An empirical revisiting of the secularization debate at the micro level: Europe’s heterodox...

EuroPolis, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2013, pp. 37-73

An empirical revisiting of the secularization debate at the micro

level: Europe’s heterodox religiosity over the last two decades

Ionuţ Apahideanu

The underlying article examines the current state of the secularization debate

in order to develop an updated working model of the paradigm at the micro

level as manifesting in two interrelated directions: atheism, respectively

heterodox hybridization of religiosity. The latter direction is further explored

in its manifestation in Europe over the past two decades in an integrated

approach based on the waves of the European Values Study (EVS) and the

International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), focusing on church mediation

of the individual-divine relation, conceptualizations of God as personal versus

impersonal, self-defined religiosity and spirituality, and various heterodox,

uncanonical, beliefs. The findings support the secularization paradigm as

manifested predominantly towards atheism in Western Europe, respectively

towards heterodox, hybrid, forms of religiosity in the East.

Keywords: secularization, post-secularism, religiosity, individualization, hybridization, Europe

Introduction: the state of the secularization debate

Following an exponential multiplication and intensifying of criticism initiated

somewhere in the 1960s (e.g. Martin 1965; Franzmann, Gärtner and Köck 2006: 11) against the

formerly “long standing consensus” (Chaves 1994: 749) around the secularization paradigm, the

1990s witnessed a “paradigm shift” in the sociology of religion (Warner 1993: 1044). The

subsequent spectacular augmentation of a body of literature extensively contesting the classic

paradigm on grounds of its Christian bias, theoretical assumptions, empirical findings, or

methodological approach (Berger 1999), “took the secularization faithful by surprise”1

(Introvigne and Stark 2005: 1) and led to an apparent reversal of the balance of forces within the

disciplinary field. Thus, within the otherwise remarkably eclectic “anti”-secularist camp, some

voices went even so far as to proclaim “Secularization, R.I.P” (Stark 1999), considering that

“[a]fter nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophesies and misrepresentations of both present

and past, it seems time to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories”

1 As did the “defection” of Peter L. Berger, a former ardent supporter of secularization, who reached a surprising

and unequivocal conclusion: “I think what I and most sociologists of religion wrote in the 1960s about

secularization was a mistake. Our underlying argument was that secularization and modernity go hand in hand.

With more modernization comes more secularization. It wasn’t a crazy theory. There was some evidence for it. But I

think it’s basically wrong” […] “The world today, with some exceptions […] is as furiously religious as it ever was,

and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists

loosely labeled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially mistaken.” ((Berger 1997: 974; 1999: 2).


(Stark and Finke 2000: 79; Stark 1999: 241, 261), while an eponymous advocate of the

secularization paradigm lamented that “it is assumed that all right thinking people are against it”

(Bruce 2006: 39).

In this context, some prominent authors of the besieged secularist camp, such as

Tschannen (1991), Dobbelaere (1987, 1998), Lechner (1991, 1996), Hanson (1997), or Yamane

(1997) began to gradually depart from Bryan Wilson’s classic broad definition of secularization2,

in an attempt to reformulate secularization by “lowering its epistemological ambitions” (Vásquez

and Friedman Marquardt 2003: 18) which, however, has been promptly denounced as a

convenient and inelegant ad hoc argument by post-secularists such as Rodney Stark and Roger

Finke (Stark 1999: 251; Stark and Finke 2000: 59).

Broadly speaking, this reformulation unfolded as a gradual emphasis shift between

levels following Karel Dobbelaere’s (1981) model of secularization manifesting at three levels:

societal (as an expression of society’s functional differentiation); organizational (with religious

organizations changing their internal structure); individual (with individuals becoming less

religious and church-oriented). A summarizing overview of Dobbelaere’s subsequent slightly

amended model versions (2000, 2004) and of the ones of other authors inspired by the Belgian

sociologist (e.g. Chaves 1994: 757, 1997: 445-447; Yamane 1997; Chaves and Gorski 2001;

Ziebertz and Riegel 2008: 23; Ballantine and Roberts 2009: 321) would operationalize

secularization as a complex multi-dimensional phenomenon occurring at three levels3:

macro (or societal), where secularization manifests itself as laicization (Dobbelaere 1981;

Chaves 1994: 757), meaning

a.) [along the Durkheim-inspired society’s functional differentiation] a minimization of

religious elites’ and organizations’ capacity to exercise authority over other

institutional spheres (e.g. government, economy, military, education), subsequent to a

changing locus of authority in the social system (Wilson 1998: 50) and

b.) [in terms of the Weber-conceptualized rationalizing disenchantment of the world] a

rationalization of public policies, increasingly based on logic, empirical data, cost-

benefit analysis, etc., rather than on holy books or religious authorities’ proclamations

(Ballantine and Roberts 2009: 321);

meso (or institutional/organizational), witnessing an internal secularization (Dobbelaere

1981) and pluralization (Martin 1978; Wilson 1998: 58-59) of religious organizations

(churches, schools, hospitals, etc.), whereby, along the above-mentioned theoretical

distinction,

a.) religious authorities exert less control over organizational resources within the

religious sphere, with

b.) religious organizations increasingly guiding themselves by secular, rationality and

efficiency-derived criteria;

micro (or individual), where secularization translates into

2 As the process whereby religious thinking/consciousness, practice/actions, and institutions “lose social

significance” (Wilson 1966: 15; 1982: xiv, 49; also Davie 1994, Dobbelaere 2002, Martin 1978, or Pollack 2003) 3 Alternatively, John C. Somerville operates a more complex six-tier, structure and process, distinction among:

macro social structures (meaning broadly functional differentiation and specialization); individual institutions

(transformations of religious into secular institutions); activities (transfered from religious to secular institutions);

mentalities (a religiosity decline at the individual level); populations (broad patterns of societal decline in levels of

religiosity); religion (integratedely approaching the previous five dimensions) (Somerville 1998: 249-253).


a.) a religious disinvolvement of individuals (Chaves 1994: 757) or, more specifically, a

decline of church religiosity (Martin 1978) largely accompanied by an extremely

diversified redefining of religiosity/spirituality at the individual level, in a genuine

“individualization” of beliefs (Bellah et al. 1985), and

b.) a gradual replacement of a specifically religious consciousness by a rational,

empirical, instrumental orientation (Wilson 1982: 149), individual decision-making

being increasingly based on calculated self-interest, in a more or less pronounced

and/or aware disregard of religious teachings (Ballantine and Roberts 2009: 321),

thus marking a “secularization of consciousness” (Berger 1967: 107-108).

Within this framework, considering in a common denominator that societal

differentiation as a core assumption of the secularization paradigm remains still valid (Lechner

1991, Tschannen 1991, Chaves 1994, Casanova 1994, Yamane 1997), recent advocates of the

paradigm have been advancing an updated version of it, so-called “macro” (Lechner 1996),

refrained exclusively to the societal level and narrowly defining secularization as “de-

institutionalization”4 (Martin 1978; Dobbelaere 1987, 1998, 1999, 2000; Chaves 1994;

Dobbelaere and Jagodzinski 1995; Voye 1999; Fenn 2003), or, alternatively, “de-

churchification” or “un-churching” (Dobbelaere 2000: 22, 28; Pollack 2006; Casanova 2007;

Pollack, Müller and Pickel 2012), meaning a “declining scope of religious authority on the

societal level” (Chaves 1994: 754). Explicitly, “[s]ecularization is situated at the societal level

and should be seen as a resulting from the process of functional differentiation and the

autonomization of societal subsystems” (Dobbelaere 1999: 2315).

Conveniently enough, such a narrowing down of the secularization definition eludes

any debate, since the overwhelming majority of sociologists, post-secularists included, agree on

the factual progressive differentiation of societies and its significance (Demerath 1995: 110;

Ziebertz and Riegel 2008: 27), so that, “if that is all secularization means, there would be nothing

to argue about” (Stark 199: 252). Moreover, it also escapes the otherwise bothering fact that

processes at the three aforementioned levels “do not seem to be consistent or compatible”

(Ballantine and Roberts 2009: 321) since, equally convenient, secularists emphasize that “the

religiousness of individuals is not a valid indicator in evaluating the process of secularization

(Dobbelaere 1999: 2396).

Acknowledging the harsh criticism against such a form of revisionism, repudiated as

both “historically false” and “insincere”7, my underlying research specifically addresses a part of

the “hot potato” identified by secularists in the individual religiosity variability in space and

time, based on a generic definition of secularization at the micro level as a progressive erosion of

the traditionally monopolistic control of religious authorities over the individuals’

conceptualization and administration of the sacred. As such, secularization is recognizable in its

manifestation in two interrelated directions, one towards atheism, and the other towards religious

hybridization:

a.) a decline of church-oriented religiosity (Martin 1978; Luckmann 1967, 1991; Gabriel

1992; Pollack 2006), manifested in affiliation, practice and beliefs as well, with a first

4 Among the few attempts to still preserve the multi-level approach of secularization, see for instance Bruce (2006).

5 Italics in the original.

6 Idem.

7 As “those who employ it revert to celebrating the demise of individual piety whenever they see a fact that seems to

be supportive or whenever they believe they are speaking to an audience of fellow devotees” (Stark 1999: 252).


category of progressively “unchurched” people (Dobbelaere 2000: 28) who practice their

nominal religion less frequently and less convinced;

b.) for other people, an increasingly outside-of-Church, trans-religious, reconfiguration

of individual beliefs, with Churches increasingly incapacitated in controlling what

people believe in (Ester, Halman and de Moor 1993; Hervieu-Léger 1998; Fenn 2003)

and progressively surrendering “to demands that are less orthodox from the viewpoint of

the official model” (Cipriani 1994: 277).

Of these two directions, I will explore mainly the second one in its manifestation in

contemporary Europe, in both its Western part, as arguably the most (societally) secularized area

across the globe, and its Eastern one, which, at least during the 1990s, has generically witnessed

an aggregate religiosity revival.

Heterodox religious hybridization as an expression of secularization at the

micro level

The distinction between the two phenomena and acknowledging their co-manifesting

is crucial in any attempt to understand secularization at the micro level. Unlike the first trend,

generically oriented towards atheism and largely documented throughout Western Europe, the

second one, also tributary to de-churchification, doesn’t mean “a loss of faith en masse” (Pollack

2006: 83), nor “the end of religion, but rather the tendency of the individual to construct his or

her [own] religious-life project” (Berzano 2011: 68) outside of the traditional institutional and

doctrinal boundaries, with “individuals and communities now claim[ing] direct access to the

sacred, without mediation by religious professionals or a clerical elite” (Fenn 2003: 3).

