serving in

24

the military unit for almost ten years before he became foreign minister and prime

minister, the highest-ranking government officials, respectively (Mehta & Mehta,

1999). Predominantly, during the 1970s and 1980s, Hun Sen felt deep antipathy

towards both China and the United States. Notwithstanding, his historical animosity

towards Beijing did not occupy any leading role in the current context. Interestingly,

this was more likely in large part because of the fact that China, to display its

unswerving loyalty, intermittently remunerated Hun Sen a great amount of unstinting

accolades, which seemingly exhorted Hun Sen to erase the past antipathy towards

Beijing. Arguably, it could be postulated that the diplomatic amelioration between

him and China was grotesquely shaped by context—the context that his government

was isolated and under international pressure after the factional fighting or coup

d‘état in 1997. In this connection, Julio Jeldres put:

―Hun Sen, who had written a long essay back in 1988 suggesting that

-China "was the root of everything that was evil in Cambodia", had

now changed his tune and, confronted by Western accusations of

gross violations of human rights, government corruption and lack of

transparency, decided to play "the China card" in his relations with

foreign countries‖ (2003).

Evidently, China not just was the first country to recognize Hun Sen administration

after the 5-6-July event in 1997, but also provided this government with military aid

when it had been in time of desperate need for such assistance (Jeldres, 2003).

However, Hun Sen‘s historical animosity towards Washington seemingly still made

appearance. In fact, even two decades after the collapse of Pol Pot regime almost

elapsed, the prime minister, in an interview with Harish Mehta and Julie Mehta in

late 1990s, was still holding a view that America together with ASEAN was the

cause of human rights violation in Cambodia (Mehta & Mehta, 1999). Despite the

25

collapse of Khmer Regime, the criticism from the U.S. over the legitimacy of Hun

Sen government during 1980s remained trenchant, centering on the Vietnamese

invasion of Cambodia. Though the relationship between Phnom Penh and

Washington was not confrontational in the post-1997 factional fighting, the U.S

Congress and American media frequently chastised Hun Sen administration

regarding the issues of human rights and governance, which was not acceptable to

Hun Sen. To cite one, the U.S. House of Representatives, introduced by the US

Congressman Dana Rohrbacher, unanimously issued a resolution, condemning and

accusing Hun Sen of violating international humanitarian law, instead of putting

―war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide‖ (Marston, 1999). Without

doubt, such a berating act of U.S. Congressman emphatically exasperated Hun Sen,

whose power was undisputed and demeanor was adamant and obstinate. Taking into

account, the background of the prime minister seemed to played less influential role

simply because had Hun Sen‘s historical animosity mattered, the encomium of his

personal relation with China would not have been possible.

Besides, his personality seemed to generate great impact. First, Hun Sen was

obstinate and resilient, which made him decisive and less consultative on certain

issues, and less tolerable to Western preachy (Mehta & Mehta, 1999). For instance,

―his demeanor was that of man who never needed to consult his aides before making

a decision about whom to meet‖ (Mehta & Mehta, 1999). More often than not, such

a personal quality would provide a ground for his fervent belief on his ability to

control the event (Hermann, 1980). Pertaining to the Prime Minister Hun Sen, each

of his speech relative to China or the U.S. noticed his deep-seated belief. In this

connection, obdurate personality and lack of consultative quality plus his negative

26

attitudes towards the U.S. seemed lead him to decide a supportive position towards

China—China who very often pleased Hun Sen with a great amount of accolades.

Second, a quality of being active-negative was also likely to play a role. According

to Breuning (2007), the leader with active-negative personality was primarily

interested in staying in power, and yet he or she worked very hard. Pertaining to the

prime minister Hun Sen, he apparently fell into this fashion. Undeniably, the

Cambodian strongman has been in power for almost thirty years, while Hun Sen

himself vowed to stay in office until he reached 74, signifying his lively and

passionate interest in power (Tep & Van, 2013, & Doyle, 2014). Moreover, when he

received any documents, the prime minister read every words (Mehta & Mehta,

1999). This notified his diligent work, indubitably. Corresponding to Breuning, ―the

more active a leader, the more criticism he or she encountered. Positive personalities

took such criticism in stride, but negative personalities were prone to assume that

opponents were enemies‖ (Rourke, 2003). More than hard-working, the prime

minister was also very active. It was recognized that he frequently gave speech to the

public. In tandem, however, the prime minister was also very often trenchantly

criticized by others. In fact, the strongman frequently faced strident castigation from

the U.S., the U.S. Congress more specifically, relative to human rights and

governance issues. In December 6, 1997, for instance, the Cambodian leader rejected

a meeting with an American delegate, arguing that it was just a way to avoid facing

negative interaction and he did not want advice from the U.S (Mehta & Mehta, 1999).

In addition, Dana Rohrabacher, the US Congressman representing an area in the

state of California, for instance, chastised Hun Sen for ―war crimes, crimes against

humanity, and genocide‖ during Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia between 1979-

27

1989—even more noticeable, this American legislator regarded the factional fighting

in July 1997 as coup d‘état (Smith, 1998). Notwithstanding, the prime minister

reiterated that human rights in Cambodia was respected and we had free press and

multi-party democracy, adding it was always an accusation from the America which

adversely criticized us for not having respect for human rights (Spetalnik, 2012). Yet,

such a quality of this Cambodia leader would provide a favorable training ground for

a smoother cooperation between Cambodia and China, given that this rising star not

just provided a great deal of assistance to Cambodia with a vow not to give lecture

and not interfere in Cambodia‘s affairs but also expressly and unflaggingly support

Hun Sen government‘s legitimacy.

Assiduously, Hun Sen‘s perception and his cognitive factor would also be a

subjected to a scrutiny. Arguably, Rourke (2003) commented that ―perceptions

played a key role in policy because they form an operational reality. That was, policy

makers tended to act based on perceptions, whether they were accurate or not.‖

Similarly, Breuning (2007) argued that perceptions were guided in part by their

personality, beliefs, experiences, and expertise, but also by how the information is

presented, in what context, and by whom.‖ Moreover, Rosati believed that belief

system, experience, organization position, and background were an integral part in

determining cognition, saying that it was critical to perception (As cited in Smith,

2012). In connection with the Prime Minister Hun Sen, his had more positive

perception of China than the U.S. For instance, diplomatic amelioration between him

and China made appearance in 1997 because Hun Sen was cognizant that playing

China card would help ensure the legitimacy of his administration, withstanding the

unrelenting pressure from the international community which engendered Cambodia

28

isolation. Aside, the diplomatic revitalization with China would give Cambodia more

benefit. Incontestably, Cambodia was a resource-hungry country, implying that

foreign assistance was of overriding importance for this nation. Also, with regard to

the Uighur case, the decision to send the 20 Uighur asylum seekers to China

promptly encouraged Beijing administration to provided Cambodia with loan of 1.2

billion U.S. dollars in return, while the Washington decided to halt military

assistance to the kingdom (An, 2011). Other equally crucial motivation would begin

with the aids of China which could help Hun Sen administration to increase the

popularity in the domestic politics. Beyond doubt, China was the biggest source of

foreign aid to Cambodia. Since 1993, the prime minister had focused on building

infrastructure, including schools, bridges, roads, hospital, in which the name ―Hun

Sen‖ were addressed (Mehta & Mehta, 1999). Through this mechanism, he could

manage to generate more popularity amongst Cambodian people, which

tremendously had helped cultivated more political support locally between the

elections in 1998 and 2008.

Taking everything into consideration, the perception and personality of the Prime

Minister Hun Sen did exert enormous impacts on Cambodia‘s foreign policy which

burgeoned to be steadfastly more supportive to China than to the United States.

Given his unqualified power in Cambodian politics since 1997 together with his

unfolded personality and perception, it gave a powerful impetus behind the stronger

ties of Phnom Penh with Beijing. However, his harrowing experiences with both the

United States and China were discernibly incredulous. Elaborately, this was because

in the past decades, apparently 1970s and 1980s, the prime minister felt strong

antipathy towards both China and the United States, yet after the July-1997 tussle,

29

Hun Sen appeared to endear to China act. Beijing not just recognized his government

and not joined hand with Western countries to condemn that his faction was staging

coup d‘état but also provided his administration with sizable assistance in the wake

of overriding need for resources, militarily and financially. Seemingly, he might have

buried the historical animosity when it came to a business of the country and his

administration, given that Chinese helps since 1997 were overwhelming for his

government.

30

Chapter IV: Sub-state Actors, Contexts, and Cambodia’s

Relations with China and the United States

____________________________________________________________

In the domain of foreign-policy decision-making process, it, by and large,

engaged more than one actor. It was not just the leader of the executive branch who

was the key decision maker. Arguably, bureaucrats and the interest groups claimed

their weighty responsibility in this regard. More often than not, speculation unveiled

bureaucrats to possess capability to influence certain foreign policy of a country

through disseminating information, recommending policy option, and implementing

decided policy output (Rourke, 2003). Correspondingly, Graham Allison argued that

―an analysis of foreign policy decision making had to start with bureaucracies and

the various factors that caused them to play what was, in their view, the determining

role in shaping foreign policy outcomes‖ (As cited in Alden, 2011). Similarly,

interest groups also displayed their exerted influence on particular foreign policy.

The interest groups, at large, were said to be those who were capable of pressuring

the government to adopt certain policy at their own belief, adding an edge for their

increasing importance for the policy-making process (Rourke, 2003). Equal

importance also noticed that leader of a country would make policy differently in

different situations. In time of crisis, in particular, foreign policy-making process was

seen in a view that the leader and his advisors would perform fundamental role

(Rourke, 2003). Deliberately, ―crisis situation occurred when decision makers are

surprised by an event, felt threatened, and believed that they have only short time to

31

react‖ (Rourke, 2003). Unlike the previous chapter which focused mainly on the role

of Prime Minister Hun Sen in burgeoning Cambodia‘s foreign policy to be more

supportive to China, this chapter will explore the roles of Cambodian bureaucrat,

Cambodian interest groups, and Cambodia‘s contexts, pertinent to Cambodia‘s

foreign policy towards China and the United States. Given his in important role in

the government whose decision-making process was rather vertical and not so

democratic and the fact that Cambodia‘s foreign policy towards China and the

United States is more political in nature, only Hor Namhong, Cambodian foreign

minister, is subjected to detailed scrutiny concerning the bureaucrat‘s impacts. In

tandem, the assessment of impacts made by Cambodian interest groups will only be

drawn upon Cambodian business people and chamber, giving that these groups have

strong voice in economic links of Phnom Penh with Beijing and Washington, while

other groups‘ involvement seems not apparent, and to some extent muted.

