Aesthetics: From Platonic to Thomistic

Abstract

We can describe aesthetics as the science of beauty. And within

that field of discipline, we should understand that many other

topics are descended from it, like our concept of taste. Why can

something pleasing come immediately (a priori) and what are the

factors that come into play to bring out that immediacy? What are

the potential implications that make us interested in a specific

object (a posteriori)1? As much as experiencing a plurality of beauty

and whatnot on a daily basis, we also encounter a multitude of

questions arise regarding the authenticity of the aesthetic

experience. And I would further clause: because the norm of

subjectivity is dominant in our (imperfect) nature, we can never

have a genuine aesthetic experience.

Though, aesthetics did not become an independent philosophy

until the eighteenth century. And the concept of aesthetics (and 1 I borrowed the terms (a priori and a posteriori) from the epistemological discipline.It is to provide a preliminary connotation for aesthetic immediacy and interest.

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what constitutes it) has grown significantly in contrast, notably

as to how aesthetic moment can truly be identified. Questions like:

”does immediacy preclude critical analysis”? According to John

O’Brien, SJ in The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, October 15, 2011, “Thomist

philosopher Jacques Maritain felt that this was precisely what

aesthetic experience was: “the repose of the intellect when it

rejoices without labour or discussion; freed from its natural

labour of abstraction, it ‘drinks the clarity of being’; for him,

“The [aesthetic moment] is contemplative, uncritical, blessed”2.

This may be relevant to the sometimes-perpetual feeling we get when

we view a specific artwork or listen to a particular kind of music.

Our innate desire to set aside intellectual activities other than

fully enjoying the art right in front of us. Again, I quote John

O’Brien, SJ in The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, October 15, 2011. O’Brien

states:

But it was another 20th century Thomist, the philosopher and novelist Umberto Eco, for whom aesthetic intuition is intellectual intuition. In his doctoral dissertation, later published and still in print today as the book The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, Eco reminds usthat the data of our senses give us intuitive knowledge of the sensible while it’s the intellect that gives us knowledge of the

2 John O’Brien, SJ, “The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas”, Fellowship of Catholic Scholars (October 15, 2011), http://www.academia.edu/5173364/The_Aesthetics_of_Thomas_Aquinas (accessed October 21, 2014), 2.

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universal. Working together, their operation is known as visio or vision. Eco notes that “Lightening knowledge, that is direct and immediate contact between intellect and sensible, does not exist inman.” The intellect with its universal principles is always working cooperatively with the sensible function.3

1. Plato’s Aesthetics

According to Nickolas Pappas in Plato’s Aesthetics, 2014, “If

aesthetics is the philosophical inquiry into art and beauty (or a

contemporary surrogate for beauty, e.g. aesthetic value), the

striking feature of Plato's dialogues is that he devotes so much

time to both topics but treats them oppositely”4. Platonic aesthetic

is a fundamental topic for us to probe on because our initial

understanding of aesthetics is grounded on Platonic concepts. And

just as any artwork’s end is to bear integrity and beauty, we

should take into account the definition of both. But Plato inquires

a contrast art and beauty as two separate topics. I quote Nickolas

Pappas in Plato’s Aesthetics, 2014. He states:

3

Ibid., 2-3.

4 Nickolas Pappas, "Plato's Aesthetics", ed., Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopediaof Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/plato-aesthetics/, (accessed October 21, 2014), Introduction

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“To him, art, mostly as represented by poetry, is closer to a greatest danger than any other phenomenon he (Plato) speaks of, while beauty is close to a greatest good. Art, from evoking stark, concrete emotions even while it can (almost always) be abstract, iscloser to evil than to goodness. Beauty however, is a more or less an objective state, and is often associated with the divine, is closer to good5.

2. Three Concepts of Platonic Aesthetics

I will be discussing the three core-concepts of Platonic

Aesthetics: beauty, mimesis, and inspiration. The three core concepts are

the foundational body of thought that fabricated the concept of

Platonic aesthetics, and what is notable with these three concepts,

is the fact that they still exist today and are foundations for

determining aesthetic experiences and values.

2A. Beauty

This concept is widely accepted as being the most fundamental

factor in aesthetics, and experience. While emulation and

inspiration are also of high importance, they are not demanded as

much as beauty, which is a “must have” for artworks. In Crispin

Sartwell’s Beauty, 2014, “The classical conception is that beauty

consists of an arrangement of integral parts into a coherent whole,5 Ibid., Introduction

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according to proportion, harmony, symmetry, and similar notions”6.