The latter phenomenon and its product have been coined in an abundance of

alternative labels, tributary in part to different epistemic affiliations and scholarly traditions:

“individualization” of beliefs and subsequently individual religion as opposed to institutional

religion (Bellah et al. 1985; Cipriani 1984, 2006 (who’s trademark is the “diffused religion”

concept); Gabriel 1992; Ester, Halman and de Moor 1993; Swatos 1998: 455; Pickel 2009;

Zaccaria 2010: 32; Pollack, Müller and Pickel 2012); “privatization” (Luckmann 1996a, 1996b;

Casanova 1994, 2007) or “selfation” (Roeland 2009) of religion; subjective, outside of Church,

religiosity (Pollack 2003b; 2004); “syncretism” (Pollack 2006: 83; Stewart and Shaw 1994;

Maroney 2006; or Leopold and Jensen 2004); “patchwork” religion (Wuthnow 1998;

Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1998; Dobbelaere 2000: 31; Denz 2009; Campbell 2013); “religion

à la carte” (Bibby 1988; Champion 1996: 707; Berzano 2011); “bricolage” (Luckmann 1979;

Champion 1996; Hervieu-Léger 1998; Dobbelaere 1999; McGuire 2008; Casson 2011);

“hybridization” (McGuire 2008; Sausner 2006), etc.

Specifically different from other deviations from canonical religion, contemporary

processes of religious hybridization transgress institutional and doctrinal religious frontiers8, in

8 Unlike, for instance, “popular religion”, alternatively coined “folk religion”, “religion of the masses”, “mass

religion”, “religion of the people”, “diffused religion”, “religion of the oppressed”, “religion of the poor”, “common

religion”, “civil religion”, “popular piety”, “popular faith”, “popular Catholicism”, etc. Specifically, popular religion

is a term applied predominantly to Latin Catholicism (especially Italy and Latin America) and refers to mainly intra-

religious deviations from strict canons, and not trans- or extra- religious syncretism: in terms of practice, a specific

organizations in groups and associations, transgressing parish frontiers, and a great cohesive and unifying power,

aggregated especially around devotion to a saint or feast, venerating sacred images and relics, pilgimages,


order to eclectically incorporate not only elements of other religions, but also various non-

religious beliefs, values, ideas and practices, such as reincarnation, astrology, chiromancy, yoga,

fortune-telling, telepathy, Gnostic, impersonal conceptualizations of God, etc. As a resultant,

“religion today is less institutional and more individual, privatized and largely syncretic in

nature” (Pollack 2006: 83), progressively oriented towards the mundane instead of the

transcendent (Luckmann 1967, 1990) and focused on a set of rigorously speaking non-religious

values such as individual autonomy, self-expression, self-fulfillment, mobility ethos, sex and

familism (Cipriani 2006: 123; 134), all essentially subsumable to anthropocentrism9.

Subsequently, as a last remark, whether or not these new highly individualized and

eclectic cognitive systems should be still classified as “religious”, at least in the traditional

meaning of the term, represents a legitimate questioning. “Spiritual” would seem the alternative

at hand, but sociologists still appear reluctant to use it, considering the term “difficult to define”

and “peculiarly resistant to sociological encapsulation” (Flanagan and Jupp 2009: 251), so that

“spirituality” “is most unlikely to be found in the index of sociological works, even those

devoted to religion” (Flanagan 2009: 1).

Outside of sociology however, the distinction between religious and spiritual has

gained prominence especially in the field of psychology (both general and social), along the

traditional dichotomy between psyche (the psychological soul) and pneuma (the religious spirit)

(Vande Kemp 1996). Thus, Richards and Bergin (1997) for instance consider religion a subset of

the broader spiritual, while addressing the specific difference, Shafranske and Maloney (1990)

view religion as church-oriented, and spirituality as a rather personal, experiential dimension.

Similarly and relevant to my enterprise, Hill et al. (2000) consider that unlike spirituality,

religiosity implies rituals, being more outdated, although Tsang and McCullough (2003) stress

that dissociating them along the institutional-individual cleavage is rather simplistic and omits

their interaction, in the same spirit in which Hill et al. (2000) emphasize religiosity and

spirituality are kindred rather than independent.

In this context, the following employs the last three waves of European Values Study

(EVS; 1990, 1999 and 2008) and of the the European components of the International Social

Survey Programme (ISSP; 1991, 1998 and 2008), preferred for their both diachronic and cross-

country standardized approach to any other un-standardized collection of national polls or

objective national data, in order to empirically explore three main manifestations of the religious

outside of Church hybridization as an expression of secularization at the individual level: the

extent to which Churches currently mediate the relationship between individual and divine;

unorthodox beliefs, one might say superstitions, such as the ones in reincarnation, lucky charm

protection, Nirvana, telepathy, astrology, and fortune-telling, plus conceptualization of God as

impersonal as opposed to the monotheistic personal model; the delineation between self-

perceived religiosity and spirituality.

processions, vows and rosary; in terms of beliefs, specific mental representations of God, with a special emphasis on

the religious interpretation and significance of suffering and on certain aspects of Christ’s images, and particular

images of the church on terms of its internal organization and of its relation to society (Zaccaria 2010: 7ff).

Moreover, having been applied to a spectacularly heterogeneous range of religious/spiritual expressions, as for

instance from the snake-handling cults in Appalachia to Greek pilgrims crawling on their hands and knees to catch a

glimpse of an icon on the island of Tinos (Berlinerblau 200: 3), the term remains extremely ambiguous and

problematic as a scholarly category (Badone 1990: 4), and by some opinions should be simply discarded (Holzern

2002). 9 If defined as the “doctrine which posits humanity as the centerpiece of the universe and sees the well-being of

mankind as the ultimate purpose of things (Chandler and Dreger 1993: 169).


Church mediation of individual-Divine relation

EVS ISSP

1 2 3 4 5 N ICM 1 2 3 4 5 N ICM

GEO 48.1 14.6 15.8 8.3 13.2 1329 76.0

KSV 24.1 25.1 29.1 8.6 13.1 1347 66.2

MLT 23.5 17.6 37.6 9.5 11.9 1434 65.1

MNT 46.9 10.2 16.6 8.3 18.0 1054 62.3

ALB 27.8 16.6 21.1 17.9 16.5 1239 36.4

NOR 21.6 13.3 30.7 16.2 18.2 573 32.2 7.1 14.0 20.6 44.6 13.7 379 -27.6

ITA 22.0 14.0 27.3 19.3 17.5 1225 27.4

MCD 24.0 7.4 30.6 9.6 28.5 1170 21.1

GeE 22.1 14.9 23.8 16.6 22.7 181 20.8 16.5 17.6 6.6 38.5 20.9 91 -26.1

HRV 19.4 11.1 30.0 19.3 20.2 1192 18.5 7.9 20.6 20.3 32.9 18.4 876 -10.8

BLR 21.5 13.3 24.6 19.4 21.2 1037 17.4

HUN 18.7 11.4 29.5 19.9 20.4 999 16.3 12.4 15.6 30.6 25.6 15.8 493 13.0

SRB 24.3 11.0 23.4 19.2 22.2 1164 16.3

CZE 16.6 14.3 27.3 21.5 20.3 512 12.7 8.2 21.1 26.2 28.0 16.5 389 5.2

SLV 17.6 9.7 31.2 20.0 21.5 818 12.5 5.6 20.5 18.6 39.7 15.7 522 -20.6

AZB 44.8 1.7 6.8 21.0 25.6 1271 11.5

POL 15.0 14.9 27.9 20.7 21.5 1360 10.9 5.7 21.9 19.0 37.2 16.2 1003 -15.7

UKR 27.5 9.6 18.7 15.9 28.3 1213 9.6 12.2 17.4 19.0 31.1 20.3 1401 -10.2

BIH 19.4 10.9 25.6 20.8 23.3 1274 7.4

EST 18.9 12.0 23.2 19.9 26.0 684 2.7

BLG 18.4 11.1 23.4 16.9 30.2 936 -1.5

LIT 10.4 14.2 28.1 23.2 24.1 925 -3.7

NED 14.1 8.5 29.0 25.4 23.1 898 -5.6 12.2 18.9 15.5 37.5 15.9 794 -13.3

RUS 17.1 8.4 25.6 18 30.8 983 -6.9 11.1 13.7 17.3 30.6 27.2 503 -28.0

AUT 12.3 12.5 25.3 24.1 25.9 1076 -9.6

SLK 13.9 10.7 25.4 20.1 29.9 1014 -10.3 19.4 17.7 29.1 22.0 11.7 726 35.3

ESP 13.7 10.5 23.9 20.3 31.7 1032 -15.3 4.6 11.9 13.1 42.9 27.5 1614 -60.1

BEL 11.7 10.0 24.7 25.7 27.9 891 -19.2

GBR 10.5 8.9 27.0 24.5 29.1 911 -20.4 7.9 10.9 14.0 50.4 16.8 787 -48.4

LUX 13.5 7.7 25.1 19.2 34.6 928 -20.9

GeW 7.7 11.0 26.6 31.4 23.3 688 -22.3 10.2 16.4 12.7 35.0 25.8 695 -33.8

LAT 7.7 8.1 28.2 28.9 27.0 1013 -26.7 2.3 13.2 20.6 47.2 16.6 559 -43.4

TUR 12.1 5.1 26.6 14.8 41.5 2193 -29.6 9.1 10.9 8.9 11.3 59.8 1331 -67.6

MLD 10.4 10.6 19.8 27.2 31.9 1287 -33.2

ROM 11.1 8.3 20.5 20.4 39.7 1304 -37.5

CYP 6.7 9.2 24.1 26.0 34.0 921 -37.9 5.2 14.0 27.3 36.1 17.5 767 -18.8

PRT 2.6 8.5 28.6 31.8 28.4 1322 -39.2 1.2 8.4 11.8 51.4 27.3 872 -81.2

DEN 8.4 6.8 24.0 25.1 35.6 879 -39.7 12.5 8.0 13.6 25.5 40.4 792 -50.2

SUI 10.3 7.3 20.7 27.8 33.9 855 -40.3 2.8 16.9 12.6 44.7 23.0 716 -52.5

SWE 11.5 7.7 18.9 22.1 39.7 375 -41.4 6.3 8.9 20.1 46.3 18.4 348 -44.7

FIN 8.0 10.4 19.5 28.9 33.2 615 -41.4 10.7 16.2 16.2 38.0 19.0 469 -23.5

FRA 9.6 6.7 22.1 19.8 41.8 761 -42.6 6.0 14.3 11.8 39.5 28.4 915 -53.2

ARM 8.1 7.8 20.4 22.6 41.2 1351 -47.7

EIR 10.1 7.4 17.4 26.2 38.9 810 -49.3 5.7 15.6 17.8 45.5 15.5 1592 -34.2

GRE 5.8 5.1 23.3 34.9 30.8 1354 -51.4

NCY 7.9 6.4 17.6 21.6 46.5 454 -59.3

NIR 6.8 6.0 17.6 32.1 37.4 414 -60.9 8.1 21.2 20.1 38.0 12.7 813 -7.8

ICE 5.1 6.4 18.7 26.1 43.8 514 -64.0

Total 17.3 10.4 24.3 20.6 27.5 47780 9.5 8.0 15.2 17.2 36.4 23.2 19447 -32.2

Church mediation of individual-God relation (% of total valid) Q: “I have my own way of connecting with the Divine [EVS] / God [ISSP], without churches or religious services”;

Scales: EVS - from 1 = “not at all” to 5 = very much”; ISSP - from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree”;


Filters: EVS – belief in God (“yes”); ISSP – “I believe in God and always have” or “I believe in God now, but I

didn’t use to”10

;

ICM = standardized “index of church mediation”, calculated by assigning weighting coefficients to the five value

series from left to right: +1.5; +1.25; 1; -1.25; -1.5; on a scale from -150 to +150, ICM’s values are interpreted as: the

higher (positive) the score, the higher the church’s mediation of the individual-divine relation.

