Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

www.elsevier.com/locate/cedpsych

Approaching and avoiding arguments:The role of epistemological beliefs, need forcognition, and extraverted personality traits

E. Michael Nussbaum* and Lisa D. Bendixen

Department of Educational Psychology, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 4505 Maryland Parkway,

Box 453003 Las Vegas, NV 89154-3003, USA

Abstract

Because argumentation may promote deeper processing of content, this study examined fac-

tors affecting students� dispositions to engage in argument, specifically epistemological beliefs,

need for cognition, and extraversion (assertiveness and warmth). An instrument developed by

Infante and Rancer (1982) was used to measure dispositions to approach or avoid arguments.

Subjects were 238 undergraduates who completed surveys of the relevant constructs. Contrary

to expectation that epistemological beliefs would predict the approach component by affecting

the perceived usefulness of argumentation, regression analysis indicated that epistemological

beliefs instead predicted the avoidance component (as did a desire to maintain warm relation-

ships). Need for cognition predicted the approach component, whereas assertiveness predicted

both. The need to better understand why some students avoid arguments is discussed.

� 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

Keywords: Argumentativeness; Argument; Persuasive discourse; Epistemological beliefs; Epistemology;

Need for cognition; Extraversion; Personality traits; Individual differences; Interpersonal communication

1. Introduction

Educational reformers in a number of subject areas stress the importance of hav-

ing students construct and critique arguments to further conceptual understanding

(Anderson et al., 2001; Driver, Newton, & Osborne, 2000; Lampert, Rittenhouse,

& Crumbaugh, 1996; Perfetti, Britt, & Georgi, 1995). One problem, however, is that

* Corresponding author. Fax: 1-702-895-1658.

E-mail address: nussbaum@unlv.edu (E. Michael Nussbaum).

0361-476X/$ - see front matter � 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/S0361-476X(02)00062-0

574 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

some students are reluctant—for a variety of reasons—to participate in argumenta-

tive discussions or to disagree with their classmates. It is therefore important to ex-

amine individual differences in students� dispositions to engage in argument and to

take these individual differences into account when designing discourse-rich learning

environments. Although situational factors, such as the culture of particular class-rooms, undoubtedly play a role in affecting students� willingness to argue (Kovalai-

nen, Kumpulainen, & Vasama, 2002; Kynigos & Theodossopoulou, 2002), there is

substantial evidence that more stable individual characteristics also affect communi-

cation behavior (Beatty, 1998; Daly & Bippus, 1998). An understanding of these

characteristics may in fact inform efforts to create reflective classroom cultures

by providing information on some possible reasons that certain students may resist

engaging in argumentative discourse.

Toward this end, this study investigates the role of several individual difference vari-ables on students� dispositions to engage in or avoid arguments: epistemological be-

liefs, need for cognition, and extraversion. Epistemological beliefs and need for

cognition have been shown to affect students� dispositions to engage in various types

of cognitive tasks (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997)

and extraversion affects dispositions to engage in various types of social tasks (Eysenck

&Eysenck, 1985). Because argumentation is an activity that is both heavily intellectual

and social, these constructs appear highly relevant in understanding students� disposi-tions to engage in argument. The following section of this article, after first reviewingrecent work in argumentation and education, presents research suggesting the rele-

vance of the above-mentioned constructs in shaping argumentation behavior.

2. Background

We define argumentative discourse as that involving the construction and critique

of arguments aimed at answering a question or solving a problem. There is a smallbut growing body of evidence that links the quality and depth of students� oral ar-guments during small-group discussions to learning outcomes in science (Alexopou-

lou & Driver, 1996; Chinn, O�Donnell, & Jinks, 2000) and writing (Reznitskaya

et al., 2001). There are a number of potential benefits from engaging students in

arguments about subject matter. Arguments can make students curious and engaged

(Hatano & Inagaki, 1991; Johnson, Johnson, Pierson, & Lyons, 1985), encourage

them to construct explanations that deepen understanding (Chi, 1994), and enable

students to scrutinize and resolve errors (Schwarz, Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000). Al-though arguments can also be used to propagate misconceptions (Hynd, 1998), this

may be less likely to occur when students use disagreement to avoid reaching prema-

ture consensus (and if teachers intervene when necessary).

It is important to note that argument-rich discourse is not synonymous with debate.

In fact, Resnick and colleagues (Keefer, Zeitz, & Resnick, 2000; Resnick, Salmon,

Zeitz, Wathen, & Holowchak, 1993), in studying patterns of argument among

fourth-graders and undergraduates, identified two distinct styles of argumentation:

a co-constructive style, in which students worked together to construct and critique

E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595 575

arguments, and a more individual, adversarial style, in which students took opposing

sides and attempted to win arguments. Keefer et al. (2000) found that oral discussions

were richest when students were co-constructive, that is, were willing to disagree but

also adopted positions flexibly so that eventual consensus could be reached (see also

Mercer, 1996). Although the instructional approaches reported in the literature varyon the amount of attention given to conflict, with some emphasizing controversy

(Flower, 1996; Hatano & Inagaki, 1991; Johnson et al., 1985; Linn, Bell, & Hsi,

1998) and others collaboration (Anderson et al., 2001; Mercer, 1996), almost all em-

phasize the importance of having students critique one another�s arguments.

Unfortunately, students are sometimes reluctant to criticize the ideas of their

classmates (Lampert et al., 1996). For example, a recent study by Nussbaum, Hart-

ley, Sinatra, Reynolds, and Bendixen (2002) found many (though not all) undergrad-

uates resist challenging the ideas of their peers. Lampert et al. (1996) noticed asimilar phenomenon among upper elementary school students. There could be a va-

riety of reasons for such resistance (e.g., not valuing arguments, concerns that crit-

icism may disrupt friendship, etc.) and it will require a sustained program of research

to fully understand the nature of this problem. A first step toward achieving such

understanding, however, may be to understand what individual difference variables

correlate with students� dispositions to engage in or avoid arguments.

