A study of how the European Citizens’ Initiative was created and how it is related to democracy

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Abstract

The project takes its point of departure in the European Citizens’ Initiative, which will be

implemented on April 1st 2012. We seek to assess who were the most important actors involved in

creating the European Citizens Initiative, and how is the European Citizens Initiative related to the

democratic deficit in the European Union.

The EU is know for suffering from a democratic deficit, hence the ECI can in theory be seen as a

great tool to overcome some of this deficit. The project tries to assess if the ECI was initiated top-

down by the European Commission and if it can be seen as a way to reduce the democratic deficit

in any way. To best assess this we have conducted qualitative interviews with people, who on some

level have a connection to the ECI. Through these interviews and various documents, we have

realised that the European Commission, contrary to our belief, did not take part in the creation of

the ECI. The ECI was instead created by NGOs such as Democracy International, who were

striving for more direct democracy and participatory democracy in the EU. The Commission was

only peripherally a part of the ECI, by in the end having a say on what was put into the Lisbon

Treaty.

We furthermore discuss, who can benefit from the ECI. According to our interviewees it will be

difficult to be an organiser of an ECI without the help and network of either MEPs or big NGOs.

However even though it might be MEPs and NGOs who will be able to use the ECI, the citizens can

still benefit from it. In some way NGOs represent the citizens and NGO participation is also helping

in increasing democracy. Furthermore the ECIs might help increase deliberation and a general

interest in the EU, since the ordinary citizens will feel more included and as if they get a voice.

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Content

1. Problem area ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 5

1.1. Problem statement ____________________________________________________________________________________ 6

1.2. Research questions ___________________________________________________________________________________ 6

2. Methodology ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 7

2.1. Methodological considerations _____________________________________________________________________ 7

2.2. Methodological approach ____________________________________________________________________________ 7 2.2.1. Case study ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 8 2.2.2. Presentation of the ECI ________________________________________________________________________________________ 8 2.2.3. Setting the scene of the ECI _________________________________________________________________________________ 11

2.3. Choice of theory _____________________________________________________________________________________ 12

2.4. Choice of empirical data ____________________________________________________________________________ 13 2.4.1. Document analysis __________________________________________________________________________________________ 13 2.4.2. Qualitative interviews _______________________________________________________________________________________ 13 2.4.3. Choice of interviewees ______________________________________________________________________________________ 15

2.5. Analysis of data ______________________________________________________________________________________ 16

2.6. Discussion ____________________________________________________________________________________________ 16

2.7. Philosophy of social science _______________________________________________________________________ 17

2.8. Limitations ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 17

2.9. Project outline _______________________________________________________________________________________ 18

3. Theory __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 19

3.1. Democratic deficit in the EU _______________________________________________________________________ 19

3.2. Participatory democracy ___________________________________________________________________________ 22 3.2.1. NGO-‐participation and the democracy _____________________________________________________________________ 23

3.3. Defining network governance _____________________________________________________________________ 24 3.3.1. Network as a way of governing _____________________________________________________________________________ 25 3.3.2. Pure and managed networks _______________________________________________________________________________ 26 3.3.3. Metagovernance _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 26

3.4. Democracy and governance networks ___________________________________________________________ 27

4. Analysis ________________________________________________________________________________________________ 31

4.1. The document analysis _____________________________________________________________________________ 31

4.2. Mapping the actors __________________________________________________________________________________ 31

4.3. The role of the actors _______________________________________________________________________________ 33 4.3.1. The role of the non-‐governmental organizations _________________________________________________________ 34 4.3.2. The role of MEPs _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 35 4.3.3. The role of the Commission _________________________________________________________________________________ 37

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4.3.4. The role of the Member States ______________________________________________________________________________ 38

4.4. Part conclusion ______________________________________________________________________________________ 39

5. Discussion _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 40

5.1. Prejudice 1: The ECI is an initiative created top-‐down from the Commission to gain more democratic legitimacy ___________________________________________________________________________________ 40

5.2. Prejudice 2: The European citizens will not be able to create an ECI group because of the complexity of the regulations __________________________________________________________________________ 42

5.3. Prejudice 3: The ECI will not have any significant effects on the democratic deficit _____ 46

6. Conclusion _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 53

7. Perspectives ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 54

8. Bibliography __________________________________________________________________________________________ 56

Appendix 1:CB – Interview with Carsten Berg _____________________________________________________ 60

Appendix 2:BK – Interview with Bruno Kaufmann _______________________________________________ 69

Appendix 3:JPB – Interview with Jens-‐Peter Bonde _______________________________________________ 74

Appendix 4:LLG – Interview with Laust Leth Gregersen _________________________________________ 77

Appendix 5:AL – Written interview with Alain Lamassoure ____________________________________ 84

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1. Problem area

On April 1st 2012 the European Citizens Initiative (ECI) will be introduced in the European Union

(EU); an initiative encouraging the citizens of the EU to participate in the democratic process by

directly suggesting new EU legislation to the European Commission. According to a press release

from the Commission:

”It [ECI] is a major step forward in the democratic life of the Union. It's a concrete example of

bringing Europe closer to its citizens. And it will foster a cross border debate about what we are

doing in Brussels and thus contribute, we hope, to the development of a real European public

space" (Website 1).

The EU is notorious for suffering from a democratic deficit and one purpose of the ECI is to reduce

this deficit. But the ECI is only the latest attempt from the EU to accommodate the democratic

deficit. In recent years different initiatives have been taken to include the European citizens and

also make the EU more familiar and less alienated to its population.

“The era in which relatively insulated elites bargained grand treaties in the shadow of an

uninterested and generally approving public has come to an end” (Hooghe 2007:5).

Hence, the EU has over many years opened up to more democracy in decision-making processes by

giving more power to the European Parliament. The European citizens are thereby gaining a

stronger voice in the EU.

However, it still seems like there is a long way from the high reaching political ambitions in

Brussels to the everyday problems of the European citizen.

To solve this problem the Commission has introduced the notion of participatory democracy

(Kohler-Koch 2007). By advocating for more citizens participation the Commission strives at

achieving more democratic legitimacy and hence reducing the democratic deficit in the EU. Thus, it

is reasonable to assume that the idea of the ECI was initiated by the Commission as well. If this is

indeed the case the ECI was created for the sake of the Commission rather than the European

citizens.

This project aims at investigating to what extent the idea of the ECI was initiated top-down by the

Commission or bottom-up by actors with a genuine ambition of improving the democratic

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possibilities of the European citizens. Additionally the project intends to investigate how the ECI is

related to the democratic deficit in the EU and what democratic potential the ECI has.

This brings us to our problem statement.

1.1. Problem statement

1.2. Research questions

• How will the ECI work?

• Why was the ECI created?

• Who were behind the creation of the ECI?

• What was their interest?

• Who will benefit from the ECI?

• Will the Commission get more democratic legitimacy through the ECI?

• Will the ECI have a real political effect on the democratic deficit?

• Is there a democratic problem in the EU?

Who were the most important actors involved in creating the European Citizens Initiative, and

how is the European Citizens Initiative related to the democratic deficit in the European Union?

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2. Methodology

2.1. Methodological considerations

The following section will describe the considerations we have had when choosing our approach to

study the ECI and answer our problem statement.

The purpose of this project is to investigate who were the main actors in the network creating the

ECI and how the ECI is related to the democratic deficit within the EU. To best examine this we

have chosen a qualitative methodological approach, where we will conduct expert interviews. Since

the ECI has not yet been implemented it is not possible to study an already existing ECI proposal.

Thus the interviews will provide us with an understanding of how the ECI will work, who were the

initiators and how the ECI relates to the democratic deficit in the EU. Of course we have considered

other methodological approaches, for instance a comparative analysis. However, had we chosen a

comparative approach and investigated an organisation or a country with direct democracy and

analysed the ECI opposite to this, we would have had troubles since it is difficult to compare the

EU to an organisation or a country; the EU is simply too unique.

2.2. Methodological approach

The following section will describe our overall research design of the project in relation to

answering the problem statement and research questions.

Due to the fact the ECI has not yet been implemented we cannot analyse how the ECI is actually

working. Instead we have conducted expert interviews to analyse the role of the ECI. The first

interviewees have been chosen through a document analysis and after that we have identified other

interviewees using the ‘snowballing’-method: Asking our interviewees, whom they consider as

important people to interview in relation to who were part of the network working for the ECI. We

have deemed literature in relation to the background of the ECI, the democratic deficit of the EU,

participatory democracy, democratic network governance and democratic theories in relation to

network governance relevant to this project. However, the literature of the ECI is very scarce and

therefore the qualitative interviews are of high importance in this project.

We have certain pre-understandings as to how the ECI might work and relate to the democratic

deficit; hence we feel that it is important to clarify our initial point of departure. When first hearing

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about the ECI we were mostly positive for the possibilities the initiative might bring. However,

when discussing the opportunities of the ECI few doubts appeared. Based on our initial

considerations and problem statement we have recognised three prejudices:

P1: The ECI is an initiative created top-down from the Commission to gain more democratic

legitimacy.

P2: The European citizens will not be able to create an ECI group because of the complexity of the

regulations.

P3: The ECI will not have any significant effects on the democratic deficit.

2.2.1. Case study To best go around our problem formulation, we have chosen the approach of a case study. Doing a

detailed analysis of a single case, the ECI, is making us elucidate the unique features of this case.

Doing this case study we are not trying to make general statements. Instead of making

generalizations, we try to make an examination of the ECI as a case and see how the ECI is related

to the democratic deficit in the EU. We are neither trying to either create or test theory, which is

often seen with case studies (Bryman 2008:57). Instead this case study of the ECI is descriptive or

atheoritical:

“Atheoretical case studies are the traditional single-country or single-case analyses. They are

entirely descriptive and move in a theoretical vacuum: they are neither guided by established or

hypothesized generalizations nor motivated by a desire to formulate general hypotheses.” (Lijphart

1971:691).

2.2.2. Presentation of the ECI In the following a brief outline of the formalities of the ECI will be presented. This is a fundamental

premise to understand the further analysis and discussion of the ECI and its influence on the

democratic deficit in the EU.

The ECI was introduced in the Lisbon Treaty as a new form of public participation in EU policy

shaping and will become effective from 1st of April 2012 (Website 2). The ECI will allow one

million citizens from at least one quarter of the EU Member States to invite the Commission to

bring forward proposals for legal acts in areas where the Commission has the power to do so. The

organisers of a citizens' initiative, a citizens' committee composed of at least seven EU citizens who

are resident in at least seven different Member States, will have one year to collect the necessary

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statements of support (Website 3). Once the signatures have been collected and verified by the

Member States, the citizens' initiative has to be submitted to the Commission. From that moment,

the Commission will have three months to examine the request made by the citizens. Meanwhile,

the organisers will be received at the Commission and they will also have the opportunity to present

their initiative at a public hearing organised at the European Parliament. The Commission will then

set out in a public document its conclusions on the initiative and the action, if any, it intends to take

and will explain its reasoning (Website 4). The process of creating an ECI is gone through in Figure

1 (Website 5) on the following page.

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Figure 1: The process of creating an ECI

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2.2.3. Setting the scene of the ECI Prior to the ECI the Commission had acknowledged and taken several steps towards a more

legitimate democracy in the EU. We will briefly present some of the main steps leading up to the

ECI as it is today.

Amsterdam Treaty

Already back in the 1990s were several initiatives like that of the ECI proposed and considered in

different European networks. At a meeting in 1995, several representatives from Member States and

these networks translated an initiative into a first proposal. At the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations in

1996 Austria and Italy proposed a citizens’ initiative right, however it was not accepted in the final

Treaty text (Appendix 1:CB & Appendix 2:BK).

White Paper on European Governance by the European Commission, July 2001

Long before the agreement to implement the ECI the EU was known to suffer from a legitimacy

problem in relation to its institutions and the way of acting. This was something the whole structure

of the EU wanted to change. In the White Paper, the Commission acknowledges there “needs to be

a stronger interaction with regional and local governments and civil society” (White Paper, July

2001:4).

In the White Paper the Commission tried to deal with this issue:

“A better use of powers should connect the EU more closely to its citizens and lead to more

effective policies” (White Paper, July 2001:8).

The Commission notes that reforming governance addresses the question of how the EU uses the

powers given by its citizens and that the goal is to open up its policy-making to make it more

inclusive and accountable and thereby connect the EU more closely to its citizens, which hopefully

will lead to more effective policies.

The European Constitution, 2004 (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe)

The European Constitution, the Constitution, was meant to take over the Nice Treaty after the

enlargement to 25 Member States. It was created at the European Convention with former French

President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing as the leader of the Convention (Website 6). The Constitution

was signed by the Member States, but when put to vote France and Holland rejected the document

and it was never ratified. The European Constitution however presented the idea of a popular

mandate, where the Commission was to consider any proposal “on matters where citizens consider

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that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Constitution” (Website

6), when it was supported by one million citizens.

The Lisbon Treaty

On the 1st of December 2009 the Lisbon Treaty became effective and the ECI was a reality. The

Lisbon Treaty had three main goals: to make the EU more open and democratic; to make it easier to

make decisions in an EU with a lot of countries; and to enhance the EU’s capabilities to tackle

global challenges.

The first goal of the Treaty is what the ECI is part of; to make the EU more open and democratic to

its citizens, to strengthen the role of the parliament, the national parliaments and the role of the

citizens by giving them a say in European politics through the ECI. The Lisbon Treaty defines the

ECI in article 11 as the following:

“Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may

take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any

appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required

for the purpose of implementing the Treaties” (Treaty on European Union, Article 11(4)).

2.3. Choice of theory

To best answer our research questions we have chosen to focus on: a) theories on the democratic

deficit within the EU; b) theories on participatory democracy; c) democratic network governance

theories to analyse the network behind the ECI; and d) democratic theories, which can be linked to

democracy in the EU.

The democratic deficit theories are arguing for and against a democratic deficit in the EU, which is

used to create a nuanced picture of the alleged democratic deficit. We have further supplemented

with statistics from Eurobarometer, focusing among other things on the trust in the EU institutions

and a feeling of being heard in the EU. The theories on participatory democracy give an

understanding on the theoretical potential of the ECI, which is based on the idea of participatory

democracy. In addition theory on NGO participation will be presented since we have a prejudice

that the ECI will foster NGO participation more than ‘real’ citizen participation. The democratic

network governance theories provide us with the means to analyse who were the actors in the

network creating the ECI. Additionally these theories give an understanding of the network

governance system, which is central in the EU. The democratic theories related to network

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governance are used to understand what mechanisms lay behind the democratic deficit in the EU

since we see the EU as governed by networks. This will further enable us to discuss how the ECI is

related to the democratic deficit.

2.4. Choice of empirical data

This chapter will present our empirical approach. We first did a light document analysis followed

by qualitative interviews, which is our main empirical approach.

2.4.1. Document analysis Our initial approach to mapping the network was a document analysis. The document analysis is

well suited for reproducing social practices and events (Esmark & Triantafillou 2007:101).

However, in terms of direct actor reference document analysis can only provide an initial mapping

of networks, which should be cross-checked and elaborated with interviews (Esmark &

Triantafillou 2007:123). Thus, we used the document analysis to locate possible actors in the ECI

network. Following this, we assessed who were the main actors in the process of creating the ECI,

but it was impossible to determine the role of all the actors and whether we missed some important

actors in the initial document analysis. Thus, we needed to conduct qualitative interviews in order to

complete our map, placing the actors in the map in relation to their importance in the process of

creating the ECI.

According to our document analysis, Carsten Berg from Democracy International was one of the

main actors, hence we interviewed him first. Based on that interview we decided on who else were

interesting to interview and a picture of the map began to evolve.

2.4.2. Qualitative interviews We have chosen to use qualitative interviews as our main empirical approach. In relation to

studying networks qualitative interviews have two main strengths. Firstly, qualitative interviews

give an insight into the interviewees’ individual experience. This can shed light on aspects of policy

interactions that often remain informal and therefore inaccessible through other methods. Secondly,

qualitative interviews reveal the interviewees’ perception of the network and the interactions within

the network. Hence, qualitative interviews are a means of obtaining the perspectives of those

working inside a given policy process (Zølner et al. 2007:125); in this case the qualitative

interviews will give an insight of the network processes leading up to the creation of the ECI. Thus,

qualitative interviews have been chosen as our main empirical approach, since they will provide us

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with understandings of the network behind the ECI and how the ECI is related to the democratic

deficit in the EU.