Correlation between the two comparable ICM series: +0.46.

In a reconfiguration of clusters, both polls suggest a stronger church-mediation in the

East than in the West (ICM country average values of 2.51 vs. -19.08 (EVS), respectively -15.64

vs. -40.8 (ISSP)), attributable to a great extent to inter-denomination differences:

Outside-of-Church individual-Divine relation by major denominations, EVS 2008 (Q: “I have my own way of connecting with the Divine, without churches or religious services”)

(% of valid; filters: belief in God; N>1000)

Comparatively, the ISSP-derived ICM also places Protestants at the bottom of the scale

(-31.6), but Orthodox Christians (-18.2) above Roman Catholics (-27.9), while Turkey’s

considerable share of the Muslim subsample (83.9%) hinder any generalizations regarding

church-mediation in European Islam11

.

Personal vs. impersonal God conceptualizations

The current section verifies for Europe the conclusion reached by some scholars in

the 1990s, i.e. of a growing unbelief and a decline in the belief in the monotheistic representation

10

In order to avoid negative double barreled questions. For instance, in an unfiltered EVS ranking of Church-

mediation, Malta and East Germany would occupy the top positions at the “not at all” extreme, however for entirely

different reasons, i.e. devout Church-oriented religiosity in the first case, respectively mostly atheism in the latter. 11

Additionally, the ICM difference between respondents declaring to have always believed in God and “new

believers” is minimal (-32.4 vs. -30.4, corresponding to 17,146, respectively 2,301 persons subsamples).


of God as personal12

(Halman and de Moor 1993; Dobbelaere and Jagodzinski 1995: 210-214;

Dobbelaere 2000: 32).

For the 27 countries surveyed by the 1990-2008 EVS waves, the personal God vs.

spirit or life force dichotomy illustrates a relatively clear pattern in Western Europe, where belief

in a personal God has generally decreased (12 out of 16), in favor of the belief in a spirit or life

force (11 out of 16) and more so in favor of atheism (i.e. unbelief in either of them) and an

extremely fragmented pattern in Central and Eastern Europe, where: a.) a relatively “orthodox”

religiosity revival in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania, where %PG increased to the

detriment of %SLF, although in the first two cases the percentage of atheists also increased; b.1)

a higher increase of %PG than of %SLF in Romania and Slovakia; b.2) a higher increase of

%SLF in Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary; c.) a clear decrease of both categories in favor

of atheism in East Germany; d.) a decrease of %PG in favor of %SLF in Latvia. As a resultant of

these trends, the SLF / PG ratio variation (∆SP%) increased in the overwhelming majority of

Western countries and half of the Eastern European ones, registering:

%PG (R

2)

%SLF (R

2)

%none (R

2)

∆SP% %PG

(R2)

%SLF (R

2)

%none (R

2)

∆SP%

AUT ▼(.41) ▲(.00) ▲(.67) ▲ BLG ▲(.75) ▲(.99) ▼(.84) ▼

BEL ▼(.90) ▲(.84) ▲(.96) ▲ CZE ▲(.00) ▼(.12) ▲(.60) ▼

DEN ▲(.14) ▲(.18) ▲(.04) ▼ EST ▲(.96) ▼(.97) ▲(.58) ▼

EIR ▼(.73) ▲(.17) ▲(.98) ▼ GeE ▼(.42) ▼(.03) ▲(.95) ▲

ESP ▼(.97) ▼(.81) ▲(.75) ▲ HUN ▲(.02) ▲(.99) ▼(.97) ▲

FIN ▲(.16) ▼(.75) ▲(.38) ▲ LAT ▼(.16) ▲(.84) ▼(.88) ▲

FRA ▼(.75) ▼(.01) ▲(1.0) ▲ LIT ▲(.69) ▼(.70) ▼(.59) ▼

GeW ▲(.01) ▲(.00) ▲(.99) ▼ POL ▲(.09) ▲(.87) ▲(.52) ▲

GBR ▼(.92) ▼(.71) ▲(.86) ▲ ROM ▲(.95) ▲(.82) ▼(.90) ▲

ICE ▼(.75) ▲(.87) ▲(.70) ▲ SLK ▲(.70) ▲(.03) ▼(.68) ▼

ITA ▼(.20) ▲(.04) ◄►(.0) ▲ SLV ▲(.25) ▲(.60) ▼(.95) ▲

MLT ▼(.05) ▲(.56) ◄►(.0) ▲

NED ▼(.44) ▼(.00) ▲(.31) ▲

NIR ▼(.47) ▲(.43) ▲(.65) ▲

PRT ▲(.08) ▲(.34) ▼(.14) ▲

SWE ▼(.17) ▲(.00) ◄►(.0) ▲ “PG” = personal God; “SLF” = spirit or life force; none = unbelief in PG or SLF; rest to 100% = DK

“∆SP%” = SLF/PG ratio variation – calculated as [(% of believers in SLF in 2008) / (% of believers in PG in 2008)]

- [(% of believers in SLF in 1990) / (% of believers in PG in 1990)]; positive = increase; negative = decrease.

Personal God versus spirit/life force trends, 1990-2008 (EVS)

A narrow approach of the last decade, over which the EVS covered 33 countries, confirms for

Western Europe in general and half of Central in Eastern Europe the trend already identified by

the aforementioned scholars. Thus, out of the 17 Western countries surveyed, 15 registered a

decline of %PG (in 11 of them in favor rather of %SLF, while in Austria, Denmark, Spain and

Sweden rather to the benefit of the atheist category), the only genuine exceptions being the

Netherlands and Northern Ireland, where %PG increased, while %SLF decreased.

12

For a theological explanation of the two views (personal vs. impersonal God), see Alistar E. McGrath (2006),

Christian Theology: An Introduction, Blackwell Publishing.


Comparatively, in Central and Eastern European, the belief in a personal God

continued to increase, albeit at a slower pace than during the previous decade, with almost half of

the countries (7/16) witnessing a religiosity revitalization classifiable as canonical (i.e. %PG

increase vs. %SLF decrease in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, Greece

and Croatia), as opposite to the Western-like trend registered in Lithuania, Poland, East

Germany, Bulgaria and Belarus (most of them also featuring an increase of atheism). Of the

remaining four countries, both beliefs multiplied in Latvia, Russia and Romania, while in

Slovenia, both percentages slightly diminished.

Although covering fewer countries and employing a relatively different answer scale,

the ISSP (in its European subsample) series reasonably reinforces the above findings:

% God exists,

no doubts (R2)

% believe in a

Higher Power (R2)

% Don’t believe

in God (R2)

∆HP/G

%

AUT ▼(.51) ▲(.71) ▲(1.0) ▲

GeW ▼(.00) ▼(.53) ▲(.02) ▼

GBR ▼(.88) ▲(.49) ▲(.72) ▲

NIR ▼(.95) ▲(.70) ▲(.98) ▲

NED ▼(.44) ▲(.37) ▲(.95) ▲

EIR ▼(.97) ▲(.98) ▲(.89) ▲

NOR ▼(.96) ▼(.08) ▲(.92) ▲

GeE ▼(.63) ▼(.39) ▲(.58) ▲

HUN ▼(.64) ▲(.97) ▲(.83) ▲

POL ▼(.20) ▼(.94) ▲(.95) ▼

SLV ▲(.99) ▲(.77) ▼(.83) ▲

RUS ▲(1.0) ▼(.97) ▼(.72) ▼ “∆HP/G%” = calculated as [(% of believers in a Higher Power in 2008) / (% of undoubting believers in God in

2008)] - [(% of believers in a Higher Power in 1991) / (% of undoubting believers in God in 1990).

Belief in God versus Higher Power spirit/life force trends, 1991-2008 (ISSP)

Thus, while in the West canonical belief in God decreased in favor of especially atheism and

secondary to beliefs in an impersonal God, the pattern in the East seems rather divided.

In terms of area trends calculated by (un-weighted) country average values for the 27,

respectively 12, countries measured over three waves of the poll series, the figures converge

toward differentiated area patterns. Thus, in the West both the belief in an impersonal God and

(especially) atheism increased to the detriment of the conception of a personal God, while in the

East, the last decade witnessed a stagnation or even slight reversal of the ascending trend of the

1990s in both categories of believers, thus fitting the aggregate religiosity trend of the area, one

currently of a plateau-phase following the previous decade’s revitalization (Apahideanu 2013):


Personal vs. impersonal God beliefs’ trends over the last two decades (% of valid; country averages)

Moreover, statically and calculated for the 2008 waves, both polls highlight on

country averages a higher belief in (a personal) God in the East and a higher one in an

impersonal deity in the West13

, although the East remains an extremely diverse area in terms of

beliefs, recognizable as such in the standard deviation values14

:

EVS ISSP

area belief

%

PG

%

SLF

%

none area belief

% God

exists, no

doubts

% Belief

in Higher

Power

%

Belief

in none

West (19)

avg. 36.9 35.4 13.2 West (14)

avg. 26.8 18.5 12.8 σ 18.6 9.4 6.9 σ 13.8 7.8 6.2

East (29)

avg. 48.2 31.0 9.1 East (13)

avg. 39.8 13.4 14.5 σ 26.4 18.3 11.4 σ 24.1 8.8 15.0

The rest to 100% comprises: for EVS “don’t know” answers; for ISSP “I don't know whether there is a God

and I don't believe there is any way to find out”, “I find myself believing in God some of the time, but not

at others”, “While I have doubts, I feel that I do believe in God”, and “Can't choose, don't know” answers.

Conceptions of God in Europe by country average and poll, 2008 (% of valid answers)

The inter-area discrepancy diminishes when exploring gnosiological attitudes of the

respondents to other religions in terms of truth location, the negative correlation between belief

in only one religion fostering truth and, grosso modo, disbelief in all religions being spectacular:

13

Believers in an impersonal God outnumber those believing in a personal one in 11 of the 19 Western European

countries and in 11/29 Eastern European ones. 14

Thus, in the 2008 EVS wave, the area comprises both the three most “orthodox” (Georgia, Northern Cyprus, and

Turkey, with highest PG/SLF ratios) and the three least ones of all Europe (Latvia, Serbia, and Bosnia, with lowest

values).


