Biologising paternity, moralising maternity: The construction of parenthood in the determination of...
Transcript of Biologising paternity, moralising maternity: The construction of parenthood in the determination of...
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A final version of this article was published in Feminist Legal Studies, 16(2): 215-236, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10691-008-9089-y Machado, Helena (2008), “Biologising paternity, moralising maternity: The construction of parenthood in the determination of paternity through the courts in Portugal”.1
ABSTRACT. This article explores how the Portuguese legal system’s efforts to determine paternity of children born outside legal marriage, automatically provoked by the Registry Office when a birth registration doesn’t indicate the father, reveal cultural models, which reinforce the naturalisation of the differences between mothers and fathers with significant effects on the social construction of parental roles, expectations of family organisation and of female sexual behaviour. It relies on a case study using ethnographic data drawn from fieldwork in courtrooms with direct observation of court procedures for the determination of paternity, as well as interviews with judges and Prosecuting Counsels all over the country. It is argued that the judicial practices, in the specific context of courtroom investigation of paternity, reinforce gender inequalities in two interrelated ways. On one hand, they are strengthened in the discursive practices performed during the course of the interactions between judges, Prosecuting Counsels and the mother of the minor, as well as the alleged father. On the other hand, the normative models of family life and the dominant ideology of women’s and men’s relationships, which emphasize women’s socially subordinate position, are revealed by the selective use of DNA testing in paternity cases, based on the judge’s evaluation of the mother’s sexual behaviour. This paper argues that legal attempts to establish the paternity of children born outside marriage – though based on novel technical and supposedly objective procedures – tend, nevertheless, to reproduce the prevailing patriarchal structures.
KEY WORDS: court proceedings, evaluation of female sexual behaviour, family
law, feminist legal studies, parenthood, DNA paternity testing.
1 Author’s note: This paper draws on research funded by the Portuguese Ministry of Science and Higher Education –
Foundation for Science and Technology, and I acknowledge that support with gratitude. An earlier version of this
article was presented on a seminar organized by the Department of Sociology of the University of York, in February
2005. Many thanks to the members of the audience for their input. I also would like to thank Susana Silva (Faculty of
Arts, University of Oporto), Cátia Guimarães and Filomena Louro (Scientific Editing Programme of University of
Minho) and Filipe Santos (Department of Sociology, University of Minho) for revising the final version of this text.
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Children born outside institutional marriage without a legal father, along with the
uncertainty of biological paternity, have always been a problem for legal systems that
based ownership and inheritance of property on descent through the male line. Carol
Smart puts it in these terms: “[Historically], paternity has been a continuing ‘problem’
for the patriarchal family in Western Europe (…) and this is manifest in the tortuous
complexing nature of the legal system designed to protect the descent of property and
privilege” (Smart, 1987, p. 99).
It has not always been usual to establish the link between a child and its parents,
when the child is born to an unmarried woman. Ancient societies commonly denied
family ties between such a child and its father. In ancient Roman law, a child born out
of marriage was a filius nullius, i.e., it had no family ties with any of its parents (not
even with its mother). It has not been self-evident that such a child should be entitled to
financial support from its father, or that it should have the right to inherit from him (or
his relatives). In fact, until the 70s, affiliation laws in most western European countries
protected the ‘legitimate family’2. There were very limited conditions for admissibility
of a paternity investigation and it was almost impossible to recognize paternity in the
case of a married man. In fact, the law almost appeared to have been designed to give
2 In France, the Civil Code of 1804 forbade trying to establish who the father of a child born to an unmarried woman
was. In Portugal, the Civil Code of 1867 imposed several restrictions on the investigation of paternity, in order to protect the
legitimate family. On the contrary, in ancient Nordic Law, however, the link between a child born to an unmarried woman and its
father was acknowledged, and it seems to be characteristic of the Nordic countries that the task of establishing paternity of non-
marital children (in Sweden since the late 1910s) should fall on society. The legal situation in the Nordic countries is not, however,
identical in all aspects, as is, for example, where the question of how a refusal on the part of the mother to co-operate in the
identification of the father is regarded (Eekelaar & Sarcevic, 1993).
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the putative father a ‘sporting chance to get away with it’ (Barton & Douglas, 1995:
200).
Despite some differences in family law systems concerning affiliation laws, most
Western European legal systems are historically interconnected and have some common
legal dispositions, like the appliance of the Roman law rule of the presumption of
paternity, – Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrate - which ties men legally to any children
born to their wives (Assier-Andrieu & Commaille, 1995; Council of Europe, 1999;
Diduck & Kaganas, 1999; Eekelaar & Sarcevic, 1993; European Commission, 1997;
Forder, 1993). Even if there isn’t a biological tie between the child and the mother’s
husband, the law considers that the husband is the legal father and in most countries
people have to engage themselves in a particular civil proceeding in order to remove
that presumption of paternity. As such, the marriage retains a privileged place as the
preferred way of attributing paternity (Sheldon, 2005 p. 541). However, regarding
children born outside legal marriage, the problem of paternity remains. If the unmarried
father voluntarily registers the child’s birth with the mother, he will automatically be
recognised as the legal father, but when that doesn’t happen and the birth certificate
doesn’t indicate the identity of the child’s father, courts proceedings may make efforts
to establish fatherhood. In Portugal, since the civil code of 1966 that it is the State’s
obligation to initiate the paternity establishment proceedings when no father is listed to
the birth registration. This obligation ends when the child reaches the age of two, and
after that period the determination of paternity can be asked by the mother, the putative
father or the child when becoming of age. This paper will only focus the cases in which
paternity establishment is automatically provoked by the Registry Office forwarding
details of birth registrations where no father is listed.
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Although family law and civil proceedings concerning investigation of paternity
of children born outside marriage may vary in the diverse national legal systems3,
almost all societies now support efforts to establish parentage in these cases. The degree
of support varies from country to country. The reasons to establish parentage and the
definition of legal rules to establish parentage are controversial and not self evident.