I. The Impacts of Bureaucrat and Interest Groups on Cambodia’s

Relations with China and the United States

In the context of Cambodia, bureaucrats and the business tycoons unveiled their

sufficient leverage, conceivably motivating Cambodia to move closer to China than

to the United States. In this relation, John D. Ciorciari cited that ―Sino-Cambodia

relation increasingly took clientelistic character‖ (2013). Persistently, Ciorciari (2013)

went further that Cambodia fell into this fashion in her relations with China due in

large part to the fact that Cambodian governing elites strived to foster ties with China

in hoping of generating benefit for their personal enrichment politically and

economically, distinctly from Chinese aid. Similarly, Lao Mong Hay, a political

analyst, viewed that by obtaining benefit from China, Cambodian businessmen who

32

did business with this rising star became its client. The validity of this scholarship

would be proven unswerving at the invitation of an extensive investigation on

various Cambodian governing elites and business tycoons who were portrayed to

have played a starring role in forging the bond of relationship between Cambodia and

China.

1. The Leverage of Cambodian Bureaucrat

To scrutinize impacts made by Cambodian bureaucrats on Cambodia‘s foreign

policy with China and the United States, it was inevitable to delve into the profile of

Hor Namhong, who was a long-serving foreign minister of Cambodia. Hor

Namhong, according to a political analyst Lao Mong Hay, was considered a

skillfully career diplomat as he undertook his study in a diplomatic profession from

the Royal School of Administration, plus adequately knowing foreign languages. In a

view of Lao, Hor Namhong‘s scholarship was seen having exerted great influence

amongst other Cambodian politicians and ministers since the Paris Agreement,

particularly in the realm of foreign affairs. In the past decades, Hor Namhong had

been a diplomat in different regimes, namely Sinanouk, Pol Pot, and Hun Sen

administrations (O‘Brien, 2011). After the collapse of Khmer Rouge, Hor Namhong

had been a Deputy Foreign Minister between 1981 and 1982 before he was tasked to

undertake another diplomatic mission to Moscow as a Cambodian ambassador from

1982 to 1990 (Leifer, 2013). Between 1990 and 1993, he had served as foreign

minister and he regained this post in 1998, which he relentlessly continued working

until now (Kuch, 2014). In an interval, certainly between 1993 and 1998, he was

appointed as Cambodian Ambassador to France (Leifer, 2013). Authentically, Hor

33

Namhong had been seen working very closely and consistently with Hun Sen since

the early 1980s.

A. Uighur Case

In the case of Uighur in 2009 which the Uighur asylum seekers were sent back to

Beijing by Cambodian government, Hor Namhong unveiled his impact in two main

facets. First of all, the issue was in the jurisdiction of the foreign ministry and interior

ministry. As a foreign minister, he more or less must have had a say before deciding

to send those refugees to Beijing. In other words, Hor Namhong, interior minister Sar

Kheng, and Hun Sen should have arrived at consensus in this regard. Had Hor

Namhong opposed or advised not to make such a decision, given his post as a foreign

minister and his closeness with the prime minister, the issue of Uighur refugee could

have been different. Second, it was because the issue pertained to political matter

between three countries, Cambodia, China, the United States. Beijing demanded to

bring these people to her country, saying that they took part in criminal activities

(Sam & Strangio, 2009). Meanwhile, Washington fiercely opposed the return of the

refugee, adding that it could hurt Cambodia-U.S. relations if Cambodia persisted to

do so (CNN, 2009). Given that Hor Namhong not just had historical antipathy

towards America during the 1970s and 1980s and frequently met with American

chastisement on his government while receiving complaisance from Beijing in the

current days, it was more than convincing that he would rather opt for a choice that

pleased Beijing, not the U.S.

B. 2012 ASEAN Summit and South China Sea Issue

With due respect to the case of Phnom Penh fiasco during the ASEAN

Ministerial Meeting on July 2012 in Phnom Penh, Hor Namhong would also claim

34

an important role in engendering the said behavior of Cambodia in its foreign

relations with the two countries. First, both Hor Namhong and Hun Sen must have

been consistent, given their close relations with one another since the early 1980s

and their endearment towards Beijing. The consistency between them would bring an

impetus for Hor Namhong to persuade Hun Sen that Cambodia should take side with

China. Second, the regional expert of Hor Namhong on the issue would unveil his

mushroom capability to make the impact. Notably, Hor Namhong was the chair of

the ASEAN Minister Meeting at that time, who refrained from putting South China

Sea issue into the Joint Communiqué. Pertinent to this, Lao Mong Hay claimed that

Hun Sen was not so expert regarding this issue, so it would be Hor Namhong playing

a vital role, given his career as a long-serving diplomat.

2. The Leverage of Cambodian Interest Groups

Apart from the foreign minister, there could also be the other Cambodian

businessmen. Noticeably, Lao Meng Khin and his wife Choeung Sopheap, called

Yeay Phu, were seen having connection with Chinese investors to Cambodia.

Primarily, Lao Meng Khin was a CPP senator, an advisor to Hun Sen, and a Vice

President of the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce, while his wife Yeay Phu was a

co-owner of Pheapimex Fu Chan Co. Ltd with her husband (Wikileaks, n.d.).

Interestingly, they both were characterized as a powerful business figure in

Cambodia, making her and her husband the most powerful and politically-connected

couple (Pye, 2014). The major business of Pheapimex were mainly salt iodization,

iron ore extraction, bamboo cultivation, pharmaceutical imports and hotel

construction (Wikileaks, n.d.). Discernibly, Pheapimex had developed connection

with China‘s companies. According to Khouth (2010), Shukaku Inc., owned by

35

Senator Lao Meng Khin, reached a deal with the municipality in 2007 to grant 99-

year economic concession to the Boeung Kak Lake. With connection to this issue,

Deth believed that though Shukaku Inc. was owned by Lawmaker Lao Meng Khin,

financial investment, discernibly came from China. Not just owning Shukaku Inc.,

Phu was seen having had Joint Venture with a few other Chinese companies,

including Sinohydro United Ltd, world‘s largest hydropower developer and the

affiliate of Beijing-based Sinohydro Corp, Wuzhishan LS and Jiangsu Taihu

International (Wikileaks, n.d. & Pye, 2014).

Equally important, Sy Kong Triv, the Chairman of KT Pacific Group, also had

business contact with Chinese companies. Having born in a well-blown Chinese

family in Kampot, Sy Kong Triv were the owners of many local businesses in

Cambodia, namely KTE Mitsubishi electronics, Mondial Center and other business

joint ventures, including British American Tobacco (BAT), Eastern Steel Industry

Corporation and SCA Airport (Wikileaks, n.d.). Also, this Cambodian tycoon was a

co-director together with Lao Meng Khin of the joint ventures of Wuzhishan LS, a

controversial Chinese company focusing on tree plantation in Pursat and Mondulkiri

provinces (Wikileaks, n.d. & Pye, 2014). Furthermore, in December 2012, the

Cambodian powerful businessman, as the President of Cambodian Petrochemical

Company, arrived at a deal with Sinomach China Perfect Machinery Industry Corp

pertinent to a joint venture for the first oil refinery in Cambodia (Investvine, 2014).

In relation to this, thank to the increasingly ameliorated Sino-Cambodian relations,

the president of Sinomach China Perfect Machinery Industry Corp claimed that this

operation would cost 2.3 billion US dollars (Xinhua, 2012). Following this, another

vivid importance to note was that in October 2013 ―Prime Minister Hun Sen urged a

36

Chinese firm to expedite the construction of what would be Cambodia‘s first oil

refinery, and to have the facility operational by 2018, later than previously

anticipated‖ (Hul, 2013).

Besides those business influential figures, Theng Bunma, called Thai Boon

Roong, was also discerned to have a share in term of making impact on the Sino-

Cambodian relations in the past decade. This Cambodian-Chinese tycoon was the

former president of the Cambodian Chamber of Commerce (Mehta & Mehta, 1999).

Even more noticeable, Bunma, according to Thayer (2002), was considered

―Cambodia‘s most powerful tycoon.‖ In reference to the bilateral relations of

Cambodia with China, the personal contact of Burma with this Beijing, particularly

Chinese businessmen, appeared to stay unflaggingly indulgent. More than obvious,

Theng Bunma engendered link for Chinese investment from Guangxi province

(Jeldres, 2003). In line with this, Phou claimed that ―business contact were facilitated

through the Overseas Chinese Liaison Offices of Guangdong Province and

Guangzhou, Shantou, Jieyang, and Chaozhou cities‖ (n.d.).

On another side, when catching a glimpse of Cambodia-US relation, the role of

American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) in Cambodia could not be looked upon.

Convened in 1996, AmCham Cambodia was one of the largest business federations

in Cambodia and in the world at large (AmCham Cambodia). Representing more

than 3 million businesses, sectors, local associations, and business associations

across the United States, AmCham Cambodia contributed gigantically to Cambodia

economy and the development of private sectors (Sciaroni & Associates). It also

played a leading role in encouraging American business people to invest in

Cambodia. Particularly, Sciaroni G. Bretton, the founder and chairman of AmCham

37

Cambodia, also co-chaired Working Group on Law, Tax and Good Governance

which was one of the mechanisms to bridge private sector dialogue with the Royal

Government. Moreover, AmCham Cambodia also cooperated with US embassy,

particularly Ambassador Todd, to address potential challenges that made US trade

and investments in Cambodia hardly possible through providing solutions to a

number of potential issues namely lack of rule of law, corruption, gaps in skill sets

and capacity of local employees, and technical skills and understandings among

ministerial working level staff (Mitchell, 2013). Reiterated by Ambassador Todd

(2014) in a discussion session with the new Ministry of Commerce minister Chanthol,

through AmCham, Cambodia economic and commercial opportunity could reach out

to businesspeople in the US by urging government reform to produce a favorable

environment for businesses. Notably, numerous American companies were seeding

interests in Cambodia. For instance, there were the stalwart companies (Coca-Cola,

Pepsi, and Caltex) operating since the early days, and by 2011, companies like

Crown Cork, General Electric, Royal Crowntex, Dupont, Microsoft, Ford, Chevrolet,

and many more had their presence in Cambodia (Sciaroni, 2011). Yet, this number

remained limited if compared to those of China.