As noted previously, there is evidence that both fairly stable individual character-

istics and situational factors affect communication behavior (Giles & Street, 1994;Patterson & Ritts, 1997). The focus of this study is on the former because, in our view,

the more general and stable relationships should first be mapped out to provide a con-

text for the investigation of situational factors, such as classroom cultures, and how

general and situational factors interact. We ultimately hope to work toward a synthe-

sis of theoretical perspectives, using a mixed quantitative-qualitative approach (Cre-

swell, 2002; see also Nussbaum et al., 2002). In addition, we primarily investigate

individual-level measures in this study rather than group measures because the latter

are subject to substantial within-group variability and have less explanatory powerwhen predicting individual-level communication behavior (Goldsmith & Fulfs, 1999).

2.1. Tendencies to approach or avoid argument

One way of conceptualizing and measuring students� tendencies to approach or

avoid argumentative discourse is with the construct of argumentativeness, which In-

fante and Rancer (1996) define as an individual�s tendency to argue about controver-

sial issues. In their conceptual framework, argumentativeness has both an approachand avoidance component. The approach component reflects a positive attraction to

and excitement about arguing; the avoidance component reflects anxiety about argu-

ing. Theoretically, an individual could be high on both components: excited but also

apprehensive about arguing (resulting in ‘‘conflicting feelings’’), or alternatively, low

on both components (resulting in overall ‘‘general apathy’’). Infante and Rancer

conceptualize argumentativeness as having both a state and trait component. The

state component varies among situations and is affected by such things as the impor-

tance of persuading someone in that situation and the probability of success; the trait

576 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

component, on the other hand, reflects a general tendency across situations to ap-

proach or avoid arguments. Infante and Rancer (1982) have developed a 20-item,

self-report scale for measuring trait argumentativeness, and reported good internal

consistency (.91 and .86 for the approach and avoidance components respectively)

and strong test–retest reliability (.91). Also in support of the stability of the measure,Rancer, Avtgis, Kosberg, and Whitecap (2000) found no significant differences be-

tween administrations of the instrument spaced 7 months–1 year later. We neverthe-

less prefer to conceptualize argumentativeness as a disposition to act in a certain way

rather than a trait. A trait connotes a characteristic that is stable over an extremely

long period of time (Myers, 1989), whereas dispositions are often more malleable.

Because levels of argumentativeness can be increased with training (see Rancer,

Whitecap, Kosberg, & Avtgis, 1997), it makes more sense to conceive of argumenta-

tiveness as a disposition.In relation to the validity of Infante and Rancer�s measure, significant positive

correlations have been found between argumentativeness and such variables as peer

ratings of argumentativeness, choosing to engage in debates over other activities, and

choosing professions which require more communication (Infante & Rancer, 1982,

1996; Rancer & Infante, 1985). Their construct is applicable to a wide variety of set-

tings, including formal ones (debates, classroom discussions) and informal ones (li-

vely discussions among friends). Because many of the items use phrases such as

‘‘controversial issues’’ or ‘‘defending a point of view,’’ it seems mostly applicableto arguments with intellectual content rather than, for example, children�s arguments

with their parents over rights and privileges (although argumentativeness is predic-

tive of authoritative parenting, see Bayer & Cegala, 1992).

2.2. Cognitive dispositions and epistemological beliefs

The disposition of students to engage in argument may be related to cognitive dis-

positions, specifically an individual�s disposition to engage in reflective thinking.Stanovich (1999) has shown that such dispositions explain a substantial portion of

variance on standardized tests of problem solving, over and above what can be ac-

counted for by ability alone. One measure that has attracted considerable attention is

need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1996), which measures whether individuals enjoy

engaging in effortful and complex thinking. It is likely that deriving enjoyment in

thinking would contribute to the approach component of argumentativeness, be-

cause arguing may provide individuals with a high need for cognition with intellec-

tual stimulation. However, the two constructs do not appear to be identical.Someone with a high need for cognition could gain intellectual stimulation in non-

social situations (for example, from reading books) and the items on the need for

cognition scale are not specifically geared toward social interaction. The items on

the argumentativeness (approach) scale, on the other hand, reflect behavioral dispo-

sitions in social situations, and refer to enjoyment gained from ‘‘arguing a controver-

sial issue’’ during a conversation. Need for cognition could be one factor

contributing to argumentativeness but there could be other factors as well, such as

E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595 577

need for social stimulation and attention. In support of the separability of the two

constructs, Sanders, Gass, Wiseman, and Bruschke (1992) found need for cognition

to correlate with argumentativeness, by .49. Sanders et al. concluded that the rela-

tionship was ‘‘small enough in magnitude to conclude that the scales were measuring

different (though overlapping) constructs (amount of shared variance was 24%)’’(p. 53). Their finding supports our claim that these are not identical constructs.

One problem with the Sanders et al. study is that it did not control for the possible

confounding effect of epistemological beliefs (views of the nature of knowledge). In

his seminal study of Harvard undergraduates, Perry (1970) found that students var-

ied in whether they perceived knowledge to be certain, relative, or tentative within a

particular context (see also King & Kitchener, 1994; Kuhn, 1991). Schommer (1990)

proposed several dimensions of epistemological beliefs. These dimensions were sim-

ple knowledge (i.e., knowledge consists of discrete facts), certain knowledge (i.e., ab-solute knowledge exists and will eventually be known), omniscient authority (i.e.,

authorities have access to otherwise inaccessible knowledge), innate ability (i.e.,

the ability to acquire knowledge is innate), and quick learning (i.e., learning occurs

in a quick or not-at-all fashion). Kardash and Scholes (1996) found that both need

for cognition and certain epistemological beliefs affected comprehension of pairs of

passages that provided opposing views on controversial issues. Students with more

uncertain views of knowledge (and higher need for cognition) wrote more balanced,

integrated responses to these texts than did other students. Epistemological beliefshave also been found to affect cognitive strategy use in reading (Kardash & Howell,

2000; Ryan, 1984) and problem solving (King & Kitchener, 1994; Schommer,

Crouse, & Rhodes, 1992; Schraw, Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995).