Most European societies support efforts to establish parenthood in order to promote
creating families and ensure that children are cared not only financially but also with
regards to education, upbringing and day-to-day care. There are also medical reasons to
establish parentage, the main ones being to enable the child to know his personal
medical history and the importance of parents in the psychological development of
infants. These must not be underestimated. However, it does not mean that establishing
parentage is necessarily important. It may not matter to the child if the male and the
female adults of its family are its legal parents or not. It may be claimed that the
important thing is that there is someone who acts as a father and a mother towards the
child (Eriksson & Saldeen, 1993). At the other end of the spectrum, however, there is
the possibility that the parent with custody (generally the mother) doesn’t want the
recognition or the determination of paternity, because the child was born as a result of
transient or coercive relationships. The underlying aim of the present UK Family Law
on parental responsibility has been to protect women who are ‘victims' of such
circumstances by allowing the mother, in effect, to veto parental responsibility for an
unmarried father, unless he can persuade the court to override her objections.
3 Several European countries, such as Scandinavian countries, Germany and Portugal have compulsory inquiries of paternity when
the birth certificate of a child under two years old does not show the identity of the father. Other countries just give the court the
power to investigate paternity in the course of existing civil proceedings regarding the child. That is the case in the UK, where
Family Law allows the Secretary of State, the alleged father or the person with custody to apply for a declaration of parentage of the
child (Cretney, 2003).
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Nevertheless, recent changes to the UK law by way of ‘The Child Support Act’
(Pensions and Social Security), Act 2000 allows courts to authorize blood testing of a
child when the parent with custody refuses consent, but the court considers it to be in
the child’s best interest (Wallbank, 2004).
Nonetheless, in the last four decades, in most European countries, family law has
registered a drift towards the end of the disparity between children born in and out of
wedlock, as well as the privileging of assuring the children’s right to have a mother and
a father. The reasons for this general consensus are connected with personal,
psychological, social, economic, moral and medical factors, which interrelate in
complex ways. Some of them have even raised some controversies, especially regarding
issues related to the invocation of the need to establish paternity of children without a
legal father, or who have a legal father who is not the biological father, regarding
children born by artificial procreation using donor sperm (Gilbar, 2005)4.
Some authors point out that the recent trends of affiliation laws in Europe have
three common elements: equalisation, liberalisation and modernisation (Senaeve,
1993). Regarding ‘equalisation’, the primary object and result of the reforms has been
the elimination of discrimination between various categories of children (legitimate and
illegitimate) on the grounds of birth5. The liberalisation of affiliation laws has occurred
4 Over the last years there has been an intense public debate concerning the child’s right to know its genetic origins. In the context of
donor anonymity, the debate refers to the balance between the child’s right to know (the ethics of ‘rights’, according to which
priority is given to the right over the good) and the possible integrity of the family (the ethics of ‘utility’ by which the concern
would be to balance the interests of all the parties, bearing in mind the consequences for individuals and for the family as a unit)
(Wallbank, 2004, p. 247).
5 In the past four decades, all west European countries have carried out more or less substantial reforms of their affiliation laws
regarding the equality in all fields between children born within and outside of wedlock, with the elimination of the traditional
institution of legitimacy and its accompanying terminology. Some outstanding examples of reforms of affiliation laws took place in
the Netherlands (1969), in France (1972), Switzerland (1976), Portugal (1977), Luxembourg (1979) and Belgium (1987) (for further
details on reforms on affiliation laws in Europe, consult Senaeve, 1993; Assier-Andrieu & Commaille, 1995; Spaas, 1998).
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in the sense of suppressing numerous restrictions on the establishment and on the
contestation of affiliation. Finally, one of the most perceptible objectives of all these
reforms has been to modernise affiliation laws by adapting them to new medico-genetic
techniques, which allow a child to be conceived without sexual intercourse.
Furthermore, attention has been given to the application of scientific proof of parentage,
with a view to the establishment and the contestation of maternity and paternity. Today,
DNA profiling is indeed becoming increasingly important, as part of the court’s
procedures to investigate paternity of children born outside legal marriage, as well as
when a voluntary recognition of paternity is not spontaneously made by the alleged
father.
These profound modifications in Family Law reflect a set of conditions that
rebounded in many countries, namely the considerable advances seen during the 70s in
the field of genetics and particularly in the realm of investigation of biological paternity.
At par with these scientific advances, there were certain ideological changes, translated
in a greater concern with the defence of the rights of the children born outside
institutional marriage, as well as a growing intervention of the State in areas such as
protection of the minor and control of parental authority (Meulders in Eekelaar &
Sarcevic, 1993).6
The critical and theoretical approach of this study is based on two distinctive and
confluent areas.
6 The European concern over the rights of children born outside marriage is self-evident in the orientation professed by the EC of 15
October 1975, the European Convention on the Judicial Statute of Children born Outside of Wedlock, which specified the need for
the member states of the European Council to adopt common judicial dispositions on this matter.
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It endorses the currents of thought followed by cultural anthropology for quite a
long time, since Lévi-Strauss’s studies of the kinship systems (Lévi-Strauss, 1969),
argued that the reproduction of human beings is also the reproduction of social
relationships (Strathern, 1992; Spass, 1998; Smart, 1987; Smart & Neale, 1999) and is
also rooted in a tradition of feminist legal studies. This research explores the social
relationships reproduced by the courts of law and evoked in the context of paternity
investigation (i.e. representations of paternity, maternity and family) which highlight the
ideologically dominant gender relations, interpreted as means of reinforcing the socially
subordinate position of women.
This study explores how the Portuguese court procedures for the determination of
paternity out of wedlock, when the alleged father doesn’t voluntarily recognize
paternity, highlighting the prevailing notions of parenthood. I will use ethnographic data
collected from fieldwork in Portuguese courtrooms, based on direct observation of court
proceedings in paternity cases in one court of law selected to develop a case study, as
well as in interviews with judges and Prosecuting Counsels all over the country. This
paper will analyse two aspects of court procedures in paternity investigation: Firstly,
based on feminist legal studies literature, we will consider the modes of domination of
women by means of courtroom discourse (Cameron, 1990; Conley, 1998; Matoesian,
1992). In particular, the discursive practices performed during the interrogations of the
mother and the alleged father, in the course of paternity investigations, will be
examined. And secondly, the selective uses of DNA testing in paternity cases, whose
request is mainly based on the evaluation of the moral character of the child’s mother,
will be analysed. DNA testing – one of the technologies believed to be almost infallible
– is used in a restrictive and selective way, with the unrevealed objective of adapting
individual demeanour to standards of values and behaviour of the dominant social
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groups. This will show that scientific knowledge both embeds and is embedded in social
identities, institutions, representations and discourses (Jasanoff, 2004a) and that the uses
of science in this context have an important impact, both ideological and of
normalization of behaviour, namely when it comes to reproducing the prevailing
patriarchal structures, in particular the privilege of biological kin relationship, of the
symbolic importance of the father and the imposition of the feminine monogamy.