The qualitative interviews we have conducted have been with ‘experts’. By expert we understand a

person who by profession and/or expertise has knowledge or insight on a specific issue (Kristensen

2007:282).

The objective of the interviews is to gain an understanding and knowledge about the ECI. Thus the

best interview type is semi-structured interviews, in which the themes are predetermined, but

flexible, leaving space to involve and explore new aspects and themes (Kristensen, 2007:282). We

choose to build the interviews around mainly two themes: who were behind the idea of the ECI and

how can the ECI be related to the democratic deficit in the EU.

To support the skeletal structure of the themes, we proposed a number of additional questions. The

interview guide used looks this way:

• How was the process of creating the ECI?

o Who had the initial idea of the ECI?

o Why was the ECI created?

• Who were involved in the creation of the ECI?

o Who do you deem the most important supporters and opponents to the ECI?

o What was the role of the Commission when creating the ECI?

• Who benefits from the ECI?

o Who will be able to make an ECI? Citizens, MEPs, NGOs?

o Will the Commission get more democratic legitimacy through the ECI?

• Will the ECI be able to reduce the democratic deficit in the EU?

o Do you think the ECI will increase the citizen participation in the EU?

o Will the ECI be able to create a feeling amongst the citizens of more democracy?

However, the interviews had different focal points because they were semi-structured. Hence, not

all questions were answered in every interview. We took into account the possibility that interviews

might develop in various directions and created ad hoc questions during the interviews to

accommodate such developments.

We ended up interviewing experts, who all have a good knowledge of the process or/and the

potential of the ECI.

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2.4.3. Choice of interviewees Carsten Berg was the first interviewee we located through the document analysis. Jens-Peter Bonde

and Laust Leth Gregersen were too chosen from analysing documents, but the rest of our

interviewees have been chosen through the snowballing effect; having them “nominated” from the

already existing interviewees.

The interviewees

Carsten Berg - ECI Campaign Director at Democracy International (One of the NGOs who initiated

the ECI)

Bruno Kaufmann - President, Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe (One of the NGOs who

initiated the ECI)

Alain Lamassoure - European People's Party, France (Rapporteur on the ECI from AFCO)

Zita Gurmai - Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, Hungary (Rapporteur from AFCO)

Jens-Peter Bonde – Previous MEP for Junibevægelsen (Took part in informal working group at the

European Convention)

Laust Leth Gregersen – Policy officer at Concord Denmark (The only interviewee who has not

worked with the ECI. However, Concord has shown an interest in the ECI and Gregersen gives an

insight in how the ECI is seen from an NGO perspective)

Alain Lamassoure and Zita Gurmai are both appointed rapporteurs of the ECI, meaning their tasks

are to draft legislation and come to agreement with the involved parties, for example the

stakeholders, the political group, the Commission and the Council. They are rapporteurs from the

Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO).

The interviews with Alain Lamassoure and Zita Gurmai were both done in writings due to their

busy schedule. We know that this pose a problem for our method, however we concluded that even

in writing they would be beneficial to the project, and thus we agreed to do the interviews in writing

rather than not getting their point of view at all. Alain Lamassoure took his time providing us with

sufficient answers; hence his interview is to be found in the appendix’ alongside with the

transcriptions of the ‘real’ interviews. The answers from Zita Gurmai were on the other hand very

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insufficient, thus we have decided not to include her in the project as anything more than

background information.

We tried to get an interview with Diana Wallis, the third rapporteur of the ECI, however we never

got a reply – despite several attempts to get in contact.

We also tried to get an interview with Jens Nymand Christensen, the Director at the General

Secretary for Better Regulations and Institutional Issues. Since he did not have time before January

5th 2012, we passed.

Lastly we had scheduled a Skype interview with Marco Contiero from Greenpeace, he however

never appeared for the interview and we never heard from him again.

The interviews were recorded and the parts, which we considered interesting for our further analysis

and comprehension of the ECI, were transcribed. The transcriptions can be found in Appendix 1-5.

The interviews conducted in Danish are also transcribed in Danish, however we have translated the

parts used in the project into English to enhance the understanding, when reading.

Based on the qualitative expert interviews we can interpret the social reality of the interviewees

(Bryman 2008:435). This means that we need to have a critical stance, since our interviewees will

be influenced by their preunderstandings. We acknowledge the experts possess great knowledge

within the research field, but we are still aware that we have to be critical of our findings.

2.5. Analysis of data

We do not present our empirical findings in an individual chapter, but instead we do a map and an

analysis on the role of the central actors. Transcribed interviews can be analysed in various ways

(Zølner et al. 2007:143). We have chosen to use a simple method of presenting the role of the

different actors by laying out how the interviewees has explained their own and other actors’ role in

the creation of the ECI.

2.6. Discussion

In order to answer our problem statement we conduct a discussion of our prejudices. Thus, the three

prejudices form a frame of the discussion, which in accordance is divided into three parts. In the

discussion we present our reflections on how the ECI was created; who will be able to make an

ECI; and how the ECI is related to the democratic deficit. This is done by mixing theoretic point of

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views with the different views of the interviewees, and on top of that we will reflect on the various

issues in question.

2.7. Philosophy of social science

Qualitative interviews seek inspiration in phenomenology and the philosophic hermeneutic, hence

so do we. The methodology of phenomenology is closely based on empirical data, and the aim is to

understand, describe and interpret people’s actions and statements. In the philosophic hermeneutic

there is a dialectic association between pre-understanding and understanding, thus it is important to

recognise that our pre-understandings should be brought into play and revised in order to reach new

understandings. Concrete for this project, it has for instance meant that our pre-understandings of

the network creating the ECI have been revised through some of the interviews with experts. The

hermeneutic circle has also been a useful apparatus in our comprehension of the subject; meaning is

understood in proportion to the whole, it is part of, and hence the individual parts are understood in

reference to the whole and vice versa. Accordingly, each statement from the interviewees has been

referenced to the holistic understanding of the subject, which consequently has been revised

(Kristensen 2007:280).

2.8. Limitations

The most extensive limitations we are facing in this project are time and resources. The creation of

the ECI is a long process with many different actors participating on many different levels, thus

doing a very thorough mapping locating each actor on each level would need much more time than

the four months we have had. We would also have liked to do a policy analysis from this network to

go more in depth with the power structures within the network. This would have demanded a more

thorough analysis of the network to see how each actor is related. Doing this we would have needed

access to reports from meetings, which we do not have. We as students do not have the same access

to the network as those who are professional network researchers. Having more access and more

time, we would of course have liked to go more in depth with documents, also those who are not as

directly related to the ECI as those we have analysed. Doing this would maybe enable us to find

other actors, who are not mentioned in the most official documents and by our interviewees. We do

however feel that our mapping of the actors does give a good overview on the actors, who took part

in the process of creating the ECI.

Another limitation is that we are doing this project before the implementation on April 1st 2012.

Doing the project after would have enabled us to look at concrete facts and changes, for instance

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looking at how many ECI proposals were handed to the Commission, how many proposals were

approved, how many became a success and how much the media was covering the proposals. Also

using Eurobarometer for instance to consider whether or not the citizens feel more included in the

EU and if they feel as if they have a voice would be ideal after the implementation of the ECI.

2.9. Project outline

In order to give an overview of the project the following figure shows the overall project structure:

Figure 2: Project structure

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3. Theory

The following chapter will present the theoretical foundation of the project. It consists of four parts:

Firstly, a theoretical discussion of the democratic deficit in the EU will be presented. This serves

the purpose of sketching out different views on the democratic deficit and if there is a deficit at all.

We have supplemented this with statistics form Eurobarometer. Secondly, different views on

participatory democracy will be gone through. This will give a theoretical understanding of the ECI,

due to the fact that the ECI builds on ideas of participatory democracy. Thirdly, network

governance will be defined. This serves two purposes; it gives a theoretical understanding of the

network behind the creation of the ECI, which is important in order to map the network;

furthermore it provides an understanding of how the ECI will fit in the current EU network

governance system. Fourthly, different theories on how democracy and network governance is

related will be presented. This will later form the basis on a discussion of how the ECI is related to

the democratic deficit in the EU.

3.1. Democratic deficit in the EU

The democratic deficit of the EU is widely debated. Political scientists are disagreeing whether or

not there exists such a democratic deficit in the EU. Either way at every stage of the European

integration process, the question of democratic legitimacy has become increasingly sensitive. The

Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties have triggered the inclusion of the principle of

democratic legitimacy within the institutional system by reinforcing the powers of Parliament with

regard to the appointment and control of the Commission and successively extending the scope of

the co -decision procedure (Website 7).

On the official website of the EU the democratic deficit is defined as follows:

“The democratic deficit is a concept invoked principally in the argument that the European Union

and its various bodies suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to the ordinary citizen

because their method of operating is so complex. The view is that the Community institutional set-

up is dominated by an institution combining legislative and government powers (the Council of the

European Union) and an institution that lacks democratic legitimacy (the European Commission)”

(Website 7).

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There are several arguments for the existence of a democratic deficit in the EU: Firstly, the

European integration has meant an increase in executive power and a decrease in national

parliamentary control. The design of the EU means that executive actors (Council and Commission)

dominate policy-making at the EU level. The problem is that the actions of these executive agents at

the EU level are beyond the control of the national parliaments (Follesdal & Hix 2006:534).

Secondly the citizens cannot hold the Commission accountable for their actions:

“The basic condition of representative democracy is, indeed, that at election time the citizens ‘can

throw the scoundrels out’ – that is, replace the government. This basic feature of representative

democracy does not exist in the Community and Union. The form of European governance is – and

will remain for a considerable time – such that there is no ‘governments’ to throw out (…). There is

no civic act of the European citizen where he or she can influence directly the outcome of any

policy choice facing the Community or Union” (Karr 2006:101).

Thirdly, the European Parliament is too weak. Despite reforms of the EU treaties increasing the

power of the Parliament, many democratic deficit scholars still argue that the Parliament is weak

compared to the governments in the Council. Fourthly, there are no ‘European’ elections. The

citizens elect their European politicians through national elections, and the focus is therefore on the

domestic issues rather than on European ones. Fifthly, the EU is ‘too distant’ from its voters.

Psychologically, the EU is too different from the domestic democratic institutions that citizens are

used to. Hence the citizens cannot understand the EU. Lastly, European integration produces

‘policy drift’ from voters’ ideal policy preferences. The EU adopts policies that are not supported

by a majority of citizens in many or even most Member States (Follesdal & Hix 2006:534).

However, some political scientists do not support the notion that the EU is suffering from a

legitimacy crisis.

“When judged by the practices of existing nation-states and in the context of a multi-level system,

there is little evidence that the EU suffers from a fundamental democratic deficit” (Moravcsik 2002:

621).

Arguably political scientists, who are concerned about the democratic deficit of the EU, are

comparing the EU to an “ideal plebiscitary or parliamentary democracy, standing alone, rather

than to the actual functioning of national democracies adjusted for its multi-level context”

(Moravcsik 2002:621).

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Instead EU decision-making procedures can be seen in line with the general practice of most

modern democracies. The EU, as a problem frame, simply does not directly generalize to the

developed democracies, as the EU is not a ‘state’ but rather a federation that emerged as an

incremental consequence of market integration under the direction of the European Commission

(Warren 2009:2). On the other hand:

“The claim that the EU is in ‘democratic deficit’ reflected not a democratic past that was eroding,

but rather the growing democratic expectations that came with political integration, combined with

institutions—the European Parliament in particular—that can and should be measured according

to democratic norms. Measured in these terms, the EU was (and is) found wanting, with

expectations evolving more quickly than the institutions” (Warren 2009:2).

To better understand the existence of a democratic deficit one needs to also look at how the EU and

its institutions are perceived by the European citizens.

According to Eurobarometer trust in the EU has fallen since 2009 along with the feeling of

benefiting from being a member state. 49 percent of the European citizens see membership as a

‘good thing’ and 18 percent as a ‘bad thing’. Trust in the EU has fallen from 48 percent in 2009 to

42 percent in 2010 while the feeling of not trusting the EU has risen from 40 percent to 47 percent

(Website 8). This drop might be due to the economic crises and uncertainty in Europe at the

moment. However, less than half of the European citizens trust the EU. Another Eurobarometer

shows us that 48 percent of the European citizens trust the Parliament and 38 percent do not trust

the Parliament. At the same time do 44 percent of the citizens trust the Commission and 34 percent

do not trust the Commission. So less than half of the European population have trust in the EU and

its institutions. This might relate to whether or not the citizens feel as if they have a say in the EU.

In general the European citizens do not feel that their voice is heard. Only 38 percent feel as if their

voice counts in the EU – so just about one third of the citizens of the European citizens actually

believe they have a say. However 61 percent believes that their country’s voice is heard. Still, at the

same time do close to two-thirds (63 percent) of EU citizens polled believe that the regional or local

public authorities are not sufficiently taken into account when deciding policies in the European

Union (Website 9).

Another important poll is that of whether the citizens relate democracy to the EU. Only 22 percent

say ‘democracy’ when answering what the EU means to them.

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Not being heard, a rather low trust in the most democratic institution in the EU, the Parliament, and

only 22 percent answering democracy when it comes to what the EU means to them implies that the

democratic trust in the EU is rather low. However an absolute majority of respondents believe that

more decisions in a number of areas should be taken at the European level. And support for taking

more decisions at the European level has risen over the years. This support is greatest in the case of

the fight against terrorism and the promotion of democracy and peace in the world (81 percent).

Though the percentage of respondents who think that more decision making at the European level

regarding unemployment was relatively low (60 percent), this nevertheless still represents a

substantial majority. Even among citizens who tend not to trust the EU, a majority would prefer to

see more decisions taken at the EU level in all the areas covered by the Eurobarometer survey.

Whether or not the EU is suffering from a democratic deficit is not so straightforward. As the

scientists and the statistics presented above shows, there are some issues with how the citizens

perceive democracy in the EU.

3.2. Participatory democracy

The ECI builds on ideas of participatory democracy, thus theory on participatory democracy is

presented.

Participatory democracy is based on the direct, unmediated and continuous participation of citizens

in the tasks of government. Thus, in its optimal form:

“participatory democracy obliterates the distinction between government and the governed and

between the state and civil society” (Heywood 2002:70).

Participation is traditionally seen as a means to legitimize the decision-making procedures of the

state. In addition, according to some traditions in democratic theory it is assumed that participation

produces better results. This is argued on several grounds. First of all, one basic normative

assumption of democratic theory, starting from the idea of the natural rights of individuals, is that

those who are affected by a decision shall be given a right to participate in the process leading to the

outcome of that particular decision. Thus, even if the final decision is not based on their ideas, they

have had the opportunity to make their argument heard. Secondly, participation by individuals with

a broad range of interests, if undertaken in an open and free way, allows all participants to offer

reasons for their position, which aids in the elimination of egoistic and illogical positions (Heinelt

2007:220).

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In the case of the ECI participation is reached by initiatives. Through initiatives the electorate can

express a view on particular issues of public policy or raise legislative proposals. This form of

participatory democracy enables the citizens to check the power of elected governments, ensuring

that they stay in line with the public opinion; promote political participation, thus helping to create a

more educated and better informed electorate; and strengthen legitimacy in the sense that people are

more likely to accept decisions that they have made themselves. On the other hand, some of the

decision making is left to those who have less education and experience, and are most susceptible to

media and other influence; politicians may use initiatives as excuses to absolve themselves of

responsibility for making difficult decisions; initiatives may not give the true picture of the public

opinion; and political issues tend to be distorted and simplified, hence reducing them to questions

that can be answered with yes and no (Heywood 2002:226).

3.2.1. NGO-‐participation and the democracy The cooperation with interest groups is by some seen as an important ingredient in reducing the

democratic deficit in the EU. In this perspective the notion of participatory democracy in the EU

aims at giving greater consideration to representatives of general interests, i.e. NGOs (Kohler-Koch

2007:258). But what correlation is there between NGO-participation and the democracy in the EU?