Although the ancient greeks postulate the adjective kalon with that

which approximates the beautiful, and claim it to be different with

what “beautiful” is. This is further explained in Nickolas Pappas’

Plato’s Aesthetics, 2014. He states:

The study of Plato's account of beauty must begin with one pronounced warning about terminology. The Greek adjective kalon onlyapproximates to the English “beautiful,” so that not everything Plato says about a kalon thing will belong in a summary of his aesthetic theories (Pappas 2014). Plato describes kalon as of a different from what is beautiful, and have overlapping but distinctranges of application7.

We can understand that since kalon only goes so far as to have

an approximation to what is beautiful, we can say that it does not

always apply to what “beautiful” does, and can be appropriated well

to human beings. In Nickolas Pappas’ Plato’s Aesthetics, 2014, “In many

respects for Greek popular morality—kalon has a particular role to

6 Crispin Sartwell, "Beauty", ed., Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/beauty/, (accessed October 22,2014), part 2.1

7 Nickolas Pappas, "Plato's Aesthetics", ed., Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/plato-aesthetics/, (accessed October 25, 2014), part 1

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play as ethical approbation”8, and can connote a “noble” character

or even an “admirable virtue”. Why do I postulate a difference

between kalon and physical beauty (for instance, in his dialogue

anamnesis)? It is to give credit to the ancient Greek thought of

reducing ambiguity. This is worth mentioning, because, one of the

modern problems we posit today is the problem of ambiguity

(equivocations) in the sense that most people today tend to

interchange the meanings of terms which are not supposed to be

interchanged.

2B. Mimesis

According to Stephen Halliwell in The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient

Texts and Modern Problems, 2002, “Far from providing a static model of

artistic representation, mimesis has generated many different models

of art, encompassing a spectrum from realism to idealism”9. Mimesis

or imitation immediately denotes to “emulation” or

“representation”. And when we say an object, or a phenomenon to be

emulated, we are not only referring to its end-form. We will also

8 Ibid., part 1

9 Stephen Halliwell, The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems, (2002), Book Description

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be referring to the process it underwent. The process can also be

mimesis. Again, Nickolas Pappas in Plato’s Aesthetics, 2014 further

explains:

Besides mimêsis Plato sometimes speaks of a mimêma. “Imitation”like mimêsis can refer either to a process or to that process's outcome. You engage in the act of imitation in order to produce an imitation. A mimêma however is only ever a copy, not also the act that produced it.

And so if the function of mimesis is to emulate, or to “borrow” we

then ask, from which do we borrow? We take them from reality: From

physical objects to immaterial concepts. And we realize those

emulations through our creations, which can then be called works of

art. Walter Jackson Bate’s An Explanation of the term Classical, 1959, says

that, “Art, as an imitation of what is essential in nature, is therefore

concerned with persisting, objective forms”10.

Another notable thing we must grasp concerning the notion of

emulation, we pause and take note of the word “integral”. By

integrity, we are referring to the object’s uniqueness and of the

10 Walter Jackson Bate, “An Explanation of the term Classical”, Prefaces to Criticism (1959), http://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/batewj/class.htm/ ,(accessed November 8, 2014)

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“unreplicable virtue it radiates”11. A fine example of this

unreplicable virtue is understood in music. According to Andrew

Kania in The Philosophy of Music, 2014, “Music, unlike painting, has works

that often have multiple instances, none of which can be identified

with the work itself12.

2C. Inspiration

In my opinion, the third core-concept is much more difficult

to grasp, because we now take into consideration an external

source. Furthermore, if we take into context the intervention of

something divine, inspiration will also connote to the notions of

providence and virtue. This, in my opinion, is one of the main factors

that spurred Thomas Aquinas to formulate his own theory on

aesthetics and its correlation to morality.

11 By unreplicable, I don’t necessarily mean that a specific artwork cannot be emulated per se, but it has its own individuality that even when emulated, makes it what it is.

12 Andrew Kania , "The Philosophy of Music", ed., Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/music/, (accessed November 8, 2014), Introduction

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In modern context, inspiration can be provided by almost

anyone or anything. Nature can very well provide inspiration. A

person dear to us (can be in the form of a lover or a family

member) can serve as inspiration to us. But even as modern

ideologies on the notion of inspiration go so far as to stray away

from the idea that it comes from a divine source, we go back to

God. Let us look at the idea of causality. If another person was

the catalyst, what caused that person to subsequently act as an

inspiration? If we claim that nature inspired us to do this

specific kind of artwork, what caused nature to give us that

impetus? According to Nickolas Pappas in Plato’s Aesthetics, 2014, “The

cause behind inspiration is unimpeachable, for it begins in the

divine realm”13. As contrasted to the first two, it is crystal clear

that inspiration comes from an external source: in Plato’s

philosophy, it could very well be a divine being.

