Chelsea CohenSIS 3184/30/14

Afghanistan’s Human Security Challenges: Insurgency andBeyond

The current American military operations in Afghanistan

began as part of the Global War on Terror in October of 2001

in retribution for the terror attacks of September 11th.

More than a decade later, the security situation in the

region is still unstable and its future is uncertain despite

significant human and monetary expenditure. The nature of

the warfare in Afghanistan has proven difficult to overcome

for the United States and the coalition of NATO members who

intervened on their behalf; there seemed to be a colossal

misunderstanding of how to fight an unconventional and

asymmetric enemy, a holdover from the Vietnam War, as well

as an inability to maintain effective state-building once

the Taliban was ousted. This paper seeks to explore the

conditions of human insecurity in Afghanistan prior to U.S.

intervention, the weak points of the U.S.’s operations, and

to how to incorporate human security in order to produce

more successful peace building mechanisms for future

interventionist endeavors.

In order to understand the issue presented in this

paper, the concept of human security and the difficulty in

embracing it in a practical sense must be explained, as well

as the historical context of Afghanistan and its subsequent

security problems. Human security was proposed as a converse

concept to state or national security in the United Nations

Development Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Report of

1994. Rather than a focus on territorial sovereignty and the

maintenance and defense of borders as in state security,

human security places the focus on people, their needs, and

the threats to those needs. It is a multilayered approach

that requires an understanding of how issues are

interconnected, and it incorporates not just military issues

of security but also economic, environmental, and social

causes of conflict, such as poverty, disease, trans-national

crime, oppressive power structures, and resource

inequality.1 Approaching security issues through a human 1 Richard Jolly and Deepayan Basu Ray, “Human Security—National Perspectives and Global Agendas: Insights from

security frame aims to prevent an escalation of violence

rather than a direct approach with force on one side of a

conflict or the other. Instead of force, insecurity must be

addressed by four tasks with the ultimate goal of long-term

sustainability. These tasks are the creation of sustainable

security, which moves beyond simple bodily protection to

encompass the provision of safety to the extent that an

insecure population could achieve monopoly of force and its

reinforcing institutions; sustainable livelihoods, which

provide economic and social rights and grant access to

survival needs, even in the midst of violence; sustainable

governance, which the provision of a political authority

that the population trusts and the capacity for state

institutions to provide services to the public, rather than

individuals; and sustainable development, which ensures that

individuals live in a dignified way and have a sense of

self-worth with regard to their lives and their treatment.2

National Human Development Reports”, Journal of International Development, 19 (2007), 458-461 2 Shannon D. Beebe and Mary Kaldor, The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human Security and the New Rules of War and Peace, (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2010), 90-105

The holistic concept of human security is a potential

response to the increasing failure of conventional security

and military tactics, as these tend to focus on state level

problems and fail to account for the micro level problems

faced by individuals. Prioritizing the individual as the

focus of security and redefining the primary target of

security operations as any threat to human wellbeing

challenges the high value placed on conventional armed

forces. The United States and its allies have proven their

proficiency with addressing problems that fit into

traditional security analyses of issues and conflicts.

However, the state building and peace making that human

security required have often been ignored or poorly

addressed. 3

Applying the perspective of human security requires

policymakers to reframe how they interpret insecure

situations and implement steps to resecure unstable

populations. Due to the more fluid nature of human security,

this has not been easy and will continue to present 3 Matt McDonald, “Human Security and the Construction of Security”, Global Society, 16:3 (2010), 279-282

difficulties as long as the traditional view of security

tends to pervade the American political consciousness. It is

not easy to deconstruct a society’s historically constructed

interpretation—especially a globally dominating view such as

the United States’—because of the strength and salience of

language and legitimacy that surrounds security discourse.