My main argument is that while the genetic expert reports reinforce a notion of
paternity associated to a biological determinism, the secure ascertaining of paternity
gave the courts further power of control over those sexual and procreative female
behaviours which break from the conventional standards of a woman’s fidelity to a sole
sexual partner. Thus, maternity is ‘moralized’.
In the words of Gillian Douglas (1991), legal regulation of reproduction mainly
reproduces patriarchal structures in society. As she points out, “On a more basic level,
while women have almost total power over reproduction, because they bear the child, they have
been unable to make use of this power. No man can be certain if a child is his, short of having
genetic testing to find out. Nonetheless, all women, until the past decade, have known that the
child they carry is ‘theirs’. Patriarchal structures in society might be said to be based on the
desire of men to seek to control this power that women have, to try to ensure that a child
belongs to the right man.” (Douglas, 1991: xix). This seems to be emphasised by the
phenomenon of children born outside legal marriage and who have no legal father,
articulated together with the uncertainty of biological paternity, often reinforced by
assumptions about women’s predilection for deception in reproductive matters (Diduck
& Kaganas, 1999, p.130).
Feminist legal studies have shown that lawsuits that evoke sexuality - such as
rape, sexual assault, abortion, assisted reproduction techniques, and now I add to this
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list the law cases of judicial investigation for the determination of paternity – highlight
mechanisms by which the law provides specific meanings to women’s bodies and
behaviours (Abbott, 1991; Bridgeman & Millns, 1995; Gruen & Panichas, 1997;
Mackinnon, 1987; Matoesian, 1992; Pineau, 1997; Smart, 1995). In this process they
reproduce cultural beliefs about female sexuality and show how the law has its own
very powerful mode of disqualification and subordination of women. This work follows
the feminist legal studies agenda in the way Richardson (2005) proposes and illustrates
in this quote: “Instead of creating the identity of the woman-victim, feminism has
questioned the meaning of what it is to be a woman. This has allowed feminism to
challenge rather than create such a victim identity.” (Richardson, 2005, p. 291).
1. Court proceedings of a paternity investigation in Portugal
Since the Family Law changes were introduced in Portugal in 19667, the legal
system allows the unofficial inquiry of paternity, which occurs in a court of law and
investigates the paternity of any minor under the age of two, whose birth record does
not show the identity of the father8. By imposition of the Portuguese law, the clerk at
the Registry Office is bound to forward to the proper court a copy of the birth certificate
7 One hundred years after the creation of the first Portuguese Civil Code (1867), a new Civil Code was produced – the 1966’s – that
comes to consolidate the binding of new civil code’s social ethics to the catholic moral, thus reinforcing the dictatorial regime’s
doctrinal project (started in1926 and coming to an end with the so-called ‘April’s Revolution’, in 1974). The change in the
legislation was centered on the institution of the State’s obligation to assume the role of petitioner on paternity investigations,
whenever a birth certificate without the father’s identification was found (article 1860). However, legal recognition of paternity was
performed in a manner as to ‘protect the legitimate family or the dignity and honor of unmarried individuals’ (Pinto, 1995). 8 The 1864th article of the Civil Code states: “At any time that a minor’s birth register is made in which only the maternity is
established, the clerk is bound to forward an unabridged register certificate to the court so that the father’s identity is unofficially
investigated.”
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that only indicates the mother’s identity, with the exception of cases in which the clerk
can verify that the registered minor was born of an incestuous relationship9.
The dominant juridical doctrine has been that paternity investigation as a State
obligation is justified on behalf of the defence of the essential rights of the child whose
paternity is not legally determined, such as the ‘right to personal identity’ and
‘development of personality’10, generally seen as associated to the ‘right to paternity’
(Pinto 1995). The identity of an individual is thus reconfigured according to the
symbolical domination function of biological affiliation, from which has resulted the
emergence of new rights, namely the ‘right to genetic information’ (Eriksson &
Saldeen, 1993; Wallbank, 2004). One of the interviewed judges clearly states the
privileging of biological paternity by the Portuguese judicial system:
There are no human rights that rise above the determination of paternity, there
aren’t. That determination comes with a natural force, supernatural! (Interview with
judge, 2001).
The duty to protect and to defend the best interest of children born outside
matrimony is assumed by the Portuguese State by enforcing procedures that aim to
equalize those cases with the situations of families considered normal, with the purpose
to assure legal parity between the children born within and outside legal wedlock. Well,
the dominant concept of family in western legal frameworks is characterized not only
by the privileging of biological affiliation (Strathern, 1992), but also by the imagery of
9 According to article 121, no 3 of the Registry Office Code “the consignment of the certificate does not take place if, knowing the
name of the alleged father, the clerk verifies that he and the mother are blood relations or relatives by marriage.
10 The right to “development of personality” was introduced with the constitutional revision of 1991, by the Constitutional Law nº
1/97 on September 20th.
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the breadwinner male and its corresponding configuration of paternity as financial and
moral support of the family (Eaton, 1986). Although the legal conception of parental
duties appeals to the obligation of both mother and father to ensure to child’s well-
being, namely through economical resources and emotional support, it’s more or less
explicit the notion that the maternal role is played under the yoke of emotional and
financial dependence regarding the father. As Pat Carlen and Anne Worral emphasize in
a work dedicated to the ways how the judicial system deals with women, one of the
pillars of juridical construction of femininity is based upon a normative definition of
‘motherhood’ which evokes the conceptions of frailty and weakness: “The ‘normal’
mother is both economically and emotionally dependent on the father of her child, and it
is considered essential to the child’s welfare to have two parents in situ in the family
home.” (Carlen e Worrall, 1987: 3).