3. Aquinas’s Aesthetics

13 Nickolas Pappas, "Plato's Aesthetics", ed., Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/plato-aesthetics/ (accessed October 21, 2014), part 4

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As we go forward in time, we will encounter the writings of

St. Thomas Aquinas, who is, undisputedly, considered as one of the

brightest Philosophers of his time. Aquinas, who was also a

clergyman by profession, associates the aesthetic experience to

goodness and morality. According to Ananda K. Coomaraswamy in

Mediaeval Aesthetic II. St. Thomas on Dionysius, and a Note on the relation of Beauty to

Truth, March 1938, “And when he speaks of ‘the beautiful as being at the

same time most beautiful and superbeautiful, superexistent in one

and the same mode,’ he shows how the beautiful is predicated of

God”14.

4. Beauty and Goodness

Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae Translated by Fathers of the

English Dominican Province. Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981, puts it as: “Id

quod visum placet” 15 – that which pleases by being seen”. His

(Aquinas’s) idea of aesthetics and the beautiful are then brought

14 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Mediaeval Aesthetic II. St. Thomas on Dionysius, and a Note on the relation of Beauty to Truth, The Art Bulletin VOL. XX (March 1938), University of Chicago (ed.),69

15 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1274, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981 (The text actually says, “pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent.”)

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back to the divine properties of God: His integrity, goodness,

authenticity, and beauty (His Beauty as beauty surpassing the

limitations of the humanly concept). According to Ananda K.

Coomaraswamy in Mediaeval Aesthetic II. St. Thomas on Dionysius, and a Note on the

relation of Beauty to Truth, March 1938, “Aquinas claims that non-existent

things ‘participate in the beautiful and the good’ since the non-

existent primal being (ens primum non existens, Skr. asat) has a certain

likeness to the divine beautiful and good”16. Here, we understand

that Aquinas’s philosophy is that beauty and goodness are two

separate themes. Moreover, they are the two basic themes in

Thomistic aesthetics, and how they make their appeal is different.

Goodness makes its appeal in appetite; for the good is what all

humanity desires. Ethically, man’s ultimate goal is the summum

bonnum – the ultimate good. An online article PHIL 4304 Aesthetics: Thomas

Aquinas, n.d., states “And by achieving this ultimate good, man will

have his appetite satisfied, seeking nothing else17. How then, does

the beautiful make its appeal? The beautiful appeals not to

16 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Mediaeval Aesthetic II. St. Thomas on Dionysius, and a Note on the relation of Beauty to Truth, The Art Bulletin VOL. XX (March 1938), University of Chicago (ed.),7217 Retrieved from http://www3.dbu.edu/naugle/pdf/4304_handouts/Thomistic%20aesthetics.pdf/, (accessed November 9, 2014)

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appetite, but to cognitive power; for the beautiful consists in due

proportion and property belongs to the intelligible character of

the formal cause, and which when perceived gives pleasure and is

called beautiful. Again in PHIL 4304 Aesthetics: Thomas Aquinas, n.d.,

“Cognition finds its rest in the beautiful”18. As the saying goes:

“Beauty is in the eye of the beholder”, we are not only referring

to the subjectivity of pleasure. We are also referring to this

distinction of beauty as being realized through the immediate

cognitive senses.

To summarize, Aquinas’s aesthetics consist of two themes that

we initially thought were interchangeable, but were approached

differently: beauty and goodness. According to the online article

PHIL 4304 Aesthetics: Thomas Aquinas, n.d., “Goodness appeals to the appetite,

while beauty gives pleasure when apprehended”19.

5. Aquinas’s requirements for beauty

Similar to how Plato cited concepts that ultimately formulate his

aesthetic theory, Aquinas also postulates three concepts (or in 18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

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this case, requirements) for beauty. They are revealed in the

revealing quote in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, 1a pars, question 39,

article 8:

For beauty includes three conditions, ‘integrity’ or ‘perfection,’ since those things which are impaired are by the veryfact ugly; due ‘proportion’ or ‘harmony’; and lastly, ‘brightness’ or ‘clarity,’ whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.10

5A. Integritas

Integrity as a requirement for beauty is described as

perfection. Of course, any mortal man cannot achieve perfection,

and it is only God that can personify truest integrity. However,

Integrity also speaks of actuality. According to Michael Spicher in

Medieval Theories of Aesthetics, n.d., “Everything has its ultimate source (or

being); therefore, actuality (or being) is the basis of

beauty20. Aquinas claims that integrity is a ground for beauty and

that one “cannot exist” without the other. Actuality exists in all

tangible things. An object must exist, in order for it to be

beautiful.