A. The Impacts of Interest Groups on Business Links

Preponderantly, the appearance of the Cambodian interests groups to exert

substantial impacts which indubitably moved Cambodia closer to China than to the

United States was unambiguous. Primarily, their roles were arguably influential,

thanks to their close relations with the strongman Hun Sen and CPP as well as their

important position in the government. According to Wikileak (n.d.), ―Hun Sen's

38

relationship to this group [the said Cambodian tycoons] were both symbiotic and

self-limiting.‖ Adding to this, these Cambodian businessmen could exploit benefit

from its ties with Hun Sen government in return for what they financially support

CPP (Wikileaks, n.d.). Lucidly, it was known that the powerfully connected couple,

Lao Meng Khin and Yeay Phou, not only had strong bond of ties with Hun Sen and

his wife Bun Rany but also offered the intervening financial back to Hun Sen‘s use in

several occasions (Wikileaks, n.d. & Klein, 2009). Moreover, having been elected as

the president of Cambodian Chamber of Commerce twice, Theng Bunma had served

as an economic advisor to the leader of the Cambodian People‘s Party and provided

Hun Sen with millions of dollars and gold to support 5-6-July factional fighting,

giving him unflaggingly political and economic legitimacy in Cambodia. Pertinent to

the propinquity between Hun Sen and the tycoon, Hun Sen in Juanry 1996 acclaimed

Bunma for his munificent support for the country, adding that the Cambodian

government would never abandon Bunma (Thayer, 2002). Using their connection

with the prime minister and CPP, those Cambodian businessmen could make an ease

for the Chinese investment to come to Cambodia. Pertinent to what was being said,

Lao Meng Khin, both Cambodian lawmaker and powerful businessman, together

with his wife Choeung Sopheap, called Yeay Phou, had provided a gateway for the

Chinese investment to Cambodia, namely, Shukaku Inc, which was owned by Lao

Mengkhin but was said to have financial back from China, Sinohydro United Ltd,

Wuzhishan LS and Jiangsu Taihu International (Wikileaks, n.d. & Pye, 2014). What

was more eye-catching, when there was any disagreement from the Hun Sen

administration in relation to Chinese business issues, Bunma, at the request of

39

Chinese Embassy in Cambodia, had intervened several times, given his close and

unstinting contact with the Cambodian People‘s Party (Jeldres, 2003).

Apart from that, possessing Chinese descent would bring the Cambodian tycoon

mushroom capability to make business contact with Beijing. With Cambodian-

Chinese ethnics, either Lao Meng Khin, Yeay Phou, Theng Bunma, or Sy Kong Triv

would find it easy to run business with Chinese investors who would come to

Cambodia rather through the so-called Guanxi. Literally, Guanxi meant

―relationships that may result in the exchanges of favors or "connections" that were

beneficial for the parties involved‖ (World Learner English, n.d.). In this context,

Guanxi would happen through network of Chinese investment, which were

Cambodian tycoons who consistently had close connection with the Prime Minister

Hun Sen. Unlike with Chinese, the Cambodian tycoons would find it hard to conduct

business with American companies which were bound by regulations, rules of laws,

and so on. In this regard, the role of Amcham to bring in American investment to

Cambodia was not as outstanding yet. Indubitably, the impulse that discouraged

American businessmen to invest their capital in Cambodia was the endemic

corruption in the country. If any of which were found committing corruption, bribery

or other illegal payment in Cambodia, they would have to face with their government

and their judiciary, particularly through the so-called 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices

Act (FCPA). Authentically, FCPA, which was aimed at preventing US companies

from enmeshing unethical businesses in foreign soil, was the most power legal

instrument in the U.S., second to the anti-terrorism law, and had prosecuted 50

companies just between 1998 and 2008 (Ambassador Solutions, n.d.). In line with

this, in September 2013, William Todd, U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, said that

40

corruption in the country scared and make U.S. businessmen reluctant to invest in

Cambodia (Woods & Bopha, 2013).

II. Cambodia’s Contexts and Its Bilateral Relations

with the United States and China

Literally, leader of a country would make policy differently in different situations.

Particularly in time of crisis, the leader and his advisors would perform fundamental

role in making certain foreign policy (Rourke, 2003). Arguably, ―crisis situation

occurred when decision makers were surprised by an event, felt threatened, and

believed that they have only short time to react‖ (Rourke, 2003). In the case of

Cambodia, a series of events not just served as a stepping stone to ameliorate Sino-

Cambodia relations but also encouraged Hun Sen administration to take side with

China, not the United States.

To cite one, the clash in July 1997 deliberately produced spillover effect,

negatively making the profound impact on the Hun Sen government‘s legitimacy and

development effort. In the causatum of the tussle, Phnom Penh administration had

faced a critical time as the black cloud of diplomatic pressure revolved around this

country. As a matter of fact, there had been vehemently fierce condemnation from

the Western hemisphere, arguing that the CPP was staging the coup despite Hun

Sen‘s denial—―the CPP itself and other observers claimed that the fighting was

CPP‘s pre-emptive strike for FUNCINPEC‘s planned attack, as Ranaridh was

allegedly seeking alliance with the Anlong Veng Khmer Rouge faction and had

imported illegal weapons‖ (CNN, 1997 & Deth, 2014). Capriciously, the US

Congress decided to impose ban on direct bilateral assistance to Cambodia in the

wake of the factional fighting in Phnom Penh in July 1997 (Stern, 2009). Plainly said,

41

two-third of 35 million US dollars of the U.S. assistance to kingdom was called on

suspension, fueling forthwith by the cease of U.S. military assistance to the Royal

Cambodian Armed Forces (Stern, 1997 & Mehta & Mehta, 1999). Of eye-catching

matter, a White House spokeswoman Ann Luzzatto claimed that ―40 U.S. diplomats

and dependents were told to leave Cambodia and that 21 remained at the U.S.

mission‖ (CNN, 1997). Even worse, the application of Cambodia for the ASEAN

membership instantaneously was rejected while the UN membership of Cambodia

was later suspended, adding more disgraceful atmosphere to the sustaining of the

legitimacy of the Hun Sen government (Jeldres, 2003 & Deth, 2014).

Surprisingly, however, China did not joined hand with those Western countries

in unequivocally condemning the Phnom Penh government, despite the mortal

adversary with Hun Sen and his party in the past. Seizing this favorable opportunities,

China helped break Cambodia‘s isolation, galvanizing a way for diplomatic

propinquity between Chinese government and the Cambodian People‘s Party

(Biedermann, 2010 & Dahles, 2013). According to Lao Mong Hay, Hun Sen grabbed

China unambiguously due to the matter of legitimacy. Sanguinely discerning the

possibility of the CPP to take control the country and win the 1998 election, China,

according to Lao, took initial step to converge CPP. In consistent to this, China was

not just the first country to recognize Hun Sen administration but also

instantaneously provided this government, which was in time of overriding need for

resource backup, with loan of 10 million US dollars and military aid of 2.8 million

US dollars (Ciorciari, 2013). Undeniably, not only undermining the legitimacy of

Phnom Penh administration, the July street fighting also emphatically exasperated

Cambodia‘s economy as defense spending skyrocketed, while foreign assistance,

42

which the government depended on more than half of its national budget, slumped,

and tourism and investment consistently dwindled (International Republic Institute &

National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1998). To evince loyalty to

Beijing, Hun Sen, in 1997, unequivocally gave an order to close the Taiwanese

representative office in the Capital Phnom Penh, and constantly reiterated his

unswervingly unwaving support for one-China policy (Biedermann, 2010, Saing &

Saito, 1998, Cambodia Daily, 2000, Thet & Barron, 2003 & People‘s Daily Online,

2011). Of peculiarity, in December 1997, the Cambodian strongman emphatically

rejected a meeting with the American delegation (Mehta & Mehta, 1999).

In addition, the post-election crisis in Cambodia also downplayed significant

impact on the Cambodia‘s foreign relations, specifically with the United States and

China. More often than not, in each post-election period since 1993, it ended up with,

if not turmoil, political impasse amongst those political parties in Cambodia. Put it

simply, defeated parties frequently refused to accept the election result and staged

spontaneous demonstrations to evince their rejection. Apparently, such hostility

would potentially keep question the legitimacy of the victorious party to establish a

new government. In the case of 1998 election, it signified the eye-catching scenario,

galvanizing the question of CPP-led government‘s legitimacy. Publicly known, the

CPP could gained only 41.4 percent, failing to acquire two third majority to form its

own government, which was stipulated in the 1993 Constitution of Cambodia before

its amendment years later (International Crisis Group, 1998). Indubitably, given that

it was in any legal force to create its own government, the CPP was desperate to form

a coalition government plausibly in hoping of burgeoning credibility for its

legitimacy, which could serve as a breakthrough for the gate to retch up the flow of

43

foreign aids which served more than a half of its national budget, to acquire ASEAN

membership, and to resume its seat at the United Nations (International Crisis Group,

1998). However, the ruling party could not convincingly manage to persuade the

other two parties, FUNCIPEC and Sam Rainsy Party, to arrive at this desirous end.

In the wake of this political impasse, the United States took a tough line with the

CPP than any other countries both before and after the election period (Marston,

1999). Even worse, the U.S. House of Representatives, introduced by the US

Congressman Dana Rohrbacher, unanimously issued a resolution, condemning and

accusing Hun Sen of violation of international humanitarian law, instead of putting

―war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide‖ (Marston, 1999). Despite the

fact that later Kenneth Quinn, the U.S. Ambassador, defended that resolution ―was in

no way binding‖, it, more or less, hampered the relationship revitalization between

Hun Sen and Washington (Marston, 1999). Contradictorily, China not just in no time

endorsed the election result, but also publicly castigated the street demonstration in

the post-election (Marston, 1999). Recently but more noticeably, the scenario after

the July-2013 election appeared to be even worse. Despite the fact that the National

Election Committee officially confirmed the CPP victory, the Cambodia National

Rescue Party (CNRP) indignantly constantly refused to accept the announced result,

citing electoral irregularities and vowing to hold continually street demonstrations

until there was a reelection or the Prime Minister Hun Sen stepped down (BBC, 2013

& Meas & Pye, 2013). Controversially, the CPP formed the government, though

CNRP lawmakers boycotted the inaugural session of the National Assembly for the

new mandate (The Southeast Asia Weekly, 2013). The legitimacy of the CPP-led

government, in this regard, was still a matter of debate. In spite of the new

44

government formation, the US did not officially recognize the Hun Sen

administration in this new term. In line with this, Chheang argued:

―US has shifted from the ruling and moving closer to opposition

forces, because they understood that the opposition forces had been

popular support and they tried to maintain this kind of principle

democracy and human rights in Cambodia by condemning and even

not recognizing the election result even until now.‖

Of the same issue, Deth Sok Udom postulated that the though the U.S. raised concern

about the electoral irregularities, US manifested its ―de facto recognition‖ to the

current government. Notwithstanding, China warmly endorsed the election result,

and officially recognized Hun Sen government. Even more noticeable, in reaction to

the public hearing of the US congress over its consideration regarding the possibility

to cut financial support to the kingdom of, the Prime Minister, forthwith the July

2013 election, called on the US lawmakers to do make a cut, addding that it could be

comfortably superseded by the China‘s fund in no time (Vong & White, 2013). In no

time, the Cambodian defense ministry unambiguously announced to put the US

military aid to Cambodia in suspension (Khuon & Lewis, 2013).

To sum up, the unfolded catalysts, amalgamated together, emphatically exerted

considerable influence on the decision of Cambodia to move closer to China than to

the United States, second to the contribution of the Prime Minister Hun Sen.

Touching upon the account of the Cambodian strongman, these two factors in no

way surpassed the impact made by Hun Sen, given his perception and cognition, past

experiences, personality, and most importantly his unqualified and incontestable

power facilitated by the weak political system of check and balance in Cambodia.