Truth only

in one rel.

Basic

truths in

many

religions

Very little

truth in any

rel.

Truth

only in

one rel.

Basic

truths in

many

religions

Very little

truth in any

rel.

AUT ▼ ▼ ▲ CYP ▼ ▲ ▲

DEN ▼ ◄► ▲ CZE ▼ ▼ ▲

EIR ▼ ▲ ▲ GeE ▼ ▼ ▲

ESP ▼ ▲ ▲ HUN ▼ ▲ ▲

FRA ▼ ▼ ▲ LAT ▼ ▲ ▲

GeW ▼ ▲ ▲ POL ▼ ▲ ▲

GBR ▼ ▼ ▲ RUS ▼ ▲ ▼

NIR ▼ ▲ ▲ SLK ▲ ▲ ▼

NED ▼ ▼ ▲ SLV ▼ ▲ ▼

NOR ▼ ▼ ▲ (SLK: first column: increase from 18.5 to 19.6%)

PRT ▼ ▲ ▲

SUI ▼ ▲ ▲

SWE ▼ ▼ ▲

Inter-religious attitudes in terms of perceived truth location (% variation, 1998-2008)

Noteworthy enough, except the two cases of East Germany and the Czech Republic

(both placed at the atheist extreme of a religiosity ranking), East Europeans have actually shown

a higher and increasing propensity than their Western counterparts towards believing all religions

contain to certain extents truths, thus meaning their general religious revival has included, to

various degrees, trans-religious components.

Finally, among major religious denominations in Europe, within the 2008 EVS wave,

conceptions of a personal vs. impersonal God vary inversely proportional between the two

extremes represented by Muslims, respectively Protestants, the latter being the only major

religious denomination among whose adherents the percentage of believers in an impersonal God

surpasses the one of those believing in a personal one:

Conceptions of God among religious denominations in Europe (EVS 2008; % of valid)

Thus, the geographical situation of the two extreme denominations adds explanation to the

difference of PG/SLF ratio values between Eastern and Western Europe highlighted above.


Belief in reincarnation

Belief in reincarnation, 1990-2008 (EVS and ISSP)

poll EVS ISSP Trend (EVS)

(R2)

poll EVS ISSP Trend

(EVS)

(R2)

[1990] [1999] [2008] [2008] [1990] [1999] [2008] [2008]

% N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N

AUT 29.4 1148 21.7 1289 28.8 1293 37.4 841 ▼(.005) ALB 19.1 1271

BEL 16.9 2290 18.6 1766 17.5 1455 ▲(.121) AZB 7.1 1460

DEN 16.6 911 17.3 909 18.4 1395 19.6 1715 ▲(.984) BiH 22.4 1364

EIR 20.4 910 22.2 854 30.5 822 32.3 1716 ▲(.879) BLG 25.4 856 32.4 762 29.8 1145 ▲(.387)

ESP 25.9 2070 20.1 969 23.1 1288 22.3 2114 ▼(.233) BLR 32.5 802 30.6 1128 ▼

FIN 33.6 425 18.4 865 24.7 847 20.6 915 ▼(.339) CYP 17.5 815 11.8 845

FRA 28.1 865 28.5 1413 22.6 1441 20.4 2032 ▼(.696) CZE 10.9 1735 21.8 1560 17.6 1563 16.4 1376 ▲(.371)

GBR 30.0 1253 27.8 1318 27.4 1671 ▼ EST 37.5 758 30.7 1317 ▼

GEW 25.6 1565 21.0 910 27.6 914 27.3 1009 ▲(.087) GeE 12.6 1224 11.6 929 8.5 848 10.2 483 ▼(.920)

ICE 39.5 575 41.1 820 36.2 719 ▼(.436) GEO 11.3 1193

ITA 27.2 1625 17.8 1717 19.2 1273 ▼(.622) GRE 26.0 865 17.4 1301 ▼

LUX 25.2 1030 26.1 1451 ▲ HRV 23.8 814 16.2 1320 22.4 1020 ▼

MLT 19.8 313 12.0 935 19.5 1334 ▼(.001) HUN 23.2 887 19.6 912 23.2 1441 26.0 947 ◄► (0.0)

NED 18.1 888 22.2 962 18.8 1459 26.2 1590 ▲(.025) KSV 62.8 1481 ▼

NIR 32.7 281 15.6 835 23.2 400 20.4 930 ▼(.307) LAT 44.6 249 33.4 739 41.9 1243 36.9 973 ▼(.053)

NOR 15.2 1031 18.4 1057 18.0 874 ▲ LIT 42.8 626 37.4 930 ▼

PRT 32.2 929 29.9 829 31.4 1323 36.1 893 ▼(.117) MCD 17.4 1247

SUI 28.0 1074 30.8 2125 MLD 27.5 1249

SWE 19.8 881 22.3 888 22.6 871 20.7 1030 ▲(.829) MNT 16.7 1404

(avg.) 25.3 22.1 24.4 25.7 NCY 30.5 443

σ 7.1 6.8 5.2 6.4 POL 42.4 735 24.2 880 17.4 1291 22.7 1052 ▼(.935)

Measurement:

EVS: % “yes answers” (of total valid)

ISSP: % “definitely yes” + % probably yes”

Correl. EVS2008-ISSP2008 = +.505 (or +0.81 if Turkey excluded)

ROM 24.1 870 28.0 676 21.8 1222 ▼(.135)

RUS 31.7 1884 33.0 1171 35.7 677 ▲

SLK 20.6 872 19.6 1017 13.0 1267 21.8 955 ▼(.847)

SLV 17.4 734 16.7 920 19.4 1228 30.3 932 ▲(.509)

SRB 22.6 1289

TUR 33.1 1111 28.4 2255 91.1 1421 ▼

UKR 29.2 870 37.1 1151 31.3 1353 ▲

(avg.) 24.6 27.3 24.2 29.7

σ 11.8 8.0 11.6 21.1


Diachronically approached as in the table above, belief in reincarnation doesn’t seem

correlated with area throughout Europe, except for the trends of the last decade, over which, as a

general rule, the West registered an increase (12 out of 16 countries), as opposed to the

predominant decrease in the East (13 out of 17), a discrepancy possibly connected to the superior

rates of non-Christian immigration registered over the recent years in Western Europe.

Belief in lucky charm protection

The last two EVS waves capture belief in lucky charm protection on a clear and

general ascending trend in both Western and Eastern Europe, the exceptions being mostly

attributable to strikingly small subsamples most likely affecting representativeness (e.g. Bulgaria

and Poland 1999, Malta 1999 and 2008):

Belief in lucky charm protection by country (EVS 1999 and 2008 waves)

Statically and valid for both waves, Eastern Europeans show on average a

significantly higher belief in lucky charm protection in a disparity also confirmed by the 2008

ISSP wave (27.3% “definitely” and “probably” believing in lucky charm bringing good luck in

the West, compared to an average 44.6% in Central and Eastern Europe).


Other un-canonical beliefs and practices (not measured longitudinally)

Nirvana

(ISSP ’08)a

Telepathy (EVS ’99)

b

Horoscope Fortune

telling (ISSP ’08)

a

Nirvana

(ISSP ’08)a

Telepathy (EVS ’99)

b

Horoscope Fortune

telling (ISSP ’08)

a

Consulting

(EVS ’99)c

Belief in it

(ISSP ’08)d

Consulting

(EVS ’99)c

Belief in it

(ISSP ’08)d

% N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N % N

AUT 22.9 688 48.8 1323 33.0 1506 35.8 912 29.1 918 BLG 48.6 760 39.8 971

BEL 37.7 1722 BLR 31.6 727

DEN 7.4 1318 35.7 879 21.2 1780 27.2 1788 CYP 14.7 830

EIR 25.5 1389 40.5 782 25.3 1869 34.2 1911 CZE 11.1 1231 72.7 1576 29.6 1902 47.4 1389 47.4 1389

ESP 15.2 1572 26.7 939 EST 55.1 793 38.8 978

FIN 11.3 783 45.8 877 26.0 1035 14.4 1000 27.9 1014 GeE 4.2 42.7 18.4 874 29.2 994 19.3 480 13.8 490

FRA 10.1 1859 38.9 1436 31.0 1609 33.0 2099 27.6 2173 GRE 54.9 961 15.1 1112

GBR 13.8 1273 HRV 15.5 903 43.1 859 16.7 998

GeW 11.3 857 20.7 1034 26.9 1086 20.6 1106 HUN 14.0 856 46.3 935

ICE 61.1 857 28.9 964 LAT 14.7 857 52.3 801 60.7 983 61.4 1027

ITA 37.4 1717 21.9 1986 LIT 78.6 576 43.2 998

LUX 38.3 1041 POL 13.3 872 38.3 918

MLT 33.8 913 ROM 66.5 756

NED 14.2 1083 51.2 975 17.6 1708 29.1 1740 RUS 26.8 503 27.9 2464 55.4 674 70.1 777

NIR 14.6 723 SLK 12.3 749 52.6 861 41.2 999 58.3 1022

NOR 10.8 727 15.4 900 26.6 922 SLV 26.3 795 27.4 912 32.9 989 37.1 999

PRT 26.1 631 34.8 716 TUR 8.3 1178 13.2 1413 9.6 1438

SUI 17.7 1024 40.7 1143 31.0 1167 UKR 22.3 1105 56.9 837 36.3 1170

SWE 9.0 833 48.9 908

Avg. 15.0 40.9 26.9 25.6 28.1 Avg. 15.9 47.0 30.7 38.6 42.5

σ 6.0 8.6 4.9 9.4 3.4 σ 6.7 18.9 9.9 17.8 23.5 a sum of % “yes, definitely” and “yes, probably” on a 4-point scale (out of total valid);

b % “yes” out of total valid;

c % sum of at least weekly;

d % sum “definitely

true” and “probably true” on a 4-point scale.

Beliefs in Nirvana, telepathy, horoscope, and fortune-telling in Europe (EVS, ISSP)

Highlighted above, other unorthodox beliefs of respondents not measured longitudinally, but only over one or another poll

wave15

, generally score higher in the East, an area however very diverse in this regard, as suggested by the standard deviation values.

15

Beliefs in horoscope affecting the future and in fortune-telling have actually been measured diachronically over the ISSP series, but the small number of countries

covered by all three waves (4 in each case) hinders any reliable conclusion regarding trends.


On one extreme, the Central European countries, especially Poland, East Germany, Croatia and

Hungary rather fit into the Western pattern, while, oppositely, superstitions in Latvia, Lithuania,

or Russia register spectacularly high values.