No studies have examined, however, the relationship of epistemological beliefs to

argumentativeness. Although beliefs are not dispositions to act in a certain way,

fairly stable and deep-seated beliefs may affect dispositions. There is evidence that,

like argumentativeness, epistemological beliefs are fairly stable; for example, Hofer

(2001) found no shifts in these beliefs for many (though not all) students over 4-yearsof college. It is possible that students with less advanced epistemological beliefs, for

instance those who believe that knowledge is simple and certain, would see little va-

lue in engaging in argument as a way of deriving truth and would thus have less of a

disposition to approach arguments. On the other hand, an alternative hypothesis is

that students who believe that knowledge is certain and/or derived from authority

may be more sure of their own beliefs and therefore more likely to argue. In any

event, it is important to investigate this relationship while controlling for need for

cognition and, conversely, to examine the relation of need for cognition and argu-mentativeness while controlling for epistemological beliefs. From a theoretical per-

spective, it is certainly plausible that need for cognition may foster more advanced

epistemological beliefs (and vice versa), and so it would be important to determine

the respective relationship of need for cognition and of epistemological beliefs to ar-

gumentativeness while simultaneously controlling for the other predictor.

It is also important to examine the factor structure of epistemological beliefs be-

cause not all researchers have been able to replicate Schommer�s proposed factor struc-ture at the item level (Hofer, 2001; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Qian & Alverman, 2000).

578 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

Schraw, Bendixen, and Dunkle (2002) have developed a more recent instrument, the

32-itemEpistemic Belief Inventory (EBI) that is more concise and has somewhat better

reliability. Schraw et al. were able to obtain the five factors proposed by Schommer,

but the replicability of the factor structure needs to be investigated.

2.3. Extraversion

In examining factors that shape students� dispositions to approach or avoid argu-

ments, cognitive dispositions and beliefs convey only part of the story; an individ-

ual�s comfort level in social situations may also affect this behavior. The latter is

probably best captured by the personality trait of extraversion, which reflects how

outgoing and assertive individuals are in social situations. There is prior research

pointing to the importance of extraversion in argumentation. First, Nussbaum(2002), in an in-depth observational study, found a greater tendency of extraverts

to engage in argumentative behaviors. The study also provided evidence that extra-

verts were much more confident in their ideas as well as possibly their interpersonal

skills. The study, however, involved a small sample and thus the results require ad-

ditional verification. In a much larger study of 286 adults, Blickle (1997) found ar-

gumentativeness to be correlated with the assertiveness facet of extraversion. In

contemporary personality theory (i.e., McCrae & Costa, 1997), extraversion is com-

prised of six subscales, or facets, specifically assertiveness, warmth, gregariousness,activity, excitement seeking, and positive emotions. Assertiveness refers to being

forceful and dominant in social situations. Assertive individuals—because of a ten-

dency to dominate social situations—may as a result tend to be confident in them-

selves and their ideas, and to argue for their particular ideas more.

A limitation of Blickle�s (1997) study, however, is that he only examined zero-order

correlations and did not control for any extraneous variables. For example, it is pos-

sible that extraverts and introverts may differ in relationship to need for cognition, gi-

ven that introverts may be more oriented toward internal thoughts than externalstimuli (Jung, 1971; Myers, 1989). Furthermore, it is possible that some other impor-

tant facets of extraversion may be relevant when other variables are controlled. Nuss-

baum (2001) conducted a small exploratory analysis that suggested that warmthmight

also be related to argumentativeness. Individuals who score high on warmth attempt

to maintain warm and friendly interpersonal relations, and might find that arguing

with others hinders these goals. If that is the case, then there would be a facet of extra-

version that would be positively associated with avoiding, and not just approaching,

arguments. On the other hand, because the preliminary finding was based on a smallamount of data (N ¼ 101) using forward stepwise regression, it could have capitalized

on a chance relationship and therefore needs to be verified against a larger set of data.

2.4. Controlling for gender

Finally, we would be remiss if we did not control for the effect of gender in explor-

ing these relationships. Although our focus is primarily on individual-level factors,

whereas gender effects reflect cultural socialization, gender is a potential confound

E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595 579

that needs to be addressed. Specifically, females generally are less argumentative

than males (Infante & Rancer, 1996; Nicotera & Rancer, 1994) and use more miti-

gated and less adversarial forms of argumentation to maintain more cohesive social

relationships (Kyratzis, 2001; Maltz & Borker, 1982; Sheldon, 1992, 1996; Tannen,

1990), although the differences are often small (Goldsmith & Fulfs, 1999). Genderdifferences have also been found in epistemological beliefs (Bendixen, Schraw, &

Dunkle, 1998; Schommer, 1993), with males more likely to endorse the certainty

of knowledge. Without controlling for gender, there could be a spurious, positive as-

sociation between certainty of knowledge and argumentativeness simply because

more males believe in certainty. In addition, gender may be related to the warmth

facet of extraversion, given the research cited above suggesting that females may

tend more than males to foster warm and cohesive relationships, and therefore it

may be particularly important to control for gender in examining the relationshipbetween warmth and argumentativeness.

2.5. Summary

In summary, the article examines several questions. As a preliminary step, the factor

structure of epistemological beliefs is explored and clarified. Following this step, we ex-

amine the following questions: (a)What is the relationship between epistemological be-

liefs and argumentativeness, while controlling for other variables (particularly need forcognition, assertiveness, and gender)? (b)What is the relationship of need for cognition

to the tendency to approach arguments while controlling for other variables, particu-

larly epistemological beliefs? and (c)What is the relationship of the two relevant facets

of extraversion (assertiveness and warmth) to argumentativeness when other factors

are controlled, particularly need for cognition and the other facet of extraversion?

Table 1 summarizes our various hypotheses regarding how these various variables

might be related to argumentativeness. Because the approach and avoidance scales

were developed to be independent (Infante & Rancer, 1982, 1996), the table doesnot assume that a positive relationship with the approach factor will be matched

with a negative relationship with the avoidance factor.