20 Michael Spicher, “Medieval Theories of Aesthetics”, University of South Carolina (n.d.), http://www.iep.utm.edu/m-aesthe/#H2/, (accessed November 10, 2014).

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According to Armand Maurer in About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation,

1983, “Actuality is used in three ways when referring to beauty:

existence, form, and action”21. An object must first exist before it

can be deemed beautiful. As different objects have varying degrees

of integrity, that is beside the point. What should be clear for us

is that an object must first come into being, before it can be

deemed integral. The second aspect of actuality is form. The form

of an object is integral to its own and in a sense, separates it

from another object which has a different integrity of its own. For

instance, if we compare an animal to a plant, we can both say that

both possess beauty: but at different degrees. An animal’s quiddity

defines its own beauty, as well as separates itself from that of

the plant that has its own sense of quiddity. The third aspect is

action. According to Armand Maurer in About Beauty: A Thomistic

Interpretation, 1983, “Action completes the actuality of existence and

form”22. For instance, we have a pianist. A pianist who is currently

not engaged in any musical activity (for instance, eating) is still

a pianist, in a sense that s/he still possesses the skills required

21 Armand Maurer, About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation, Houston: Center for ThomisticStudies, 1983, 6ff.

22 Ibid., 8

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of that of a pianist. Yet s/he is most completely a pianist when

s/he is engaged in the act of playing the instrument. We’ve now

understood that the mind plays three roles before it can define

integrity. And according to Michael Spicher in Medieval Theories of

Aesthetics, n.d., “We can conclude that Integrity is not only a

characteristic of beauty, but also rather a necessary condition for

grounding beauty”23.

5B. Proportio

We’ve just described Integritas as an object’s completeness; its

solidarity that makes it beautiful. Alongside integrity, three

particular usages are considered before an object can be considered

integral. According to Jonathan McIntosh in The Three Properties of

Thomistic Beauty, n.d., “Is of Pythagorean extraction and designates in

Aquinas’s usage a sense of qualitative proportion that he

calls convenientia24 or what Hugh Bredin and Liberato Santoro-Brienza

23 Michael Spicher, “Medieval Theories of Aesthetics”, University of South Carolina (n.d.), http://www.iep.utm.edu/m-aesthe/#H2/, (accessed November 10, 2014)

24 Jonathan McIntosh, “The Three Properties of Thomistic Beauty” (n.d.) http://jonathansmcintosh.wordpress.com/2012/09/22/the-three-properties-of-thomistic-beauty/, (accessed November 11, 2014)

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in their book Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Introducing Aesthetics, 2000, describe

as “An ‘intrinsic attunement’ or ‘correspondence between inner and

outer reality, appearance and essence, matter and form’.”25

When we say that Proportio is of a Pythagorean extraction,

implications such as mathematical formulae come into play.

According to Robert Wood in Placing Aesthetics, 2000, “Pleasing

correspondence obtaining both between the parts and metaphysical

principles within the object and between the object and the sensory

faculties of the perceiver”26. In Aquinas’s Summa Theologica Translated by

Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981, Ia pars,

question 12, article 1:

Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch asit is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God27.

25 Hugh Bredin and Liberato Santoro-Brieza, Philosophies of Art and Beauty: Introducing Aesthetics (2000), 72

26 Robert Wood, Placing Aesthetics, Reflections on the Philosophic Tradition, (2000), 109.  

27 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1274, trans., Fathers of the English DominicanProvince.Westminster: Christian Classics, 1981, Ia pars, question 12, article 1.

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Aquinas posits the qualitative and quantitative properties of

proportion. When we attribute an object’s symmetrical property and

all of its statistical, geometrical or triogonometrical

characteristics, we refer to its quantity. Quality however, is

derived from the object’s “habitual”, which Umberto Eco in The

Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, 1988, explains “As a relation of ‘mutual

reference or analogy, or some kind of agreement between them which

subjects both to a common criterion or rule’” (Eco, 1988,

82)28. Paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Contra Gentiles, I pars, question 16,

article 8; I pars, questions 80-81, article 7, “This is simply the relationship of

an object to its source (in causal terms, ultimately points back to

God): A ‘cause to effect’ or ‘Creator to created’”29.