The examining stage of this type of judicial lawsuit is set about under the
jurisdiction of the Prosecuting Counsel, which has to gather all evidence deemed
necessary for a safe identification of the biological father of a given minor: holding an
interview with the mother of the minor whose paternity is being judicially investigated,
interrogating the alleged father and witnesses, as well as requesting reports on the
‘moral and socio-economic situation’ of the minor’s mother, which are generally
performed by the GNR (National Guard), PSP (Police Force) or by technicians from the
Social Services at the Social Reinsertion Institute. In more recent years, reports of
genetic exams of paternity investigation have been incorporated as evidence in judicial
investigations of paternity. The admission of scientific exams as evidence in lawsuits of
investigation of paternity was introduced in Portugal with the decree-law No. 496/77 of
November 25th, and sanctioned in article No. 1801 of the Civil Code, where it states:
“In lawsuits concerning affiliation, blood tests and any other scientifically reliable
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methods are admitted as evidence.” However, until the 90’s, scientific exams were
scarcely used in paternity cases in Portugal. In countries such as the USA or the UK, the
use of DNA paternity testing in courts was only disseminated in the late 80’s (Derksen,
2000), but in Portugal, only since the mid 90’s have Portuguese courts become more
receptive to the use of genetics as evidence.
As soon as the evidence is gathered, a formal opinion is issued by the Prosecuting
Counsel on the viability of an unofficial inquiry of paternity, so that an ordinary lawsuit
of paternity can be pursued11. This opinion may or may not be confirmed by a judge’s
ruling. If a judicial magistrate considers an unofficial inquiry of paternity viable, an
ordinary lawsuit of paternity is initiated, in which the evidence gathered in the previous
stage is presented once again, and other elements are eventually included. From this
comes a new formal opinion laid down by a magistrate for the Prosecuting Counsel,
who rules on its grounds (the defendant’s, that is, the alleged father’s conviction) or
groundlessness. The person indicated as being the father can, at any time during the
judicial investigation of paternity, voluntarily acknowledge the minor’s paternity, with
an affiliation tenor being immediately drafted and the case filed.
Although the penetration of the DNA profiling in the Portuguese courts seems to
be significant, the most recent data concerning official statistics in Portuguese Justice,
covering the period between 1996-2004, shows that in 28% of the cases, the courts
don’t reach the determination of the legal paternity of children under the age of two, in
56% of the cases, the legal determination of paternity is made because the alleged father
voluntarily recognizes paternity in the course of the investigation, which leaves only a
11 Article 204, No. 1 of the Minors Tutelary Organisation (Epifânio et al., 1992) states: “1. the judge will issue a final ruling as to
whether to file the case or having it proceed to the magistrate for the prosecuting counsel of the proper court, so that an investigation
or impugnment are recommended .”
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percentage of 16% of viable cases, referring to those situations, in which the gathered
evidence is actually evaluated in open court (Portuguese Ministry of Justice, Statistics
of Justice, 1996-2004). This relatively low percentage of paternity cases that actually
reach the court sessions can be explained by the existence of a selective use of genetic
testing, based on the judge’s evaluation of the mother’s sexual and moral behaviour, as
it will be discussed in the third section of this paper. I will argue that the assumption of
the child’s best interests within the determination of the legal fatherhood and the
subsequent legal efforts to carry out such establishment, will depend of the production
of evidence, which in this specific case will mainly be based on the evaluation of the
mother’s sexual and moral behaviour. Although the defence of the child’s rights is the
main goal of the judicial system’s attempts to establish paternity, the selective and
restrictive ways of using scientific evidence will produce the fact that only the children
with well behaved mothers will have access to DNA paternity testing ordered by the
court, and therefore, access to the legal determination of paternity.
2. Discursive practices and gendered perceptions of parenthood
Discursive practices in the courtrooms may reflect pre-existing gender differences
and hierarchies of knowledge and power in society. My aim was to understand how this
happens in the particular field of ‘legal language’12, used in hearings with the mother of
12 ‘Legal language’ is here understood as all written and non-written statements produced by the different social actors within the
context of court rooms. I share Conklin’s (1998) opinion that the distinction between the concepts of ‘language’ and ‘discourse’ are
of little analytical importance, in that they are very closely linked and both have to do with ways of expressing ‘power’ (Conklin,
1998: 8), so throughout this paper I will use them both with no distinction.
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the child born outside legal marriage and whose birth certificate does not state the
identity of the father, as well as in interrogations of the presumed father. In the 1960s
and 1970s, studies of the judicial behaviour of trial court focused on recorded outcomes
of legal procedures, specifically on sentencing behaviour. It means that studies on
judicial practices referred to in written records could be done without ever setting foot
in a trial court (Philips, 1998).
Many sociolinguistic works on courtroom language have provided evidence that
ideology produced in judicial practices is constitutive of certain social processes, or
incites certain social consequences (Jasanoff, 2004a; Smart, 1987), and is related to
everyday ideologies in the family, in schools, in the media, in the workplace (Eaton,
1986, Philips, 1998), which makes the boundaries between law and non law permeable.
This paper is an attempt to contribute to an understanding of how speakers create
realities through language use in courtrooms (Jasanoff, 1998), in the specific context of
judicial investigation of paternity of minors. To pursue this goal, I’ve spent 6 months in
a court of law, between 1996 and 1997, attending the hearings done by a group of
judges and Prosecuting Counsels, with whom I worked closely. I returned in 2000 and
carried out fieldwork for 12 more months. I’ve focused on the language used in court
and on the model of specific gender roles, as well as on feminine sexuality ascribed to
those interactions. This approach is rooted within a feminist tradition of legal studies.
This study proposes to understand how language used in court reproduces the social
construction of gender roles, of ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ behaviours for women
and men, for mothers and fathers, thus reproducing prevailing patriarchal structures.