Essentially, the governing elites and the interest groups signified a reason that pushed

45

Cambodia towards China, not the U.S., in a way that their close relations with Hun

Sen, their influential money, and their backgrounds came into place. In the meantime,

a series of noticeable events, including the July-1997 tussle and the subsequent

general elections, served a favorably pressing context, exhorting Cambodia to

burgeon strong ties with China, rather than the United States.

46

Chapter V: Intensity of Interactions and Cambodia’s

Relations with China and the United States

____________________________________________________________

In principle, each state was in its legitimate autonomy to opt for certain foreign

policy. Disputatiously, however, power disparity between small and great powers

acted as a stumbling block for small state to independently exercise this autonomous

function. Correspondingly, as countries burgeoned to be increasingly dependent on

another economically, this increment emerged as a cogent point which to a great

extent determined states‘ foreign policies. Concurrently, fierce intensity in

diplomatic interactions between states, particular exchange visits, served as a

stepping stone to constitute an impetus for statesmen‘s consideration whether or not

their countries should forge closer relations with the other countries in any distinctive

ways and means. Different from previous discussions which actually entailed the

roles of leader, bureaucrats, and interest groups in making impact on Cambodia‘s

foreign policies towards China and the U.S., this chapter would focus on the essential

roles of different levels of economic links and exchange visits between Cambodia

with China and with the United States.

I. Economic Links

Following the end of the Cold War, economic interactions among states had been

increasingly intensified, surpassing any points in the past. Theoretically, it was

dictated that ―the economic realities of the international system helped shape the

choices that countries made‖ (Rourke, 2003.). Literally, state‘s behavior was shaped

47

by economic interdependence (Rourke, 2003). In respect to Cambodia‘s foreign

policy with the U.S. and China, the overriding need for economic development of

Cambodia, given its situation on the ground, was a stimulant for Phnom Penh to take

side with Beijing. Precisely, the discussion below would explain why Cambodia

decided to make such a move.

1. Economic Interactions between Cambodia and the United States

Despite a tough line on political interactions, economic cooperation between the

United States and Cambodia, which had been in considerable progress, could be

identified in three aspects: trade, investment, and aid.

Apparently, bilateral trade between the two countries was discerned in a healthy

move. Thanks to the better economic situation in the US and other western countries,

the total trade value of Cambodia, both in import and export, in general was with an

anticipation to achieve 16 billion US dollars in 2013, with 14.4 percent rise

compared to that of last year, while export would savored more hefty increment

(Chan, 2013). With the United States, according to Census Bureau of the U.S.

Department of Commerce (n.d.), the total trade volume in 2013 was approximately

3.014 billion US dollars, roughly 96 million US dollars rise from last year and 2.892

billion more than their bilateral trade in 1997. As a matter of fact, bilateral trade

between the two countries in 1997 stood only at 122 million US dollars (Census

Bureau, n.d.). Significantly, Cambodia‘s export to the U.S. market was at glimpse,

seen as having risen dramatically overtime between 1997 and 2013, from 103.2

million US dollars to 2, 773.4 million in 2013, while the figures of US products

imported to the kingdom also had consistently been in parallel, soaring from18.8

millions US dollars in 1997 to 241 million in 2013 (Census Bureau, n.d.). According

48

to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, even until 2013, ―the United

States remained Cambodia‘s largest trading and export partner‖ (2014). A number in

2008 suggested that 54.5 percent of Cambodia‘s total export had been to the U.S.

market, marking it as the largest destination for Cambodia‘s exported products

(Economy Watch, 2010). More seemingly, in 2012 U.S. was incredibly persistent to

be the champion of Cambodia‘s trading partner for its largest market of Cambodia‘s

exported product, accounting for 32.5 percent of Cambodia‘s total export

(Directorate-General for Trade of European Commission, 2014). Explicitly,

according to Xinhua, the U.S. kept its record as the most sizable exported market for

textile and footwear products from Cambodia—as in 2006, this downplayed 63

percent of total export revenue (As cited in Oung, 2012). To be more specific, in

2013 the major export commodities to the American market were ―Knit Apparel

($1.9 billion), Woven Apparel ($694 million), Footwear ($59 million),

Miscellaneous Textile Articles ($34 million), and Plastic ($21 million)‖ (Office of

the United States Trade Representative, 2014). In line with this, U.S. Ambassador

William Todd elucidated that over 40 percent of textile commodities for export of

Cambodia, which was responsible for around 20 percent of Cambodia‘s GDP, were

purchased in the U.S. market, essentially provided more than 150, 000 job

opportunities to Cambodian people (As cited in Teng, 2013).

49

Figure One: Cambodia‘s trade with the United States

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce

In connection with this, that Cambodia‘s exported products had experienced such

exponential increment would be attributable largely to scores of bilateral trade

agreements signed between the two countries. For instance, Cambodian Commerce

Minister Cham Prasidh and Charlene Barshefsky, the acting trade representative of

the U.S., met in Washington in September 1996 and signed bilateral trade agreement

which granted Cambodia Most Favored Nation status, allowing this country to relish

―lower tariff to levels‖ (Lang, 1996). To be more precise, Most Favored Nation was

defined as:

―A level of status was given to one country by another and enforced

by the World Trade Organization. A country granted this clause to

another nation if it was interested in increasing trade with that

country. Countries achieving most favored nation status were given

specific trade advantages such as reduced tariffs on imported goods‖

(Investopedia, n.d.)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Import from US (million USD)

Export to US (million USD)

50

Three years later, in 1999 in fact, Bilateral Textile Agreement between Washington,

during Clinton administration, and Phnom Penh came into place, which ―guaranteed

free quotas for US‘s textile import and a bonus for improved labor standards in the

country‖ (Oung, 2012). In addition, in July 2006, Trade and Investment Framework

Agreement was reached by Karan Bhatia, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, and

Cham Prasidh, Cambodian Minister of Commerce, which aimed to establish platform

to deal with trade-related issues as well as to strengthen investment impulse (Office

of the United States Trade Representative, 2006). Also, Cambodia was no longer

listed in trade blacklist of the U.S. as Obama decided to remove it from the status of

Marxist-Leninist states, which ―allowed for increased U.S. investment through easier

financing and loans‖ (Wikileaks, 2012).

However, scrutinizing U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Cambodia, it

remained staying relatively low. By and large, according to the Council for the

Development of Cambodia (n.d.), ―the investment approval reached 25.75 billion US

dollars.‖ Dolefully, the American FDI in Cambodia seemed to be persistently lesser

than that of other countries, distinctly China. By 2012, its FDI in Cambodia was

equal to abruptly 54 million US dollars (Office of the United States Trade

Representative, n.d.). In Cambodia, either in the capital or the countryside, there

were not many American companies. According to Deth Sok Udom, a Southeast

Asian politics analyst, not much large-scale investment from the Western countries,

particularly the United States, burgeoned in this Southeast Asian mainland due to the

fact that those foreign firms were bound by regulation, rules of law, and the like.

Promptly, he went on saying that:

51

―if they [American companies] were found to be making bribe or so

whatever, then they were responsible to answer this to their own

congress. And so, it was quite difficult for them to involve,

especially the most two sectors that were prone to corruption were

construction and natural resources, and they were dominated very

much by China because the Chinese companies were not bound to

such a thing.‖

Correspondingly, according to Woods and Bopha (2013), William Todd, U.S.

Ambassador to Cambodia, well articulated that despite vivid interests of American

companies to invest in Cambodia, corruption remained a chief impediment to their

decisions, displaying a sign of reluctance to bring in their capitals. Despite this, the

cumulative U.S. FDI in Cambodia between 1994 to 2011 was totaled 1.3 billion U.S.

dollars (Todd, 2013).

In spite of the fact that in 1997, the U.S. Congress announced to impose ban on

bilateral direct assistance to Cambodia following the July tussle in the Cambodia‘s

capital, the influx of U.S. assistance to the kingdom stayed ceaseless. Of certitude,

according to USAID, U.S. aids to Cambodia had undergone a slump move from

nearly 40 million U.S. dollars to a bit more than 10 million from 1997 until the mid

of 1999, insinuated by U.S. Congress decision pertinent to the ban on direct

assistance to the kingdom in 1997. However, the figure started to glidingly went up

in 2000, and continually soared to nearly 60 million U.S. dollars in 2004 (As cited in

US-Cambodian Economic and Trade relations, n.d.). Even more complaisantly, in

2007, Washington pronounced to lift ban on direct assistance to Cambodia,

converging ways for the increasing flow of American aid to Cambodia. Evidently,

U.S. assistance to Cambodia was in an upsurge to over 70 million dollars in 2012

(Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, 2013).

52

More often than not, it was the United States Agency for International Development

(USAID) which was responsible for funding any development program to other

countries, including Cambodia. Lucidly, those funds would support NGOs, rather

than the Cambodian government.

In principle, USAID was determined to serve three central areas. Governing

justly and democratically would bear the first responsibility, whose importance

would begin to ―help combat corruption, improve the legal system, strengthen key

political and civil liberties, and protect human rights, through USAID‘s engagement

with the government and civil society organizations‖ (As cited in Teng, 2013). The

second target would bear responsibility to invest in people, aiming to ―combat a

number of health problems in Cambodia such as maternal mortality, child mortality,

TB, HIV, Malaria and provide health education to Cambodian population‖ (As cited

in Teng, 2013). The last program would go to sustaining economic growth, focusing

on ―investment environment and enhance the competitiveness of Cambodia‘s small-

and medium-sized enterprises.‖ (As cited in Teng, 2013).

2. Economic Interactions between Cambodia and China

Not just in positive end of political and diplomatic spectrums, the close

partnership between China and Cambodia would also begin with economic

cooperation. In the realm of trading interactions, China was vividly portrayed as a

major trading partner of Cambodia. In an actuality, in 2012, China hectically relished

being the Phnom Penh‘s third biggest trading partner (Directorate-General for Trade

of European Commission, 2014). In the same year, in term of import, China was the

third largest, while it was ranked the 8th

for the export market of Cambodia‘s product

(Directorate-General for Trade of European Commission, 2014). According to Chap

53

(2010), ―in 2007, China-Cambodia trade rose to US$ 933 million, an increase of 72

times compared to 1992.‖ Despite the global financial crisis in 2008, the figure

prevailingly pursued continual growth to 2.5 billion US dollars in 2011 (Heng, 2012).

Unceasingly, the amount of trading exchange activities went soaring to 2.9 billion

US dollars in 2012, before it increased by 31 percent in the first nine months of 2013

(Xinhua, 2013). However, with China, Cambodia faced huge trade deficit, which was

contrary to what Cambodia savored its trading interactions with the U.S. Reportedly,

it was said that, based on BRC Report in 2009, between 2000 and 2008, Cambodia,

with no exception, had always run trade deficit with China, ―ranging from -

US$ 104.57 million in 2000 up to –US$ 920.50 million in 2008 (As cited in Chap,

2010). The imbalance appeared to grow exponentially larger as in 2010 the upsurge

of Cambodia‘s trade deficit was responsible of roughly 1.121 billion US dollars

(Oung, 2012). Conspicuously, in 2012, this deficit soared to 2.948 billion US dollars,

as China‘s import to Cambodia was 3.155 billion US dollars, while Cambodia‘s

export to China valued only 207 million US dollars (Directorate-General for Trade of

European Commission, 2014). Chiefly, Cambodia‘s exported commodities to China

were ―agricultural products, rubber, fishery, timber and textile‖, while China

imported ―garment raw materials, machinery, motorcycles, cars, foodstuffs,

electronics, furniture, medicines and cosmetics‖ to Cambodia (Xinhua, 2012). In

spite of the fact that there were incentives from China, including tax exemption on

Cambodia‘s exported product to its market, challenges, such as ―lack of resources,

quality products, information on the market, and means,‖ remained at stake (Chap,

2010).