NGOs have a central role in the EU system, and NGO-participation does have several democratic

values. Thus, NGOs may offer an effective representation, i.e. NGOs can secure overall public

policy that fits citizens’ preferences (Jordan & Maloney 2007:2); NGOs provide the EU institutions

and politicians with information about the many and diverse aspects of European societies; they

function as powerful agenda-setters (Richardson 2007:276); and provide a counter-balance to state

and economic actors (Kohler-Koch 2007:265). Furthermore, it can be argued that NGOs are

essential in order to facilitate participation:

“...direct democracy falls down in the face of increasing numbers. The individual plain man,

swallowed up in the sea of highly differentiated human beings, finds it necessary to organize with

others of a like mind so that by concerted action they may bend the state to their will” (Jordan &

Maloney 2007:1).

Despite the immediate advantages related to NGO-participation there are some significant

downsides to the concept. Firstly, a considerable number of organisations are not enthusiastic about

rendering their own political activities more transparent. Many associations rather aim at improving

general support from a large constituency because it promises to yield greater political weight and

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higher revenues. Secondly, within several organisations there is a lack of incentives, scarce

resources and deficient grass-root response. The agenda is set by activists of the association and

systematic mechanisms for exchange with supporters are almost non-existent. Hence,

“even organisations that are committed to represent general interests do neither contribute to the

development of a trans-national civil society nor do they act as socialising entities or ensure the

participation of its supporters in any other significant way” (Kohler-Koch 2007:264).

Thirdly, the criteria for participation in EU programs discriminate against grass-root organisations.

Such groups are usually not able to fulfil the requirement. And fourthly, citizens who want to

promote general interests such as the protection of the environment or consumer rights look for

someone to represent them rather than becoming personally engaged. They do not opt for

converting into an activist and equally do not feel obliged to participate directly in decision-making

and agenda setting (Kohler-Koch 2007:264). Thus,

“NGO supporters do not wish to use these organisations as a means of active citizenship. Instead,

supporters wish to delegate responsibility to organisations whose broad aim they support even if

they are ignorant of and might conceivable oppose, these organisations’ policy stances on a range

of issues” (Warleigh 2003:30).

In addition it is important to stress that NGOs are very different. On one end at the scale there is

NGOs, which are organized bottom-up, and where there is policy-making initiative at the local level

and meaningful accountability of leaders to members. Opposite there is the ‘Not-In-My-Back-Yard’

participation. This type of NGO is driven by self-interests and the involvement is ‘thin’ – simply

monetary, i.e. chequebook participation, which is poorly regarded compared with ‘real’

participation. Studies have shown that chequebook participation is the most popular form of

political involvement; money is a more common contribution than time (Jordan & Maloney

2007:171).

3.3. Defining network governance

The ECI was created through networks and when ECI groups are formed they will be part of the

governance network system in the EU, thus it is important to define and understand the term. One

can define network governance in many ways and the many understandings can be quite confusing

(Börzel & Panke 2007:154). We have chosen to use the following description of network

governance:

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“A relatively stable, horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors

who interact through negotiations that take place within a relatively institutionalized community

which is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies and contributes to the production of

public purpose” (Torfing 2007:5).

3.3.1. Network as a way of governing Today public policy and governance are not produced exclusively by central or local governments

and bureaucracies. The neo-liberal critique of state regulation as being inflexible, inefficient and too

costly has triggered an increasing use of market regulation through privatisations, quasi-markets,

contracting out, and commercialization of the remaining public sector. At the same time, the

communitarian critique of the detrimental effects of the systemic logics of state and market on the

social cohesion of local communities has stimulated a growing interest in the regulatory capacities

of civil society. There is no general agreement on which of the three institutional orders of state,

market and civil society that provides the best mechanism for the production and coordination of

public policy and governance, thus governance networks that tend to cut across state, market and

civil society has developed in great numbers. Hence, the development of an increasingly complex,

fragmented and multi-layered society reveals the limits of state, market and civil society and

highlights the advantages of governance networks based on crosscutting negotiations between a

plurality of relevant and affected actors. Within the EU are governance networks increasingly seen

as an effective and legitimate way of formulating and implementing public policy (Torfing 2007:1).

Through network governance governments can mobilize resources in situations where they are

widely dispersed among public and private actors at different levels of government, international,

national, regional and local. The private actors can offer the public actors information, expertise,

financial means or political support, which the public actors need to make and enforce collectively

binding norms and rules. In exchange the private actors receive substantive policy influence since

the public actors do not adopt and implement policies against the interest of the private actors

involved (Börzel and Panke 2007:158).

Governance networks can be seen as a happy medium when choosing between the state and the

market governance and the studying of the role, the function and the impact of different kinds of

governance networks.

So the public governance and policy making has changed. Smaller actors, such as private ones, but

also public and semi-public ones are now part of these governance networks. The state however is

still very central and is not missing or “hollowed out”. It does however no longer have the only say

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in the governing of the publics’ well being, like it used to. The power focused and centred state is

no longer as sovereign as it has been:

“The idea of the sovereign state governing society top-down through comprehensive planning,

programmed action and detailed regulations is losing its grip, and is being replaced by new ideas

about a pluricentric governance based on interdependence, negotiation, and trust” (Sørensen &

Torfing 2007a:3).

The government is no longer the one fully controlling the governing process as it used to. The

government is now more subject to negotiations between different actors, those public, semi-public

and also private:

“whose interactions give rise to a relatively stable pattern of policy making that constitutes a

specific form of regulation, or mode of coordination. It is this pluricentric mode of coordination

that in the literature is dubbed governance networks” (Sørensen & Torfing 2007a:4).

3.3.2. Pure and managed networks One of the objectives of the analysis is to establish to what extent the network behind the ECI was a

‘managed’ or a ‘pure’ network, i.e. if the idea of the ECI was created top-down or bottom-up. A

managed network is characterised by a top-down process where the network is centrally steered

with specific deliverables and targets defined by the centre rather than the individual partnerships.

Leadership is undertaken by formal agencies rather than by mobilised communities. The network

actors have some ability to shape their own local priorities, but within limits set by a central

authority (Lewis 2005:2). Pure networks on the other hand are bottom-up self-generated networks.

These networks are more self-organised and informal, in the sense that they have not been imposed

or encouraged through policy signals and governance arrangements, and no single organization has

power to force others to cooperate. It is important to stress that the distinction between managed

and pure networks is an artificial one between two polar extremes. Thus, all networks are

somewhere on a continuum from more to less structured (Lewis 2010:51).

3.3.3. Metagovernance The functioning of governance networks can be improved by careful and deliberate attempts to

regulate the self-regulating governance networks through processes of metagovernance. Politicians,

administrators and other powerful actors and networks might attempt to metagovern a particular

governance network by means of a combination of direct and indirect techniques. Metagovernance

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includes indirect attempts to influence the processes and outcomes of network governance through

network design, network framing and network management. Metagovernance can also take a more

direct form in terms of participation in the network-based processes of negotiation. This enables the

politicians and administrators to influence the political agenda, change the balance of forces, and

facilitate a mutual adjustment of the conception of the policy problem and the feasible solutions

(Torfing 2007:13).

3.4. Democracy and governance networks

When ECIs are created they will enter into the governance network system of the EU, thus it is

necessary to consider which democratic problems and potentials governance networks are facing in

order to assess how the ECI is related to the democratic deficit in the EU.

According to some theorists governance networks have a strong democratic potential. Thus,

governance networks can be seen as parts of the development of a new democracy as a mean of

linking different units of democratic governance in the global, polycentric political systems of our

time. Furthermore, governance networks represent an important functionally organised supplement

to the territorially organised institutions of representative democracy and can be seen as an

important means to increase democratic outcome legitimacy because governance networks increase

knowledge exchange and shared understanding between policy makers and stakeholders (Sørensen

& Torfing 2007b:233). Postliberal theorists are mainly positive towards networks because they

search for:

“new perceptions of democracy, and new institutions of democracy that do not take the existence of

a well-defined homogenous nation-state and a sharp demarcation between state and society as their

starting point. Postliberal theories of democracy share the ambition of developing such new

perceptions and institutions of democracy, but they do so from very different theoretical starting

points” (Sørensen & Torfing 2007b:236).

One postliberal point of view is that semi-public sub-elites, such as social movements and other

actors placed in the grey zone between the public and the private sphere, can enhance democracy.

Sub-elites are important in the democracy because they establish an intermediary level between the

people and the ruling elites that facilitates mobility between the people and the political elites. This

level gives citizens an opportunity to play an active role in policy processes without themselves

becoming political elites. Thus, governance networks can be seen as a contribution to strengthening

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democracy. Nevertheless, postliberal theorists still have doubts regarding governance networks,

such as the informal character of many governance networks, which is likely to result in a low level

of accountability and publicity in the decision-making process and that there is the risk that

governance networks might encroach on tasks that are to be dealt with exclusively by the state

(Sørensen &Torfing 2007b:237).

Another approach is that of outcome democracy, which tend to measure the quality of democratic

governance more on its ability to produce desired outcomes through various forms of coordination

than on how decision-makers are democratically legitimized. According to this approach the

democratic institutions must be judged by their ability to solve policy problems experienced by the

people more effectively than alternative institutional arrangements. Governance networks go very

well with outcome democracy since they tend to facilitate bottom-up participation; and they provide

an arena for negotiated deliberation between autonomous and mutually dependent actors and

therefore contribute to effective policymaking and policy outcomes (Sørensen & Torfing

2007b:240).

Governance networks can also be seen as an important method of establishing linkages and bridges

between political identities, narratives and communities, as they bring together stakeholders with

different points of identification in an autonomous environment, which enhances communication,

coordination, negotiation and cooperation between them. At the same time governance networks

increase public participation and engagement and consequently contribute to empowerment of the

citizens (Sørensen & Torfing 2007b:240).

Sceptics of governance networks see the networks as a threat to democracy because governance

networks undermine the borderline between state and society. In addition political equality is under

pressure because governance networks also undermine the sovereign position of the elected

government and a threat to individual liberty because the collective decision-making is spreading

into the private sphere. Some critics challenge the view that governance networks contribute to

expanding the scope of public participation in processes of political decision-making, but stress that

networks are more oriented towards the promotion of particularistic interests than on the promotion

of the common good of society as such. Thereby, they threat the development of democratic

citizens instead of promoting it (Sørensen & Torfing 2007b:235). Additionally, overlaps and ties

between political communities might turn out to be systematically structured in ways that tend to

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marginalize certain communities and identities and governance networks might empower and

engage the few while disempowering and disengaging the majority (Sørensen & Torfing 2007:244).

Even though governance networks may not live up to traditional liberal-democratic norms about

equal participation of all citizens, open competition between the political elites, and accountability

through regular elections, governance networks might enhance democracy in the sense that

democracy is also a question of ensuring the broad and empowering participation of relevant

stakeholders in public deliberations that aim to craft political solutions to common problems on the

basis of agonistic respect of one’s political adversaries (Torfing 2007:19). However, the positive

effects that governance networks might have on the democratic functioning of society as a whole

can only be attained if governance networks are themselves democratic. To assess the democratic

performance of governance networks Sørensen & Torfing (2005) introduces the term democratic

anchorage. Democratic anchorage of governance networks is a function of the different forms of

democratic legitimacy that are obtained when a governance network; is controlled by

democratically elected politicians; represents the membership basis of the participating groups and

organizations; is accountable to the territorially defined citizenry; and follows the democratic rules

specified by a particular grammar of conduct (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:201).

In the following the four anchorage points will be briefly explained to the extent that is relevant for

understanding the ECI’s relation to the democratic performance of governance networks:

Anchorage in Democratically Elected Politicians

Government control of governance networks helps to make sure that the public policy and

governance produced by these networks is in line with the popular will expressed by the political

majority of the elected assemblies. Hence, elected politicians can lend democratic legitimacy to

governance networks in so far as they are capable of controlling the formation, functioning and

development of governance networks through metagovernance (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:202).

Anchorage in the Membership Basis of Participating Groups and Organizations

Members of groups and organizations constitute a demos of directly affected people that the

different network actors must represent in order for the governance network to obtain democratic

legitimacy. The policy processes in governance networks are democratically legitimate insofar as

they reflect, or at least take into account, the interests, preferences and opinions of the members of

these different groups and organizations. However, the classical notion of representation is

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problematic as it wrongly assumes that a pre-defined interest or preference is reproduced in an

undistorted way at the level of representation, thus the membership basis must be able to select and

instruct their representatives; form an informed opinion about their representatives’ performance in

the governance network; and express different opinions and criticize the representatives’

performance in the governance network (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:205).

Anchorage in a Territorially Defined Citizenry

Democratic legitimacy is not only obtained through being accountable to the demos constituted by

the people who are directly affected by the results of certain governance networks. Governance

networks must also be accountable to the wider demos constituted by the people who are indirectly

affected by the decisions taken in the governance network. The citizens that live within the local,

regional, national or transnational territory within which a certain governance network is making

authoritative decisions should be able to hold the governance network accountable for its policy

output and the policy outcomes it produces (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:208).

Anchorage in Democratic Rules and Norms

The basic rationale for anchoring governance networks in democratic rules and norms is to ensure

that governance networks are not only democratically anchored in a series of external political

constituencies, but that the internal processes and interactions also live up to some commonly

accepted democratic standards. For instance inclusion of all relevant and affected actors, respect for

other people’s opinions, commitment to reach a ‘rough consensus’, and a relatively transparent and

responsible decision-making (Sørensen & Torfing 2005:211).

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4. Analysis

We will use this chapter to analyse on, who were the actors during the process of creating the ECI

and which role they had. From our interviews we have created a map of the actors, who have been

mentioned as central to the process of creating the ECI.

4.1. The document analysis

From various documents regarding the ECI, we have found several people, who were part of the

beginning, for example people who took part in the informal working group at the European

Convention. Those who have, according to our document analysis and interviews, taken further part

in the creation of the ECI are mentioned both here and in our mapping of the actors. The informal

working group consisted of the following actors:

MEPs Heidi Hautala, Diana Wallis, Michael Efler, Eduarda Azevedo, Péter Balázs, Michel Barnier,

Jens-Peter Bonde, John Bruton, Panayiotis Demetriou, Karel De Gucht, Gijs De Vries, Lone

Dybkjaer, Alexander Earl of Stockton, Casper Einem, Douglas Stewart, Joschka, Fischer, Michael

Frendo, Carlos Gonzalez Carnero, John Gormley, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann, Alain Lamassoure, Jo

Leinen, Linda Mc Avan, Iñigo Mendez de Vigo, Jürgen Meyer, Louis Michel, Alojz Peterle, and

Jacob Södermann (Website 10).

Looking through documents and conducted interviews, we have discovered some of the actors in

this group took further part in the creation of the ECI; hence they are included in our specific map

of the actors.

4.2. Mapping the actors

Based upon our document analysis and the interviews, we have created a map of the most central

actors to enhance the understanding of the network. Due to time and resource limits, we are not able

to produce a map, which covers the whole network process, for example including all the actors in

the informal working group. However we have decided to create a simplified map of the network to

enhance the understanding of the centrality and roles of the different key actors. We have chosen to

divide the actors into four different levels according to how central they were in the process. This is

of course also a simplification, and a more thorough analysis of specific role of the actors will be

done further on in chapter 4.3.

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The first level contains the actors, who came up with the idea, which later on resulted in the ECI.

These actors were also a part of the whole process until the ECI became a part of the Lisbon Treaty.

They are still a part of the process of the ECI by promoting it and helping the potential ECI

organizers on what’s and how’s.

The second level consists of the actors who have been working closely with the first level

throughout the whole process and has played an active role in promoting the ECI. The main

difference between the first and the second level is that, the actors on the second did not take the

first step in introducing the idea, which later became the ECI.

The third level actors are very similar to those on the second level, however the actors on the third

level were included later in the process than those on the second level. But afterwards they too have

been working actively in promoting the ECI.

The fourth and last level in our map consists of the actors, who have not played a central role in the

creation of the ECI, but were mostly on the sideline. However, after the ECI has been approved,

some of the actors have gained a more central role in working for the promotion of the ECI.

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Figure 3: Map of the most central actors in the creation of the ECI

4.3. The role of the actors

This section will analyse the role of the different actors during the process of creating the ECI.

Doing this will help us verify or falsify our second prejudice: P1: The ECI is an initiative created

top-down from the Commission to gain more democratic legitimacy.

Various members of national parliaments

Michael Efler (Mehr Dem.)

Bruno Kaufmann (IRI)

Jürgen Meyer (MEP)

Alain Lamassoure (MEP)

Zita Gurmai (MEP, Rapporteur)

Diana Wallis (MEP, Rapporteur)

Gerald Häfner (MEP, Mehr Dem.)