The question of language as a means of exercising the power of differentiation and
domination has been a frequent matter of interest in feminist studies (Benor et al., 2002;
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Cameron, 1990; Diamond & Quinby, 1988; MacNay, 1994, 1992; Sawicki, 1991;
Smith, 1990), particularly in feminist approaches to law.
I base much of my argument on what took place in open court, but also on
documents and court hearings that are not available to the casual visitor, namely the
reports on the ‘moral and socio-economic situation’ of the minor’s mother, which are
generally performed by the GNR (National Guard), PSP (Police Force) or by
technicians from the Social Services at the Social Reinsertion Institute. My study
sample is made up of documentation referring to 1257 lawsuits of unofficial inquiry of
paternity, prosecuted in the court in study between the years of 1967 and 2000, on
jurisprudence published in Portuguese law reviews during that period. In 2000 and 2001
I interviewed judges (five women and thirteen men) and Prosecuting Counsel (two
women and eighteen men) who volunteered to participate in this study in response to an
invitation letter which advertised the research. All of them were working in courts
situated in different parts of the country.
I present excerpts of text proceeding from those diverse sources of information
that I consider particularly illustrative of the specific points I will discuss in this paper.
A feminist discourse analysis was used and themes were identified by reading
transcriptions of interviews, jurisprudence and my own notes drawing on the
observation of court hearings. I was interested to focus on the various ideological
functions of the discourses and practices of judges and Prosecuting Counsels in the
specific context of courtroom investigation of paternity, intending to explore how those
reinforce gender inequalities, in particular by constructing a concept of paternity
entailed to biological links between a man and a child, and an understanding of
motherhood grounded on the assessment of moral profiles, directly connected to the
evaluation of the mother’s sexual behaviour.
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In the judicial investigation of paternity, the present and past history of the
mother’s sexual life is of major relevance, insofar as it will condition the lawsuit’s
results. The minor’s mother is prompted by an agent of the Prosecuting Counsel to
answer certain questions about her sexual life such as: number of sexual partners prior
to her relationship with the person indicated as being the minor’s father; type of sexual
intercourse kept with the alleged father; place and date of those instances of sexual
intercourse with the alleged father; reasons for keeping such sexual relationship; usage
of birth control methods and the alleged father’s reaction to the news of a pregnancy.
With these, the answer to two other questions is sought: if during the so-called ‘legal
period for the minor’s conception’13 his mother and the alleged father had sexual
intercourse of ‘complete copulation’14; and if in the same legal period of conception the
minor’s mother had sexual intercourse solely with the defendant. Basically, the minor’s
mother is asked about the practice of heterosexual sexual intercourse of vaginal
penetration by the male sex organ, as well as about the number of sexual partners she
had before and during the period of time the Portuguese law considers susceptible of
involving the conception and birth of the minor, whose paternity is being investigated.
Despite its façade of neutrality and objectivity, based on the idea that judicial
behaviour enacts mainly legal ideology, law reinforces the prevailing order by
expressing multiple ideologies (Jasanoff, 2004a). In the 1980’s and 1990’s, researchers
from different scientific areas shared the conviction on the importance of the ‘social’ in
the construction of language, which demystified some significant aspects of legal
rhetoric – namely the idea frequently expressed by juridical science that the law is some 13 According to article 204 of the Minors Tutelary Organisation and articles 1795 and following of the Civil Code, the so-called
legal period of conception corresponds to the first 120 days out of the 300 that preceded the minor’s birth.
14 As Teresa Beleza (1993) states, the Portuguese law and jurisprudence restricts the notion of “copulation” to the penetration of the
vagina by the man. Thus, “complete” copulation is of such kind, but sperm release is included.
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sort of auto-poetic entity which is auto legitimating and auto constructive. As Pierre
Bourdieu says, this rhetoric is a fundamental basis for the legitimacy of judicial power:
“The body of jurists has so little difficulty in convincing itself that the law is based upon
itself (…) [that] the social cohesion of those who interpret the law tends to give the
impression of a transcendental enforcement to historic forms of juridical reason, as well
as to the belief in an organised vision of the social order they produce…”(Bourdieu,
1986:5) [Author’s translation]
Observing courtroom hearings in law cases for the determination of paternity of
children born outside legal marriage, without a legal father, allowed me to understand
how the contents of the language used in the courtroom play a crucial role in the
production and exercise of power, which is particularly clear in the formulation of
questions directed to mothers of minors. Indeed, through judicial paternity hearings, the
sexual and reproductive activity of the mother of the minor is no longer seen as an
intimate and private experience, and becomes a matter of interest to the State, in the
name of ‘the defence of the interests of the minor’, namely the child’s right to know its
genetic history15. The child’s right to know implicates the right of others, i.e., in some
instances the conflicting right of the mother’s to privacy16 (Wallbank, 2004). Facts that
are in no way relevant to the case in question are brought up in the court room, namely
those that refer to the sexual life of the mother of the minor17, although the judges I
15 In Portugal, the individuals’ right to ‘genetic identity’ was introduced to the Constitution in 1997, article 26.º, No.3.
16 European Convention of Human Rights 1950 (ECHR), Strasbourg. Article 8 states that: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence’.
17 According to some feminist writers, in adversarial juridical systems, it is common for the defence to try to emphasize details of
women’s sexual lives (namely, their ‘sexual past’) in rape (Chambers and Millar, 1987; Matoesian, 1993) and sexual harassment
cases, in order to try to prove that the woman in question is not ‘worthy’ of a favourable judicial sentence because she is, for
example, considered ‘promiscuous’. Indeed, the strategy of making public certain facets of the private life of people involved in
legal proceedings would appear to be quite frequent when it comes to the administration of justice, including criminal justice. As Pat
18
interviewed frequently repeated that the sexual behaviour of the mother of the minor, in
the periods before and after the time of conception of the minor, were of no interest.
Let us look at the following example, which involves a textile worker (the mother)
and a businessman (the alleged father), who spent three years in prison for homicide and
who was also suspect of living off immoral earnings, proceeding from economic
exploitation of prostitutes.
The judge begins the interview with the minor’s mother by questioning her about
her fidelity to the alleged father during the long period of time that he spent in prison.