As shown in Table 1, we hypothesize that students who view knowledge as simple

and/or derived from quick learning would be less attracted to arguments because

they would not understand the utility of argumentation for arriving at complex

truths (e.g., exploring questions from different viewpoints). Because we hypothesize

that epistemological beliefs, particularly simple knowledge and quick learning,

would be negatively correlated with need for cognition, which may be positively cor-related with approaching arguments, need for cognition could potentially account

for any correlation between simple knowledge/quick learning and approaching argu-

ments. We hypothesize, however, that epistemological beliefs would still have some

effect on argumentativeness, even when need for cognition is controlled.

We are unsure of the relationship between certain knowledge/omniscient authority

and argumentativeness: There could be a positive relationship, a negative relationship,

or some combination (e.g., a curvilinear relationship). We hypothesize that the innate

ability factor would not be related to argumentativeness. Individuals who view the

Table 1

Predictions regarding approaching and avoiding arguments: summary of hypotheses

Variable Approach arguments Avoid arguments

Epistemological beliefs

Simple knowledge/

Quick learninga ;b Negatively related

Certain knowledge/

Omniscient authoritya ;b ;c ;d Unclear (could be positive or negative)

Innate ability Not related Not related

Need for cognitionb Positively related

Assertivenessc ;e Positively related Negatively related

Warmthe ;f Positively related

aGiven a (hypothesized) positive correlation between simple and certain knowledge.bGiven a (hypothesized) negative correlation between epistemological beliefs and need for cognition.cGiven a (hypothesized) positive correlation between certain knowledge and assertiveness.dGiven a (hypothesized) negative correlation between certain knowledge and gender.eGiven a (hypothesized) positive correlation between assertiveness and warmth.fGiven a (hypothesized) positive correlation between warmth and gender.

580 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

ability to acquire intelligence as innatemay ormay not be attracted to argument, prob-

ably depending on various other factors (e.g., self-perceptions of intelligence).

In regards to our remaining hypotheses, we predict that need for cognitionwould be

positively correlated with approaching arguments (even when controlling for episte-mological beliefs) because arguments would provide individuals with intellectual stim-

ulation. We hypothesize that assertiveness would be positively related to approaching

arguments because assertive students would bemore confident in their ideas and social

skills. Conversely, students with low levels of assertiveness would be less confident and

would try to avoid argumentative situation (where they could be made to look dumb

or foolish); we therefore hypothesize a negative relationship between assertiveness and

avoiding arguments. We hypothesize a positive relationship between warmth and

avoiding arguments; students who want to maintain friendly relationships with otherswould avoid arguments because arguments produce an element of conflict. We would

expect that this relationship would hold even when controlling for gender, because we

theorize that the primary reason that gender even has an effect is because females have

a greater tendency to maintain warm relationships.

3. Method

3.1. Participants

Participants consisted of 238 undergraduates (primarily preservice teachers) who

were enrolled in courses in educational psychology or educational assessment. Par-

ticipants participated in the study to satisfy a course requirement. Of the subjects,

most were majoring in elementary education (55%), secondary education (18%), or

some other type of education program (17%) and had an average G.P.A. of 3.3. Ages

ranged from 19 to 55 (mean age was 27). Ethnicities represented were Caucasian

E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595 581

(79%), Asian (6%), Hispanic (8%), and African American (5%). Most subjects were

female (79%).

Data were collected from different subjects during the fall semesters of 2000 and

2001. There were 101 participants in the first group and 137 in the second.

3.2. Measures and procedures

All participants were administered a number of instruments during an hour-long

session in a large group setting. The instruments measured argumentativeness, epis-

temological beliefs, need for cognition, and extraversion. The first group completed

the instruments in the order just mentioned, whereas the second group of subjects

completed the instruments in various random orders, to control for order effects.

The specific measures are described below. Except where otherwise noted, the self-report measures consisted of a 5-point Likert scale.

3.2.1. Argumentativeness scale

This scale consisted of 20 items such as ‘‘I consider an argument an exciting intel-

lectual challenge’’ and ‘‘I get an unpleasant feeling when I realize I am about to get

into an argument.’’ The specific items appear in Infante and Rancer (1982). Of the 20

items, 10 measured the tendency to approach argumentative situations, and 10 mea-

sured the tendency to avoid. The reliability and validity of the instrument were dis-cussed previously.

3.2.2. Need for cognition (NFC)

Subjects also completed the short form (18 items) of the Need for Cognition Scale

(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), which measures whether individuals enjoy engaging

in effortful and complex thinking. The instrument contains such items as ‘‘I prefer

my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve’’ or ‘‘The notion of thinking ab-

stractly is appealing to me.’’ The short form has good reliability (a ¼ :90) and ischaracterized by one dominant factor (Cacioppo et al., 1984). Cacioppo et al.

(1996) report on a large number of studies supporting the measure�s convergent

and discriminant validity. For example, students with high need for cognition tend

recall more arguments presented in various modalities and rate argument quality

more accurately.

3.2.3. Epistemic beliefs inventory (EBI)

To measure participants� beliefs about the nature of knowledge and knowing, the32-item EBI was used, which is based on the five epistemological belief factors pro-

posed by Schommer (1990). Schraw et al. (2002) completed a validation study of the

EBI in which a comparison was made with Schommer�s (1990) Epistemological

Questionnaire (EQ). The EBI measured all five epistemological beliefs proposed

by Schommer and explained 20% more sample variance with one half the items.

The EBI was also found to have better test–retest reliability than the EQ. Stability

coefficients on the EBI ranged from .62 (innate ability) to .81 (certain knowledge)

582 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

on the five dimensions over a one-month period. In regards to the EQ, on the other

hand, only two of the same factors appeared at both times 1 and 2, with stability co-

efficients ranging from .41 to .67. The EBI appeared to be a more valid and reliable

measure.