Focusing on denominations, the 2008 EVS wave has covered four beliefs classifiable

as uncanonical:

denomination

belief

Protestant Ro.-Catholic Muslim Orthodox

Reincarnationa 25.2

(22,519) 25.6

(48,947)

30.0 (8,581)

27.0 (17,413)

Lucky charm protectionb 22.2

(12,748) 26.0

(32,144)

30.6 (8,542)

36.6 (18,708)

Horoscopec 28.7

(2,796) 28.1

(6,348)

24.4 (188)

28.4 (3,889)

Telepathya 47.4

(4,906) 41.6

(12,906)

12.5 (1,364)

d 57.6

(3,771) a % “yes”

b ∑ 6-10 on a 10-point scale from 1 = definitely not to 10 = definitely yes

c ∑ consulting it at least once a week

d Turkey covers 84.2% of the Muslim subsample

Filter: N > 1,000.

Four unorthodox beliefs among religious denominations in Europe16

(EVS; % of valid (N))

As shown in the table above, Orthodox usually score higher in terms of the four

unorthodox beliefs analyzed, and Protestants generally lowest, but the correlations are weaker

than between geographical areas as analysis units.

Religious versus spiritual

Independent of the aforementioned reluctance of most sociologists to operate with the

term “spiritual” in relation to the classic “religious”, according to some scholars not only do

“individuals emphasize being rather spiritual than religious” (Ballantine and Roberts 2009: 321),

but, equally relevant, “[o]rthodox religion might have gone out with the cultural tide, but with its

ebbing spirituality has rolled in unexpectedly as a sort of replacement” (Flanagan and Jupp 2009:

251). Subsequently, the underlying section reaches beyond the church-attendance – self-defined

religiosity discrepancy17

and specifically explores to what degree Europeans perceive themselves

as spiritual outside of the conventional church-defined borders of religiosity, starting from the

statement that, as an expression of secularization at the micro, individual, level.

16

The European subsample of the ISSP admits a similar analysis, one however reliable only for Roman Catholics

and Protestants. For almost all relevant questions, Turkey usually covers more than 80% of the Muslim subsample,

while Ukraine, Russia and Cyprus correspondingly combine in over 85% of the Orthodox subsample. Therefore, any

inter-denomination comparisons below will be operated exclusively on the basis of the EVS wave. 17

One misbalanced in favor of the latter in both Eastern and Western Europe (see for instance Apahideanu 2013,

Berzano 2011, Cipriani 2011, or Franzmann, Gärtner and Köck, 2006).


Fortunately, both EVS and ISSP have included in the questionnaires of their last

waves each one question aiming at the respondents’ self-perceived placement in relation to the

religious vs. spiritual delineation. Concretely, the EVS allows corroborating two questions: a.)

[Q.28] “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are…” a religious

person / not a religious person / a convinced atheist? and b.) [Q.34] “Whether or not you think of

yourself as a religious person, how spiritual would you say you are, that is how strongly are you

interested in the sacred or the supernatural…” – very / somewhat / not very / not at all interested.

Comparatively, the ISSP questionnaire (Q.32) explicitly addresses the dichotomy of religious vs.

spiritual, with the latter term identically defined to the EVS questioning, i.e. “interested in the

sacred or the supernatural”, and the former as “follow [or not] a religion”.

Corroborating the two variables highlights an overwhelming majority of cases in

which the percentages of people self-defined as religious surpasses the one of those very or

somewhat interested in the sacred or supernatural (40 of the 47 countries surveyed by the 2008

EVS wave)18

, independent of area delineation, meaning there is more self-perceived religiosity

than interest in spiritual matters (on country averages for the entire Europe 70.4% vs. 57.0%).

The conclusion is reinforced by the 2008 ISSP wave, over which the percentage respondents

declaring themselves religious but not spiritual was double the one of those considering

themselves spiritual although not following a religion (36.3 vs. 16.7% as un-weighted average

values for the 26 countries surveyed), while the combined percentage of self-declared religious

persons also significantly surpasses the combined one of self-identified spiritual respondents

(57.0 vs. 37.5%), in a ratio independent of area-delineation.

Self-attributed religiosity vs. spirituality in Europe, 2008 (% of valid)

Between areas, the EVS data suggest East being subjectively far more (traditionally)

religious (albeit also more heterogeneous) following the general religious revitalization of the

last two decades, but less interested in extra-religious spiritual matters, while the ISSP scale,

covering significantly less Eastern European countries, many of them located in Central Europe

(and following, as mentioned, rather the Western European pattern), doesn’t capture significant

inter-area differences in terms of religiosity vs. spirituality judging by country average values.

18

The exceptions, mostly Protestant countries, being: Belarus (60.5% interested in the sacred/supernatural vs. 31.8%

self-defined as religious), Estonia (45.0 vs. 44.4), Malta (76.5 vs. 72.9), Norway (45.8 vs. 44.7), Sweden (45.4 vs.

33.9), Great Britain (52.4 vs. 48.3) and East Germany (19.3 vs. 17.7), whereas in Luxemburg the percentages are

equal (each 52.6%). For the entire European sample, the correlation of the two percentage series is +0.718.


EVS (2008) ISSP (2008) EVS (2008) ISSP (2008)

% N

% N

% N

% N

A B C D A B C D A B C D A B C D

AUT 15.7 48.2 10.1 25.9 1430 35.2 17.3 22.1 25.4 874 ALB 32.3 58.4 .4 8.9 1263

BEL 21.5 36.1 11.2 31.1 1488 37.4 18.4 16.5 27.6 1784 AZB 35.1 55.8 7.4 1.7 1297

DEN 40.0 32.0 9.0 18.9 1432 ARM 26.2 62.6 5.1 6.0 1456

ESP 16.5 39.3 11.3 32.8 1455 39.7 21.7 15.4 23.2 2190 BiH 24.4 70.6 .7 4.3 1459

FIN 16.9 36.2 11.6 35.3 1411 32.1 13.9 22.0 32.1 960 BLG 19.0 42.1 12.5 26.4 1336

FRA 17.7 25.1 16.6 40.6 1471 34.4 13.8 17.2 34.7 2156 BLR 4.4 27.1 34.5 33.9 1392

GBR 12.5 35.8 15.9 35.8 1471 25.4 14.3 21.6 38.8 1682 CYP 20.3 72.4 2.8 4.4 953 56.3 31.4 6.7 5.5 904

GeW 20.0 36.6 11.5 31.9 975 41.0 12.6 12.7 33.7 969 CZE 11.9 24.5 10.4 53.1 1536 20.1 11.3 12.5 56.1 1393

ICE 15.2 53.3 12.9 18.6 790 EST 14.3 29.9 15.1 40.7 1411

EIR 15.7 52.8 9.2 22.2 922 44.7 33.5 12.7 9.1 1895 GeE 5.6 11.8 12.7 69.8 957 10.6 4.1 9.1 76.2 483

ITA 28.0 56.8 4.8 10.4 1411 GEO 28.5 69.1 .3 2.0 1407

LUX 16.5 35.6 17.0 30.9 1511 GRE 34.4 53 4.6 7.9 1462

MLT 12.9 59.9 16.8 10.4 1447 HRV 13.0 70.8 5.4 10.7 1420 42.9 23.1 23.8 10.1 1197

NED 18.0 46.5 15.1 20.4 1509 26.4 14.0 24.1 35.6 1700 HUN 20.1 33.4 12 34.5 1479 33.7 14.9 19.8 31.6 931

NIR 23.5 40.6 13.2 22.6 468 42.7 29.6 12.9 14.8 930 KSV 16.4 83 .3 .3 1510

NOR 14.0 30.5 15.5 39.9 1077 26.6 15.0 20.2 38.2 900 LAT 26.6 50.9 5.0 17.5 1383 33.3 16.4 23.8 26.5 1007

PRT 29.1 54.0 5.8 11.1 1499 53.6 32.9 6.0 7.5 979 LIT 31.6 53.7 2.4 12.3 1338

SUI 21.3 40.9 14.6 23.2 1160 40.2 20.2 18.9 20.7 1148 MCD 18.7 65.7 4.7 10.9 1365

SWE 14.0 35.3 30.1 20.6 734 29.0 11.9 17.9 41.3 1036 MLD 25.5 57.7 7.8 8.9 1354

(avg.) 19.4 41.9 13.3 25.4 36.3 19.2 17.1 27.3 MNT 25.7 61.9 2.2 10.1 1332

∑ 61.3 55.2 55.5 36.3 POL 37.3 51.1 2.3 9.2 1375 63.2 19.4 7.5 9.9 1170

σ 6.8 9.8 5.4 9.5 8.1 7.5 4.9 11.0 ROM 34.4 48.4 8.0 9.2 1351

A = religious, but not spiritual (i.e. interested in the sacred or supernatural);

B = religious and spiritual;

C = spiritual, but not religious;

D = neither religious or spiritual

RUS 38.8 36.9 3.8 20.5 1353 44.1 12.5 22.2 21.2 778

SRB 31.5 58.6 1.9 8.0 1392

SLK 28.7 55.6 1.0 14.6 1332 38.4 35.6 7.9 18.1 1047

SLV 18.3 54.3 12.1 15.2 1259 28.6 19.7 26.6 25.1 951

TUR 15.3 74.8 6.3 3.6 2289 28.4 47.5 20.4 3.8 1424

UKR 21.1 65.6 4.0 9.3 1385 36.1 35.3 12.6 16.0 1681

(avg.) 23.5 53.6 6.6 16.2 36.3 22.6 16.1 25.0

∑ 77.1 60.2 58.9 38.7

σ 9.2 16.9 6.9 16.5 14.4 12.4 7.4 21.4

Self-identified religiosity and spirituality by country, 2008 (% of valid)


In terms of area, while East Europeans self-identify to a larger extent as religious than

their Western counterparts, the proportions of respondents considering themselves only spiritual

and not also religious do not differ significantly on country average.

Expectedly, considering geographical positions, extra-religious spirituality is more

frequent among Protestants and least present among Muslims, the two variables’ values being

distributed reasonably inverse among denominations:

Intra- and extra-religious interest in the sacred/supernatural by religious denomination (% of valid)

Turning back to areas, the findings are somewhat contradictory in their corroboration,

in the sense that, although declaring themselves rather religious (than spiritual) in higher

frequencies, Eastern Europeans simultaneously display, as highlighted above, greater non-

religious, rather spiritual, beliefs (one might say superstitions) than Western Europeans, a

paradox that requires additional investigation.

Integrated approach and conclusions

The following addresses the identified contradiction by investigating in multivariate

analyses the frequency of five unorthodox beliefs as measured by the ISSP dependent on self-

identification as religious and/or spiritual.

For each of the five underlying tables, the coding uses:

A = neither religious or spiritual; B = religious, but not spiritual; C = religious and

spiritual; D = spiritual, but not religious;

Yellow shaded = anomalies from the expected (from B to D increasing) distribution;

Green shaded = cases where the analyzed belief is more frequent among atheists than

among religious, but not spiritual persons;

R2

B-D = R squared calculated for the B-C-D series of percentages;

Bold = R2

B-D values ≥ (+) 0.75.