54

Figure Two: Cambodia‘s trade with China

Source: Compilation of (1) Oung (2013), (2) Chap (2010), (3), ASEAN China Center

More meticulously, Chinese FDI in Cambodia saw its ever-increasing trend.

According to Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), China was

responsible for the largest share of FDI in Cambodia, accounting 23.97 percent

extensively in the areas of resource development (n.d.). In conformity with Heng‘s

speculation, Cambodia experienced steadfast surge in Chinese investment, reported

to be with an encomium of 8.8 billion US dollars between 1994 and 2011 (2012).

This number accelerated to 9.1 billion US dollars in 2013, eight times more than that

of the U.S. (Seiff, 2013). Indubitably, the sizably growing influx of Chinese

investment to the kingdom was of panegyric in a jiffy following the July-1997 event

(Oung, 2012). Steadfastly, China became the largest foreign investor in Cambodia

since 2004 (Oung, 2012). Based on Xinhua (2014), ―China's investments in

Cambodia were mainly in garment and manufacturing industries, banking and

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Import from China (million USD)

Export to China (million USD)

55

finance, agriculture, tourism, energy, mining, real estate, transport and

telecommunication.‖ In addition to its focused sectors, garment and manufacturing in

particular, China also invested vastly on energy and natural resources, allowing it to

take a lead in these potential areas (Heng, 2012). In 2011, for instance, 23 Chinese

companies were reported to work on mineral resources exploitation projects, while

hundreds of garments factories also belonged to Chinese and there were five other

hydro dams on the construction, reported to have total value of 1.6 billion US dollar

with capacity to generate 915-megawatt electricity in Cambodia (People‘s Daily

Online, 2011). Assiduously, the hydro-power dams, funded by China, would reach

six projects in 2013 (Vong, 2013). Despite strident castigation against the hydro-

power plans, practically voicing out environmental concern, the hydro-power

projects persisted to cultivate some profit for Cambodia in term of electricity supply.

Also, in 2013, 392 garment factories were listed in the Garment Manufacturer‘s

Association in Cambodia (GMAC), and it was a stipulation that ―about one-fourth of

garment factories in Cambodia were mainland China-owned‖ (Becker, 2013). In

general, those garment factories created more than 600, 000 jobs for Cambodians

(Becker, 2013). Discernibly, it was conceded that Chinese businesses sought joint

venture with a few Cambodian tycoons. In this juncture, Shukaku Inc. which focused

on housing and commercial development, for instance, was owned by Lao Meng

Khin, a Cambodia senator, yet this commercial company was speculated to have

financial support from Chinese investors. Besides, there were also the joint ventures

between Pheapimex company with Sinohydro Corp, establishing Sinohydro United

Ltd with the major focus on hydro-dam construction, as in Areng Valley (Pye, 2014).

This Cambodian firm was also said to have link with Wuzhishan LS and Jiangsu

56

Taihu International (Wikileak, n.d. & Pye, 2014). In line with this, ―Chinese

investors were flexible in lobbying and negotiating for investment licenses from

Cambodian authorities‖ (Chap, 2010).

Even more significance would also begin with a meticulous study on Chinese‘s

development assistance to Cambodia. On the whole, Chinese assistance was

characterized as no string attached or any complicated condition. Chou Heng, a

senior policy expert for the government‘s Council for the Development of Cambodia,

divulged that unlike other foreign assistance which relevant ministries were not

granted the right to managed Chinese aids allowed those governmental institutions to

do so (Khoun, 2013). Basically, it was conceded that Chinese aid to Cambodia,

practically in the name of concessional loan, amounted to 860 million US dollars

between 1992 and 2011 (Heng, 2012). In the mid of 2013, former Finance Minister

Keat Chhon said that ―from 1992 to present, China had provided 2.7 billion U. S.

dollars in soft loans and grants to Cambodia for rehabilitating and building

infrastructures‖ (Global Times, 2013). Markedly, the World Bank disclosed that

―China was the biggest bilateral loan of Cambodia by the end of 2010, amounting to

66 percent of Cambodia total debt (As cited in Heng, 2012). Specifically, in term of

grant, Beijing had given Cambodia approximately 204.41 million US dollars

between 2000 and 2009 (Chap, 2010). According to Sok and Ek (2008), China was

considered the largest loan donor to Cambodia in the field of infrastructure and

hydro-power development, despite its limited grant. In this relation, Chap stipulated

that by 2010 there were 17 ongoing and completed projects funded by Chinese ODA,

most of which were infrastructure construction and rehabilitation—the construction

of Prek Kdam and Prek Tamak bridges, the rehabilitation of national road.7, national

57

road. 57, national road.76, and national road. 8, and more interestingly, the building

of the Cambodia‘s Council of Ministers and the reparation and construction of the

senate library, for instances (2012). More eye-catching, Keat Chhon in July 2012

also gave a cogent note that ―China was the largest provider of financial assistance to

Cambodia for agriculture and irrigation development‖ between 2010 and 2012

(Xinhua, 2012). Furthermore, during a meeting between former Chinese president

Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Hun Sen on the sideline of ASEAN Summit in

Cambodia in April 2012, ―China pledged almost US$40 million in grants and more

than $30 million in loans to Cambodia, while Hun Sen asked Hu Jintao for an annual

loan of between $300 million and $500 million for infrastructure, irrigation and

electricity‖ (Vong & Worrell, 2012). Analogously, based on Cheunboran (2014),

between 2013 and 2017, Beijing vowed to give loan to Phnom Penh with the value of

300 to 500 US dollars annually with a principal purpose to foster infrastructure

development. Additionally, it was also elucidated that ―China agreed to provide 48

million US dollars as grant aid and other 500 million as soft loan in the framework of

ASEAN to Cambodia for the year 2013‖ (Cheunboran, 2014).

3. The Impacts of Different Intensity of Economic Interaction

Ostensibly, given the earlier explication and figure, Cambodia should have

savored its business more with the U.S. as the former continually enjoy trade surplus

over the time, putting on a view that this should have operated vital factor to bring

propinquity between Washington and Phnom Penh. Nevertheless, this enjoyment of

Cambodia, from the public‘s point of view, was not a determining force. Very

important to note, it was imperative that one need to identify who were the key

58

players in shaping Cambodia‘s foreign relations with U.S. and China, and

indubitably it was Cambodia‘s top leaders, governing elites, and a few prominent

interest groups. To be more exact, having trade surplus with the U.S. was not what

made Cambodia lawmakers enjoy as those exports were, by and large, attributable to

the foreign companies in Cambodia, namely Taiwan, China mainland, and on.

As a matter of fact, what made Cambodia foreign policy decision makers

genuinely fond of China were lucrative Chinese investment and bilateral assistance

to the kingdom. In a view of Sok Udom Deth, a Southeast Asia politics analyst,

though U.S. was the largest market for Cambodia‘s exported commodities, garment

in particular, it could not outweigh Chinese FDI to Cambodia, and what China gave

to Hun Sen administration in respect to loans, and other controversial business

projects, either dams or others. Strikingly, Chinese aid to Cambodia was a great deal,

and its FDI to the country shared even more assiduous rate. Incontrovertibly, both

Chinese assistance and its investment brought considerable benefit for Cambodia top

leaders and governing elites as well as some interest groups. With regard to Chinese

assistance, Cambodian government and its relevant ministries could enjoy managing

it as the aid was conceded to hold no string attached, unlike foreign assistance of the

U.S. and other western donors which comprised complicated condition, and

governmental institutions were not mandated to control. Also, as China‘s assistance

to Cambodia was seen immensely growing to be at the top, the figure emphatically

attracted Cambodia‘s law makers, while the complicated conditions—improvement

in governance, democratic practices, transparency, and human rights, for example—

attached to the U.S. aid to Cambodia made them weary. Consistently, World Bank

asserted that ―China was the biggest bilateral loan of Cambodia by the end of 2010,

59

amounting to 66 percent of Cambodia total debt (As cited in Heng, 2012). Moreover,

both in soft loans and grants, Cambodia was reported to receive 2.7 billion U.S.

dollars from China between 1992 and 2013 (Global Times, 2013). This was much

huger than what the U.S. gave to Cambodia. In the last few years, U.S. aid to

Cambodia stayed around 70 million US dollars annually. Even more eye-catching,

the huge Chinese bilateral assistance focusing mainly on infrastructure development,

which potentially allowed Hun Sen regimes to foster his local popularity, was even

more attractive to Cambodian top leaders. Likewise, U.S. aid went to NGOs, not

central government, with aims to strengthen democracy, good governance, and

human rights, which occasionally derailed Cambodian government‘s interest.

In addition to bilateral assistance, Chinese investment in Cambodia would also

signify its massive role in forging the close partnership. In a distinctive comparison,

American investment in Cambodia held relatively much less shared compared to that

of China. According U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia William Todd, totaled U.S. FDI

in Cambodia amounted to only 1.3 billion between 1994 and 2011 (2013).

Specifically, in 2012, 54 million US dollars was a figure representing U.S.

investment in the kingdom (Office of the United States Trade Representative, n.d.).

Much larger than the U.S. investment, Chinese cumulative FDI in Cambodia was

said to be 9.1 billion between 1994 and 2013 (Seiff, 2013). Literally, it was

contributory to the creation of job opportunities in Cambodia as many of Chinese

firms invested in garment an footwear sectors as well as hydro-dam projects, though

it was trenchantly castigated that China imported its labor for the later sector.

Beyond this, Chinese investment was lucrative for the local governing and business

elites who shared close ties with the Prime Minister Hun Sen. Pertaining to this

60

argument, Deth Sok Udom postulated that those elites not just provided a link for

Chinese investment to Cambodia but also sought joint venture which could bring

them chances for personal enrichment, while Chinese investor would be fond of the

joint venture due to a calculation that those Cambodia local tycoons would help

safeguard their business.