Of the 32 items on the EBI, seven measured simple knowledge (e.g., ‘‘Too manytheories just complicate things’’), eight measured certain knowledge (e.g., ‘‘What is

true today will be true tomorrow’’), five measured quick learning (e.g., ‘‘If you don�tlearn something quickly, you will never learn it’’), five measured omniscient author-

ity (e.g., ‘‘When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it’’), and se-

ven measured innate ability (e.g, ‘‘Smart people are born that way’’).

3.3. Extraversion

Subjects completed 48 items related to extraversion. Items were drawn from the

NEO-R Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). All 6 facets of each trait were

measured, with each subscale consisting of 8 items each. Although we were only in-

terested in some of the facets, all facets were measured to preserve the order that

items were presented on the complete instrument. (Items measuring the same facet

were separated by 12 items to maintain item independence.) Costa and McCrae

(1992) report that the NEO-PI-R has been generally successful at measuring the in-

tended constructs, and that the instrument correlates well with spousal ratings ofpersonality and other personality tests (McCrae, 1982, 1989). It also appears robust

against social desirability bias (Costa & McCrae, 1980; McCrae & Costa, 1983). As

reported in Costa and McCrae (1988), the extraversion scale has good internal con-

sistency (.87) and test–retest reliability (.91). Additional information on the instru-

ment�s factor structure can be found in McCrae and Costa (1989).

The extraversion facets relevant to our analysis were: (a) assertiveness (e.g., ‘‘I

have often been a leader of groups I have belonged to’’) and (b) warmth (e.g., ‘‘I find

it easy to smile and be outgoing with strangers’’). Approximately half the items werenegatively phrased to guard against response bias (including social desirability bias).

4. Analysis and results

4.1. Preliminary analyses

4.1.1. Epistemological beliefs factor structure

Before examining our three major questions, it was first necessary to factor ana-

lyze the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) to derive subscales—and accompanying

subscores—that could be used in the subsequent analysis. Principal component fac-

tor analysis with Promax rotation was used for this purpose. Varimax rotation was

not used because we had no theoretical rationale for assuming the factors would be

uncorrelated. Because prior research on both the EBI and Schommer�s instrument

identified five subcomponents, we forced a five-factor solution. Of these, three were

interpretable and displayed adequate reliability. These three reflected core aspects of

E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595 583

epistemological beliefs that had been identified in previous analyses, specifically sim-

ple knowledge (knowledge as discrete facts), certain knowledge (a belief that knowl-

edge can be known with certainty), and innate ability. Table 2 shows the pattern

Table 2

Pattern coefficients of epistemic belief items (N¼ 238)

Item CK SK IA h2

Absolute moral truth does not exista .70 ).15 ).05 .48

What is true today will be true tomorrow .61 .07 ).01 .38

Sometimes there are no right answers to life�s problemsa .50 ).28 ).04 .36

People should always obey the law .59 .13 ).10 .53

When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it .47 .19 .03 .32

Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life .47 .12 .07 .30

The moral rules I live by apply to everyone .43 ).15 .27 .28

You can study something for years and still not understand ita .46 ).25 ).05 .38

People who question authority are troublemakers .34 .26 .10 .33

Truth means different things to different peoplea .30 ).03 .15 .16

Too many theories just complicate things ).10 .72 ).03 .49

If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will

most likely end up confused

.06 .61 .02 .41

The best ideas are often the most simple ).11 .63 .06 .42

Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories .12 .62 ).03 .54

Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe ).07 .57 ).03 .36

It bothers me when instructors don�t tell students the answers tocomplicated problemsb

.02 .37 ).14 .13

If two people are arguing about something, at least one of them

must be wrong

.00 .35 .09 .28

Some people will never be smart no matter how hard they work ).27 ).18 .70 .53

Really smart students don�t have to work as hard to do well in

school

.13 ).01 .67 .47

People can�t do too much about how smart they are ).03 .14 .43 .42

How well you do in school depends on how smart you are .11 ).06 .69 .51

Some people just have a knack for learning and others don�t ).15 .12 .63 .4

Smart people are born that way .04 ).05 .76 .54

Students who learn things quickly are the most successful .16 .04 .61 .43

If you don�t learn something quickly, you will never learn it .10 .03 .47 .45

Some people are born with special gifts & talents .04 ).08 .32 .39

If you haven�t understood a chapter the first time through, going

back over it won�t help).09 ).02 .16 .44

Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts ).02 ).08 ).07 .20

Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time .23 .29 .09 .41

The more you know about a topic, the more there is to knowa ).22 ).13 ).01 .64

I like teachers who present several competing theories & let their

students decide which is besta.09 ).05 ).12 .46

Children should be allowed to question their parents�authoritya

.30c .06 ).06 .33

Note. Bold indicates highest loading .30 and above. Factor correlations were: certain and simple

knowledge (.17), certain knowledge and innate ability (.07), and simple knowledge and innate ability (.33).a Item reversed coded.b Item excluded from SK scale because it reduced internal consistency by .04.c Item excluded from CK scale because of a higher cross loading (.39) on a fifth factor.

584 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

coefficients for each item on the EBI. Four of the items that in Schraw et al. (2002)

comprised omniscient authority (Items 4, 7, 25, and 26 in Schraw et al.) were ab-

sorbed by certain knowledge and appeared interpretable under that factor. The

quick learning items did not form any coherent pattern. The factor solution ac-

counted for 40% of the item variance.For the three interpretable factors, subscores were computed using the items in-

dicated in the table (except where noted, items included in each subscale are in bold).

The coefficient as were .69 for both certain and simple knowledge, and .77 for innate

ability.