5C. Claritas

According to John O’Brien, SJ, in The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas,

October 15, 2011, “Clarity or brilliance, comes from an ontological

28 Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, trans., Hugh Bredin, Harvard UniversityPress, 1988, 82

29 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 1260-1264, University of Notre Dame Press,1975, I pars, question 16, article 8; I pars, questions 80-81, article 7.

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splendour, in which the object is clear in itself. It shines forth

from the form of the object or person”30. It posits to its capacity

to radiate not only in the corporeal sense, but also in the

spiritual sense. O’Brien, SJ further states that “Thomas would say

that clarity is not of emanation of being– a Platonic idea – but of

participation of form in being”31. The criterion of claritas also has some

relations to the medieval notions concerning light. Michael Spicher

in Medieval Theories of Aesthetics, n.d., says “For example, in terms of natural

light, there is a sense in which the paintings in a gallery lose

some of their beauty when the lights are turned off because they

are no longer being perceived” 32. Light is an important catalyst,

for it gives due radiance to the object. But another catalyst that

should be taken into consideration is the object’s color. Just as

light would be the benefactor, color would be the receptacle.

Gilson (2000) further suggests that “Radiance belongs to

being considered precisely as beautiful: it is, in being, that 30 John O’Brien SJ, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, Fellowship of Catholic Scholars (October 15, 2011), 7

31 Ibid., 7

32 Now in its original denotation of illumination.

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which catches the eye, or the ear, or the mind, and makes us want

to perceive it again” 33. In this regard, we also refer to

brilliance with the object’s power of sustainability.

Sustainability can further be understood when we talk about music.

Music, as we all know it, is not a visual art. It is aural,

complex, and more than that, since purely instrumental music lacks

any obvious semantic content34 we cannot deny its ability to linger

in our memory. We take, for instance, the 9th Symphony of Beethoven.

Other than the entrance of the choir, there is no doubt that

radiance is evident in that melody.

Main melodic theme from Beethoven’s 9th Symphony (Fourth Movement). Retrieved

11.5.2014 from

http://88.198.78.90/lily/good_res/110508666313.4052565659175.preview.png/.

Whenever we hear of the phrase “Ode to Joy”, we associate it

with Beethoven’s 9th Symphony, as well as associate it with the

melody. In retrospect, when we hear this iconic melody, we

33 Etienne Gilson, The Arts of the Beautiful, Dalkey Archive Press, 2000, 35.

34 Semantic content is a strong factor in determining any piece of work’s sustainability.

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immediately associate it with Beethoven’s 9th. The fact that this

melodic motif has the capacity to sustain in our minds, we prove

that the piece itself possesses radiant quality. Now that the three

requirements have been explained, I close with a quote from John

O’Brien, SJ in The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, October 15, 2011:

Integrity and proportion are criteria of ontological perfection, and pertain to the

work’s essence and existence, not to the aesthetic, while claritas is the capacity of a form to signify itself as something with integrity and proportion – but only by means of a subject’s perception of it. Thus will Thomas say that beauty in itself is “a state of equilibrium between a perfect object andthe intellect”; beauty is therefore both objective and subjective.

6. Judgment of Beauty: Universality and Subjectivism

In Kant’s view, universality and necessity are the two

indications of a claim that has an a priori character. In his Critique

of Pure Reason 1781, he says:

Experience teaches us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise. First, then, if a proposition is thought along withits necessity, it is an a priori judgment; if it is, moreover, also not derived from any proposition except one that in turn is valid as a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely a priori. Second: Experience never gives its judgments true or strict but only assumed and comparative universality (through induction), so properly it must be said: as far as we have yetperceived, there is no exception to this or that rule. Thus ifa judg- ment is thought in strict universality, i.e., in such

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a way that no exception at all is allowed to be possible, thenit is not derived from experience, but is rather valid absolutely a priori35.

And Immanuel Kant launches his discussion of the matter in The Critique of Judgment, 1790, at least as emphatically:

The judgment of taste is therefore not a judgment of cognition, and is consequently not logical but aesthetical, bywhich we understand that whose determining ground can be no other than subjective. Every reference of representations, even thatof sensations, may be objective (and then it signifies the real [element] of an empirical representation), save only the reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain, by which nothing in the object is signified, but through which there isa feeling in the subject as it is affected by the representation36.

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