Maros Sefcovic (Commission)

Margot Wallström (Commission)

Antonio Vitorino (Commission)

Carsten Berg (Dem. Int.)

Various MEPs

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4.3.1. The role of the non-‐governmental organizations Through both the document analysis (Website 11 + 12 + 13) and our qualitative interviews it

quickly showed that the NGOs played a rather central role. In fact it was NGOs who came up with

the idea behind the ECI. It was particular NGOs who were pursuing the idea of more direct

democracy in the EU who were the initiators. Organisations such as Mehr Demokratie, Democracy

International and Initiative and Referendum Institute fought for more direct democracy in the EU

and according to Carsten Berg these organisations:

“were striving and campaigning for the introduction of participatory and direct democracy as to

complement purely indirect parliamentary democracy” (Appendix 1:CB).

Jens-Peter Bonde from the June Movement also mentions NGOs such as Democracy International

as the key actor.

”It is the people from Democracy International, they are the ones who brought it in. We made a

collaboration and launched the ECI at a press conference, where I sat with the previous French

European minister, Alain Lamassoure” (Appendix 3:JPB).

When different NGOs such as Democracy International proposed the idea of a citizen’s initiative at

the European Convention the deliberation regarding the ECI, as we know it from the Lisbon Treaty,

began. The rapporteur of the ECI Alain Lamassoure supports this:

”The idea has been suggested to Jürgen Meyer and myself at the European Convention by

representatives of the civil society and NGOs working on direct democracy. We both decided to

take it up to the Convention and the Convention approved it” (Appendix 5:AL).

The idea behind the proposition was to bridge the gap between the citizens and the EU institutions

and thereby giving the citizens a way to seize the Commission directly.

“We thought that we would ensure that the Commission will deal with matters that interest and

concern the citizens” (Appendix 5:AL).

For Democracy International and the other NGOs the wish was to make the EU more democratic

and closer to its citizens, hence giving the European citizens a voice. And finally:

“to contribute to overcome this big gulf between citizens and institutions and to overcome the

democratic deficit, of course” (Appendix 1:CB).

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So for the NGOs the intention behind the ECI was to reduce the democratic deficit and make the

EU closer to its citizens by having more direct democracy.

4.3.2. The role of MEPs Those who are in the second level are Alain Lamassoure and Jürgen Meyer, who, after having

discussed the idea with Carsten Berg, Michael Efler, Bruno Kaufmann and their NGOs, took the

idea up at the Convention. Lamassoure in particular has played a great role throughout the whole

process, as he became a rapporteur on the ECI, participating in drafting legislation and coming to an

agreement with the involved parties. One can therefore argue for him belonging on a higher level

than Jürgen Meyer, however interviews and documents (Website 11+12+14) give the impression

that both Lamassoure and Meyer were equally important in the first phases of the creation of the

ECI. Berg recalls the importance of Meyer and his work with the ECI:

“We especially worked together with likeminded Convention members and especially Alain

Lamassoure, a French European Parliamentarian, Professor Jürgen Meyer, the delegate of the

German national parliament and these two guys, especially Jürgen Meyer were the strongest

fighters, so to say, within the Convention” (Appendix 1:CB).

On the home page of the ECI Michael Efler from Mehr Demokratie defines the cooperation with

both Lamassoure and Meyer as close:

“It was not clear either who should be responsible for coordinating the whole process and

especially for collecting signatures in the Convention. We discussed these problems and decided to

coordinate the process ourselves in close cooperation with Jürgen Meyer and Alain Lamassoure”

(Website 11).

This leaves us with an impression that right after the NGOs had proposed the idea of the ECI, Alain

Lamassoure and Jürgen Meyer became very central actors in the further work with the ECI.

Alain Lamassoure was not the only rapporteur on the ECI. Two other MEPs took part in this, Diana

Wallis and Zita Gurmai. Diana Wallis also was a member of the Petitions and Legal Affairs

Committees and took part in the signature gathering (Website 14). The last person on the third level

is Gerald Häfner, who like Diana Wallis pushed for 18 months for the ECI organisers to collect the

one million votes (Appendix 1:CB). One can gather from this, that he was a strong supporter of the

ECI. These three actors are placed on the same level due to their further involvement with the ECI

for the period of signatures gathering. Had we done a more thorough map of the actors with more

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levels, one might argue for Diana Wallis to be ranked higher than Gurmai and Häfner. Still, going

through interviews and documents these three actors appear to have had approximately the same

role.

It is interesting that both Lamassoure and Gurmai pushed for 12 month to gather signatures, like the

Commission, whereas both Wallis and Häfner went for 18 months. There were advantages and

disadvantages with both suggestions. Had it been 18 months more, issues from smaller and less

known groups would be submitted, however 18 months can also be a long time to be involved in

such a big process.

“They said it would be also for the sake of the citizens themselves, one should have a momentum of

one year “ (Appendix 1:CB).

Almost all groups in the Parliament supported the proposal of the ECI (Website 11). One reason for

this could be, as Carsten Berg explains it:

“Like at the Convention, it’s obvious it’s the parliamentarians who are closer to the citizens than

the people who are in the Commission” (Appendix 1:CB).

Alain Lamassoure also mentions that most MEPs were supportive of the ECI.

“There were no real opponents, some members of the European Parliament were a bit reluctant at

first for the fear of being kept out of the loop, but these fears were rapidly dismissed once the first

exchange of views took place in the Committee on Constitutional Affairs” (Appendix AL:5).

However, not all the MEPs were equally supportive of the notion of ECIs, but had their own

agenda, such as Jens-Peter Bonde.

“At the Convention I worked closely with the people from Democracy International and my share

was that I wanted to put all treaties in referendum and get the demand for referendum displayed

and Democracy International wanted to get the requirement on the ECI, so the compromise was

that we worked for both ideas. Therefore I too worked for them” (Appendix 3:JPB).

It seems as if there was almost no real opposition to the ECI. This was not the case (Website 11). A

few Member States and MEPs were a bit worried or did not feel the need in the EU to open up for

ECI. As Bruno Kaufmann explains these kinds of actors:

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“think that the average people is not prepared enough to be in charge of such rights and most

people are not really competent enough to that. And because they are afraid of losing some of their

monopoly of deciding or agenda setting power” (Appendix 2:BK).

However, the opposition was strongest in the beginning and many changed their mind during the

negotiation process. One reason for this is that those with political power in reality do not give

away much of their authority. The ECI is not powerful enough.

“It’s not a decision-making procedure, it’s not a decision-making tool (…). In that sense the

Commission and governments are not afraid to lose power. They would be if the ECI would be

more binding” (Appendix 1:CB).

Jens-Peter Bonde shares this view:

“It doesn’t change the Commissions sole right to make legislation in any way” (Appendix 3:JPB).

4.3.3. The role of the Commission As already established our prejudice is that the Commission played an active role in the creation of

the ECI in order to enhance their democratic legitimacy. In the following we will determine the role

of the Commission to consider to what extent our prejudice is substantiated.

The Commission was represented at the European Convention where the ECI was negotiated. But

according to Bruno Kaufmann the Commission did not play an active role in the creation of the ECI

(Appendix 2:BK), and Carsten Berg agrees to that by saying:

“The European Commission was represented on only the low level. We had more than 110 members

or so and only two of them were from the European Commission, so the European Commission

played more a backstage role” (Appendix 1:CB).

The Portuguese commissioner Antonio Vitorino took some part in the ECI working group

(Appendix 1:CB), but in general the Commission stayed in the background during the negotiation

of the ECI, working neither for nor against the proposal.

Jens-Peter Bonde has the same perception of the Commission:

“They didn’t work against the ECI, but they wanted to make sure there was a demand to have

signatures from different countries. It is not my reminiscence that they worked against, but the ECI

is formulated in a way, which can’t impede the Commission in any way. The Commission worked

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hard as nails at the Convention for nothing to touch their sole right to suggest EU legislation. They

are guarding that” (Appendix 3:JPB).

Thus, according to Bonde, the Commission let the ECI be included in the Constitution proposition,

because it did not take away any real decision-making power. Oppositely Kaufmann argues that

even though the Commission did not work actively for the ECI several people from the

Commission were “genuinely interested to make this instrument a success and not just something

nice” (Appendix 2:BK).

The interviewees agree that the Commission did not plan the ECI as a means to increase the

democratic legitimacy of the Commission. However, the Commission seems to have realised that

potential afterwards:

“The Commission is very much promoting the instrument themselves to receive more legitimacy

(…). There’s a huge democratisation potential and need and that is why the commissioner Maros

Sefcovic for example (...) was responsible for the implementation. Commissioner Margot Wallström

also promoted the instrument very well. Everyone speaks very positively of it within the

Commission, but the Commission was certainly not one of the initiators at the Convention, they just

use it now to sell themselves, or lets put it more correctly to promote themselves. They’ve got the

message; it’s a chance” (Appendix 1:CB).

In addition to the potential legitimacy boost the Commission saw another advantage in promoting

the ECI to the European citizens:

“It was easily understood that this is a good selling point, so both Mr. Barosso and several other

Commissioners they very much appraised the European Citizens Initiative. After that they hoped

that this would be a good argument to get the Constitutional Treaty through the popular votes in

France and in the Netherlands and in other countries, so they went out and said: This will bring

more democracy, the European citizens will have more power” (Appendix 2:BK).

However, the Constitutional Treaty was voted down and according to Kaufmann this has meant that

the Commission has lost some of its interest in promoting the ECI (Appendix 2:BK).

4.3.4. The role of the Member States The Member States did not participate in the creation of the ECI as such. However, they did have

an indirect influence on the process given that they appointed the Presidium of the European

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Convention. According to the interviewees the Presidium had the last say in what was accepted into

the final Constitution text. As Berg explains:

“The Presidium in the Convention of the future of Europe was very top down, was very

hierarchical. (...) Basically it was this little group, who decided what was in, what will be put into

the Constitution (...) and what was rejected” (Appendix 1:CB).

Kaufmann shares this view:

“The Convention was not fully democratic, but very much run by the Presidium, the president and

his deputies” (Appendix 2:BK).

Thus, the Member States through the Presidium had the power to reject the ECI if the Member

States for instance felt that the ECI took away too much of their power.

4.4. Part conclusion

The prejudice we have sought to verify or falsify is that the ECI is an initiative created top-down

from the Commission to gain more democratic legitimacy. Through the analysis we have realised

that the ECI was in fact not created top-down by the Commission. The initial idea instead came

from NGOs promoting direct and participatory democracy and was later on supported by different

MEPs, firstly and in particular by Alain Lamassoure and Jürgen Meyer. The Commission actually

only played a peripheral role along with the Member States.

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5. Discussion

This part will discuss our finding in relation to our three prejudices.

5.1. Prejudice 1: The ECI is an initiative created top-‐down from the Commission to gain more democratic legitimacy

From the analysis we have gathered that contrary to our prejudice the process of the ECI was not

created top-down by the Commission, but instead initiated by different NGOs. Later on different

MEPs took part in the process with the Commission only participating peripherally. The network

was thus more pure than it was managed. It was self-generated and self-organised and informal,

which are characteristics of pure networks. The network was however subject to the Presidium at

European Convention as concluded in the analysis. This is not consistent with the notion of pure

networks because no single organisations must have power to force others to cooperate in pure

networks.

According to Lewis (2010) a strictly pure or managed network is also impractical. The distinction

between managed and pure networks is an artificial one between two polar extremes. Thus, all

networks are somewhere on a continuum from more to less structured. This artificial distinction

suits the case of the ECI very well. It was started by NGOs and carried out by NGOs and MEPs, but

with the Presidium having the final say. As Berg points out:

“The Presidium in the Convention of the future of Europe was very top down, was very hierarchical.

(...) Basically it was this little group, who decided what was in, what will be put into the

Constitution (...) and what was rejected" (Appendix 1:CB).

So the network started out very pure, initiated by interest groups wanting more participatory and

direct democracy in the EU, becoming managed in the end by the Presidium.

Part of our prejudice was that the Commission might have imposed or encouraged the creation of

the ECI through policy signals and discourses. This would make the ECI network appear more

managed according to the theory. Considering the arguments by both Kohler-Koch (2007) and

Richardson (2007), that the notion of more participatory democracy in the EU has been introduced

by the Commission in order to gain more democratic legitimacy, one could easily draw the

conclusion that the ECI was an outcome of this notion of more citizen participation. One should not

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underestimate the power of discourses, thus it is important to reflect upon the idea that the

Commission to some degree has had an ‘invisible’ hand in encouraging the idea of the ECI through

discourses. However, according to our interviewees the idea of the ECI came from the NGOs, not

the Commission. Thus, the ECI was indeed bottom-up initiated by NGOs such as Democracy

International and The Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe. That the idea of the ECI was not

imposed by the Commission through policy signals is further substantiated by the fact that the

NGOs began working towards more citizen participation already in the mid 1990’s, long before the

Commission advocated for the notion in their White Paper on Governance from 2001. Thus, the

first prejudice has not been confirmed in this project.

Even though the Commission did not actively work for the ECI in order to gain democratic

legitimacy the empirical data suggests that the Commission has realized the potential of the ECI

afterwards:

“The Commission is very much promoting the instrument themselves to receive more legitimacy

(…). There’s a huge democratisation potential”(Appendix 1:CB).

Also Lamassoure argues that the ECI might lead to more confidence in the Commission from the

European citizens:

“It has been designed to give them [the citizens] a chance to be listened to, to make sure that their

concerns are being taken into account when drafting EU laws thus enhancing a better

understanding of the EU institutions and, hopefully, more confidence in them” (Appendix 5:AL).

Thus, the ECI may actually produce some kind of legitimacy, something, which the Commission in

particular is in need of. The implementation of the ECI can give the Commission more democratic

legitimacy in the eyes of the European citizens regardless of how the idea was initially formed. As

Lamassoure says it:

“The ECI provides the Commission with an opportunity to address the issues that interest the

citizens on their day-to-day life. Hence, it gives it an opportunity to "reconnect" with the citizens

and to put an end to the impression that it is far away from them” (Appendix 5:AL).

Kaufmann advises the Commission to see the ECI as a chance for the Commission to gain

democratic legitimacy:

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“It is an enormous opportunity to finally get something of a direct democratic legitimacy. If they

[the Commission] are ready, if they are offering enough of resources and they are really investing

into this instrument, into this communication, it is of course a fantastic opportunity for them to be

really a partner in European democracy” (Appendix 2:BK).

5.2. Prejudice 2: The European citizens will not be able to create an ECI group because of the complexity of the regulations

The ECI is created for the European citizens, hence the name European Citizens Initiative. With the

ECI the EU and its institutions is supposedly bringing Europe:

“closer to its citizens. And it will foster a cross border debate about what we are doing in Brussels

and thus contribute, we hope, to the development of a real European public space" (Website 4).

However, according to several of our interviewees the intention and the real political effects do not

go hand in hand. Carsten Berg has a pretty direct answer as to whether or not the European citizens

will make use of the ECI:

“It’s too difficult for ordinary citizens to organise such a huge campaign” (Appendix 1:CB).

This is supported by Laust-Leth Gregersen from Concord Denmark:

“It is not for Mr. and Mrs. Jensen” (Appendix 4:LLG).

Instead Laust Leth Gregersen proposes that the ECI will be easy to use for both MEPs and big

NGOs:

“In reality I do not think it is that difficult, if the European Social Democrats can write to, I don’t

know how many members they have, but try to imagine writing out to the full range of members of

your party or those you know share the point of view, or Amnestry International or another big

organisation, who have some kind of SMS-service. We (Concord Denmark) had nothing1, so I think

in some way, you need to have some kind of campaign apparatus ready beforehand” (Appendix

4:LLG).

1 When the Lisbon Treaty became effective on midnight December 1st 2009, Concord Denmark did a political stunt making an online petition to create attention on the ECI and Concord Denmark. However, it was very small.

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According to interviewees such as Berg, Bonde and Gregersen the ECI is too extensive to carry out

for an ordinary European citizen. Since the ECI is not allowed to be organised by MEPs or by NGO

and is not possible to be run by normal European citizens, then who can make use of it?

Carsten Berg and Laust Leth Gregersen both argue that even if it is not for MEPs and NGOs, they

can go about this rule by joining in on citizen’s initiatives:

“This is an instrument that cannot be performed by only one or two persons or it’s hardly possible.