Thus, for each country, continuously increasing percentages from B to D, as expected

in case of consistent placement along the religious vs. spiritual delineation, would translate into

high values of R squared (non religious and non spiritual respondents not counted)


Belief in reincarnation (columns: % yes, definitely + yes, probably; 4-point scale):

A B C D R2

B-D A B C D R2

B-D

AUT % 21.2 30.5 53.2 55.8

▲.82 CYP % 2.5 12.3 10.8 15.4

▲.44 N 189 246 126 172 N 40 430 250 52

DEN % 6.5 16.0 33.6 36.0

▲.84 CZE % 4.7 23.4 48.6 30.1

▲.07 N 447 569 289 261 N 728 248 138 166

ESP % 7.8 23.4 30.8 33.9

▲.95 GeE % 3.7 20.5 50.0 29.3

▲.08 N 490 758 406 310 N 353 44 18 41

FIN % 9.0 17.6 33.3 33.9

▲.78 HRV % 9.8 19.4 33.8 23.0

▲.06 N 277 238 111 177 N 112 454 234 217

FRA % 6.9 19.6 32.2 40.0

▲.98 HUN % 9.5 26.1 47.6 40.3

▲.42 N 681 581 233 325 N 283 291 124 176

GBR % 10.6 28.2 39.5 50.8

▲1.0 LAT % 15.5 44.4 54.9 39.6

▼.09 N 586 344 215 317 N 251 306 153 217

GeW % 12.2 30.2 36.2 48.6

▲.96 POL % 17.0 22.7 24.3 34.2

▲.85 N 288 348 105 111 N 106 629 185 76

EIR % 18.1 29.4 38.1 37.7

▲.71 RUS % 17.2 40.7 63.0 36.1

▼.03 N 144 721 522 215 N 128 216 73 133

NED % 8.1 12.9 36.1 63.5

▲1.0 SLK % 10.4 22.8 24.9 35.2

▲.87 N 516 371 194 240 N 173 342 321 71

NIR % 6.6 22.5 18.2 32.3

▲.46 SLV % 11.9 30.7 45.2 39.3

▲.35 N 121 347 242 99 N 226 238 166 224

NOR % 6.3 15.4 18.3 47.7

▲.82 TUR % 55.3 89.1 94.8 92.3

▲.31 N 318 182 115 151 N 47 395 668 286

PRT % 11.6 28.5 53.7 46.3

▲.47 UKR % 12.3 39.5 35.5 35.1

▼.82 N 69 471 285 54 N 220 395 408 151

SUI % 24.3 21.9 42.0 49.0

▲.93

N 222 421 212 206

SWE % 7.1 21.9 28.3 50.3

▲.91 N 382 256 113 143

Avg. % 11.2 22.7 35.3 44.7 Avg.* % 10.4 27.5 39.9 32.5 * Turkey excluded

Belief in Nirvana (columns: % yes, definitely + yes, probably; 4-point scale):

A B C D R2

B-D A B C D R2

B-D

AUT % 13.9 17.1 33.0 38.1

▲.92 CYP % 12.2 14.1 13.1 27.5

▲.69 N 166 199 94 134 N 41 434 237 51

DEN % 2.2 5.6 14.4 16.4

▲.88 CZE % 3.0 16.6 37.6 22.9

▲.08 N 410 396 202 201 N 690 193 113 157

ESP % 5.9 15.1 23.4 24.2

▲.81 GeE % 1.6 8.6 21.4 17.9

▲.49 N 438 530 248 256 N 320 35 14 39

FIN % 5.6 9.0 20.6 19.7

▲.69 HRV % 11.3 9.8 28.0 16.6

▲.14 N 249 201 102 142 N 106 388 200 205

FRA % 2.4 8.2 22.5 22.0

▲.72 HUN % 2.2 17.3 31.5 19.5

▲.02 N 666 510 204 304 N 272 254 108 159

GBR % 3.1 18.6 28.9 22.9

▲.17 LAT % 4.7 17.5 27.3 14.9

▲.04 N 486 247 166 236 N 236 257 132 195


GeW % 6.0 11.4 16.7 22.5

▲1.0 POL % 8.8 13.9 12.8 22.9

▲.66 N 267 289 90 89 N 91 517 149 70

EIR % 13.2 23.7 29.0 29.8

▲.85 RUS % 14.3 25.5 46.8 34.4

▲.17 N 129 586 410 178 N 112 153 47 96

NED % 2.9 5.6 28.5 37.7

▲.94 SLK % 4.1 9.5 17.9 21.2

▲.94 N 409 234 123 228 N 146 262 235 66

NIR % 2.8 16.9 14.7 22.9

▲.50 SLV % 12.4 26.3 38.2 34.7

▲.47 N 106 266 190 83 N 209 190 136 196

NOR % 3.4 10.8 10.5 31.2

▲.74 TUR % 51.2 74.5 67.6 77.9

▲.10 N 296 139 86 125 N 41 330 478 244

PRT % 8.3 18.0 41.8 44.2

▲.82 UKR % 10.1 30.7 25.0 21.9

▼.97 N 60 323 184 52 N 199 335 300 128

SUI % 7.9 11.3 28.2 35.2

▲.95

N 215 379 179 193

SWE % 2.6 8.1 14.1 26.4

▲.96 N 351 198 85 110

Avg. % 5.7 12.8 23.3 28.1 Avg. % 11.3 22.0 30.6 27.7

Belief in horoscope (columns: % definitely true + probably true; 4-point scale)

A B C D R2

B-D A B C D R2

B-D

AUT % 19.0 32.5 45.6 51.1

▲.95 CZE % 34.6 61.7 66.7 64.1

▲.23 N 200 274 147 178 N 717 261 147 167

DEN % 10.4 19.0 30.8 33.9

▲.90 GeE % 14.6 28.0 50.0 26.8

▼.00 N 470 596 289 274 N 343 50 20 41

FIN % 6.6 14.4 21.0 20.1

▲.63 LAT % 49.2 66.9 52.9 71.6

▲.06 N 286 264 119 194 N 240 317 157 218

FRA % 17.7 36.9 42.2 46.1

▲1.0 RUS % 37.6 56.4 53.2 63.6

▲.46 N 684 621 237 330 N 109 241 62 132

GeW % 15.3 30.9 32.1 45.1

▲.81 SLK % 24.0 45.7 44.5 45.0

▼.34 N 314 369 112 113 N 171 352 335 80

EIR % 23.9 22.2 25.8 30.0

▲1.0 SLV % 19.4 33.9 38.3 42.3

▲1.0 N 163 781 573 217 N 232 248 175 239

NED % 9.0 12.2 20.0 36.0

▲.96 TUR % 9.6 15.7 9.8 18.9

▲.12 N 564 401 205 358 N 52 394 655 286

NOR % 6.3 15.5 15.7 29.9

▲.76

N 318 194 108 157

SUI % 31.3 38.4 43.8 51.2

▲1.0 N 227 427 655 209

Avg. % 15.5 24.7 30.8 38.2 Avg. % 27.0 44.0 45.0 47.5

Belief in fortune tellers’ ability to predict future (columns: % definitely yes + probably yes; 4-point

scale):

A B C D R2

B-D A B C D R2

B-D

AUT % 12.3 24.9 46.9 40.2

▲.46 CZE % 34.6 61.7 66.7 64.1

▲.23 N 204 285 130 169 N 717 261 147 167

DEN % 10.1 24.7 46.6 37.2

▲.32 GeE % 12.5 10.6 30.0 17.5

▲.12 N 465 600 296 277 N 353 47 20 40


FIN % 13.3 25.5 42.4 44.4

▲.83 LAT % 52.9 63.0 63.2 67.4

▲.78 N 285 274 118 196 N 255 327 163 227

FRA % 13.9 26.9 38.2 43.7

▲.96 RUS % 41.5 71.5 85.7 80.8

▲.42 N 704 650 254 334 N 135 267 77 151

GeW % 12.7 22.0 27.2 37.9

▲.96 SLK % 36.5 63.8 62.1 62.0

▼.79 N 316 372 114 116 N 167 373 340 79

EIR % 27.9 33.1 35.7 33.2

▲.00 SLV % 21.6 37.6 50.0 42.4

▲.15 N 165 800 580 232 N 231 250 176 245

NED % 15.3 21.1 40.6 52.4

▲.98 TUR % 15.1 7.2 11.7 11.7

▲.75 N 562 407 207 372 N 53 667 401 290

NOR % 12.2 23.3 36.8 50.9

▲1.0

N 319 202 114 159

SUI % 24.3 27.1 37.7 40.8

▲.91 N 230 436 220 213

Avg. % 15.8 25.4 39.1 42.3 Avg. % 30.7 45.1 52.8 49.4

Belief in lucky charm bringing good luck (columns: % definitely + probably true; 4-point scale)19:

A B C D R2

B-D A B C D R2

B-D

AUT % 20.5 37.7 46.1 47.1

▲.83 CZE % 34.6 61.7 66.7 64.1

▲.23 N 200 284 128 174 N 717 261 147 167

DEN % 8.0 20.9 29.6 26.4

▲.39 GeE % 21.0 39.1 31.6 37.5

▼.04 N 463 607 291 269 N 357 46 19 40

FIN % 7.6 22.0 16.9 24.1

▲.08 LAT % 60.2 69.0 62.9 80.4

▲.41 N 288 273 118 195 N 251 319 159 230

FRA % 12.1 28.2 25.1 23.2

▼.98 RUS % 37.8 62.1 57.9 59.4

▼.40 N 694 639 255 328 N 127 248 76 128

GeW % 23.4 34.0 38.6 44.7

▲.99 SLK % 23.0 47.4 42.3 48.1

▲.01 N 316 374 114 114 N 178 359 333 79

EIR % 29.8 38.7 42.2 39.8

▲.09 SLV % 20.9 42.8 46.9 45.8

▲.50 N 168 806 585 236 N 230 250 175 240

NED % 11.1 18.4 24.4 30.9

▲1.0 TUR % 32.0 39.5 32.8 33.6

▼.65 N 569 407 217 363 N 53 397 667 289

NOR % 8.4 14.1 15.1 28.8

▲.80

N 322 198 119 160

SUI % 33.9 44.9 43.3 41.7

▼1.0 N 230 445 224 216

Avg. % 17.2 28.8 31.3 34.1 Avg. % 32.8 51.7 48.7 52.7

Heterodox beliefs depending on religious vs. spiritual self-identification (ISSP 2008)

Corroborated with the previous findings, the column-by-column comparison of

Western and Eastern Europe and the study of R squared values in the two areas along these

19

Unlike the previous beliefs, the last one, in lucky charm bringing good luck, although once again both higher in

relative individual and aggregate frequencies and transgressing the religious-spiritual delineation in the East, this

time also shows some considerable distribution anomalies in five of the nine Western countries covered. The fact

that out of all the 16 countries analyzed, R2 values surpass 0.75 in only four may admit as an at least partial

explanation a proportion of the respondents identifying “good luck charm” with specific religious items, such as

crucifixes, prayer books, rosaries, etc.


beliefs thus both explain the apparent paradox by unveiling the highly subjective component of

self-defined religiosity and spirituality and allow a the formulation of two major conclusions.