II. Exchange of Visits

1. Cambodia and the United States and Their Exchange Visits

Compared to China, the intensity of exchange visit of Cambodia to the United

States appeared to be inferior and less active, markedly diverging from the way

Cambodia top leaders interacted with Beijing. Unlike with China, both King

Norodom Sihamoni, since his ascending to the throne in 2004, and Prime Minister

Hun Sen, for more than 30 years in his political career, were not seen paying any

official visit to Washington. Notwithstanding, few Cambodian senior officials did

made trips to America. To cite one, in September 2009, Cambodian Defense Minister

Tea Banh went on an official visit to the U.S., appreciating that the trip was with

more warmly welcome than the previous one in 1995 (Sam, 2009). During the

Washington trip, he was scheduled to have a talk with Robert Gates, U.S. Secretary

of State, on forging military cooperation and the strengthening Royal Cambodian

Armed Forces‘ capacity as well as bolstering regional security cooperation against

terrorism (Gold and Vong, 2009). Well regrettably, the human rights violation by

Cambodian soldiers was also put into discussion, which would not provide any

favorable atmosphere during the talk (Gold & Vong, 2009). Even more exasperated,

unnamed RCAF officers, who were believed to be in Bodyguard Unit of the Prime

Minister Hun Sen and in RCAF Brigades 31, 70, and 911, were denied visa entry

61

owing to suspicion relative to human rights abuse in Cambodia (Sam, 2009). Despite

this, the U.S. pledged to sponsor a joint military exercise scheduled to be inaugurated

in 2010 in Cambodia with the participation of over 2,000 military personnel from

countries in Asia-Pacific region—later it was known as Angkor Sentinel (Gold &

Vong, 2009). Likewise, at the invitation of Hilary Clinton, Hor Namhong,

Cambodian Foreign Minister, paid an official visit to Washington in June 2012

(China Daily, 2012). During the visit, Hor also met Hilary and other U.S. senators to

discuss issues on the development of Cambodia and Cambodia-US bilateral relations

(China Daily, 2012)

Figure Three: Exchange Visits of Cambodia to U.S.

Year Name

2009 Defense Minister Tea Banh

2012 Foreign Minister Hor Namhong

Source: (Cheunboran, 2014)

Consistently, it rarely happened to see the U.S. top leader visiting Phnom Penh,

after 1997 in particular. Authentically, Obama was the first U.S. president to visit

Cambodia, yet meticulously it was conducted only in the form of working visit, not

an official one. Making a trip to Cambodia to attend the East Asia Summit held in

Phnom Penh in November 2012, Obama met and talked with Hun Sen on the sideline

of the multilateral meeting. Gloomily, it was said to be a frank but tense conservation

due to the fact that Washington leader raised concern over human rights situation in

Cambodia, which met denial from Hun Sen who defended that in relation to human

rights issues, Cambodia had a better record than any other countries in the Southeast

Asian region (Kuch & Peter, 2012). Taking this opportunity, Hun Sen also made a

62

request to Obama to assuage the Cambodia‘s debt during Lon Nol regime which was

worth over 370 million US dollars (Spetalnik, 2012). Equally important to note, it

was interesting that Hilary Clinton as the U.S. Secretary of State visited Cambodia

twice, in November 2010 and November 2012 (Cheunboran, 2014). In a trip to

Cambodia in November 2010, distinctly, she was scheduled to meet King Sihanomi,

other Cambodian senior officials, opposition leaders as well as Cambodian youth

(An, 2011). Also, Hilary vowed to bring the issue of debt cancellation, totaled 445

million US dollars during Lon Nol regim, to Washington for consideration in

addition to what she pledged to deepen Cambodia-US bilateral relations (As cited in

An, 2011). In the latter trip, she came along with Obama to attend the East Asia

Summit held in Cambodia in November 2012. In the past, it was another U.S.

Secretary of State, Colin Powell, visiting Cambodia in 2003. According to Doyle,

Powell‘s trip in the kingdom yielded great success as he did not take high-profile

over castigation on anti-Thai riot in Cambodia, though U.S. concern on the situation

was raised (2003). Additionally, what made his trip fruitful was because he met with

opposition leader, CPP senior officials, and especially Powel had a talk with the

Prime Minister Hun Sen, which was said to be smooth in that several serious issues

were addressed, including a request for Cambodia to exempt US citizens and troops

from prosecution by the International Criminal Court‖ (Doyle, 2003). Besides, there

were also scores of other American senior officials, namely Under Secretary of State

John Negroponte in (2008), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot Marciel in 2008,

2009, and 2013, Senetor Jim Webb in 2009, Deputy Secretary of State William

Burns in 2010, and on (Cheunboran, 2014). To sum up, U.S. became the largest

63

market for Cambodia‘s exported products, while Chinese aid and FDI were even

more substantial.

Figure Four: Exchange Visits of U.S. to Cambodia

Year Name

2003 Secretary of State Colin Powel

2007 Chairman of the Committee on Asia and the Pacific, Eni

Faleomavaega

2008 Under Secretary of State John Negroponte

2008 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot Marciel

2009 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot Marciel

2009 Senator Jim Webb

2010 Chairman of the Committee on Asia and the Pacific, Eni

Faleomavaega

2010 Secretary of State Hilary Clinton

2010 Deputy Secretary of State William Burns

2012 President Barack Obama

2012 Secretary of State Hilary Clinton

2013 Assistant Secretary of State Michael Posner

2013 Senator Mary Landrieu

2013 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scot Marciel

Source: (Cheunboran, 2014)

2. Cambodia and China and Their Exchange Visits

Preponderantly, the strong bond of relationship between China and Cambodia

would be displayed by their frequent exchange visits. From Cambodia side, not to

mention about the making visit of Cambodian officials, it was discernable that there

64

was great frequency of Cambodian top leaders‘ visits to China. To cite one, between

2005 and 2010, Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni had made at least five visits to

Beijing in the pattern of either official visits or medical-checkup trips, let alone his

father, late King Norodm Sihanouk who was said to be the architect of Sino-

Cambodia traditional relations and who frequently visited and stayed in Beijing with

an honorable respect from Chinese (Cheunboran, 2014). Assiduously, China was the

first country that King Sihamoni paid his official trip oversea to since his ascending

to the throne in 2004—the visit took place in August 2005 (Highbeam Business,

2005). Interestingly, in 2008, the prince also attended the opening ceremony of the

Beijing Olympic Games, a historic event of China, citing that he came to share joys

with Chinese people (Xinhuanet, 2008). Notably, more than 80 world leaders

presided over this opening ceremony (Reuters, 2008). Besides those aforementioned

oversea trips, the prince also went for medical-checkup sojourns in Beijing in

January 2012 and in August 2013 respectively (the Cambodia Herald, 2012 & Vong

& White, 2013).

Figure Five: Exchange Visits of Cambodia to China

Year Name

1999 Prime Minister Hun Sen

2001 President of Senate Chea Sim, 2011

2001 President of Cambodian Red Cross Bunray Hun Sen

2004 Prime Minister Hun Sen

2005 King Norodom Sihamoni

65

2006 Foreign Minister Hor Namhong

2006 King Norodom Sihamoni

2007 National Assembly President HengSamrin

2008 King Norodom Sihamoni

2008 President of Senate Chea Sim

2010 King Norodom Sihamoni

2010 King Norodom Sihamoni

2010 Prime Minister Hun Sen

2011 National Assembly President Heng Samrin

2011 First Vice President of Senate Say Chhum

2012 King Norodom Sihamoni

2012 Foreign Minister Hor Namhong

2013 Prime Minister Hun Sen

2013 King Norodom Sihamoni

Source: (Cheunboran, 2014)

Other than seeing the visit of the king, other Cambodian top leaders would also

be subjected to thorough scrutiny. To the greatest, the Prime Minister Hun Sen was

considered a frequent visitor to China. By and large, it appeared that this Cambodian

strongman went to China six times since the post-1997 tussle, four of which were on

official trips (Storey, 2006 & Cheunboran, 2014). In February 03, 1999, a few days

after Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yi came to Cambodia, the strongman Hun Sen

paid a four-day official visit to Beijing for his first time since July 1997, scheduled to

meet former Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Premier Zhu Rongji, and the chairman

66

of the Chinese People‘s Political Consultative Conference Li Ruihan, to promote

their bilateral relations (The Cambodia Daily, 1999 & Levy, 1999). This oversea trip

allowed him to acquire 220 million US dollars both in loans and grants from China

for water resource and infrastructure development (Levy, 1999). With connection to

this, Jeldres put that ―since then there has been not a single month without a Chinese

delegation of some kind visiting Cambodia‖ (2003). Following the February-1999

visit, there were also other three official trips to China between 1997 and 2013,

mainly in April 2004, December 2010, and the last one in April 2013. Significantly,

in his trip to Beijing in December 2010, Cambodia and China unflaggingly agreed to

bolster their bilateral cooperation to a comprehensive strategic partnership, vividly

―increasing political and strategic mutual trust, expanding pragmatic cooperation,

involving each other‘s major concerns and common interests,‖ and forging greater

joint collaboration between the two countries to promote peace and prosperity to deal

with challenges in light of complicated regional and international situation (People‘s

Daily Online, 2010). Moreover, at the invitation of newly appointed Chinese Primier

Li Keqian, Hun Sen made another four-day official visit to China in April 2013,

meeting with President Xi Jinping, Primier Li Kequian, and Zhang Dejiang, the

chairman of National People‘s Congress Standing Committee (Vong, 2013).

According to Khov (n.d.), there were eight documents signed, and to name a few,

they were Memorandum of Understanding between National Bank of Cambodia and

China Banking Regulatory Commission, Action Plan on the Implementation of the

China-Cambodia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Memorandum of

Understanding on the 5 Million Tons of Oil Refinery Project among China

Development Bank, China Export and Credit Insurance and Cooperation, China

67

Project Machinery Industry Cooperation, and Cambodia Petrochemical Company

which valued 1.67 billion US dollars, and on. In this connection, it was also dictated

that in addition to the MoU for oil refinery projects, there were also other agreements

on concessional loans worth over 100 million US dollars (Vong, 2013). Alongside

with the prime minister, it was seen separate visits of other Cambodian leaders: Chea

Sim, President of Senate, in March 2001 and September 2008; Heng Samrin,

President of National Assembly, in August 2007 and December 2011; Say Chhum,

First Vice President of the Senate, in October 2011; and Hor Namhong, Foreign

Minister, in July 2006 and in February 2012 (Cheunboran, 2014). Additionally,

countless exchanges visits of Cambodia junior and senior officials as well as other

military officers, which took place almost every single month, came into place.