So presumably or preferably you should really create an alliance with other NGOs who have the

same ideas or share your ideas and who are ready to commit and then you have to develop a

campaign plan, you have to get an advance commitment of every NGO, then you see how much you

have to fundraise, because it’s very expensive also or somewhat expensive” (Appendix 1:CB).

And the interviewees also agree, that even though the NGOs officially cannot work as organisers,

they can still go about this:

“In practical terms of course, this is just a formal thing” (Appendix 1:CB).

Alain Lamassoure explains that MEPs actually have the opportunity to join a citizens' committee

launching an ECI, but they will not be counted within the seven citizens coming from seven

different Member States that the committee must gather:

“The Parliament proposed this restriction itself so that MEPs would not be able to make use of this

instrument and would leave it to the citizens” (Appendix 5:AL).

The Parliament might have good intensions behind this proposal, but the fact that the MEPs can

support or even indirectly initiate ECIs is still a bit of an issue because the MEPs with a big support

group will have much less trouble raising one million signatures than an ordinary citizen without

such the same network. And the MEPs have already started to consider making use of the ECI as

organisers, which might also be a reason why the MEPs are excluded as ECI organisers:

“Parliamentarians are already approaching me, because we consult ECI organisers. In a formal

sense the regulation excludes parliamentarians to be ECI organisers” (Appendix 1:CB).

This creates a legitimate issue for the ECI. It was made for the citizens, but the result of the ECI is

more preparing the ground for the MEPs and big NGOs than for the citizens. This is something that

Berg is also concerned with:

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“We run the risk that in fact only the big NGOs, the big umbrellas like Greenpeace and Unions can

benefit from this instrument. But this was never the intent with the ECI” (Appendix 1:CB).

Jens-Peter Bonde shares the view of the Berg:

“I think it can engage people to create initiatives across the borders and that is favourable and

rational. But something, which takes place across borders is not for ordinary people, it is people

like Carsten Berg and myself, who do this kind of thing. It is very difficult to include ordinary

citizens to things like that, which takes place across borders” (Appendix 3:JPB).

And the idea behind the ECI from the NGOs was also much more a tool for the citizens than other

stakeholders:

“The intention was obvious when we were fighting and we were and we still are fighting for the

ECI, to make it accessible for normal and ordinary citizens” (Appendix 1:CB).

Carsten Berg mentions that despite the difficulties ordinary citizens might face, they are still

approaching him with ideas. He estimates that about 20 percent of those, who approach him are

ordinary European citizens. The other group is mainly NGOs. The ordinary citizens are not

necessarily organised, but still want to know how to make use of the ECI. Thus, there is some

interest from the ordinary citizens, which is very positive. It appears as if the citizens actually

would like to take part in the EU by making use of the ECI. This raises the issue of people, who

want to use it, but will have difficulties bringing it into life.

And difficulties taking part of the EU is not something brand new. Equality of voice in the EU,

meaning mainly citizen participation and representation through interest groups, is infringed upon

by a lack of transparency, formality, and equal possibility of access throughout the decision-making

process, the institutions and policy network involved therein (Karr 2006:110).

The ECI was initially seen as an instrument inciting the citizens to participate more. Having more

citizen participation would also help to legitimize the decision-making procedures of the state. And

according to some traditions in democratic theory it is assumed that participation produces better

results. Had the ECI been easier to make use of by the citizens, the participation in the EU by

citizens rather than NGOs and MEPs would have risen, increasing the legitimacy of the decision-

making procedures. Furthermore does more participatory democracy also enable the European

citizens to check the power of the EU, which then again promotes political participation, thus

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helping to create a more educated and better informed electorate; and strengthen legitimacy in the

sense that people are more likely to accept decisions that they have made themselves. Since the

citizens in general do not feel heard in the EU, opting for more political participation and a chance

for the citizens to check the power would probably create a greater feeling of having a voice.

Carsten Berg however hopes that with the technical developments in the society, the ECI stand a

chance in resulting in more participation, but he again argues for the many technicalities impeding

the ECI:

“I hope that with the internet we can boost and promote this instrument much better, but also here

we must be very careful, because it always depends on the details; how such a regulation is

implemented, for example in 18 Member States citizens are required very personal data, which you

would give away at the internet (…). You can kill the instrument with these detail regulations”

(Appendix 1:CB)

Despite the vague hope that technical instruments such as the internet can make up for some of the

strict regulations of the ECI it is safe to conclude that our second prejudice is correct; ordinary

European citizens will not be able to create an ECI group, even though it was the initial purpose of

the ECI. However, to even anticipate that the ECI would ever, even with more loose regulation, be

an initiative for the ordinary citizens might be utopian. In practice it is very questionable if it is at

all possibly to engage the citizens on such a large scale such as the EU. According to theory of

participatory democracy NGOs are necessary to facilitate citizen participation; in part because the

complexity of the EU is too difficult to comprehend for the citizens; and because the level of which

the citizens are willing to participate is limited to chequebook-participation. It is hard to believe that

this comes as a surprise for those involved in creating the ECI. This poses a question: why enforce

rules restricting NGOs from creating ECI groups? The restriction only serves as a formal hindrance;

in practice NGOs can easily bypass the rule for instance by having employees submit the ECI

proposal. This is not necessarily in itself a problem, as we will discuss later NGOs can have some

significant contributions to democracy, but you are left with a gut feeling that the restriction is made

in order to signal more citizen involvement. This focus on the signalling effect builds on the notion

that the ECI is more a veneer of artificial democratic legitimacy than an actual democratic

improvement of the EU.

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5.3. Prejudice 3: The ECI will not have any significant effects on the democratic deficit

Our last prejudice is that the ECI will not have any effects on the democratic deficit of the EU.

Since the ECI is not yet implemented and no proposals have been put forward to the Commission

we do not have any empirical evidence to support our considerations, i.e. this prejudice cannot be

fully verified or falsified. Instead it will be through the views by the interviewees and democratic

theories in which we try to ponder the effects.

But before considering how the ECI might affect the democratic deficit, we have reflected on

whether or not there is a democratic deficit in the EU. The first aspect when considering democratic

deficit is that the EU cannot be compared to regular states, the EU is too unique with its multi-

layered system. The EU should not be considered as a government, but rather seen as governance

(Karr 2006:89). However, it is a fact that the European citizens to some extent distrust the EU’s

democratic potential and that there is some kind of deficit. Whether it is a real political democratic

deficit or if the deficit merely exists as a perception of the European citizens is debatable. One can

also question if it is even possible for the EU as a transnational institution to ever live up to

traditional democratic norms and if the whole debate of a democratic deficit therefore is mistaken.

In the following discussion we will accept the notion of a democratic deficit in the EU in order to

discuss whether or not the ECI will have any significant effects on the deficit.

Having concluded that there is some kind of democratic deficit, what is interesting is then to look at

how the ECI might or might not affect this. From the interviews we have gathered some interesting

points:

We have concluded that it is NGOs or MEPs who in practice will be able to create an ECI proposal

rather than ordinary citizens. However, that does not mean that the ECI will not reduce the

democratic deficit. In the following we will at first discuss what it entails that the ECI in practice

foster NGO participation rather than citizen participation as such. After that we will consider to

what extent ECI groups can contribute to the democracy as being agenda-setters and by making the

European citizens perceive the EU as more democratic. Lastly, we will discuss how ECI groups

might mend some of the democratic flaws of network governance pointed out by democracy

theories.

As presented in the theory chapter there are both arguments for and against the democratic potential

of NGO-participation. But before democratically measuring NGO participation it is necessary to

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evaluate the premises for the discussion; is there really any alternative? It is of cause preferable if

everybody is heard, but on such a huge scale as the EU it is in practice impossible to introduce

‘real’ citizen participation where any ordinary citizen can have a say. And even if it somehow was

possible to include ordinary citizens in the legislative process it is unlikely that more than a few

would get involved. It is reasonable to presume that ordinary citizens have little interest in putting

any effort and time into it. They prefer to be heard through an occasional referendum and otherwise

be represented either through politicians or through NGOs and chequebook-participation. In this

view NGO representation is the only form of citizen participation achievable on EU level. And that

may not be all bad, since NGOs in general are closely linked with the citizens, thus are able to

provide good representation. However, there are huge differences on NGOs, and critiques may have

a point when arguing that some NGOs are not transparent enough and that they often lack

systematic mechanisms for exchange with supporters. These are of course democratic problems and

in order to fully appreciate NGO participation the NGOs themselves have to take measures to

improve these things. Additionally it is an issue of concern that the democratic potential of NGO

participation depends on, which NGOs are involved.

The second discussion is whether or not the ECI will have an agenda-setting effect. The

Commission is not obliged to make new legislation due to ECIs. In accordance with the treaties, the

Commission can reject ECI proposals if they do not support the idea. However, this may only be on

paper. Several of the interviewees see great agenda-setting potential in the ECI:

“You have a tool, where citizens as such become agenda-setters for legislation” (Appendix 2:BK).

If ECI groups indeed succeed in placing certain politics at the top of the political agenda the

Commission cannot “afford” to reject the proposals, in particular not in the initial phase:

“I do not think the Commission real politically can afford the first Citizen’s Initiative, which ends

on their table, to say no. In principle they could, but they can’t in terms of real politics” (Appendix

4:LLG).

Thus, it is plausible that the Commission deem it too costly in regards to their legitimacy issues to

reject ECI proposals. However, it has yet to be seen how many ECI proposals will get through the

eye of the needle.

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Another point is that the ECI might indirectly affect the democracy, because it will make the

citizens feel more important, they might feel as if they get a voice and there is a European sphere. If

the citizens in the EU become well aware of the ECI and sign different initiatives it might spread a

feeling of participation, of taking part in the democracy. If this is the case, the ECI will have an

indirect effect on the democracy in creating more engagement.

“It might be that it will make them [the citizens] want to participate more. And in that case it is

indirect, let’s say it’s creating engagement. It could be that people think ‘I’ve signed an initiative,

and now it is in the news, and also in France and I’ve signed the same idea as someone in Germany

and now Barosso has to respond to it’. If that is the result, then definitely! But it will be a spill-over

effect, it will not be the mechanism itself!” (Appendix 4:LLG).

Spill-over or not, if the ECI in some way creates more engagement in the EU, the ECI has also

somehow improved the democratic deficit. If more citizens will feel as if they get a voice, when

they see initiatives by other citizens resulting in legislation in the EU and more citizens will gain

more trust in the EU, the ECI can be considered to have positive effects on the democratic deficit.

But it all depends on how the ECI will be used by the citizens and not at least how the mainstream

media will cover ECIs. If ECIs get no attention and the European citizens do not learn of its

existence the ECI certainly will have difficulties affecting the democratic deficit. This was also one

of Carsten Berg’s main concerns.

One thing is how the ECI might or might not live up to the original ideal of promoting citizen

participation. Another discussion regarding the ECIs democratic potential is theoretical; how can

ECI groups, in best-case scenario, affect the democratic potential of governance networks? The

best-case scenario being that ECI groups will be included in the further work with an ECI proposal

after it has been handed to the Commission, i.e. it will be included in the governance network that

has to further negotiate the initial ECI proposal before it can be finally ratified. Fortunately, this

best-case scenario is on paper what is anticipated. Thus, it appears from the official guide to the

ECI:

“If the Commission chooses to follow up on the initiative by preparing a formal legislative

initiative, the organisers might be keen to continue their job – now as a watchdog for the legislative

process to come. But even if the Commission makes the case that an appropriate legislative

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proposal is not needed, desirable or necessary, the organisers of an ECI might wish to react,

comment or even follow up with new actions or initiatives” (Website 5).

However, how well the ECI groups will be included in the further work with ECI proposals has yet

to be seen.

According to the project’s theory chapter governance networks are criticised for their informal

character; low level of accountability and publicity in the decision-making process; for promotion

of particularistic interests; and for empowering and engaging the few while disempowering and

disengaging the majority. It is arguable that the ECI can at least slightly rectify some of these

problems. First of all the process of ECI proposals is, on paper that is, formalised and transparent.

This may provide a possibility for outsiders to follow the decision-making process, thus enabling

accountability of the network actors. Secondly, it is likely that ECI proposals will be less

particularistic since one million citizens will have to sign, i.e. agree that the proposal serves a good

purpose. If the proposal is too particularistic it possibly will be difficult to gather the signatures.

Thirdly, the ECI might empower and engage more people than are usually engaged in governance

networks if you include the one million who have signed the proposal.

The democratic anchorage points provide some specific ideals for making governance networks

more democratic, thus it is interesting to ponder on how the ECI aligns with these ideals.

The first anchorage point is that governance networks should be controlled by democratically

elected politicians. But the Commission will have control of the ECI groups through

metagovernance as the Commission will be able to decide if an ECI proposal is accepted in the first

place and later on they will have control of which actors will be involved in the further work of

processing the proposal. As already established in the theory metagovernance is crucial in order to

make governance networks effective. However, to live up to the democratic anchorage points it is

given that the metagovernance is to be exerted by democratically elected politicians. The

Commissioners are chosen by the head of government in the Member States and approved by the

Parliament. There is some parliamentary control, but it is not the citizens of the EU who choose the

legislators of the EU, thus the Commission as metagovernor do not live up to the first anchorage

point.

According to the second anchorage point the governance network should represent the membership

basis of the participating groups and organizations. As described in the theory this means that the

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membership basis of an ECI group must be able to select and instruct their representatives; form an

informed opinion about their representatives’ performance in the governance network; and express

different opinions and criticise the representatives’ performance in the governance network. If you

include the one million citizens who have signed the ECI proposal as members of the ECI group it

raises some issues. The formalised and transparent way an ECI proposal is meant to be processed

may give the members an opportunity to form an informed opinion about their representatives’

performance in the network. However, the members will have a hard time instruct and criticise their

representatives, thus the representatives will not be able to check if they keep in line with the

wishes of the membership basis as the ECI proposal evolves through the further negotiations with

the Commission and other parties. The risk is that the original proposal may be altered to the extent

that the citizens signing the proposal may not concur with the changes and regret their signature.

Thus, the huge membership basis means that an ECI group will have more difficulties to conform to

the second anchorage point than most ‘normal’ groups and NGOs. However, you can argue that the

large membership basis of ECI groups provide some democratic legitimacy in itself that NGOs will

not be able to obtain. After all, the membership basis of an ECI group has signed a concrete

proposal whereas the membership basis of most NGOs have given a much more loose and

indefinite mandate through chequebook participation, i.e. unspecific causes such as helping animals

in general or saving the environment.

The third anchorage point is that governance networks should be accountable to a territorially

defined citizenry; meaning that the citizens who are directly affected by the results of certain

governance networks should be able to hold the governance network accountable for its policy

output. In this respect ECI groups will be stronger democratically anchored than most NGOs

because of the large number of signatures it has to collect and the strict rules the signature gathering

has to abide by. When you have to collect one million signatures from at least one quarter of the EU

Member States chances are that the proposal will not harm too many people. However, it is

imaginable that big interest groups across the borders may be able to make ECI proposals, which

may benefit one particular group and pose problems for others. One example could be that the many

million European farmers would somehow promote own interests at the expense of the

environment. On the other hand eco-idealists may push for unreasonable strict regulations at the

expense of the agricultural industry. In both cases it probably would not be difficult to collect the

one million signatures, thus the Commission’s power of veto may have some reason to it after all.

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According to the fourth anchorage point governance network should follow democratic rules and

norms. In essence this means that the internal processes and interactions within governance

networks have to live up to some commonly accepted democratic standards. For instance inclusion

of all relevant and affected actors, respect for other people’s opinions, and commitment to reach a

‘rough consensus’. Whether this ideal is reached or not depends on how the individual governance

network is designed and meta-governed. In this respect the ECI is relevant. However, for the ECI to

live up to its potential, ECI groups must work in governance networks where the ideal of this

anchorage point is met. One could fear that some of the representatives of ECI groups are less

competent in working in the EU governance networks than other more experienced actors. If the

governance network does not comply with democratic rules and norms this could entail that some

representatives will get trumped by stronger actors, resulting in a dilution of the ECI proposal.

Looking at the ECI in a network governance perspective there are both advantages and

disadvantages. Metagovernance will not be a democratic force for the ECI, given that the

Commission is chosen by Member States and not by the citizens of the EU. The gathering of one

million signatures representing at least one fourth of the Member States can be seen as both a force

and an issue. It will be difficult when deliberation begins to keep all the supporters content with the

end result, but at the same time the ECI groups are entering negotiations with a strong mandate.