The implicit message is that it seems ‘abnormal’ for an adult woman to spend years
without having a relationship.
Judge: The father of the minor was in prison for three years. And during this time,
didn’t you have any other men-friends?
The mother answers according to an ideal portrait of feminine behaviour, which
displays domesticity and faithfulness.
Mother of the minor: No, Sir. I went to visit him every weekend and on public
holidays, and I went straight home after the visit. I never left home, not even to go for a
walk. It was just home, at work and made prison visits.
The judge goes on questioning her about her past relationships:
Judge: So, you never had other boyfriends?
Mother of the minor: Not since I met him.
Carlen stresses: “Defendants are set up in a guarded dock and then, at a distance stretched beyond the boundaries of face to face
communication, asked to describe or comment on intimate details of their lives; details which do not in themselves constitute
infraction of any law but which are open to public investigation once a person has been accused of breaking the law”. (Carlen,
1976: 23).
19
The judge shows surprise and suspicion regarding this testimony of chastity and
invites the mother to be more sincere, trying at the same time to assure her that her
sexual past history will not damage her intentions to see legally recognized the paternity
of her child.
Judge: And before, did you have other boyfriends? I know the past is of no
interest, and this will not go down on record, but it will make things clearer….
Mother of the minor: I had two boyfriends before him.
At this moment of the inquiry of the mother, the judge moves to a position of
paternalism, showing comprehension and sympathy for her situation of ‘falling into
temptation’ of love and sex:
Judge: And did you have sexual relations with them?
Mother of the minor: I did, with one of them. He was my boyfriend, and you know
how it’s like…
Judge: I see. That is of no interest. Do you realize you’ve wasted six years of your
life with this individual [presumed father of the minor]?
Mother of the minor (resigned): I know, Sir. I completely lost my mind. I was in
love.
(Excerpt of field notes, December 2000)
My direct observation of everyday activities of courtrooms, in which face-to-face
interactions between magistrates and citizens took place, also enabled me to detect some
patterns of gender differentiation, which place the mother in the realm of ‘domesticity’
and the alleged father in the realm of ‘economics’ (Boyd, 1989; Brophy, 1989; Eaton,
1986; Silva & Smart, 1999; Smart, 1978, 1984, 1989a, 1989b). An analysis of the
20
contents of the questions directed at the person presumed to be the father, clearly
revealed that the function of providing ‘financial support’ is associated with the man –
which can be seen in the questions directed at both the alleged father and the mother as
to whether he contributed to the ‘support of the child’.
The following example is a dialogue between a Prosecuting Counsel and a man
that a mother said to be the biological father of her underage child. The Prosecuting
Counsel wishes to determine if he intends to adopt the child, and at the same time,
warns him about his paternal duty to support his child.
Prosecuting Counsel: You never gave any type of support to the child…. but it
could be yours. How would you feel like if the child died of hunger and you found out
later on that it was your child?!!!
The alleged father responds in such a manner that expresses a biological notion of
paternity – in his perspective, the acknowledgment of paternity will only be made if the
genetic test proves the biological link.
Alleged father: I’ll have the tests to find out if I am the father. If I am, I’ll give
something – not much, because I only earn 80 contos (400 euros) and I’m still paying
back the bank loan on my car.
(Extract from field diaries, January, 2001)
The myth of the breadwinning male is very clear here: while the mother is asked
about her sexual life in order to indicate the identity of the father of her child, the
putative father is asked about his willingness to provide financial support. It is
interesting to notice that although the putative father is encouraged to fulfil his role of
financial supporter of the child, the fact is that there is strong evidence, drawing from
interviews I made to thirty eight judges and Prosecuting Counsels working in different
21
courts, that in Portugal most legal fathers do not assume parental responsibilities and
rights as carers or even as financial providers. The legal system’s fatherhood perceived
importance lies primarily in the guaranty of the child’s right to personal identity, thus in
the symbolic function of fatherhood to complete the particular model of parenting,
notably that of heterosexual, preferably married parents (Dewar, 1998; Sheldon, 2005),
and secondly in the role of breadwinner. Little is known about the social and economic
impacts of the legal determination of paternity, although some studies carried out in the
United States (Adams et al., 1992; Pirog-Good & Good, 1995), as well as in some
European Countries (European Commission, 1997), show that very few of these legal
fathers live with their children or make any contact with them, at the same time that
very few contribute to the children’s financial support. Some authors also claim that the
impact on paternity establishment outcomes, namely on what concerns child support
payments, may be improved if there is a public policy to establish a routine of
monitoring the child support obligations from the biological father (Garfinkel &
Klawitter, 1990).
In my perspective, it is necessary to study the consequences of the legal decisions
regarding paternity determination, especially in such cases that involve the use of
genetic fingerprinting as evidence of affiliation, not only due to its economic features
(as the genetic tests are a rather expensive cost to the State), but mainly due to its
individual, familial and social repercussions (Frank, 1996; Sheldon, 2001).
3– Locating judicial uses of genetic testing in paternity cases
22
Nowadays, one of the outstanding features of the judicial investigation of paternity
is the growing use of genetic profiling to assist the courts’ services, which has often
been described either as a ‘scientificization of law’ or as a ‘judicialization of science’
(Jasanoff, 1997). Genetic fingerprinting can be used to prove or disprove a biological
parental tie, with a very small margin for error. Nevertheless, some authors point out the
problem that some legal systems, which use science as evidence in paternity suits, do
not take into account the necessary balance between biological truth and social bonds
(sociological and psychological truth) (Assier-Andrieu & Commaille, 1995, European
Commission, 1997; Eriksson & Saldeen, 1993).
Based on a set of 1257 judicial lawsuits of paternity investigation filed in a court of
law in the North of Portugal, between 1968 and 2000, some aspects of the current
judicial practice, regarding the use of results of genetic tests in investigations of
paternity, were analysed, taking into consideration such cases in which paternity tests
were done as an element of evidence. The oldest lawsuit began in 1974 and the earliest
in 2000, with a total of 85 lawsuits, in which 87 laboratory tests were done (in two of
the cases blood samples from two alleged fathers were analysed).