4.1.2. Correlational analysis

The next step of the analysis was to examine the various variables that we hypoth-

esized would predict argumentativeness, as well as the subfactors of argumentative-ness. Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for all variables used in the

Table 3

Means and standard deviations of variables used in regression analysis (N¼ 238)

Variable M SD

Approaching arguments 31.53 7.21

Avoiding arguments 29.45 7.12

Certain knowledge 26.10 5.40

Simple knowledge 17.28 3.81

Need for cognition 60.35 11.58

Assertiveness 16.81 5.21

Warmth 23.82 4.40

Gender (female) .79 .41

Table 4

Intercorrelations among individual difference measures (N¼ 238)

Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Approaching

argument

—

2. Avoiding

argument

).57�� —

3. Certain

knowledge

).13 .24�� —

4. Simple

knowledge

).07 .29�� .23�� —

5. Innate ability .07 .11 .18�� .36�� —

6. Need for

cognition

.27�� ).24�� ).19� ).35�� ).10 —

7. Assertiveness .35�� ).31�� .03 .03 ).02 .27�� —

8. Warmth ).02 .13� .18�� .12 ).12 .06 .26�� —

9. Gendera ).13� .16� .06 .00 ).20�� ).13� ).03 .18�� —

aFemales were coded as 1, males as 0.* p < :05, two-tailed.** p < :01, two-tailed.

E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595 585

analysis. Table 4 displays the simple (zero-order) correlations between all variables.

The table shows that, contrary to our assumption, the approach and avoidance com-

ponents were not independent but negatively correlated. Because the correlation was

moderate (R ¼ �:57, implying only 33% shared variance), we continued to treat the

components as separate constructs in our analysis. All variables were correlated withat least one component of argumentativeness except innate ability. As we did not hy-

pothesize a relationship, it was dropped from further analysis.

4.1.3. Regression analyses

The three major research questions pertained to how different variables would

predict argumentativeness while other factors were controlled. Multiple regression

was used for this purpose. The regression approach allows one to examine the rela-

tionship between a predictor and criterion variable while controlling for the effect ofall other variables that are included in the model. It should be noted that noncorre-

lation among independent variables is not an assumption of the model or required to

obtain unbiased estimates (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990); when the goal is to

understand relationships and not simply to make predictions, it is appropriate to use

correlated independent variables as long as the correlations are not extreme (Neter

et al., p. 436). In fact, the strength of the regression approach is the ability to sort

out the relative contributions of two correlated independent variables to a dependent

variable.Another advantage of the regression approach is that it also allows one to identify

how much of the variance in the dependent variables is explained by all the predic-

tors combined; this information is given by the coefficient of determination (R2). Fur-

thermore, one can identify the unique variance explained by each predictor variable

or a set of variables (for example, the set corresponding to epistemological beliefs or

extraversion). For each of our three major questions, two separate but parallel hier-

archical regression analyses were performed, one for approaching arguments as the

criterion variable and one for avoiding arguments. The predictor variables werethose specified by our hypotheses as relevant to argumentativeness: certain and sim-

ple knowledge, NFC, assertiveness, warmth, and gender. In the first step of each

analysis, all predictors were included except the set of predictors of interest to the

question being examined. The second step was to include the variables of interest

and to calculate the change in R2. This change reflects the amount of variance un-

iquely attributable to the variables of interest. Predictors at a particular step were

included in the model simultaneously.

4.1.4. Epistemological beliefs and argumentativeness

Tables 5 and 6 summarize the regressions with epistemological beliefs (certain and

simple knowledge) entered at Step 2. Epistemological beliefs were not significantly

related to the disposition to approach arguments, but these beliefs were both posi-

tively associated with the disposition to avoid arguments, accounting for 7% of

the variance. Thus, contrary to our hypotheses, epistemological beliefs were related

to the avoidance component of argumentativeness, not the approach component.

It is possible, however, that there could be a curvilinear relationship between the

Table 5

Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting approaching arguments, with episte-

mological beliefs entered separately (N¼ 236)

Variable B SE B b

Step 1

Need for cognition 0.11 0.04 0.17��

Assertiveness 0.46 0.09 0.33���

Warmth )0.17 0.10 )0.10Gendera )1.50 1.09 )0.09

Step 2

Need for cognition 0.10 0.04 0.16�

Assertiveness 0.46 0.09 0.33���

Warmth )0.15 0.11 )0.09Gendera )1.46 1.09 )0.08Certain knowledge )0.12 0.08 )0.09Simple knowledge 0.06 0.12 0.03

Note. Variables within each step were entered simultaneously. R2 ¼ :18 for Step 1; DR2 ¼ :01 for Step 2

(p¼ .34).a Females were coded as 1, males as 0.* p6 :05** p6 :01.*** p6 :001.

Table 6

Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting avoiding arguments, with epistemo-

logical beliefs entered separately (N¼ 236)

Variable B SE B b

Step 1

Need for cognition )0.10 0.04 )0.15�

Assertiveness )0.44 0.09 )0.32���

Wamth 0.34 0.10 0.21���

Gendera 1.60 1.08 0.09

Step 2

Need for cognition )0.03 0.04 )0.04Assertiveness )0.46 0.09 )0.34���

Warmth 0.25 0.10 0.15�

Gendera 1.86 1.04 0.11

Certain knowledge 0.21 0.08 0.16��

Simple knowledge 0.41 0.12 0.22���

Note. Variables within each step were entered simultaneously. R2 ¼ :18 for Step 1; DR2 ¼ :07 for Step 2

(p < :001).a Females were coded as 1, males as 0.* p6 :05.** p6 :01.*** p6 :001.

586 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

approach component and epistemological beliefs, particularly certain knowledge.

This situation could occur if both high and low levels of certainty make it more likely

for individuals to approach arguments (high certainty because of the certainty in

E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595 587

convictions, low certainty because of the utility of intellectual exploration when

knowledge is uncertain). Certain knowledge remained insignificant, however, when

a quadratic term (certain knowledge squared) was included in the model, which

was also insignificant. So the data did not indicate a curvilinear relationship or that

certain knowledge resulted in greater confidence in beliefs. Assertiveness, which Ta-ble 5 shows to strongly predict approaching arguments, might better reflect confi-

dence in ideas than would epistemological beliefs.