Thus, as discussed the ECI have the potential to affect the democracy of the EU in a positive way.

And then maybe Alain Lamassoure will be right when he states:

“I hope and I am confident that the ECI will increase the citizen participation. It might take some

time for the citizens' to be aware of the existence of the ECI and of the way to use it but I believe

that the first successful ones will show the path and will be followed by many others” (Appendix

5:AL)

However, the theoretical discussion above was based on how the ECI possibly will work in best-

case scenario. In worst-case scenario the ECI might end up like Jens-Peter Bonde predicts:

“The ECI does not do anything about the democratic deficit. That is my critique. It is a diversion

from dealing with the democratic deficit, because the deficit has to do with the fact that non-elected

have monopoly on proposing legislation. That is the deficit (...), and that is what is essential; that

you have the right to collect signatures do not change anything. You could do that before as well,

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there has not been a ban on collecting signatures, so what does the ECI change?” (Appendix

3:JPB).

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6. Conclusion

In this project we have tried to assess: who were the most important actors involved in creating the

European Citizens Initiative, and how is the European Citizens Initiative related to the democratic

deficit in the European Union?

The most important actors in the process of creating the ECI were NGOs such as Democracy

International and The Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe. These NGOs proposed the idea at

the European Convention in 2002-2003. Their initial idea with the ECI included more participatory

democracy and more direct democracy than the final product let to. The French MEP Alain

Lamassoure and the German MEP Jürgen Meyer were both great advocators of the ECI along with

the NGOs. The third important group of actors are Diana Wallis and Zita Gurmai, who along with

Alain Lamassoure were the rapporteurs of the ECI, taking part in drafting the legislation and

coming to an agreement with the involved parties and Gerald Häfner. The Commission only played

a peripherally role in the creation of the ECI and was represented by only two Commissions at the

Convention; Maros Sefcovic and Margot Wallström.

The second part of the problem formulation regards how the ECI is related to the democracy in the

EU. The ECI is according to several documents an initiative, which will improve the democratic life

of the EU and at the same time create debate and a European public space. Something, which the

EU is in crucial need of looking through different Eurobarometer reports. When trust is low for both

the Parliament and the Commission and less than a fourth of the citizens relate democracy to the

EU, an initiative improving the democratic life can be considered a necessity for the EU and its

institutions. But for the NGOs the end result is not what they hoped for, thus it might have less

potential than what was initially the prospect. However, it can have a spill-over effect. The

initiatives can lead to more deliberation. It can lead to more participatory democracy through NGO

participation. The ECI is ideal for big NGOs, who already have a good campaign apparatus. And

since cooperation with interest groups can be seen as an important ingredient in reducing the

democratic deficit in the EU, one can therefore argue that the ECI will have this derived effect. The

NGOs may offer an effective representation for the European citizens.

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7. Perspectives

This project has dealt with who the actors were in the creation of the ECI and how the ECI relates

to democracy. The first aspect deals with the process of the whole creation, whereas the second

aspect is more focused on to what extent the ECI is related to the democratic deficit in the EU.

Further research could cover the aspect on how the ECI after the implementation on April 1st 2012

affects the European society.

The EU has for a long time been criticised for its democratic deficit. The decision-making processes

are moving away from the ordinary citizens, there is a lot of criticism of globalisation and that the

European Union and the decision making is moving away from a local and national level to a

transnational one (Calhoun 2001, 1901). Going through Eurobarometers in some year’s time, a

comparative study on whether the trust in the Parliament and the Commission has changed is also

an interesting project. One can thereby measure – to some extent – the actual effects, though there

might also have been other factors in play.

Several of our interviewees have talked about a European sphere and a more civil society among

the Europeans. A future research project can therefore look at how the ECI have or have not

improved this.

As our interviewees have said, the ECI is not for the ordinary European citizen. However, since the

ECI was created for the citizens, one can argue that there will be engaged citizen groups, who will

still stand behind such a proposal. It is therefore interesting to do a more sociological project

looking more into these European citizens, who take charge and organise ECI groups. Which

Member State – new or old? – are they from, what is their background and so forth. Our

interviewees also spoke much about the importance of a network, so looking at the network of the

organiser could also be of great interest. Since the core of civil society comprises a network of

associations that institutionalises problem-solving discourses on questions of general interest inside

the framework of organized public spheres the many networks developing through the ECI is of

great interest to look at (Calhoun 2001, 1901). Are there actually some citizens who manage to

organise an ECI without the direct (or indirect?) support of either MEPs or NGOs. When the first

ECIs have been through the whole network process and signature gathering and resulted in new

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legislation, looking at the civil society behind it can shed light on who actually make use of the

ECI?

“Citizenship implies membership of a political community and is internally defined by rights,

duties, participation, and identity. It has traditionally been subordinate to nationality, which defines

the territorial limits of citizenship. In order to theorize forms of citizenship that go beyond the

spatial domain of nationality, citizenship must be seen as multilayered, operating on the regional,

national and supranational levels” (Delanty 1997:285).

How has the participation in the EU changed since the citizens got a voice? And is the ECI helping

to create a more shared European feeling? Will the cross-border collaboration make the European

citizens feel more European? Eurobarometer and/or a quantitative survey asking people to what

extent they feel more European than before the ECI was implemented can be use as method.

Another approach to the project can be document analysis. Have the citizens started to take more

part in the EU through i.e. voting, NGOs, debates, media and so on?

“Citizenship, it is argued, is not only about rights but is also about action, it is about involvement in

the polity” (Delanty 1997:286).

Now that the citizens have more rights, do they then get more involved as well?

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Appendix 1:CB – Interview with Carsten Berg

Carsten Berg: CB, Steffen Moses: SM, Nathalie Søndergaard: NS

NS: Our focus now is on the process creating the ECI, so what were the hope and expectations,

when it was created, who were the biggest opponents and supporters of the ECI. So our first

question is, who were the initial actors behind the ECI?

CB: The original idea of the ECI is not so new. Already in the late 80s the European Parliament

made proposals to introduce the ECI and then in 1996 on the Intergovernment Conference in

Amsterdam the foreign minister of Italy and Austria, Dini and Schüssel, proposed such a citizen

initiative right, but all of these proposals were ignored and it took another six-seven years when the

European Convention, the future of Europe, took place in Brussels. This is the so-called

Constitution Convention. And this was when the civil society were invited and actually the main

imparts came from citizens organisations like ours, like Democracy International, Mehr

Demokratie, Mas Democracia and so on and so all organisations were striving and campaigning for

the introduction of participatory and direct democracy as to complement purely indirect

parliamentary democracy. And civil society was then invited for a public hearing, as where we took

place, and including myself by the way; I was part of those people working in the Conventional, the

future of Europe, and we actually formed an informal working group where we invited the

Convention members from national parliaments, Commission and governments and the European

Parliament and discussed the question ‘How we actually could introduce more elements of

participatory and direct democracy in the sense of citizens initiatives and citizens initiated

referendums”. It’s a big difference whether a referendum takes place triggered by the president for

example or as in obligation due to the Constitution as you have in it Denmark. If a citizen come up

with a proposal to start a public vote then this is something considered, what you consider as of

grass root or really direct democracy from the citizens and for the citizens. And so we has basically

two ideas in mind to introduce; a procedure for direct democracy into the Constitution and on the

other hand that we vote directly on the constitution so that all European citizens, or EU citizens,

have the right to vote on the Constitution. So this was a two step campaign at the same time, and I

was then collecting signatures to introduce direct democracy into the Convention and what was

finally left, I talked to all different groups, we made really harsh campaign work, you had to be

aware that in the Convention, at the end of the Convention, it was very short, 18 months only, the

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Convention members had many other things into their mind about European Defence Policy on the

institutional balance, you know the Constitution is really big. And participatory democracy from the

bottom was a minor thing for them, it was not so important. But since the Declaration of Laagen,

which was the base for the constitutional Convention, was that the EU has to become more

effective, more transparent and more democratic. They knew that something new democratic has to

come into force in order to justify themselves, so they were somewhat open for these kinds of

questions and then we in the end collected all the signatures. It was rejected by the Presidium first,

and only on the very last day they decided to introduce the European Citizens initiative as we know

it today and it was article 47.4 and you know the Presidium in the Convention of the future of

Europe was very top down, was very hierarchical, was governed by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the

former French president and basically it was this little group, who decided what was in, what will

be put into the Constitution or Treaty on the Constitution, it was officially called, what was into the

Constitution put and what was rejected. And only on the very last day we made it and we could

convince other parts or other members of the Presidium like Giuliano Amato, the former Italian

prime minister, he was a good friend of us then and Alain Lamassoure and well other people from

this Convention and especially also the Presidium. So it was actually a big success for civil society

organisations like us, like Democracy International, Mehr Demokratie, Initiative and Referendum

Institute, the very small family of NGOs striving for participatory and direct democracy. So this

was really a happy day, and at the same time I was a bit sad because we of course wanted to have

much more, I’m sure we come back to this later, what it means to have more, the ECI is not a

perfect tool, but it’s a very first step into democracy building, into the right direction of democracy

building in the European Union. It’s more direct, it’s more transnational and it’s also more digital as

we can see because we are going to use the Internet with online collection. So far about the

background and then of course the French and Dutch rejected the Constitution, but then 98 % of the

Constitution was then overtaken into the Lisbon Treaty, it’s basically the same, but it’s made much

more transparent and not so easy to understand for normal people and this was then pushed through

in the Netherlands and France, to only the Parliament and not to the citizens so we actually have the

same content of the ECI in the Lisbon treaty.

NS: Who were the initial people who worked for the ECI and also who worked against the ECI?

CB: Officially no one was against the ECI, especially not afterwards. But in practise politics is

always including, especially in this case, there were also people who were against this instrument.

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From a civil society part it was a strong impart as I said Mehr Demokratie, Democracy

International, Initiative and Referendum Institute who made the lobby work and we also advised,

we did advisory work and we especially worked together with likeminded Convention members and

especially Alain Lamassoure, a French European Parliamentarian, Professor Jürgen Meyer, the

delegate of the German national parliament and these two guys, especially Jürgen Meyer were the

strongest fighters, so to say, within the Convention.

NS: What about the Commission? Where did they stand?

CB: The European Commission was represented on only the low level. We had more than 110

members or so and only two of them were from the European Commission, so the European

Commission played more a backstage role. They were not so easy to approach. Antonio Vitorino

this was the guy from Portugal, who also took part in our working groups. They were interested, but

the European Commission is very careful to propose such things themselves. Actually national and

also European parliamentarians. And those who were against were especially representatives of the

government. You know the Convention was consisted on all four groups; Commission,

governments, national and European parliamentarians. It was especially parliamentarians who were

elected directly; they have a stronger sense for democracy than those who are in a bureaucratic

elected commission or so.

NS: What were the initial expectations of the ECI?

CB: First of all to make the EU a bit more democratic, closer to the citizens, to us, to give us a voice

and to contribute to overcome this big gulf between citizens and institutions and to overcome the

democratic deficit of course. Cause we run the huge risk that Europe is taking more and more

influence for the sake of good reason often, but very unlegitimated often. I am very much

concerned that the idea of Europe is getting lost or getting endangered due to undemocratic

structure within the European Union. This was to be seen as one step to get rid or to overcome this

democratic deficit. This was a main impart. More democracy. Really a citizen governed European

Union this is the idea of transnational direct democracy.

NS: The expectations back then have they been changed as to today, like realistically adjusted or

are they the same as when you first started working for the ECI?

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CB: Immediately after the ECI came into the Constitution Treaty, before ratification, which never

actually succeeded, the expectations were extremely high and maybe things have become settled

and become a bit more realistic because we realised now, but we also said back then already that it

is very difficult to organise an ECI, because our organisation and Mehr Demokratie and Democracy

International, which is the biggest NGO world wide for direct democracy, in Germany we have run

many campaigns and made use of citizens initiative rights. So we know how challenging and

difficult it is for normal citizens to organise such a huge and large-scale campaign. And then

especially on the transnational level, people now start to realise it. I also consult future ECI

organisers and that’s what I’m telling them all the time: ‘Don’t underestimate how difficult it really

is to organise a transnational issue, having in mind and being aware of the huge distances, the

language barriers and the absence of the European public space. All that makes it extremely

difficult to communicate and not every European citizen can really so easily communicate as we do

right now, not everyone can speak English and so on. And only a few have a sense of understanding

to work transnational. So the expectations are still the same, the policy is still the same, but now

when we get concrete, we realise much more how challenging and how difficult it is to organise an

ECI. And that has changed a bit.

NS: Who do you think will benefit the most from the ECI?

CB: We all as European citizens because we have a chance now to intervene at least, to get heard,

the citizens have a new right very soon in half a year, six months left and this will be the first

transnational element of democracy worldwide. Maybe it is not only us as Europeans because I

have been approached from many people all over the world, who look at this very transnational

element, so I think also the world could learn how to democratise structures beyond the national and

the transnational level. But here looking at it in a narrow way of course I hope that it is also smaller

initiatives, who will benefit from that, that remains to be seen of course. It all depends on how the

instrument will be operationalised in practise, because you can introduce many barriers and hurdles

into the practical procedures. For example right now all the member states introduce the

implementation rules, the Commission has outlined all the specific rules, for example the minimum

number of Member States, where the signatures need to be collected, the distribution forum: how

many signatures per country has to be collected or what issues are excluded. All these questions are

very important.

SM: But isn’t it too difficult for normal citizens to make an ECI group based on these rules?

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CB: Yeah, that’s what we also say. It’s really challenging on the transnational level, it’s truly

agreed, therefore we campaigned also, the ECI campaign, for a help desk function by the

Commission; that you get real advice on how to do it, because it’s too difficult for ordinary citizens

to organise such a huge campaign. If there are no support elements, in a formal sense support: in the

sense of advising and consulting, so that normal citizens could really make use of this instrument.

We run the risk that in fact only the big NGOs, the big umbrellas like Greenpeace and Unions can

benefit from this instrument. But this was never the intent with the ECI. The intention was obvious

when we were fighting and we were and we still are fighting for the ECI, to make it accessible for

normal and ordinary citizens

NS: Do you think that the normal citizens can in practise propose an initiative? Or will you need to

have an NGO or a parliamentarian behind you?

CB: Well first of all you always need, also at local level. This is an instrument that cannot be

performed by only one or two persons or it’s hardly possible. So presumably or preferably you

should really create an alliance with other NGOs who have the same ideas or share your ideas and

who are ready to commit and then you have to develop a campaign plan, you have to get an

advance commitment of every NGO, then you see how much you have to fundraise, because it’s

very expensive also or somewhat expensive. So not every single citizen will be able to of course

organise this instrument. Another thing which might facilitate and can help to make this instrument

workable is that we for the first time in history will have the chance to make use of not only paper

signatures, but also online gathering and online collection systems. So I hope that with the internet

we can boost and promote this instrument much better, but also here we must be very careful,

because as I said in the beginning it always depends on the details; how such a regulation is

implemented, for example in 18 Member States citizens are required very personal data, which you

would give away at the internet. For example, I think also in Denmark, you also have to provide

your first name, last name, address, birthday, birthplace and I think even the ID number. And this is

too personal. So you can kill the instrument with these detail regulations.

SM: I read that the whole idea of participatory democracy in the EU comes from the Commission as

a way to legitimize their existence.

CB: Sure, the Commission is very much promoting the instrument themselves to receive more

legitimacy, many people in the Commission know that not too much has realised it in the sense of

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democracy as it could. There’s a huge democratisation potential and need and that is why the

commissioner Maros Sefcovic for example was the guy in the Commission, vice-president was

responsible for the implementation. Commissioner Margot Wallström, the former vice president of

the Commission, she was from Sweden. She also promoted the instrument very well. Everyone

speaks very positively of it within the Commission, but the Commission was certainly not one of

the initiators at the Convention, they just use it now to sell themselves or lets put it more correctly

to promote themselves. They’ve got the message; it’s a chance. But the Commission itself is not

elected, it is basically an institution that is determined by governments and so on an so on, so the

Commission is very careful to have its own democracy agenda, we shouldn’t expect too much of

change of that.

SM: Why do you think the Commission is making such strict rules in the ECI? The short dure of

time you can collect signatures, all these rules. Why do you think they are so strict?