In tandem, scores of Chinese leaders‘ visits to Cambodia also insinuated a sense

of reciprocity. According to Cheunboran (2014), between 2000 and 2013, there were

at least seventeen Chinese top leaders and high-ranking senior officials visiting

Cambodia. Chiefly, in 2000 at the request of King Sihanouk, President Jiang Zemin

paid a state visit to Cambodia, pledging to cancel Cambodia‘s debt to China (Jeldres,

2003). Also, both sides, according to Chheang (2009), ―signed the Joint Statement on

bilateral cooperation, confirming further development of closer and stable traditional,

neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries in the new century.‖

Interestingly, in May 2011, Li Peng, former Chinese Premier and the Chairman of

the Standing Committee of the National People‘s Congress, made a three-day trip to

Cambodia, taking back with a request from Prime Minister Hun Sen regarding 60-

million-US-dollar aids for military demobilization and road construction in Kratie

and Stung Treng (the Cambodia Daily & Reed, 2001). Even more noticeable, in

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November 2002, Phnom Penh administration warmly welcomed a visit of Chinese

Premier Zhu Rongji, prompting a Beijing‘s declaration to make a debt relief for

Cambodia in parallel to a vow to strengthen diplomatic and economic cooperation of

both countries (Chheang, 2009). Equally important, Premier Wen Jiabao paid two

trips two Cambodia; the first one was in April 2006 while the second trip took place

in November 2012 (Cheun, 2014). With due regard to the former, Cambodia and

China signed a Treaty of Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation before it was

upgraded to comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010, while Wen vowed 600

million US dollars as financial assistance to Cambodia, and Hun Sen in return hailed

China as ―Cambodia‘s most trustworthy friend‖ (Chheang, 2009). Displaying

unswerving partnership between Cambodia and China, President Hu Jintao paid a

visit to Cambodia on March 2012, a few days before the inauguration of ASEAN

Summit in Phnom Penh (Vong, 2012). During the talk between him and Hun Sen, it

was speculated that ―China pledged almost US$40 million in grants and more than

$30 million in loans to Cambodia, while Hun Sen asked Hu Jintao for an annual loan

of between $300 million and $500 million for infrastructure, irrigation and electricity‖

(Vong & Worrell, 2012). In line with this, while both countries agreed to a clear

message that ―neither nation was in a rush to deal with the prickly South China Sea

dispute,‖ China verbally expressed its support for Cambodia‘s application for a

UNSC non-permanent member seat between 2013 and 2014 (Vong & Worrell, 2012).

69

Figure Six: Exchange Visits of China to Cambodia

Year Name

2000 President Jiang Zemin

2001 Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People‘s

Congress Li Peng

2002 Premier of State Council Zhu Rongji

2004 Vice Premier of State Council Wu Yi

2006 Premier of State Council Wen Jiabao

2009 Vice President Xi Jinping

2010 Vice Premier of State Council Hui Liangyu

2010 Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People‘s

Congress Wu Bangguo

2012 President Hu Jintao

2012 Premier of State Council Wen Jiabao

2013 Foreign Minister Wang Yi

Source: (Cheunboran, 2014)

3. The Impacts of Different Intensity of Exchange Visits

Even sheer vitality would also put an emphasis on the role of exchange visit.

Having been talked in the early phase of this chapter, intensity of exchange visit

would not only provide a useful indicator, but also possibly disclose an underlying

motivation why a state appeared to be more highly interactive with another state than

any others. Linking this to the case of Cambodia‘s diplomatic interaction with China

and the U.S., the impact made by different degree of exchange visits would be

incontrovertibly compelling.

70

Authentically, the more frequent the visit, the closer the relations among the top

leaders. The exchange visits between Cambodia and the U.S., in this respect, looked

comparatively much lower if China was to be mentioned. Historically speaking,

Obama was said to be the first U.S. president to come to Cambodia, yet it was crucial

to note that the trip was undertaken just in the pattern of working visit, not an official

one, showing that it made no differences. Beside, in conformity with the unfolding

finding, in addition to other American senior officials, there were only two U.S.

secretaries of state paying official visit to Cambodia, namely Colin Powell and

Hilary Clinton. Additionally, only few Cambodian senior officials, including

Defense Minister Tea Banh and Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, visited the U.S.,

while King Sihamoni and the Prime Minister Hun Sen never paid any official to

Washington. Given this low level of intensity in term of exchange visit, the negative

images of leaders in Washington and Phnom Penh held towards one another in the

past was by no means ameliorated, not to mention the development of their

propinquity. Even more likely, Cambodia may have been neither convinced that she

was to strike balance between China and the U.S. nor implacable to take side with

Washington.

Differently, the exchange visits of Cambodia and China not just appeared to be

much more frequent and more indulgently interactive, but also brought great

satisfaction for Phnom Penh government in each trips made either to Beijing or to

Phnom Penh. Such a frequency and satisfaction indubitably not just synchronized

Cambodian top leaders, particularly Hun Sen, with Chinese counterpart but also

helped burgeon their existing close ties. In a span between 1997 and 2013, most

Chinese top leaders experienced visiting Phnom Penh, frequently they satisfied

71

Cambodian leaders with a number of unstinting accolades. For example, during

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao‘s official visit to Cambodia, he agreed to provided

Cambodia with 600-million-US-dollar financial assistance, and in return Hun Sen

acclaimed China as a most trusted friend (Chheang, 2009). More recently, Chinese

Hu Jintao visited Cambodia in the late March 2012, a couple days before ASEAN

Summit held in Phnom Penh, and at once 40-million-US-dollar grants and over-30-

million-US-dollars loan were China‘s vow to give to Cambodia (Vong & Worrell,

2012). As exchange visits were a two-way communication, furthermore, King

Sihamoni and Prime Minister Hun Sen and other Cambodian high-ranking officials

very frequently paid officials visits to Beijing, adding an edge to Sino-Cambodia

relations. For instance, Hun Sen, let alone other senior officials and the king, made

official visits to China for four times. More often than not, in each of his visit, he met

deep satisfaction from what China provided him. Evidently, in his first trip to China

in February 1999, China gave him 220 million US dollars both in loans and grants

from China for water resource and infrastructure development (Levy, 1999).

In a denouement, the investigation on economic links and exchange visits

between Cambodia with the United States and with China seems to explain the

reasons that exhorted Cambodia to be more supportive to China than to the U.S. To

reiterate, given that Cambodian lawmakers and prominent groups saw more benefit

from its economic cooperation and frequency of exchange visits with China than

with the U.S., this served as a stepping stone in encouraging Phnom Penh

administration to move closer to China. Notwithstanding, this impetus would not

prevail the factors discussing the roles of the Cambodian prime minister, bureaucrats,

and interest groups, due to a certitude that the these groups were the determining

72

forcers of Cambodia foreign policy, and they were even capable of making decision

whether economic cooperation and exchange exchanges with either countries should

stay at Cambodia‘s prime importance.

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Chapter VI: Conclusion

____________________________________________________________

With a fulcrum that Cambodia gained genuine independence from France,

Cambodia instantaneously incepted diplomatic vitalization with the United States

and China in mid 1950s, let alone the other countries. Sino-Cambodia ties burgeoned

closer, thanks in large part to personal contact between Prince Sihanouk and Zhou

Enlai, Chinese Premier. Contrastively, diplomatic relations between Phnom Penh and

Washington underwent inconstancy, remodeling deteriorated in the early 1960s

before the normalization in 1969 which was lacerated again in 1975 when Khmer

Rouge occupied Cambodia. In 1991, diplomatic restoration between Cambodia and

the U.S. took place, engendering the end of economic sanction and paving a way for

development assistance of Washington to Phnom Penh. Gloomily, the newfangled

contact between the two countries was not of panegyric due in part to the China

factor. In the wake of the July-1997 tussle, Beijing appeared to have wielded

growing influence on Cambodia. Correspondingly, since this unfolded point of time,

Hun Sen administration became increasingly more supportive to China than the

United States.

Predominantly, the explication to such a conduct of Cambodia could be entailed

by several occasions. Assiduously, an allusion to the case of Uighur in 2009 seemed

mobilize unflagging support for this conclusion. With reference to this, Phnom Penh

administration incontrovertibly decided to send the twenty Uighur asylum seekers

back to Beijing, sparking spontaneous reaction from Washington by the halt of

military assistance. Even more palpable, the case of Phnom Penh fiasco, which took

74

place when Cambodia hosted ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2012, would

insinuate the unfolded scholarship. In the face of trenchant and firm insistence from

Vietnam and the Philippines to interpolate South China sea dispute, which was a

flashpoint, into the agenda of discussion, Hor Namhong, as the chair, refrained the

meeting from deliberating the issue, precipitating ASEAN ‗s failure to issue the joint

communiqué—the first time in ASEAN‘s 45-year history. Arguably, this intriguing

incident alluded Cambodia‘s decision to take side with China rather than her ASEAN

fellow colleagues, recognizably the Philippines and Vietnam who were the important

allies of the United States in the region. Very important to note, Chinese President

Hu Jintao paid official visit to Cambodia in late March 2012, a few days before

ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, and managed to agree with Cambodia counterpart

that ―neither nation was in a rush to deal with the prickly South China Sea dispute‖

(Vong & Worrell, 2012). Markedly, Washington had declared its interest in the

freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, while China enlisted the

aforementioned sea in its core interest (England, 2010). Based on the raised cases,

scores of commentators were confident that Cambodia did take strongly supportive

approach in ameliorating its close ties with China, rather the U.S. Disposing of

harsher assertion, one could literally postulated that Cambodia were falling in

China‘s charm.

In this connection, pictures to explain the motivations which encouraged

Cambodia to be more supportive to China rather than the United States could be

extracted from the unfolded findings of this study. Preponderantly, impacts made by

the Prime Minister Hun Sen‘s personality and perception on such a move of

Cambodia seemed to adopt high profile, while his background‘s impacts remained

75

skeptical. Palpably, as the final decision-maker with indisputably incontestable

power, Hun Sen appeared not to strike balance regarding Cambodia‘s relations with

China and the U.S., shaped in large part by his background. In the past, Hun Sen did

hold acrimony towards both China and the U.S. Given the politically fervent

atmosphere after the tussle in July 1997 in Phnom Penh together with the strident

chastise from the U.S. and its congress, the strongman‘s historical animosity towards

America would not be evanescent at any short notice, or more likely, it could be

rather retched up. Contrastively, in the wake of July-1997 street fighting, the prime

minister not just appeared to bury the historical antipathy towards Beijing but also

prompted to play Chinese card in restoring his government‘s legitimacy and in

cultivating political, financial, and military support. Seemingly, the perpetually

considerable rewards that Beijing gave to Hun Sen and his administration surpassed

the anti-Chinese sentiment which imprinted on the strongman‘s mindset in the past.

In this regard, had his background made the impact, the close ties between him, his

administration and Beijing would have been hardly possible. In reference to the

finding, personality of Hun Sen could also have taken weighty responsibility in

determining the aforementioned foreign policy of Cambodia towards the two

countries. Arguably, the irascibly intractable and active-aggressive manner of the

Cambodian leader imposed appalling condition which hardly helped revitalize

Cambodia-US relations due to the fact that very often Washington trenchantly

berated Phnom Penh administration, particularly over human rights, democratic

institutions, and governance issues, which to Hun Sen was not acceptable.

Aside, to scrutinize other catalysts which engendered Cambodia to employ

supportive foreign policy to China, rather than the U.S. was to take a glance at the

76

state level of analysis. Basically, those variables subjected to scrutiny involved

Cambodian bureaucrat—Hor Namhong—interest groups, and crisis situations

happening to the kingdom. Overriding importance, initially, would attach to the

investigation on the profile of the Foreign Minister Hor Namhong. Pertinent to the

case of Uighur, there was no amply unequivocal evidence confirming that the

decision to send those 20 asylum seekers to Beijing in late 2009 was under his ruling.