4.1.5. Need for cognition and argumentativeness

Tables 7 and 8 summarize the regressions with need for cognition entered at Step

2. Need for cognition significantly predicted the disposition to approach arguments,

but accounted for only 2% of the variance. It did not significantly predict avoiding

arguments. The zero-order correlation of need for cognition and the argumentative-ness components were both much stronger (r2 ¼ 7% for approach and 6% for avoid-

ance, based on Table 4). Need for cognition, however, was significantly correlated

with both assertiveness and epistemological beliefs, and when these latter variables

were held constant in the final regression model, the predictive power of need for

cognition was reduced considerably. We had not hypothesized a relationship with ar-

gument avoidance, but we had hypothesized that need for cognition would positively

predict the disposition to approach arguments. The regression model, however, only

tested additive contributions to approaching arguments, and it is possible that needfor cognition may have had a more powerful effect on the approach component as an

interaction with assertiveness. In other words, an enjoyment with effortful thinking,

in combination with confidence in social skills, may produce an attraction to argu-

ment. To test this possibility, we added an interactive term to the model (Need for

Cognition x Assertiveness). That term was highly significant (b ¼ 1:09, p ¼ :003)and explained an additional 2% of the variance in addition to that already explained

by NFC alone (for a total of 4%).

Table 7

Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting approaching arguments, with need

for cognition entered separately (N¼ 236)

Variable B SE B b

Step 1

Certain knowledge )0.15 0.08 )0.11Simple knowledge )0.04 0.12 )0.02Gendera )1.83 1.09 )0.10Warmth )0.13 0.11 )0.08Assertiveness 0.52 0.09 )0.37���

Step 2

(Results same as in Step 2, Table 5)

Note. Variables within each step were entered simultaneously. R2 ¼ :16 for Step 1; DR2 ¼ :02 for Step 2

(p¼ .02).a Females were coded as 1, males as 0.*** p6 :001.

Table 8

Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting avoiding arguments, with need for

cognition entered separately (N¼ 236)

Variable B SE B b

Step 1

Certain knowledge 0.21 0.08 0.16��

Simple knowledge 0.43 0.11 0.23���

Gendera 1.95 1.03 0.11

Warmth 0.24 0.10 0.15�

Assertiveness )0.48 0.08 )0.35���

Step 2

(Results same as in Step 2, Table 6)

Note. Variables within each step were entered simultaneously. R2 ¼ :25 for Step 1; DR2 ¼ :00 for Step 2

(p¼ .54).a Females were coded as 1, males as 0.* p6 :05** p6 :01.*** p6 :001.

588 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

4.1.6. Extraversion and argumentativeness

Tables 9 and 10 summarize the regressions with the extraversion variables entered

at Step 2. These variables accounted for an additional 10% of the variance on both

the approach and avoidance components. Assertiveness positively predicted the ap-

proach component and negatively predicted the avoidance component. Warmth was

also positively related to the avoidance component. Although there was a significant

zero-order correlation between warmth and avoidance (R ¼ :13, p < :05), the rela-

tionship became stronger when assertiveness was controlled (pr ¼ :23, p < :001).The positive correlation between the extraversion facets (warmth and assertiveness)

appeared to mask somewhat the positive association between warmth and avoiding

arguments when only simple correlations were examined. In summary, the regression

Table 9

Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting approaching arguments, with extra-

version variables entered separately (N¼ 236)

Variable B SE B b

Step 1

Certain knowledge )0.11 0.09 )0.08Simple knowledge 0.08 0.13 0.04

Need for cognition 0.16 0.04 0.25���

Gendera )1.72 1.13 )0.10

Step 2

(Results same as in Step 2, Table 5)

Note. Variables within each step were entered simultaneously. R2 ¼ :09 for Step 1; DR2 ¼ :10 for Step 2

(p < :001).a Females were coded as 1, males as 0.*** p6 :001.

Table 10

Summary of hierarchical regression analyses for variables predicting avoiding arguments, with extraver-

sion variables entered separately (N¼ 236)

Variable B SE B b

Step 1

Certain knowledge 0.21 0.08 0.16��

Simple knowledge 0.41 0.12 0.22���

Need for cognition )0.08 0.04 )0.12Gendera 2.32 1.08 0.13�

Step 2

(Results same as in Step 2, Table 6)

Note. Variables within each step were entered simultaneously. R2 ¼ :15 for Step 1; DR2 ¼ :10 for Step 2

(p < :001).a Females were coded as 1, males as 0.* p6 :05.** p6 :01.*** p6 :001.

E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595 589

analysis indicated that warmth was a significant predictor of argument avoidance, as

was low levels of assertiveness.

4.1.7. Diagnostic checks

Diagnostic checks revealed no statistical problems with the data. No variance in-

flation factors were greater than 1.3 (Neter et al., 1990, indicate that only factors

greater than 10 indicate a problem with excessive multicollinearity). The standard-

ized and studentized deleted residuals were examined for indication of outliers orskewness; none were greater than 3.3 (which Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996, p. 139, rec-

ommend as an appropriate threshold). Residual plots against predicted values re-

vealed no signs of heteroscedasticity or nonlinearity.

Because the instruments were administered in different orders during year one and

year two, to check for order effects, categorical variables representing year were

added to the final model, one reflecting intercept changes and one reflecting slope

changes (the procedure was repeated for each variable in the final model). With

one exception, none of these variables were significant, indicating that the resultsheld for both waves of data and were not driven by order effects. The exception

was that warmth was also found to negatively predict approaching arguments during

year 1 (b ¼ �:26, p < :01); this additional finding, however, was not indicated by the

year 2 data.

5. Discussion

This study has explored reasons why students may or may not be attracted to ar-

gumentative situations, using Infante and Rancer�s (1982) notion of argumentative-

ness. Regression analysis was used to understand the relationship of epistemological

590 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

beliefs, need for cognition, and two facets of extraversion (assertiveness and warmth)

to dispositions to approach or avoid arguments, while controlling for the other vari-

ables (as well as gender).

First, epistemological beliefs significantly predicted argumentativeness, but not in

the manner we had expected. We had hypothesized that beliefs in the certainty andsimplicity of knowledge would be related to the approach component of arguments

because students would not value argumentation and discussion as a means of ex-

ploring what is true. An alternative hypothesis was that students who believed in

the certainty of knowledge might be more certain of their beliefs and thus more will-

ing to argue. Neither hypothesis was born out. Instead, epistemological beliefs were

more related to dispositions to avoid arguments.