Social disadvantage on the access to paternity
The Portuguese legal system does not possess information that could enable a social,
economical and demographical characterization of the population involved in paternity
investigations. However, data collected in this study allows me to assert that, generally,
most of the populations involved in this type of lawsuit are social groups deprived of
cultural and economical resources. On one hand, my case study presents a majority of
population whose professional occupation is mostly of blue collar predominance and an
almost absence of professionals. On the other hand, jurisprudence itself by several
courts in the country, published on legal magazines, frequently points out the poverty
23
conditions of the participants, especially the child’s mother, in order to reinforce the
State’s protective role which, by identifying the father, tries to ensure the child’s
economical support.
The ‘social disadvantage’ profile is mentioned in the interviews, allowing the
justification of distinct and many times contradictory decision making, concerning the
performing, or not, of DNA testing. The following interview excerpt illustrates the way
how ‘poverty’ may be used to justify the request for DNA testing, suggesting that
poverty may be accompanied by lack of information and naivety, being the woman an
‘innocent victim of the male’s sexual advances’ (Beleza 1993); or in order to raise
suspicion regarding the mother’s intentions, leading to the thought that poverty may
elicit the intention to ‘catch a rich father’. It’s also mentioned the situation of the
woman’s extreme frailty – the case of the handicapped woman – stressing the need to
reinforce the State’s vigilant and protective role:
“What sort of people come to my presence in cases of paternity investigation? They are
usually people [referring to the child’s mother] less cultivated, simple and humble.
Normally, they are people who belong to a lower-middle social class, who are unaware of
contraception or are deluded by an affair and some men take advantage of such naivety (…)
There are even cases of men who take advantage of handicapped women, and in those cases
we must intervene, if not, what would become of the child? In other cases there are
‘experienced’ women who seek to get out of a deprived livelihood, who don’t have the best
manners or great stability in affective or emotional terms and think that having a child may
provide some stability to their lives and, therefore, finding the ideal husband, preferably
rich.”
(Interview with Prosecuting Counsel, 2001).
24
Moralysing maternity
The judicial magistrates’ acceptance of the results given by the forensic biology
reveals a particular logic, characterized mainly by the fact that the moral and sexual
behaviour of the minor’s mother still carries considerable weight, regarding the decision
pertaining to the legal paternity of the child, which in turn reinforces the predominant
idea of institutional control of the sexual and procreative behaviour of women.
Through an analysis of the sentences of the judicial paternity investigation lawsuits
taken into account and for which reports concerning genetic tests done were presented
as evidence, we were confronted with two different situations. On one hand, there are
cases in which the judge states he will make a certain decision concerning the
establishment of legal paternity based on the scientific report. On the other hand, we
have verified that in most lawsuits, even though a direct link between the laboratory
results and the judicial decisions is maintained, the decision is based on the existence of
the traditional evidence of the exclusiveness of sexual intercourse of the minor’s
mother, during the so-called conception period. There is a vast array of examples but let
us consider the following:
In 1994, in an ordinary lawsuit of paternity, in which the genetic tests showed a
paternity practically proven, the judge considered the case had grounds, two facts being
evident: on the one hand, the realisation of the so-called “scientific evidence” is
omitted; on the other hand, the magistrate implicitly believes that the positive result of
the investigation of paternity done in a laboratory, shows that the minor’s mother only
had sexual intercourse with the alleged father during the legal period of conception:
“The reason for filing a lawsuit of investigation of paternity is the genetic fact of procreation,
which is based on the generating act of pregnancy and consolidates biological affiliation.
The biological affiliation will have to be established on the evidence of the exclusiveness of
25
sexual intercourse with the future father during the legal period of conception (...) And, as
stated in the records pertaining to this sentence, the minor’s mother, during his legal period
of conception, had sexual intercourse with the defendant, which she did exclusively. “
(Records of lawsuits of judicial investigation of paternity, 1974-2000)
In those cases, when the judge refers to the results of the genetic tests of the
investigation of paternity explicitly, an absolute acceptance of these exams is still
verifiable, which can be seen in the following ruling concerning an unofficial
investigation of paternity, concluded in 1994:
“The minor’s mother states that she has never had sexual intercourse with any other man (...)
However, an exam of investigation of paternity was done in the Instituto de Medicina Legal
(Forensics Institute) in Porto, from which could be concluded that the designated father was
excluded as the minor’s father. Thus there is not, in our view, viability for a lawsuit of
investigation of paternity to be filed.”
(Records of lawsuits of judicial investigation of paternity, 1974-2000)
The division between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ women is thus based on the notion of
appropriate feminine behaviours, defined according to the social expectations, culturally
elaborated according to the codes of the dominant social groups, in this case the judges
and Public Counsels. The following dialog that I maintained with a judge is rather
illustrative of the selection of cases that ‘deserve’ paternity testing, based on the
judgement of the mother’s sexual behaviour.
Researcher: Suppose a situation in which the mother elects only one man as the possible
biological father of the child. If there is testimonial evidence that the child’s mother had
several sexual partners during the legal period of conception, would you demand a DNA
exam?
26
Judge: Yes, unless it’s a rather abnormal situation – if there are five, six, seven or eight…
I’m not going to test every one of them! (…)
Researcher: And what is the criteria [in order to decide if you demand an exam or not]?
Judge: The criteria, let us say, is a one of normality. If the mother says she had been with
this one, and that one, and another, there you go, these are more or less normal
relationships. Now, if things are like that, if it’s a thing, let’s say, in which the mother
knows that there were five or six, but that she had been with many more and doesn’t know
who they are, in that situation, I drop the case.
(Interview with Judge, 2000).
The blood tests in the investigation of biologic paternity are only done in those
instances when the mother is thought to have ‘good moral and sexual behaviour’. On a
first analysis, the researcher may conclude that this is culture-specific, associated with
strong persistence of conventional behaviour patterns, which in Portuguese society
relegated women to the domestic sphere. However, similar patterns of monitoring
women’s behaviour, namely with regards to the type of company kept, frequently
visited places and the types of clothes worn, were identified in countries such as the
USA and the United Kingdom, in the context of legal proceedings in cases of rape and
sexual harassment (Matoesian, 1992; Smart, 1995; Chambers and Millar, 1987).