Firstly, uncanonical pseudo-religiosity, rather considerable as spirituality, affects both

Western and Eastern Europe, albeit to different degrees. This phenomenon is recognizable in the

overwhelming majority of cases20

(94 of total 100 cases) in which heterodox beliefs are in both

areas actually more frequent among those self-defined as religious, but not spiritual, than among

those classifiable as atheists (on a gross average 1.5-2 times more frequent), although the

respective beliefs are clearly and entirely placed outside “orthodox”, properly defined,

religiosity. Moreover, compared both on average and column-by column, uncanonical beliefs are

more frequent among Easterners21

, which means that their simultaneous higher religiosity (as

established quantitatively and subjectively) is qualitatively and objectively affected to a

significant extent, one larger than in the case of Western Europeans, by unorthodox spirituality.

area

variable

West East

Self-defined religiosity (%) EVS 2008 61.3 77.1

ISSP 2008 55.5 58.9

Self-defined spirituality (%) EVS 2008 55.2 60.2

ISSP 2008 36.3 38.7

Church-mediation (ICM value) EVS 2008 -19.1 +2.5

ISSP 2008 -40.8 -15.6

Personal vs. impersonal God (%) EVS 2008 36.9 vs. 35.4 48.2 vs. 31.0

Belief in:

Reincarnation (%) EVS 2008 24.4 24.2

ISSP 2008 25.7 29.7

Lucky charm (%) EVS 2008 18.6 33.9

ISSP 2008 27.3 44.6

Nirvana (%) ISSP 2008 15.0 15.9

Telepathy (%) ISSP 1999 40.9 47.0

Horoscope (%) EVS 1999 26.9 30.7

ISSP 2008 22.5 38.6

Fortune-telling (%) ISSP 2008 28.1 42.5

Religiosity and spirituality in Western and Eastern Europe by multiple variables (% of valid)

Secondly, and reinforcing the previous conclusion, the visibly superior values of R2

registered in Western Europe along the three categories of only religious, both religious and

spiritual, respectively only spiritual respondents mean that the self-placement among the three

categories is significantly more genuine and objectively justified than in Eastern Europe, where

self-identified spirituality/religiosity and unorthodox beliefs are weakly, and in some cases even

negatively correlated, meaning self-identification as religious and church-oriented is rather

subjective, and not supported by the corresponding unorthodox beliefs held simultaneously.

20

Where „case” means the analytical pair country plus a certain belief. 21

Except for the category of respondents self-declared as solely spiritual, respectively for the trans-category belief in

Nirvana, shared in similar proportions in the West and in the East.


Concretely, in the East, although percentages of unorthodox beliefs among spiritual

persons score higher than among religious, but not spiritual respondents, out of a total 47 cases,

the distribution of percentages uniformly increases from column B to D in only 5 (meaning

10.6%). Comparatively, the distribution uniformly increases in the West in 39 out of the 55 cases

analyzed (70.9%), whereas in many of the exceptions, variations are statistically insignificant.

Thus, self-defined religiosity-spirituality placement in the East is an extremely subjective

instrument, hardly operable with, whereas in the West, respondents appear significantly more

aware and objective in their self-identification in spiritual vs. religious terms.

However, data operated on the basis of both EVS and ISSP contradict the

aforementioned claims that more people would emphasize being rather spiritual than religious,

the latter category outnumbering (still) the first one in both Western and Eastern Europe.

Among major religious denominations, Protestants distinguish themselves by almost

every variable analyzed as the group most prone to extra-religious spiritual preoccupations,

scoring lowest in terms of church-mediation of the individual-divine and consistently highest in

terms of SLF/PG ratio (being actually the only major denomination with a higher percentage of

followers believing in an impersonal God) and self-aware interest in extra-religious spirituality,

but also, interestingly, lowest for all heterodox beliefs (except for telepathy), meaning their

spiritual interest is rather directed towards other items than the one analyzable in the two poll

series. Orthodox Christians and Muslims compete at the opposite extreme of the denominations

scale, registering highest scores for Church mediation, personal God conceptualization, but also

heterodox beliefs (especially Orthodox), despite their lowest self/declared adherence to extra-

religious spirituality, while Roman-Catholics are usually placed in between the two extremes.

In terms of trends manifested over the past two decades, the limited data availability

correspondingly allows only a few safe conclusions to be formulated along three major

categories of religiosity – “orthodox”, “unorthodox”, respectively atheism. Thus, the West has

witnessed an undisputable decline of orthodox religiosity, recognizable in the steadily and

generalized declining beliefs in a personal God, in God without doubts and in only one religion

containing (the) truth. Noteworthy, this decline developed especially to the benefit of the

category of people classifiable as atheists, i.e. those not believing in God, regardless of his

personal or impersonal nature, and holding that there is little truth in any religion, and only

secondary to the benefit of uncanonical religiosity (grouping people believing in an impersonal

God and in the presence of truth among more than one religion).

Comparatively, the Eastern area of Europe seems divided between on the one hand

the narrow Central European cluster, comprising countries mostly fitting into the Western pattern

(e.g. former East Germany, the Czech Republic and, to lower rates, Poland, Croatia and

Hungary), and on the other hand the other (properly defined) Eastern European countries, which

witnessed an aggregate religiosity revival (to the detriment of atheism), one realized however on

behalf of both canonical and heterodox beliefs in ratios different from country to country, and

with people less objective in their religiosity vs. spirituality self-assessments. Thus, both God

conceptualizations became more frequent among Easterners, at least over the 1990s, while the

last decade suggests a relative stagnation, whereas the belief in more than one religion containing

truths increased numerically to an extent even larger than in the West, accompanied by

considerably higher rates of beliefs in unorthodox ideas and a increasingly hybrid religiosity.

Hence, corroborated with other researches highlighting a general decrease of Church-

oriented and orthodox religiosity in both East and West, expressed as such in diminishing values

of church attendance rates, perceived church guidance in matters ranging from social to family

life problems, or of the importance attributed to religious services in life events, the here


completed investigation generally confirms secularization in Europe at the micro level in both its

manifestations, in proportions different between the two areas: in the West and in Central

Europe, secularization translates predominantly into a numerical increase of atheism and to a

smaller degree of unorthodox spirituality, while in the East, in the context of an aggregated

religiosity revival, apparently stagnated over the past decade, its main expression lies in the

increase of heterodox beliefs at rates and absolute values consistently superior to the ones in the

West, thus exposing the considerably higher subjectivity of religious vs. spiritual self-

identification among poll respondents.

Thus, although statements of heterodox spirituality having replaced orthodox

religiosity are clearly premature even in regard to Europe as the most secularized area throughout

the world, the continent in its entirety displays a visible secularization trend manifested

predominantly depending on area in either increasing atheism, as in the West, or progressively

hybrid heterodox religiosity, as in the East, in both cases to the detriment of canonical, Church-

oriented, religiosity.

-----------

Bibliography

Acquaviva, Sabino (1993) “Some Reflections on the Parallel Decline of Religious Experience

and Religious Practice”. In Secularization, Rationalism and Religious, eds. Eileen

Barker, James A. Beckford and Karel Dobbelaere, 47-58. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Apahideanu, Ionuţ. “East Meets West once again: A Quantitative Approach of Religiosity

Trends in Europe over the Last Two decades” (forthcoming), 2013.

--------. “Tendinţe ale religiozităţii în Europa ultimelor trei decenii: o abordare cantitativă”.

Revista internaţională de psihologie politică şi societală 3, 1 (2012): 59-80.

Badone, Ellen. “Introduction”. In Religious Orthodoxy and Popular Faith in European Society,

ed. E. Badone, 3-22. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

Ballantine, Jeanne H., and Keith A. Roberts. Our Social World: Condensed Version. London:

SAGE Publications, 2009.

Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven M. Tipton,

Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press, 1985.

Berger, Peter L. The Desecularization of the World. Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy

Center, 1999.

---------. “Epistemological Modesty: An Interview with Peter Berger.” The Christian Century

114 (1997): 972–78.

---------. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor

Books, 1967.

Berlinerblau, Jacques (2000) “Official Religion and Popular Religion in Pre-Exilic Ancient

Israel”, paper presented at the 23rd

“Rabbi Louis Feinberg Memorial Lecture in Jewish

Studies”, Department of Judaic Studies, University of Cincinnati, May 11, 2000 (http://www.bibleinterp.com/articles/berlinerblau1.shtml, retrieved July 31, 2013).

Berzano, Luigi. “Religious lifestyles”. In Religion, Spirituality and Everyday Practice, eds.

Giuseppe Giordan and William H. Swatos, Jr., 57-76. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London,

New York: Springer, 2011.

http://www.bibleinterp.com/articles/berlinerblau1.shtml


Bibby, Reginald W. La religion à la carte. Pauvreté et potentiel de la religion au Canada.

Montréal: Fides, 1988.

Bruce, Steve. “What the Secularization Paradigm really says”. In Religiosität in der

säkularisierten Welt: Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte

in der Religions-soziologie,, eds. Manuel Franzmann, Christel Gärtner şi Nicole Köck,

39-48. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006.

Campbell, Heidi A. ed. Digital Religion: Understanding Religious Practice in New Media

Worlds. New York: Routledge, 2013.

Casanova, José. Public Religions in the Modern World. University of Chicago Press, 1994.

---------. “Rethinking Secularization: A Global Comparative Perspective”. In Religion,

Globalization and Culture, eds. P. Beyer and L. Beaman, 101-120. Leiden: BRILL, 2007.

Casson, Ann. “The right to ‘bricolage’: Catholic pupils’ perception of their religious identity and

the implications for Catholic schools in England”. Journal of Beliefs and Values 32, 2

(2011): 207-218.

Champion, François. “Spirit religios difuz, eclectism şi sincretism”. In Religiile lumii, ed. Jean

Delumeau, 700-728. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1996.

Chandler, E. W., and R.M. Dreger. “Anthropocentrism: Construct validity and measurement.”

Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 8 (1993): 169-188.

Chaves, Mark. “Secularization: A Luhmanian Reflection”. Soziale Systeme 3, 2 (1997): 439-449.

---------. “Secularization as Declining Religious Authority.” Social Forces 72, 3 (1994): 749-774.

---------, and Philip S. Gorski. “Religious Pluralism and Religious Participation”. Annual Review

of Sociology 27 (2001): 261-281.

Cipriani, Roberto. “Diffused religion and prayer”. Religions 2, 2 (2011): 198-215.