CB: First of all, this is a fully new territory of democracy building and there’s no comparison and

reference one could produce or refer to. There is nothing like that, so it’s not so easy to make good

rules for that. Of course the Commission itself is just one player. Those people who made it more

difficult come also from the governments. You know the Commission made the proposal, the

Council reacted, this happened already behind closed doors, the Commission had first meetings

with the Council and then the European Parliament in the end also reacted and so on. So there are

many people involved, and it is not only the Commission, who produce those rules, it’s all three

institutions. It’s an open question why. Probably there are many people, the Commission has simply

not experience this participatory democracy and there’s no idea what it means to collect so many

signatures.

NS: Is the Commission afraid?

CB: It was the European Parliament who reduced these standards. It seems to be the case. Like at

the Convention, it’s obvious it’s the parliamentarians who are closer to the citizens than the people

who are in the Commission.

NS: But are the member states and the governments afraid of giving too much power to its citizens?

CB: Of course they would be fully afraid if they would give away more power, but with the ECI

they don’t give away so much power, because it’s not a decision-making procedure, it’s not a

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decision-making tool. The good thing about the ECI is to increase deliberation, debate and to meet

citizens with institutions, but also citizens to citizens, both levels and this is all prerequisites,

preconditions for democracy, which ECI contributes to. Also create a new European public space to

a certain degree, but it’s not about decision-making. In that sense the Commission and governments

are not afraid to lose power. They would be if the ECI would be more binding.

SM: What arguments have you heard for making the period you can collect signatures only one

year instead of one and a half or two years? What are the arguments?

CB: One of the reasons for the 12 months instead of the 18 or 24 was that they only want to have,

they said, attract the ECIs, they didn’t want too exotic ECIs. For example if you had enough long

time to collect signatures more issues would come up which are less known and might be coming

more from smaller groups, and they didn’t seem to be interested in them. And they said it would be

also for the sake of the citizens themselves, one should have a momentum of one year. The push for

12 months did not only come from the Commission, especially came from Zita Gurmai who was

one of the four rapporteurs in the European Parliament from the Social Democrats and also Alain

Lamassoure from the Conservatists, they both pushed for 12 months. Gerald Häfner from the

Greens and Diana Wallis they pushed for 18 months and 24 months. So it’s also the parliament

itself. And I cannot tell you the reasons why they said it. They simply ignored, I talked to

Lamassoure, I don’t know, they couldn’t tell me any reasons, they just wanted to make it, I think,

they just thought one year would be enough. They didn’t realised how much time it would take to

raise so many signatures.

NS: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ECI?

CB: We talked a lot about the strengths, democracy making, public space, citizens to citizens

dialogue, the first federal so to say, or transnational element of democracy, you know the European

Parliaments election is only national. Danish candidates can only be elected in Denmark and the

same in Germany and so on. But here citizens have to communicate across the boarder. And it’s a

really good first step to create a European public space; we have a digital dimension in it; that’s

where democracy goes to, also in other levels. This are very plus parts in democracy building. The

critical things are as I said, it’s just the first step because it’s not binding, but one should not

exaggerate this point, that’s clear anyway that this is an agenda setting initiative, an agenda

initiative, and not a decision-making popular initiative. The weaknesses are basically I would say

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that it’s still too bureaucratic and that we got to the data required from the citizens when they sign,

it could also be that the online signatures data procedure, which is currently built up, could be very

complicated. Another weakness which we haven’t talked about is that also issues are potentially

excluded, the Commission already today says that they will not accept issues which propose to

change the existing treaties. Are you aware of that? That you cannot make proposals to change the

treaties. So only secondary policy proposals, that was never our intention when we worked on this

at the Constitution Convention and many citizens will be extremely frustrated because they realised

what they want to change is more basic, which would need a treaty change and we cannot compare

the European treaties with the Constitution, because many policies are also ruled out in the treaties,

the treaties are much more comprehensive than a constitution. So there’s even less arguments to

exclude treaty amendments from a practical point of view because the European Union is very

much governed by treaties, so I am afraid that citizens might be very frustrated. Some of them at

least when they have to face that their proposals is not considered as admissible. So that’s one of the

biggest weaknesses I would say, the restriction in terms.

NS: So having this in the back of our mind do you think the ECI is strengthening the democracy in

the EU or is it more like a point of departure for strengthening the democracy?

CB: Both. It’s a point of departure, it’s a starting point and it will increase I think, of course

empirical data has to be provided first, but I’m sure it will, even if people fail, it will make us work

to improve democracy further. So I tend to really keep the positive view on that, but be fully aware

of the limits, which I have mentioned in detail before. So yes I think it will contribute, because I

think it will make us aware much more of how much more we need participatory democracy. It will

not be enough.

SM: Do you think parliamentarians will use the ECI? Do you see this happening?

CB: Yeah I consult already. Parliamentarians are already approaching me, because we consult ECI

organisers. In a formal sense the regulation excludes parliamentarians to be ECI organisers …

SM: Yeah, but they also exclude organisations so. So organisations can’t do this either, right?

CB: Yeah I mean in practical terms of course, this is just a formal thing. But in that sense it will be

always possible for MEPs, but they won’t be able to join in the signatures and so on. And I’m sure

they will support ECIs and that’s OK, that’s also the case at national level and regional level,

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opposition parties and so on they will make use of this. Of course in the European Parliament we

don’t have opposition or governing ruling parties, that’s the bad thing about the European

Parliament; that’s why it’s so boring, because there’s no polarity. The opposition is more the

European Parliament against Council and Commission, that’s where you have the dividing line.

And that underlines and supports the idea that ECIs will be also organised by parliamentarians to

make pressure on the Commission. I’m sure this will happen sometimes. And as I said there’s

already MEPs who have approached me because they start to think about organising. All MEPs are

being consulted by ordinary citizens, asking them to make use of an ECI, asking to support them, so

I’m sure MEPs will be involved in the game.

SM: What actors are approaching you? Like what kind of actors? Is it only parliamentarians or is it

NGOs or which kind of actors are you talking to?

CB: I mean these are the exceptions or the minority compared to the others. It is people from all

different groups, social issues are being promoted, environmental or economic issues. But they are

currently really start to examine the possibility of the ECI, then I send them this little ECI pocket

guidelines, which I sent to you as well and then they realise how challenging it is. Currently one of

the hot issues is for example atomic energy and in this case you see really how difficult it is to make

an ECI. Atomic energy is not a task of the European Union; energy policy as such is up to the

member states. So in a formal sense according to the interpretation of the Commission an ECI about

atomic energy would be inadmissible and you could not do an ECI about it. So what do I say to

them is to look at other at other European or EU policies, which touch the question of energy and

there you see that the Commission and the EU can make proposals on the programme for renewal

energies. So what I then advised to the people from the Atomic Energy Movement is to make an

ECI for renewal energies and at the same time campaign against atomic energy. So you can make

your point, but you cannot exclusively make an ECI for the abolition of atomic energy as such. So

this gives you a picture how tricky the situation is; you always have to bypass or find other ways.

Then other issues are for example initiatives against roaming fees, against animal testing. I don’t

publish them on the website, because they don’t want to be published, because it’s, an ECI

campaign, or Democracy International we are not the organisation, who is responsible for launching

or to publish an ECI, it’s a very sensitive thing. You have to make somehow a surprise in the media.

SM: Is it primarily NGOs who come to you right now?

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CB: It’s NGOs preferably, right or concerned citizens, but primarily it’s NGOs and then maybe

20% also just ordinary citizens, who are not organised, but want to make use of the ECI.

NS: How did they hear about the ECI?

CB: That is a big problem, because nobody really knows. Ordinary citizens have the chance to be

agenda setters of the EU. I think only a few really know about it. Usually they look it up on the

Internet and I’m sure many more people should know about it. I assume they sometimes see or hear

from it in the media. I’m sure once it will be launched in April people will hear and it will be

reported much more wide and people will want to make use of the instrument I can imagine.

Appendix 2:BK – Interview with Bruno Kaufmann

BK: Bruno Kaufmann, NS: Nathalie Søndergaard, SM: Steffen Moses

NS: Where did the idea of the ECI come from?

BK: In the 90es several initiatives and groups proposed, I know about several networks, including

those I’ve been involved with, like a Network called Eurotopia. In this network the idea of a

European Constitution, which includes political rights and direct democracy rights, like initiatives

were formulated and developed. At one of these meetings in 1995 several representatives from

Member States and they translated that into a first proposal. In the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations

in 1996 where Austria and Italy proposed such a citizens initiative right and from there on it was an

official idea, where the Parliament and different political parties were very positive about, so when

it came to the European Convention in 2002-2003 this idea had an actual foundation and during that

time we had this informal working group at the Convention, where this issue was discussed and in

the end finalised in this European Citizens initiative proposal.

NS: Was the ECI inspired by the White Paper on Governance by the Commission with its whole

notion of participatory democracy?

BK: Not really, because this was much more a response by the Commission to meet the need of a

proactive European citizenship notion, because in 1993 was the Maastricht Treaty the whole

European Union citizenship forum was established. It was very long time that only translated into

passiv or non-political citizenship dimensions like Consumer rights, like protection rights, like free

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movements rights, but not as a political notion. And for this reason obviously the understanding

was that there has to be something like a meeting point between the institutions and the citizens, but

this participatory opening was mainly seen as a top down dimension like the Commission can

consult and inform, can do protect, but not in a way that the citizens themselves has the right to

define what the Commission has to do.

NS: What was the role of the Commission when creating the ECI?

BK: On one side they were obviously very interested, a little bit surprised about this new tool, so

they wanted to know more about this direct democracy in a modern concept and context, they got a

little bit more interested, because they knew that this would be an instrument directed to them. But

as long as you can say the treaties was not ratified they were very reluctant to be very active on that

part. Behind the doors of course during the time of Margot Wallström, the Commissioner, there was

a lot of discussion, a lot of interaction between those in the institutions and those outside to prepare

for the later implementation. And as soon as the Lisbon Treaty was ratified, and in fact a few weeks

before, two weeks before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the Commission invited a very broad

consultation in November 2009. So you can say that the Commission obviously understood the

need of being well prepared and they also found a few people, who are really and still are genuinely

interested to make this instrument a success and not just something nice.

SM: And who are they, those people?

BK: In the Commission you have the Secretary General with a team of people who are in charge of

the whole process, the head of this unit is Mario Tenreiro, Portuguese guy, who has been something

like the Godfather of good preparations to the process and now he is also in charge of the

preparation and implementation in the Member States, so he has been very key figure in doing this

work on the Commission side.

SM: You said there were discussions between the Commission and you guys. What was discussed?

BK: During the Convention the Commission was not very much involved, because during the

Convention the Commission had no real stake, that time was the time of politicians, the time of

representatives of the Member States, of the Parliament, of the European Institutions, as observers

more, and that was the time where different political individuals in the Convention worked very

strongly in favour of during something real. I mean there were two tracks, one track was the

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initiative track, the other track was the Pan-European referendum tracks. And for both of these

tracks you can say you got the majority of the members of the Convention behind it, but the

Convention was not fully democratic, but very much run by the Presidium, the president and his

deputies, and in this respect you had Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, who was mainly interested in his

own monumental role and Giuliano Amato, who was the Italian representative, was very much in

favour of this more direct democratic perspective and then you had a former Belgian foreign

minister, who was totally against it, so you had something like a balance in the Presidium. And in

the end it was then Giscard d’Estaing, who understood that there must be something of real material

in this participatory democracy, you cannot just declare it, you have to institutionalised with an

instrument, and this was then the European Citizens Initiative.

SM: Is the Commission controlling the Presidium?

BK: No no, in fact the Convention was a new method to not just let the Member States do all the

work behind closed doors. In the Nice treaties negotiations or in Amsterdam it was a new form,

which was a little bit more open. And in this the Member States were very protective in installing

this type of very, with full authority equipped Presidium, which means you couldn’t vote in the

Convention and the majority won, but the Presidium could filter all proposals and try to finalise the

proposals. So you had to go through this Presidium, but the Presidium was in fact really installed by

the Member States. So with the Commission, the Commission had in fact no role in this Convention

work and was very surprised to then get this new tool presented in 2003.

SM: Surprised in a good way?

BK: Yes and no. Some of them of course had to idea what that would mean, they never had to deal

with citizens as direct partners like that, more like spectators and consumers, those who get the

product, but not like those who give the orders in fact, orders in brackets of course. But still having

the competence to say to the Commission ‘Know you have to look into this issue, and now you

have to consider legislation of that’. So that was a new paradigm, which most people in the

Commission were not prepared for, but it was easily understood that this is a good selling point, so

both Mr. Barosso and several other Commissioners they very much appraised the European

Citizens Initiative. After that they hoped that this would be a good argument to get the

Constitutional Treaty through the popular votes in France and in the Netherlands and in other

countries, so they went out and said ‘This will bring more democracy, the European citizens will

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have more power’. And you can say that Mr. Barosso, after the no in France and the Netherlands,

was very disappointed.

SM: What do you think will be the result of the ECI?

BK: There are many results of course. Firstly is the principle one: of already that in the European

treaties it is established that modern democracy cannot only be based on an indirect way of

delegating powers to others, but it must also be based on participation by the citizens, so you have a

more modern concept of democracy established on the European level. That is one result. Secondly,

you have now a procedure, which is of course very novel to even many Member States, that you

have a tool, where citizens as such become agenda-setters for legislation, which is based not only

on a more direct way as most countries are used to, but also a transnational way, so you can do it

beyond borders, which is very new. And thirdly that it is also based on a way to do it not only on

paper, analogue, but also on a digital way, by electronic signature gathering, you can say a global

new way of gathering signatures for legislative proposals, which are more than just petitions and

opinion measurements. So you have three dimensions, you have new procedure, more direct, more

transnational, more digital and so. Even in that respect you have a new umbrella for that, which is

potentially a little bit revolutionary for democratic development. And then of course in practise will

be the big open question and there we cannot say what will be the result, because we have to wait

what the results will be.

SM: But are you positive towards it will work as you wish?

BK: I’m not sure that I in fact know, how it will work. What I wish is hard to say because on this

level with this way there has never before been such an instrument, so obviously what the hopes

and expectations is that the European Citizens Initiatives can deliver some of the most needed

elements to Europe, as it is much more communication, much more transparency, much more

legitimacy to the decisions made. Something which most people today really don’t feel they see, so

in that way it can deliver a lot, but how much of that good will be delivered is still to be seen.

NS: In a way you think the ECI might be able to create a feeling among the citizens of more

democracy?

BK: Obviously I mean, by looking into the procedure as such, to see that you will need really to

work concretely, nothing will be served on a silver plate. If you do such an initiative you will have

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to invest a lot of time, you will have to invest a lot of communicative energy, you will have to work

across borders with at least seven Member States, you will have to Communicate in many different

languages, so in a way all these efforts of thousands of initiators will of course make a difference,

as well as the fact that millions of people will be confronted with the possibility to support such a

proposal, so you will see that millions of millions of European across all different Member States

will in fact do a democratic act and sign such an initiative. So all this individual actions will of

course change already some of the realities when it comes to Europe. Because today they

understand themselves as spectators and as passive people in this whole European Union policy

system. So that will change and on the other side out, how it will change the institutions, how they

will become much more responsible and interested in what the proto European sovereign is

interested in, that is still to be shown. But of course there will be also ideas of reluctance, of

opposition to this more active citizenry, so we will see if there will be additional conflict and

antagonistic European polity and how much there will be much more of a collaborative deliberative

political sphere.

NS: Will the Commission get more democratic legitimacy through the ECI?

BK: That depends totally on how they are dealing with that. It is an enormous opportunity to finally

get something of a directive democratic legitimacy. If they are ready, if they are offering enough of

resources and they are really investing into this instrument, into this communication, it is of course

a fantastic opportunity for them to be really a partner in European democracy. Or on the other side,

what the Commission, especially Mr. Barosso, is fearing, is that they will much more see that those

who are against this idea, is that they are not able to really appreciate this effort, that they are not

investing enough of human resources into this. And there is of course a risk that the initiative will

only be seen as a disturb factor in the machinery and then it could be the contrary of what many

people would hope for.

SM: You said there were opponents of the ECI, what were the arguments against the ECI?