For example, the perception that policy agendas “compete”

with each other means that human security policies must be

able to appear competitive in comparison to traditional

security policies. Human security solutions tend to be long-

term and slow acting programs, which, while presenting

better long-term results, cannot capture a policymaker’s

attention and action like the fast-acting policies of

conventional security; proposals to research more

ecologically sound fuel sources with the intent of repairing

the environment lack the immediate gratification of drilling

on well-known shale deposits. It would require a great deal

of flexibility, patience, and norm-deviation to change such

a rigid group as American policymakers, and this is

precisely why human security has failed to be integrated as

a viable route for policy.4

This failure of flexibility is evident in American

counterinsurgency policy towards Afghanistan for the better

part of a decade and a half, which will be addressed after

illustrating the history of Afghanistan in order to explain

how the United States fits into the picture. Afghani

politics are tribally based, and tribes often cross borders

set by occupying powers and are affected by migration. The

largest tribe is the Pashtun and, because of British and

Russian-imposed borders, the majority live in Pakistan. The

other primary tribes—the Tajiks, the Hezara, and the Uzbeks—

also have ties with other states beyond Afghanistan to

further complicate the matter.5 Afghanistan’s modern

instability began during the Cold War as two opposing

forces, the Soviet-based Communist Party and the Sunni

Mujahedeen, simultaneously grew in power and struggled to

control the country. The Soviets dominated and attempted to

4 Ibidem, 458-4595 Thomas X. Hammes, “The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century”, Zenith Press, 2006, 155

make radical socialist changes, but the Mujahedeen

maintained a following on the fringe of society. The CIA

supplied these fighters with approximately $3 billion in aid

and weapons as part of the United States’ stringent anti-

Soviet policy; the most crucial weapon were shoulder-mounted

rocket launchers, which proved devastating to Soviet

aircraft. A U.N.-brokered withdrawal in 1988 ended the

Soviet occupation, and steady reconciliation between the

U.S. and the Soviets encouraged a political solution to the

weakness in Afghanistan. The collapse of the Soviet Union in

1991 severely reduced the funding available to Communist

outposts, and Moscow and the U.S. agreed simultaneously to

stop providing military aid to the Afghans. The Soviet-

appointed President, Najibullah Ahmedzai, agreed to step

down for an interim government as the Soviet Union weakened

and removed its support of Afghanistan. In his absence, a

series of rebellions among the Mujahedeen broke out,

revealing the internal divisions and problems within the

militant organization. The resulting civil war and

governmental power vacuum led to the rise of the Taliban as

a unified political force to end the infighting.6

Afghani Islamic clerics and scholars, many of whom were

disillusioned by the failures of the Mujahedeen, formed the

Taliban. Their brand of Islam is known as Wahhabism, an

orthodox, fundamentalist Sunni school of thought that

appealed to traditional Pashtun tribalist ideals and

returning to an “uncorrupted” ideology and practice free

from outside influence. Taliban militants began to take over

major Afghani cities with help from Mujahedeen defectors in

1994 and finally conquered Kabul in 1996 when the heads of

government fled to the Panjshir Valley to the north. The

attacks culminated in the hanging of former president

Najibullah, his brother, and his aides. Al Qaeda leader

Osama bin Laden relocated from Sudan to Afghanistan and

formed close ties with the head of the Taliban, Mullah

Muhammad Omar, which allowed Al Qaeda free reign over

Afghanistan. As a regime, the Taliban lost both domestic and

6 Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRS Report RL30588 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 9, 2014) 2-4

foreign support as they imposed their strict beliefs and

violent punishments for non-adherence to said beliefs on the

population; this included heavy restrictions on women’s

occupations, outlawing of Western media, and the destruction

of two Buddha statues in the hills of Bamiyan. Attempts by

the Clinton administration to engage with the Taliban regime

and reduce the severity of their policies failed, and the

refusal by the Taliban to extradite bin Laden led to U.S.

sanctions against Afghanistan in order to put pressure on

the regime. This image of U.S.-Taliban relations sets the

stage for the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and the

resulting occupation that shapes todays policies towards

Afghanistan.7

Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush

Administration enacted the Authorization for the Use of

Military Force (AUMF) which allowed the United States to

“take all necessary steps” to fight terrorism, including

enacting force against states harboring those responsible

for the attacks. The resulting “Operation Enduring Freedom”

7 Ibidem, 4-7

(OEF) began on October 7 and consisted of air strikes

against Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in order to direct anti-

Taliban Afghani coalitions, such as Pashtun groups and the

multi-tribe Northern Alliance, towards sites to attack. As

these groups took over major cities, the Taliban rapidly

lost control of the state, and the regime is considered to

have officially ended on December 9, 2001. The next two

years were marked by small U.S. operations against Al Qaeda

fighters throughout Afghanistan until the declared end of

“major combat” by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on

May 1, 2003.8 Despite these military victories, Afghanistan

was far from being considered stable, and it was at this

point in time that the power vacuum leading to deeply

ingrained insurgencies began.