Conclusion
The Portuguese law which imposes the State’s mandatory investigation of
paternity of any child whose birth certificate doesn’t mention the father’s identity is
based upon in the principle of the public duty to defend the children’s interests, seeking
to legally establish the type of affiliation bonds that Portuguese law still considers today
27
to be vital for the upholding of the “moral integrity, better socialization and economical
support of the minor” (Pinto, 1995) However, in the context of the law in action, the
defence of the children’s rights appears closely associated to the juridical evaluation of
non-conformity regarding the normative standards and dominant values, which are
represented by the situation of women who procreate outside matrimony and whose
children ‘have no father’. This seems to produce social legitimating effects of the
State’s intervention on public monitoring of private behaviors of women who procreate
outside a conventional conjugal situation. These women seem to constitute the
preferential target for strategies of social control proceeding from the courts. As Emily
Jackson states, “Women without men do not get any privacy, the prevailing wisdom is
that they may be legitimately subjected to public, political and media scrutiny.” (in
Kurczewski e Maclean, 1997: 53-54).
A judicial investigation of paternity results from a complex interrelationship
between the judicial and the patriarchal power, shown by the realization that, in the
institutional construction of negative images around single-parent families, in which the
father is absent, there are two main arguments: on one hand, it’s assumed that these are
families with low economical resources (because they lack the father’s contribution,
seen as indispensable). On the other hand, these are families who are faced as potential
sources of deviant behaviours, in the absence of an ‘adequate’ socialization of its
members, which occurs, precisely, due to the father’s absence (Narayan et al., 1999).
In the context of judicial paternity investigations, women seem to be the preferential
targets for familialist paternalistic strategies through which the legal system tries to
impose a model of femininity and familial life, seen by the judicial system as being the
most adequate: nuclear family and the woman who procreates within institutional
marriage, who develops affective and sexual relationships considered ‘stable’. Women
28
are evaluated and classified in the light of moral standards that interrelate with the
objectivity and certainty presented by forensic science through laboratorial techniques
of biological paternity investigation.
The apparently neutral application of genetic tests in paternity investigation
judicial lawsuits in Portugal has important effects, both ideological and of behaviour
normalization, namely, in reproducing social gender distinctions, which were already
present in society: on one hand, DNA testing offers a scientific means of reifying the
biological basis of kin relationships that have, at least until relatively recent times, been
assumed to provide the bedrock of kinship structures in western societies that are quite
present in Portuguese socio-legal and cultural understandings of parentage and kinship.
On the other hand, by allowing ‘safe’ ascertaining of paternity, genetic tests gave the
courts further power of control over any female sexual and procreative behaviour that
breaks away from the conventional standards of a woman’s fidelity to a sole sexual
partner, in the sense that the request of DNA testing might be denied to a mother who
has declared to have many sexual partners, even if she only points to a single man as
being the probable father of her child.
A perspective of the present and future configurations of women’s citizenship in
Portugal points to the fact that it continues to be conditioned and limited in many
situations. These limitations are aggravated whenever multidimensional accumulation
vulnerabilities are found regarding class position, economic or labour dependence or
sexual and procreative behaviours considered as deviant. This state of matters is
reinforced by the political and regulatory culture still enforced today in Portugal. This
culture is based on the central role assumed by the State in social regulation (in this
case, by the imposition of paternity investigations), as well as in the authoritarian
relationship between the State, the judicial system and certain institutional uses of
29
science. It is also built upon the citizens, affecting overall the most vulnerable citizens –
for example, working class’s mothers (as it happens to be case of the majority of
mothers who appear in paternity investigations) -, because they are particularly
permeable to the harmful effects of ‘routine justice’ which is a part of that culture. And
if the dramatization of court justice, in the sense that “the courtroom is quintessentially
also a theatre in which things are not only related but also shown in order to compel
belief” (Jasanoff, 1998, p.716) can effectively lead to the questioning of the justice
system’s own functioning and credibility, routine justice seems to ensure the continuity
of the system, not just because it is satisfactory, but because passive citizenship
prevails, grounded, on one hand, on a weak internalization of citizen’s rights and a
strong internalization of the principle of non-application of laws or their selective
application by the courts and, on the other hand, on a low motivation and feeble
capacity to make claims (Santos et al., 1996). Routine in court proceedings appears to
be the most usual scenario in the context of a judicial practice which doesn’t translate in
an actual mobilization of the judicial system by the citizens, but rather in a State
imposition that, in a compulsory fashion, involves citizens in courts, which is
aggravated by the fact that women tend to have a more negative opinion of courts and to
express more feelings of distance and incapacity to deal with them; which is consistent
with the greater distance which women in general express in regard to public
institutions, in virtue of the persistence of a patriarchal system which keeps them
preferably within the private sphere and makes the State and the public sphere
masculine
The recent history of the practice of judicial paternity investigations has been
marked by the growing use of DNA profiling to identify biological paternity. The
laboratory tests concerning biological paternity have been perceived in the juridical
30
field as the tools that made the introduction of further objectivity and exactness in
affiliation law possible. Scientific evidence is a complex production, in the sense
exposed by Jasanoff (1998), that draws on a wide range of social and cultural resources
- such as the persuasion of inscriptions (in the case of paternity testing, 'DNA
fingerprints'), the authority of professional codes and standards, and judges' and
citizens’ commonsense understandings of science (Jasanoff, idem, ibidem).
The symbolic subordination of law to science (Santos, 1995) is clearly shown in
the impact that scientific exams have in judicial results, whenever a child’s legal
paternity is established. The results of the scientific tests are seen by the judges as
mirrors of the child’s mother’s sexual and moral behaviour, producing normative
judgements legitimated by scientific ones. More than soothing the judicial watching
over women’s behaviour, the use of the denominated scientific evidence seems to
reinforce the monitoring of the sex life of the mothers of children without a legally
recognized father, by the imposition of a refined and restrictive selectivity of the cases
‘worthy’ to include that individual identification tool, based on moralist criteria which
excludes women reputed as sexually and affectively unstable.
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