Despite that the prime minister Hun Sen and the interior minister Sar Kheng

seemingly had more say in this issue, the foreign minister, more or less, might have

been a part of decision. In other words, he had to be in agreement before sending

those Uighur to China. Similar scenario also downplayed in the case of Phnom Penh

fiasco during the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in 2012. In this case, Hor

Namhong, as the chair, refrained the meeting from discussing the South China Sea

issue, instigating fervent atmosphere between Cambodia with the Philippines and

Vietnam which eventually precipitated the failure to issue joint communiqué—first

time in ASEAN‘s 45-year history. Perceptibly, there must have been a discussion

between the Prime Minister Hun Sen and Hor Namhong before such a move was

made. In both cases, the role of the foreign minister was influential due to a certitude

that the issues was in his region of expert and legitimacy plus his anti-American

sentiment during the Khmer Rouge regimes. Other possible motivations were that the

U.S., particularly the Congressmen, not just frequently castigated his government

over human rights issues, governance but also provided scant and lukewarm supports

to Cambodia while China pleased his administration by providing growingly military,

diplomatic, political, and financial assistance.

77

In relation to the Cambodian interest groups, it was discernible that they were

more likely to be capable of wielding profound impacts on the close ties between

Cambodia and China due to two major facets. Prominently, the close connection with

the prime minister Hun Sen personally and the CPP-led government in general would

add considerable impetus behind the business linkage between Beijing and Phnom

Penh. Palpably, Lao Meng Khin and his wife Yeay Phou, Theng Bunma, and Sy

Kong Triv, for instance, were seen falling into this scenario. Apart from that, holding

important position in the government together with their hybrid ethnicity helped

facilitate their business contact. In addition to owning sizable business in the

kingdom, Lao Meng Khin, for instance, were the CPP senator while Sy Kong Triv

was the Vice President of Cambodian Chamber of Commerce and Theng Bunma in

the past was not just an economic advisor to CPP but also a former president of

Cambodian Chamber of Commerce. As a matter of fact, all the unfolded business

figures were Cambodian-Chinese ethnics. Employing their important position in the

government together with their Chinese descent, they could exploit opportunity from

these to build business linkage with Chinese. For instance, Bunma was seen having

business contact with Chinese investors from Guangxi province, while Sy Kong Triv

had business joint venture with Wuzhishan LS and Sinomach China Perfect

Machinery Industry Corp. Correspondingly, Lao Meng Khin and his wife Yeay Phou

also hold a share in the joint venture with Wuzhishan LS, Sinohydro United Ltd, and

Jiangsu Taihu International. Additioanally, Lao Meng Khin was also the owner of

Shukaku Inc. which rumors pointed out that this company had financial back from

China.

78

Also, scores of events in Cambodia‘s contexts proved to be another significant

finding. By and large, China helped fill in gaps in term of political, military, and

financial support in time of crises in Cambodia, while the U.S. very often took a

tough stand towards CPP and Hun Sen. Unequivocally, the adverse political

atmosphere in Phnom Penh following the July-1997 tussle could serve as a stepping

stone which instigated China to shift its policy towards CPP. In the wake of

mounting international pressure which accused CPP of staging coup d‘état, Phnom

Penh government not just was isolated but also confronted with the foreign aid cut.

Even worse, Cambodia‘s application for ASEAN membership was rejected while its

seat at UN was promptly suspended and U.S. Congress announced ban on direct

bilateral assistance to the kingdom. Notwithstanding, Beijing administration helped

Cambodia by filling in this gap. China was not just the first country to recognize the

regime but also provided Hun Sen government with military and financial assistance

in time of overriding need. More noticeably, Hun Sen government encountered

another political crisis again after the 1998 election. Given that CPP could not

acquire two third majority of the total vote, it was not in legal capability to form the

government though its party claimed election victory. Political deadlock was

prompted by the rejection from FUNCIPEC and Sam Rainsy parties, citing election

irregularities which later they organized large-scale demonstration in Phnom Penh

streets. In light of such an impasse, while the U.S. took a tough line towards CPP,

China not only endorsed the election result but also fiercely chastised the

demonstration. Another instance would attach to the post-July-2013-election

situation which the CNRP, the largest opposition party, refused to recognize the

election result, exacerbating political turmoil in Phnom Penh. In the face of the

79

terribly impending political climax, China endorsed the election result in a flash,

while the U.S. not just had not yet officially the turnout but also appeared to move

close to the opposition party.

In an edge of system level analysis, economic links between Cambodia with

China and the United States were subjected to detailed scrutiny. In relation to this, it

was found out that between 1997 and 2013 Beijing seemed to play weightier role

than the United States. Incontrovertibly, in the lapse of the said period, the U.S.

emerged as the biggest trading partner of Cambodia, particularly in the areas of

garment and footwear. Lucidly, Phnom Penh savored the steadfastly increasing trade

surplus with Washington. This enjoyment of Cambodia, however, was not a

determining force, indubitably not capable of outweighing Beijing‘s businesses with

Phnom Penh, distinctly Hun Sen government and his group. As a matter of fact,

Cambodian governing elites relished more with Chinese investment and aids to

Cambodia than with those of the U.S. Strikingly, Chinese aid to Cambodia was a

great deal, and its FDI to the country shared even more assiduous rate. Comparably,

Beijing assistance to Cambodia was increasingly sizable with a distinctive purpose

for infrastructure development, which potentially helped burgeoned local popularity

of Hun Sen administration, particularly in Cambodian rural areas. It not just was said

to be no string attached but also allowed relevant ministries to manage, which was

utterly different from U.S. assistance to the kingdom. More than that, U.S. aid was

said given with fewer amount, probably around 70 million US dollars annually,

diffused through local NGOs and comprising complicated conditions which made

some officials weary. As Chinese aid was given without any complicated conditions,

those senior officials could take opportunities to exploit from aids for their personal

80

enrichment. Beside, Chinese investment in Cambodia was even more interesting.

Unambiguously, Chinese presented the biggest share of investment in Cambodia—

from 1994 to 2013 some sources suggested 9.1 billion US dollars while other said

9.6 billion U.S. dollars. In the meantime, total American investment in Cambodia

amounted to only 1.3 billion US dollars between 1994 and 2011 (Todd, 2011). Given

some of Chinese investors came to Cambodia through the so-called Guanxi—

informal business links—the local Cambodian businessmen and governing elites

could took opportunities to gain benefit from this through business joint venture.

However, Cambodian tycoons could not apply the same scenario if they were to

amalgamate business with American companies, given that those firms were to be

bound by regulations, rules of laws, and on, which were imposed by their

government.

Last but not least, the study found out that the different intensities of exchanges

visits would also invite sheer vitality in reference to the motivations that exhorted

Cambodia to adopt different conducts to these two countries. It was more likely that

the more frequent the exchange visits, the closer the relations between top leaders

and senior officials. In this regard, Sino-Cambodia interactions did arrest this

advantage, while that of the U.S. and Cambodia seemingly stayed less indulgent.

Particularly, between 2000 and 2013, there were approximately 20 times that

Chinese top leaders and senior officials paid official visits to Cambodia, while

similar figure also applied to the frequency of Cambodian side making official visits

to China. Assiduously, during the unfolded period all Chinese leaders, both premiers

and presidents, except President Xi Jinping in a post as Chinese president, made trips

to Cambodia, while the Cambodian kings, both prince Sihanouk and prince Sihamoni,

81

and the prime minister Hun Sen were seen as frequent visitors to China in the fashion

of official trips. Despite the fact that Xi Jinping have not yet visited Cambodia since

he came to power, he, as Chinese vice president, did pay official once to the kingdom

in 2009. Likewise, inspite of the fact that King Sihamoni and Prime Minister have

not paid any official visit to Washington, few Cambodian officials made official visit

to the U.S., namely Defense Minister Tea Banh in September 2009 and Foreign

Minister Hor Namhong in June 2012. In the meantime, it was also seen the U.S. top

leaders visiting Cambodia, namely Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2003,

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton in 2010 and 2012, and President Obama in 2012.

Very important to note, the visit of Obama to the Phnom Penh was made in the form

of working, not official, visit. Aside, Cambodian leaders and senior officials

incontrovertibly met with satisfaction more in their exchange visits with China. For

instance, in the first official visit of Hun Sen to Beijing in 1999, Hun Sen lucidly

endeared to what China gave Cambodia, 220 millions US dollars both in loans and

grants for water resource and infrastructure development. More recently, in April

2013 during his trip to Beijing in fact, Hun Sen received over 100 million US dollars

in concessional loan from China, in addition to Memorandum of Understanding for

Oil Refinery Project together with scores of agreements reached between Cambodia

and China. Notably, before this trip, Hun Sen also went to Beijing, where he reached

agreement with Chinese counterpart to forge Sino-Cambodia relations to

comprehensive strategic partnership in December 2010. In tandem, Chinese leaders

‗trips to the kingdom very often pleased Hun Sen and his administration. For

instance, when Chinese President Jiang Zemin came to Cambodia, he pledged to

cancel Cambodia‘s debt to China. Even more eye-catching, while Wen vowed 600

82

million US dollars as financial assistance to Cambodia during his trip to Cambodia in

2006, and Hun Sen in return hailed China as Cambodia‗s most trustworthy friend.

With the United States, exchange visits were not as active, and the issues of human

rights and democratic institutions very often were impediment to their smooth

interactions. For instance, Obama was the first US President to came to Cambodia in

the form of working visit, but the talk between him and Hun Sen resulted in frank but

tense conversation due to the fact that concern over human rights situation in

Cambodia was raised which met with denial from Hun Sen.

In a denouement, all the variables—the Prime Minister Hun Sen‘s perception,

personality, and background, the influences of Cambodia bureaucrats and interest

groups, unfolded crises happening to Cambodia, and different intensity in economic

interactions and exchange visits—subjected to the examination seemingly unveiled

their contribution to foreign policy of Cambodia, which was seen more supportive to

China than to the United States. Above all, it seemed that the prime minister‘s

personality and perception could made the strongest impacts on such a move of

Cambodia due to the fact that he was at the driver seat of the country, whose power

was undisputed in a country with weak check and balance system and whose

tendency was more prone to China than to the United States. In tandem, the impact

made by his background stayed questionable. In the realm of economic diplomacy, it

could be said that those interests groups were capable of providing a gateway for

Chinese investors to invest their capital in the kingdom, while the role of Amcham to

attract American investors to Cambodia was not as outstanding yet. In reference to

Hor Namhong, he was seen playing a subordinate role given that in addition to his

leading role in foreign services, he was so close to Prime Minister Hun Sen who was

83

the ultimate decision maker when it came to the core issue or interests. Likewise,

Economic interactions, the unfolded crises, and exchange visits seemed to share

equal importance given that they formed impetuses for the determining force, which

was the Prime Minister Hun Sen.

84

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