The collapse of the Taliban regime caused an anarchic

period of time wherein the absence of any form of legitimate

governance makes the state especially susceptible to

insurgent message spreading. In this anarchic state, the

lack of a legitimate governing body usually increases

8 Ibidem, 8

corruption, which means that public goods and services

cannot be provided, and the populace’s quality of life

declines, increasing malcontent. The government also lacks

the ability to enforce the rule of law, and this lack of

legitimacy allows for insurgent groups to occupy the fringes

of society and begin their state building processes such as

establishing parallel structures and acting in place of the

state.9 At this time, there were three primary insurgent

groups acting in Afghanistan: the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and

Hizb-i-Islami. These three groups had similar ideologies

that centered on a return to “pure” Islam and its laws as

well as the establishment of a “pure” Islamic state; each

envisioned a sort of ideological war that would end in the

unification of all Muslims in a state that adhered strictly

to this Islamic law. Following the ouster of the Taliban

regime, these groups relocated to Pakistan where they

received sanctuary and ample ideological support. Once in

Pakistan, these groups organized a non-state organization of

9 Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad”, International Security 32:4 (2008), 16-18

committees to support a network of planning and propaganda

dispensation while receiving both direct and indirect

assistance from the Pakistani government. From this base,

various insurgent groups now had the means to launch

offensive campaigns against Afghanistan with the goal of

overthrowing the government and expelling the U.S. and

coalition forces. The failure to institute good governance

in the place of the ousted Taliban regime made it that much

easier for the insurgency to take root in Afghanistan; the

lack of a reliable justice and security system was

especially critical as people were willing to invest in the

Taliban to provide these lacking services. Additionally, the

fear of violent retaliation led to an exodus of would-be

government supporters and informants, creating in-state

sanctuaries for Taliban insurgents.10

With a solid background on Afghanistan’s situation

through the last decade, it is possible to scrutinize the

United States’ tactics of counterinsurgency and why they

have not succeeded in stabilizing Afghanistan thus far.

10 Ibidem, 29-35

After the U.S.’s military defeat of the Taliban, Afghani

opposition groups met at a UN conference in Bonn and agreed

to a program to create a new government structure. Hamid

Karzai was installed as an interim leader with the promise

of elections in six months; Karzai was elected president by

secret ballot according to the schedule set at the Bonn

Agreement. Thinking their job was done, the U.S. shifted the

military’s focus to Iraq, refusing to take part in necessary

nation building tactics to prevent the resurgence of

insurgent groups in Afghanistan. By not supporting the

institution of good governance and security as well as not

following up on aid promises, the Bush administration

allowed the Afghani security situation to decline

drastically. Despite achieving critical milestones as

outlined in Bonn, such as the establishment of a progressive

constitution and the implementation of successful elections,

Afghanistan struggled because of the lack of state- and

institution-building.

One of the primary problems here is the inability of a

central institution, such as a presidency, to control a

periphery organization like tribes. This is further

complicated by the expansion of Northern Alliance commanders

into central governing positions, further blurring political

lines and obstructing anti-corruption efforts. Another

critical indicator of failed state building was the failure

to provide internal security, which is necessary for a

government to establish legitimacy; American soldiers had to

take over the protection of President Karzai as he could not

trust Afghani protection.11 Furthermore, the security

apparatus lacked several critical aspects for success,

namely the existence of non-partisan, non-politicized

police, intelligence, and military aspects. The presence of

factional groups and divided political powers prevented the

creation of this apparatus and further undermined any

attempt to build the legitimacy necessary to sustain a

peacekeeping apparatus. Directly related to this is the

failure to institute respect for the rule of law. Without a

legitimate legal structure, conflicts are resolved using

informal methods such as adjudications outside of a court

11 Hammes, 164-165

scenario, which are led primarily by tribal groups; while

this is not an issue in and of itself, the absence of

documentation to substantiate the legitimacy of these

practices, such as international norms or the Afghani

constitution, prevents these methods from being considered

acceptable in a professional capacity. Rule of law is a

critical underpinning of all processes of security and state

building, and without it, Afghanistan cannot succeed at

state building.12

Linking together the human security aspects introduced

prior and the situation outlined in Afghanistan will reveal

why American counterinsurgency efforts in the region have

failed. It is possible to align counterinsurgency with the

human security perspective. Both human security and

counterinsurgency theory seek to reduce violence and promote

more constructive conflict management while seeking to build

good governance and stability.13 However, there is a

misguided conflation of the American idea of 12 Mark Sedra, “Security sector reform in Afghanistan: The slide towards expediency”, International Peacekeeping, 13:1 (August 2006), 103-10513 Beebe, 89-90

counterinsurgency and of successful human security

development; the two are inherently incompatible because of

the infusion of counterinsurgency with counterterrorism and

understanding these oft-confused terms is critical.