---------. “Secularization or ‘diffused religion’”. In Religiosität in der säkularisierten Welt:

Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte in der Religions-

soziologie, eds. Manuel Franzmann, Christel Gärtner and Nicole Köck, 123-142.

Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006.

---------. “Religiosity, Religious Secularism and Secular Religions”. International Social Science

Journal 46, 2 (1994): 277-284.

---------. “Religion and Politics. The Italian Case: Diffused Religion”. Archives des Sciences

Sociales des Religions 58, 1 (1984): 29-51.

Davie, Grace. Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging. Oxford: Blackwell,

1994.

Denz, Hermann (2009) “Religion, Popular Piety, Patchwork Religion”. In Church and Religion

in Contemporary Europe. Results from Empirical and Comparative Research, eds. Gert

Pickel and Olaf Müller, 183-202. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Dobbelaere, Karel. Secularization: An Analysis at Three Levels. Brussels: Presses

Interuniversitaires Européennes, 2004.

---------. “Toward and Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept

of Secularization”. In The Secularization Debate, eds. William H. Swatos Jr. and Daniel

V.A. Olson, 21-43. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.

---------. “Toward and Integrated Perspective of the Processes Related to the Descriptive Concept

of Secularization”. Sociology of Religion 60, 3 (1999): 229-247.

---------. “Cipriani, Roberto (1945-)”. In Encyclopedia of Religion and Society, ed. William H.

Swatos, Jr., 93. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1998

---------. “Some Trends in European Sociology of Religion” Sociological Analysis 48 (1987):

107-137.


---------. “Trend Report: Secularization: A Multi-dimensional Concept”. Current Sociology 29, 2

(1981): 3-153.

--------- and Wolfgang Jagodzinski (1995) “Secularization and Church religiosity”. In The Impact

of Values, eds. Jan van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough, 76-119. Cambridge: Oxford

University Press.

Ester, Peter, Loek Halman and Ruud de Moor. “Value Shift in Western Societies”. In The

Individualizing Society: Value Change in Europe and North America, eds. Peter Ester,

Loek Halman and Ruud de Moor, 1-20. Tilburg, NED: Tilburg University Press, 1993.

Fenn, Richard K. (2003) “Editorial Commentary: Religion and the Secular; the Sacred and the

Profane: The Scope of the Argument”. In A Comparison to 19th

Century America, ed.

William L. Barney, 3-23.ed.. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003.

Flanagan, Kieran. “Introduction”. In A Sociology of Spirituality, eds. Kieran Flanagan and Peter

C. Jupp, 1-22. Ashgate / MPG Books Group, 2009.

Flanagan, Kieran and Peter C. Jupp. “Conclusion”. In A Sociology of Spirituality, eds. Kieran

Flanagan and Peter C. Jupp, 251-262. Ashgate / MPG Books Group, 2009.

Franzmann, Manuel, Christel Gärtner and Nicole Köck. “Einleitung”. In Religiosität in der

säkularisierten Welt: Theoretische und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungs-debatte

in der Religions-soziologie, eds. Manuel Franzmann, Christel Gärtner şi Nicole Köck, 11-

38 Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006.

Gabriel, Karl. Christentum zwischen Tradition und Postmoderne [Christendom between

Tradition and Postmodernity] Freiburg: Herder, 1992.

Hanson, Sharon. “The secularization thesis: Talking at cross purposes”. Journal of

Contemporary Religion 12, 2 (1997): 159-179.

Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. “Transmission and Formation of Socio-religious Identities”.

International Sociology 13, 2 (1998): 213-228.

---------. “Vers un christianisme des communautés émotionelles?”. In L’état des religions dans le

monde, ed. M. Clevenot, 507-509. Paris: La Découverte, 1987.

Hill, Peter C., Kenneth I. Pargament, Ralph W. Hood Jr., Michael E. McCullough, James P.

Swyers, David B. Larson, Brian J. Zinnbauer. ”Conceptualizing religion and spirituality:

Points of commonality, points of departure”. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour

30, 1 (2000): 51-77.

Introvigne, Massimo, and Rodney Stark. “Religious Competition and Revival in Italy: Exploring

European Exceptionalism”. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion 1, 1 (2005)

(article 5) (http://www.massimointrovigne.com/ijrr.pdf, retrieved July 1, 2013).

Jagodzinski, Wolfgang and Karel Dobbelaere. “Religion and Ethical Pluralism”. In The Impact

of Values: Beliefs in Government Volume Four., eds. Jan W. van Deth and Elinor

Scarbrough, 218-249. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Lechner, Frank J. “Secularization in the Netherlands?” Journal for the Scientific Study of

Religion. 35, 3 (1996): 252-264.

---------. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal”. Social Forces 69, 4 (1991): 1103–1119.

Leopold, Anita Maria and Jeppe Sinding Jensen (2004) Syncretism in religion: A Reader.

London: Routledge, 2004.

Luckmann, Thomas. “Privatisierung und Individualisierung. Zur Sozialform der Religion in

spätindustriellen Gesellschaften”. In Religiöse Individualisierung. Biographie und

Gruppe als Bezugspunkte moderner Religiosität, ed. Karl Gabriel, 17-28. Gütersloh:

Kaiser, 1996 (a).

http://www.massimointrovigne.com/ijrr.pdf


---------. “The Privatization of Religion and Morality”. In Detraditionalization: Critical

Reflections on Authority and Identity, eds. Paul Heelas, Scott Lash and Paul M. Morris,

72-85. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1996 (b).

---------. “Shrinking Transcendence, Expanding Religion?”. Sociological Analysis 51, 2 (1990):

127-138.

---------. “The Structural Conditions of Religious Consciousness in Modern Societies.” Japanese

Journal of Religious Studies 6, ½ (1979): 121-37.

---------. The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society. New York:

Macmillan, 1967.

Maroney, Eric. Religious syncretism. London: SCM Press, 2006.

Martin, David. A General Theory of Secularization. New York: Harper and Row, 1978.

---------. “Towards eliminating the concept of secularisation”. In Penguin Survey of the Social

Sciences, ed. J. Gould, 169-182. Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1965.

McGuire, Meredith B. Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Eeveryday Life. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2008.

Pickel, Gert. “Secularization as an European Fate? Results from the Church and Religion in an

Enlarged European Project 2006”. In Church and Religion in Contemporary Europe.

Results from Empirical and Comparative Research, eds. Gert Pickel and Olaf Müller, 89-

122. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009.

Pollack, Detlef. “Explaining religious vitality: Theoretical considerations and empirical findings

in Western and Eastern Europe”. In Religiosität in der säkularisierten Welt: Theoretische

und empirische Beiträge zur Säkularisierungsdebatte in der Religions-soziologie, eds.

Manuel Franzmann, Christel Gärtner şi Nicole Köck, 83-104. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für

Sozialwissenschaften, 2006.

---------. “Institutionalized and Subjective Religiosity in Former Communist Countries of Central

and Eastern Europe”. In Religion and Patterns of Social Transformation, eds. Dinka

Marinović Jerolimov, Siniša Zrinščak and Irena Borowik, 79-88. Zagreb: Institute for

Social Research, 2004.

---------. Säkularisierung – ein moderner Mythos? Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003a.

---------. “Religiousness inside and outside the Church in Selected Post-communist Countries of

Central and Eastern Europe”. Social Compass 50, 3 (2003b): 321-334.

---------, Olaf Müller, and Gert Pickel. (eds.) The Social Significance of Religion in the Enlarged

Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization. Farnham, UK: Ashgate

Publishing, 2012.

Richards, P. Scott and Allen E. Bergin. A Spiritual Strategy for Counseling and Psychotherapy,

Washington: American Psychological Association, 1997.

Roeland, Johan. Selfation: Dutch Evangelical Youth Between Subjectivization and Subjection.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009.

Sausner, Sarah. The Merits of Hybridization: Religious Organizations and Religious Investment

Strategies. University of Washington Press, 2006.

Shafranske, Edward P., and Newton H. Malony. ”Clinical psychologists' religious and spiritual

orientations and their practice of psychotherapy”, Psychotherapy: Theory, Research,

Practice, Training, 27, 1 (1990): 72–78.

Stark, Rodney. “Secularization, RIP”. Sociology of Religion. 60, 3 (1999): 249-273.

---------, and Roger Finke. Acts of Faith. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000.

Somerville, John. “Secular Society / Religious Peope: Our Tacit Rules for Using the Term

Secularization”. Journal for Scientific Study of Religion 37 (1998): 249-53.


Stewart, Charles, and Rosalind Shaw. Syncretism/Anti-syncretism: The Politics of Religious

Synthesis. London: Routledge, 1994.

Swatos, William H., Jr. “Religiosity”. In Encyclopedia of Religion and Society, edited by

William H. Swatos, Jr., 406. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1998.

Tsang, Jo-Ann, and Michael E. McCullough. ”Measuring religious constructs: A hierarchical

approach to construct organization and scale selection”. In Handbook of Positive

Psychological Assessment, eds. S. J. Lopez and C. R. Snyder, 345-360. Washington,

D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2003.

Tschannen, Olivier. “The Secularization Paradigm”. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion

30 (1991): 396-415.

Vande Kemp, Hendrika. “Historical perspective: Religion and clynical psychology in America”.

In Religion and the Clinical Practice of Psychology, ed. Edward P. Sharfranske, 71-112.

Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1996.

Vásquez, Manuel A., and Marie Friedman Marquardt. Globalizing the Sacred: Religion across

the Americas. Rutgers University Press, 2003.

Voyé, Liliane. “Secularization in the Context of Advanced Modernity”. Sociology of Religion 60,

3 (1999): 275-288.

Warner, R. Stephen. “Work in Progress Towards a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of

Religion in the United States”. American Journal of Sociology 98, 5 (1993): 1044-1093.

Wilson, Bryan R. “The Secularization Thesis: Criticism and Rebuttals”. In Secularization and

Social Integration: Papers in Honor of Karel Dobbelaere, eds. Rudi Laerman, Bryan R.

Wilson and Jaak Billiet, 45-66Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998.

---------. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

---------. Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment. London: C.A. Watts, 1966.

Wuthnow, Robert. After Heaven: Spirituality in America since the 1950s. Berkeley, Los

Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1998

Yamane, David. “Secularization on Trial: In Defense of a Neosecularization Paradigm”. Journal

for the Scientific Study of Religion 36, 1 (1997): 109-122.

Zaccaria, Francesco. Participation and Beliefs in Popular Religiosity: An Empirical-Theological

Exploration among Italian Catholics. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 2010.

Ziebertz, Hans-Georg, and Ulrich Riegel. “Post-secular Europe – a Concept Qustioned”. In

Europe: secular or post-secular?, eds. Hans-Georg Ziebertz şi Ulrich Riegel, 9-42.

Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2008.

.

An empirical revisiting of the secularization debate at the micro level: Europe’s heterodox...

Documents

Transcript of An empirical revisiting of the secularization debate at the micro level: Europe’s heterodox...