Second, as we had hypothesized, the tendency to approach arguments appears to

have a component related to both cognitive dispositions (need for cognition) and topersonality (assertiveness). By itself, need for cognition only explained a small per-

cent of the variance, but explained twice as much variance (4%) when allowed to in-

teract with assertiveness. This finding suggests that need for cognition may predict a

greater attraction to argumentative situations when accompanied by high levels of

social self-confidence.

Third, extraversion facets also predicted the tendency to avoid arguments, but in

opposite directions, with low levels of assertiveness and high levels of warmth pre-

dicting argument avoidance. Other research (Nussbaum, 2002) suggests that asser-tiveness may affect argumentativeness because highly assertive individuals are

more confident in their ideas and social skills. Understandably, a lack of assertive-

ness (i.e., confidence) would make individuals uneasy in argumentative situations.

A novel finding that emerged from this study is that warmth (i.e., the need to main-

tain warm and friendly relationships) also contributes to argument avoidance, even

when gender is held constant. Because assertiveness and warmth are both facets of

extraversion, these results qualify those of Nussbaum (2002), who found different ar-

gument styles among introverts and extraverts. The situation appears morecomplex, because different types of extraverts may have different orientations to

argument.

This study has several theoretical implications of our understanding of argumen-

tativeness. Infante and Rancer (1996) have typically conceived of argumentativeness

as a type of personality trait. We have argued that it may be fruitful to conceive of

argumentativeness more as a behavioral disposition, one that is fairly stable but also

somewhat malleable. Doing so allows the possibility that argumentativeness may be

shaped not only by personality traits, such as extraversion, but may also be affectedby, or at least related to, fairly stable beliefs, specifically epistemological beliefs, as

well as cognitive dispositions.

The bulk of research on argumentativeness has focused on documenting the

benefits of this disposition, in contrast to verbal aggressiveness (the tendency attack

the self-concept of others), for example in relationship to credibility ratings, conflict

resolution, marital satisfaction, parenting, and the avoidance of physical violence

(Infante & Rancer, 1996). The reasons some individuals avoid arguments, how-

ever, is less well understood; in fact, one of the limitations of Infante and Rancer�s

E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595 591

instrument is that most of the items make no reference as to why individuals avoid

arguments. Infante and Rancer (1982) did find a moderate, positive correlation of

argumentativeness avoidance with communication apprehension (a fear of speaking

in public), which in turn has been linked to a predisposition to anxiety (Beatty,

McCroskey, & Heisel, 1998). Lack of confidence in one�s communication skillsand/or ideas has also been implicated (Nussbaum, 2002), which is consistent with

the negative correlation with assertiveness reported here. This study, however, sug-

gests two additional factors that are related to argument avoidance. First, avoiding

arguments is negatively related to a desire to maintain warm relationships with oth-

ers, when controlling for assertiveness. Second, students with less well-developed

epistemological beliefs, specifically in the certainty or simplicity of knowledge, tend

to avoid arguments. These linkages broaden our knowledge of factors that are re-

lated to argument avoidance.By the same token, however, the study raises the question of why factors such as

epistemological beliefs are related to argument avoidance. Several interpretations of

this relationship are possible. First, a phenomenological study by Bendixen (2002)

indicated that students with less sophisticated epistemological beliefs can experience

epistemic doubt, defined as uncertainty regarding their epistemic beliefs, and that this

doubt can be discomforting because it challenges a stable world view. Because the

avoidance component of argumentativeness is defined by items indicating discomfort

or anxiety about arguing, it is possible that this discomfort is caused by epistemicdoubt. Of course, correlational data cannot establish causal directionality, and thus

other interpretations are possible. Perhaps students who avoid arguments (for other

reasons) have less opportunity to experience cognitive conflict, which some postulate

helps develop epistemological beliefs (Bendixen, 2002; Hofer, 2001; Hofer & Pin-

trich, 1997; King & Kitchener, 1994). It is also possible that the relationship is caused

by some variable that was not included in the model.

Certainly more research is needed to understand the reasons for the relationship

of epistemological beliefs and argument avoidance. Such research is especially im-portant given other evidence that, in educational contexts, many students avoid en-

gaging in arguments (Lampert et al., 1996; Nussbaum et al., 2002). For example,

Chan (2001) and other researchers in science education (e.g., Chinn & Brewer,

1998) have noted that students often respond to data and viewpoints that conflict

with preexisting conceptions by ignoring it or engaging in ‘‘stonewalling’’ tactics that

minimize the conflict. Understanding the reasons that fuel argument avoidance, and

the role of epistemological beliefs in this avoidance, is an especially pressing topic for

future research.One limitation of this study is that the majority of participants were females. The

findings may have been somewhat different if more males were represented in the

sample. Although gender effects on communication styles have been found to be

small and inconsistent (Goldsmith & Fulfs, 1999), future studies should strive for

a more balanced sample so that the role of gender can be more precisely clarified.

A second limitation is that our statistical model only accounted for 19–25% of

the variance in the dependent variables. Although these figures reflect a substantial

portion of the variance, clearly there are other important factors that need to be

592 E. Michael Nussbaum, L.D. Bendixen / Contemporary Educational Psychology 28 (2003) 573–595

investigated. These may include other personality variables as well as sociocultural

variables (e.g., cultural norms) related to the expression of disagreement. Statistical

interactions among some of these variables may also account for a portion of the

variance (Nussbaum et al., 2002).

Fostering critical argumentation in the classroom is part of a more general projectof creating intentional classroom environments focused on learning and thinking for

understanding (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1989). Fostering such environments may re-

quire explicit attention to a theoretically and empirically grounded framework of in-

dividual differences that affect students� disposition to engage in or avoid arguments.

In this way, theory can help advance our understanding of how to foster better stu-

dent engagement with intellectual ideas.

Acknowledgments

The authors sincerely thank Gregg Schraw for providing helpful comments on an

earlier version of this manuscript.

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