Counterterrorism has the specific intent of “lethal

targeting”—that is, killing insurgents. Counterinsurgency is

supposed to be population-centric, meaning that its focus is

on improving the situation on the ground for the people that

insurgents have settled amongst.14 American

counterinsurgency emphasizes high-impact war fighting, which

is a familiar part of the traditional (and, hence, American)

security discourse. It is not possible to divide a complex

issue such an insurgency into a dichotomy of good and evil

and to do so removes the agency of groups with legitimate

grievances that would be remedied by a human security

centered approach. Even central documents that incorporate

human and individual-centric discourses, such as Field Manual

3-24, fall back on the tradition of violence and 14 Gary Anderson, “Counterinsurgency vs. Counterterrorism: ACivilian’s View”, Small Wars Journal, February 24, 2010, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/counterinsurgency-vs-counterterrorism

delegitimizing the occupied nation (Afghanistan, in this

case). The inability of American forces to relinquish their

monopoly on state violence—which is a required tenant in

human security—prevents their counterinsurgency operations

from reaching the levels of truly human-centric development

and violence dissolution. Additionally, the language that

permeates American military discourse and that resonates

with Americans—civilians, military members, and policymakers

alike; it is possible to “defeat” insurgency in the same way

that military forces can be defeated rather than by

countering the instability and insecurity caused by

insurgent ideals. According to traditional American security

discourse, success is based on swiftness and “decisive”

victories, which are inherently impossible in a successful

counterinsurgency operation. Insurgencies very rarely follow

a single, well-demarcated ideology nor are the issues

underlying an insurgency solved quickly and simply, and to

such a one-sided, limited view dooms counterinsurgency

efforts from the start.15

15 Jonathan Gilmore, “A kinder, gentler counter-terrorism: Counterinsurgency, human security, and the War on Terror”,

David Kilcullen’s expertise is one of the best

illustrations of the Afghanistan campaign’s failings. He

describes the environment of an insurgency as a “conflict

ecosystem”, with a specific environment of interlocking and

interacting pressures and actors. These forces, which

include the current government and existing communities,

might usually interact in a cooperative, symbiotic way

during times of peace, but the specific climate of

insurgency causes them to compete for power in an anarchic

environment. This environment also attracts outside

terrorist groups as well as foreign interference, whether as

support to non-state actors or as counterinsurgents.

Kilcullen’s advice for counterinsurgency is very much in

line with the human security perspective provided earlier in

this paper. It calls for a unified understanding of the

culture, politics, history, environment, and international-

domestic interactions of the state that is affected by

insurgency and how the complex interplay of various

multifaceted problems drive people to begin and support

Security Dialogue, 42:21, 2011, 22-29

insurgencies. Rather than taking a primarily military focus,

studying insurgent environments as this sort of ecosystem

allows counterinsurgent forces to analyze how different

aspects of a society are vulnerable and how to mitigate

these efforts. He does concede, however, that violence is an

aspect of counterinsurgency with the caveat that the more

force used, the greater the indication that the campaign is

going poorly. In this case, it is better to create a

comparative advantage in which it is “costlier” for the

populace to support the insurgency by providing greater

access to services and support than the insurgents can. The

ultimate goal is to regain control over the currently

anarchic space and restore order under legitimate governance

and the rule of law.16

In Kilcullen’s testimony before the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, he plainly says that American efforts

are not a counterinsurgency and highlights where the program

went astray. He indicates the importance of breaking cycles

16 David J. Kilcullen, “Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency”,remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, DC, September 28, 2006

of corruption and delegitimizing institutions because these

lead to disillusionment amongst the populace and subsequent

enabling of insurgents. His criticism of U.S. forces’

inability to concurrently address issues of stability while

trying to fight a conventional war directly highlights the

problems with the Afghanistan campaign. Additionally, all

stability efforts including counterinsurgency require a

long-term perspective. The projected deadlines to turn over

security responsibilities to the Afghani people and

withdrawal of U.S. forces indicate both an inability to

understand the art of the long view and a lack of cultural

and historical understanding of Afghanistan’s fear of

abandonment by supportive regimes. 17 This was the case with

both Soviet and American support during the Cold War and it

threatens to again become an issue if American forces pull

out without establishing the promised security apparatus.

Without this, Afghanistan will again find itself susceptible

17 Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Afghanistan, 27th July 2010, (statement of Dr. David J. Kilcullen)

to the whims of insurgents.18 There is a direct historical-

cultural miscommunication; Americans see deadlines as

motivational while Afghanis see them as indicators of

pending abandonment, meaning their enemies will return while

they are without foreign support.19 It is still possible to

remedy the issue of timelines and construct a plan to leave

state building capabilities in place, but, given the United

States’ track record, this is unlikely.

The problems with the American campaign in Afghanistan

are very clear when approached from a human security

perspective. Looking forward, it is critical to reconsider

the traditional discourse of how wars are fought. The first

area to consider is to truly focus the efforts of

counterinsurgency on people both in action as well as in

doctrine. While couching the efforts of the military in the 18 Fatima Al-Smadi, “US Withdrawal: Afghanistan and the ‘Disposability Dilemma’”, Al-Jazeera, January 29, 2014, Accessed April 28, 2014 http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/01/20141297433764379.htm#e15 19 Ioannis Koskinas, “The Problem with Arbitrary Timelines in Afghanistan”, Foreign Policy, April 8, 2014, Accessed April 28, 2014 http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/04/08/the_problem_with_arbitrary_timelines_in_afghanistan

language of governance building and capturing the “hearts

and minds” of a population looks great on paper, without

effective action, this means nothing. Rather than centering

on the state as the main actor, shifting attention to

individuals and populations will resolve the issues that

both cause and are caused by insurgencies. This will require

a more comprehensive understanding of not just human

security but how all conflicts are caused. The shift seen in

2006 away from full-force tactics is a beginning but

successful state building cannot be based on traditional

notions of warfare. The focus on strong military-led

campaigns will not solve the people-centric problems of

legitimacy and human dignity. Efforts must be focused on and

led by civilians; the leader must be a legally appointed

civilian and possess legitimacy with both their population

and the international community. This is a key aspect that

must be embraced rather than the traditional focus on

coercion and force as the primary tools of military

operations. Sources to consider drawing inspiration from

include the Human Terrain System (HTS), which is a social

science-based manual that provides the Army with the

analytical tools to understand the cultural contexts of the

societies that they interact with on their missions.

Understanding the sociocultural and political context of a

population is key to assuage the problems that would lead an

insurgency to take root.20 It is critical looking forward to

not allow the failings of the Afghanistan campaign to

tarnish the reputation of human-centric operations as this

is the key to moving away from using war tactics better

suited for great power war on adversaries that are motivated

by grievances.

Very nice work. You incorporate many diverse ideas

into a cohesive whole, no easy task. Your take on human

security is refreshing and a welcome detour from the usual

critique of the ISAF mission. Your substance was fine, and

I suggest two stylistic changes. First, rework the longer

paragraphs and slice them into shorter bits. It is far

easier on the reader and allows for a more fluid narrative

flow. Two, edit out some of the history – much of it

20 Gilmore, 33-34

contributes nothing to your thesis. Overall, though, you

have done a fine job.

A-

References

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Beebe, Shannon D. and Mary Kaldor. The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon: Human

Security and the New Rules of War and Peace. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2010.

Gilmore, Jonathan. “A kinder, gentler counter-terrorism: Counterinsurgency, human

security, and the War on Terror”. Security Dialogue 42: 21,2011.

Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Zenith Press

(2006).

Jolly, Richard and Deepayan Basu Ray. “Human Security—National Perspectives and

Global Agendas: Insights from National Human Development Reports”. Journal of International Development 19, 2007.

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International Security 32:4 (2008).

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Report RL30588. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, April 9, 2014.

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U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference from Washington, DC, 28 September 2006.

--. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on Afghanistan, 27th July 2010.

Koskinas, Ioannis. “The Problem with Arbitrary Timelines in Afghanistan”. Foreign

Policy. April 8, 2014. Accessed April 28, 2014 http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/04/08/the_problem_with_arbitrary_timelines_in_afghanistan

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