BK: Like when it comes to sharing powers, even in many Member States, you have of course the

argument that some of those, who are already in power, especially those in political parties,

parliaments or even other establishments, media, science, they just think that the average people is

not prepared enough to be in charge of such rights and most people are not really competent enough

to that. Because they are afraid of losing some of their monopoly of deciding or agenda setting

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power. In this respect of course in the negotiations at the Convention even later there was

something of a, not a very loud, but a opposition you could feel, based on these arguments. In a way

the very open discussions like you have in many Member States, when you discuss the introduction

of such citizens initiative rights, you hadn’t because it was a little bit, the introduction order, the

launch of the instrument was done in a not very transparent way, during the final days of the

Convention, so suddenly the instrument was there. Then you had it there and after that most people,

even in the Parliament, the vote one year ago when it was introduced, the regulation was very

practical, just a few dozens of the parliament were against and more than 600 were in favour. So

you can say that most people in a way in those who were sceptical, they understood that now you

have to accept this fact and you have to like this situation. There are many good arguments for it,

but many people who are a little bit sceptical, maybe they think ‘it will not be as powerful’, as those

in favour would hope for.

SM: So they think as long as the Commission has the right to turn it down, it wont be that

dangerous?

BK: It is not really comparable to the initiative tool in countries or regions, where the people really

have the right to put an issue on the agenda and then also have the right to put a popular vote on the

referenda on the end. So it is a much less powerful instrument, because it is just agenda setting, the

decision-making is still with the institutions. It’s of course communicative wise; it can be a very

powerful way, because communication is one of the main elements of modern democracy and who

is in charge of communication and who can really steer communication of course. So this is an

entry point to a more comprehensive participatory modern democracy and this will have to be

shown how much it will really change and it depends a lot on the surrounding, how much support

there will be around it, how much infrastructure there will be structured and how smart those who

use the instrument will be in using this instrument.

Appendix 3:JPB – Interview with Jens-‐Peter Bonde

JPB: Jeg har stemt for ECI, og jeg har også arbejdet for ECI, men det er ikke min livret. I konventet

arbejdede jeg tæt sammen med folkene fra Democracy International og min andel af det var, at jeg

ønskede at få alle traktater til folkeafstemning og få folkeafstemningskravet fremmet, og de

ønskede at få bestemmelsen om ECI ind, og så var kompromisset, at vi arbejdede for dem begge.

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Derfor arbejdede jeg også for dem, men det er ikke min livret, og det er, fordi det er en lobbyist-

bestemmelse i praksis. Det er jo en bestemmelse, som medicinalselskaber og andre tilsvarende kan

anvende til at få hyppet deres egne kartofler og til at få rejst et lovinitiativ direkte. Det kan også

bruges fornuftigt, men at lade det være en erstatning for rigtig demokrati, det synes jeg ikke, man

kan.

SM: Hvor kommer ideen om ECI fra?

JPB: Det er folkene fra Democracy International. Det er dem, der har bragt det ind. Vi lavede en

samarbejdsgruppe, og vi lancerede ECI på et pressemøde, hvor jeg sad sammen med den tidligere

franske europaminister, Alain Lamassoure. Han sagde, at han var dybt uenig med mig i alt andet

end om, at vores uenighed skulle afgøres ved demokratiske valg og folkeafstemninger – det var

meget flot sagt.

SM: Tror du, at målet med ECI helt oprigtigt er at forbedre demokratiet?

JPB: Ja, de mener, at sådan et borgerinitiativ kan øge demokratiet i EU. Men vi har haft samlet en

million underskrifter for at flytte parlamentets placering fra Strassburg til Bruxelles, men der

behandlede Kommissionen det ikke engang. Altså det læste det ikke. Den ret, man får igennem ECI,

er jo ikke nogen ret til noget som helst andet end at opfordre Kommissionen til at komme med et

forslag. Det rører jo ikke Kommissionen eneret til at komme med forslag på nogen måde.

SM: Så der er ikke forskel på at samle en million stemmer ind før og efter ECI?

JPB: Jo, det er bedre end ingenting. Man kan trods alt lægge pres på en sag.

SM: Hvem får så gavn af ECI?

JPB: Altså NGOer. Den fornuftige del er, at NGOer på tværs af landegrænser kan rejse en sag, men

Kommissionen er ikke forpligtet til at gøre noget som helst ved det. Derfor er det ikke et stærkt

initiativ. Der burde jo have været regler for, at det skulle komme på dagsordenen, og så skulle

Kommissionen og Rådet og Parlamentet tage stilling til det. Altså så man tog sådan et

borgerinitiativ alvorligt. Og det var også det, der skete med vores første initiativ. Godt nok kom det

før reglerne er trådt i kraft, men det havde ikke ændret en tøddel, hvis det var kommet efter.

SM: Ændrer ECI noget på de magtstrukturer, der er i EU?

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JPB: Nej, det er det. Altså, det er et smukt stykke fernis, men det ændrer ikke noget fundamentalt.

Det er Kommissionen og ikke-valgte, der har eneret på at stille lovforslag. Sådan var det før, og

sådan er det efter. Og derfor flytter det ikke rigtig noget. Men jeg synes, at det er sympatisk

stadigvæk. Det er et sympatisk forslag, men det har bare ikke noget at gøre med demokratiet i EU,

for der skal du have fat i ikke-valgtes eneret til at stille forslag.

SM: Kan du huske, hvad Kommissionens rolle var i det her? Arbejdede de imod?

JPB: Nej, de arbejdede ikke imod. Men de ville sikre, at det var et krav, at der skulle være

underskrifter fra forskellige lande. Men det er ikke min erindring, at de arbejdede imod, men det er

jo også formuleret sådan, at det ikke kan genere Kommissionen på nogen måde. Kommissionen

arbejdede benhårdt i hele konventet for, at der ikke blev rørt ved deres eneret til at stille lovforslag.

Den vogter de over.

SM: Vil Kommissionen i virkeligheden gerne have ECI for at få noget mere demokratisk

legitimitet?

JPB: Nej, sådan tænker Kommissionen ikke. Altså, der kan godt være folk i Kommissionen, der

tænker sådan, men som institution tænker Kommissionen kun på deres eneret til at stille lovforslag.

SM: Vil man komme det demokratiske underskud til livs med ECI?

JPB: Det her rører overhovedet ikke ved det demokratiske underskud. Det er det, der er min kritik.

Det er en afledningsmanøvre i forhold til det demokratiske underskud, for det ligger i, at det er

ikke-valgte, som har eneret til at stille lovforslag, det er underskuddet, og så at love kan vedtages af

embedsmænd bag lukkede døre og ikke af folkevalgte. Det er en anden del det demokratiske

underskud. Og det er jo det afgørende. Om du har ret til at indsamle nogle underskrifter, det flytter

ikke noget. Det kunne du jo også før, for der var jo ikke forbud mod at samle underskrifter, så hvad

er ændringen? Der er jo ikke nogen ændring. Du måtte indsamle underskrifter før, du må indsamle

underskrifter efter.

SM: Kan ECI være en god agenda-sætter?

JPB: Ja, det er klart. Altså, vi samlede jo den ene million underskrifter før initiativet kom, og det er

en måde at sætte agenda på. Så det kan have den virkning, at flere får indsamlet nogle flere

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underskrifter på nogle flere emner, og det er glimrende. Men det er som at diskutere en millimeter

på hundrede kilometer. Altså, det ændrer ikke ved EU's demokratiske underskud.

SM: Men tror du, at det kan få almindelige mennesker op af stolene?

JPB: Ja, jeg tror, at det kan være med til at engagere folk til at rejse sager på tværs af grænserne, og

det er gunstigt, det er fornuftigt. Men altså, sådan noget, der foregår på tværs af grænserne, er ikke

for almindelige mennesker, det er sådan nogen som Carsten Berg og mig, der laver den slags. Det er

meget svært at inddrage almindelige mennesker til sådan noget, som foregår på tværs af grænserne.

Men det betyder ikke, at man ikke skal prøve på det. Selvfølgelig skal man prøve på det, men man

skal bare se det som noget, der erstatter det demokrati, der skal være i EU-beslutninger. Det er en

meget, meget lille lap.

SM: Vil ECI betyde, at almindelige mennesker føler sig tættere på EU?

JPB: Nej, jeg tror ikke, at det flytter noget. Det er ikke et mirakelmiddel. Men jeg skrev under på

det, og var med til at arbejde med det. Jeg var bare bange for, at det førte til en afledningsmanøvre i

forhold til at alle love skal vedtages af folkevalgte, og at ikke-valgte ikke skal have eneret til at

stille lovforslag. Det er fuldstændig sygt.

SM: Kan ECI så ligefrem have en negativ effekt?

JPB: Jeg vil ikke sige, at det får en negativ effekt. Det kan fungere som afledningsmanøvre, men det

er jo også en form, som NGOer kan gribe og bruge, ligesom det kan gribes af medicinalfirmaer, så

de kan få solgt deres produkter. Altså, de kan lave en underskriftindsamling på, at EU skal give

tilskud til ditten og datten. Det kan bruges både godt og skidt.

Appendix 4:LLG – Interview with Laust Leth Gregersen

Laust Leth Gregersen: LG, Steffen Moses: SM, Nathalie Søndergaard: NS

When the Lisbon Treaty became effective on midnight December 1st 2009, Concord Denmark did a

political stunt making an online petition to create attention on the ECI and Concord Denmark.

However, it was very small.

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LLG: Det kan overhovedet ikke sammenlignes med at gøre det i virkeligheden, altså under de rigtig

omstændigheder. Men den skabte jo noget debat.

NS: Hvor mange underskrifter fik I samlet ind?

LLG: Ikke ret mange. Totusinde eller sådan noget. Det kræver en eller anden form for politisk

infrastruktur. Jeg tror i virkeligheden ikke, at det er så svært, hvis nu de europæiske

Socialdemokrater kan skrive til, jeg ved ikke lige, hvor mange medlemmer de har, prøv at forestille

jer, hvis man kan skrive ud til samtlige medlemmer af ens parti eller en som man ved er enige med

en alligevel eller Amnesty International eller et eller andet, der har sådan en SMS-service, så har du

altså noget helt andet. Vi havde ingenting, så jeg tror på en eller anden måde, at det kræver, at man

har et eller andet kampagneapparat i forvejen.

SM: Du mener ikke at en mindre NGO, nu er I ret store, kan bruge ECI i virkeligheden?

LLG: Jo, men altså det kommer an på om man taler… Måske kunne Concord netværket som sådan

godt. Men ikke os som sådan bare. Det er slet ikke for Hr. og Fru Jensen.

NS: Det er jo ment til den enkelte borger og i princippet ikke til NGOer.

SM: NGOer må jo faktisk overhovedet ikke lave en ECI. Eller det skal være en enkeltstående

person.

LLG: Ja, men det er jo så, hvad det er. Ligesom politikere, som tilfældigvis er formænd. De

europæiske Socialdemokrater kan jo godt lave det i den egenskab af privatpersoner. Men altså jeg

ved ikke, hvad skal man sige, det her med det demokratiske underskud, altså der er jo ikke tvivl om,

at det her initiativ er lavet som en del af Lissabontraktaten, hvor hovedformålet, eller et af

hovedformålet, der er flere hovedformål, var at gøre EU mere demokratisk. Og så er antagelsen så

jo, at okay det her kan være noget der kan gøre det mere demokratisk; at borgerne kan få mere

direkte adgang til EU. Men der er jo en masse antagelser, som ligger mellem det. Altså hvorfor er

direkte demokrati mere demokratisk end repræsentativt demokrati? I forhold til andre internationale

institutioner så er EU ekstremt demokratisk på den måde, at man kan sige, at der er alle dem der

sidder på pladserne i det mindste folkevalgte. Det er de jo ikke i FN eller i den Afrikanske Union.

Så det kommer meget an på, hvor man sætter barren for, hvad det vil sige at være demokratisk. Nu

er det lang tid siden jeg har læst sådan noget EU studier, men jeg kan godt huske det der med

demokratisk underskud. Jeg kan ikke huske detaljerne i, hvad der ligesom er antagelsen, det er bare

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for at sige, at jeg tror også man skal se det her i en politisk kontekst, hvor dem der har lavet

Lissabontraktaten godt har vidst, at en hovedindvending mod EU er, at der er et demokratisk

underskud. Hvad gør man? Så laver man det her. Det lyder på papiret enormt demokratisk, men jeg

tror lige man skal prøve at tænke igennem, hvad er det lige der gør det her særlig demokratisk

relativt til alt muligt andet? Jeg er helt med på, at man kan gøre mange ting for at gøre EU mere

demokratisk, men er det lige præcis det her, som vil gøre det mere demokratisk? Det har jeg svært

ved at se i virkeligheden.

SM: Hvis man skærer det ud firkantet, så kan man sige at, ideen med det her participatory

democracy, deltagerdemokrati, er det så i ligeså høj grad i din optik et forsøg på at sælge den

demokratiske ide om EU i forhold til at lave det mere demokratisk?

LLG: Ja, men det kan jeg jo ikke sige. Det er jo en tolkning. Det kan jeg jo ikke vide. Det skal man

i virkeligheden spørge dem, som har været med til at lave det. Det, jeg mener med det er bare, det

siger noget om, hvad vores opfattelse af demokrati er. Jeg tror, det er et svar på, at man godt ved, at

mange mennesker tænker ’Hvis det er direkte demokrati, partisipatorisk, så er det mere

demokratisk’. Men er det det? Kan man gøre det i Folketinget for eksempel? Det danske Folketing

har det en mekanisme, hvor du, du kan lave en underskriftindsamling og rejse et eller andet, det kan

du også i EU…

SM: Det er også en af vores tanker. Det er jo i virkeligheden det samme som en

underskriftindsamling, de kan stadig bare sige nej Kommissionen…

LG: Ja, nej, jeg tror ikke, at Kommissionen realpolitisk har råd til, at det første borgerinitiativ, der

lander på deres bord, at sige, at det kan de ikke. Men der er jo sådan nogle tekniske ting, de kan

afvise det på og sige ’det er slet ikke Kommissionen, vi kan ikke fremsætte lovforslag for det er

uforeneligt med et eller andet i traktaten’. Men jeg har svært ved at forestille mig, at de bare kan

afvise det første borgerinitiativ. Det kunne de principielt, men det kan de ikke realpolitisk. Men min

pointe er bare, det er det der med, at ’det er bare en underskriftindsamling’, men det er jo en

underskriftindsamling, hvor der så er en traktatmæssig forpligtelse fra Kommissionen. Det er det

jeg mener. Sådan er det jo ikke, der er ikke nogen andre institutioner, jeg kender til, som har den

mekanisme. Altså du kan lave en underskriftindsamling og lægge politiske pres på den danske

statsminister eller Folketinget, men de er jo ikke forpligtigede på at gøre noget som helst. Der

findes jo ikke andre steder i demokratiske institutioner lignende mekanismer. Så det er bare for at

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prøve at illustrere, at jeg tror, det er fordi, at man har vidst, at der er en generel folkestemning mod

EU og så prøver man at gøre et eller andet. Men hvis man ser ud fra et mere demokratiteknisk

synspunkt, så har jeg svært ved at se et andet sted, der er en lignende mekanisme, eller hvorfor at

det er ’hvis ting skal være mere demokratisk, så skal der naturligvis være et Borgerinitiativ’. Kender

vi det nogen andre steder fra eller i hvilke anden sammenhæng ville man sige, at det er det der skal

til, for at tingene blev mere demokratisk?

SM: Har I tænkt jer at arbejde med det på en eller anden måde overhovedet?

LLG: Ikke decideret herfra. Men jeg har faktisk snakket lidt med den irske platform, som overvejer

måske at gøre det under det irske formandskab i en bredere koalition. Vi er jo et netværk, så det er

meget nødvendigt, at vi prøver at bakke op om det hinanden laver. Jeg får også nogle gange nogle

breve, som beder mig om at sige ’vi har det her problem og Danmark er imod en eller anden ting,

vil I ikke sende det her brev til jeres minister eller jeres parlamentsmedlem’. Så vil jeg jo gerne gøre

det. Det er jo ikke mit initiativ, men jeg bakker op om det i mit netværk. Det er bare for at sige, at i

netværket som sådan er den ikke død. I må have læst lidt på det, har Greenpeace ikke lavet et?

SM: Jo, det gælder bare ikke. De må ikke bruge de underskrifter de har samlet ind.

LG: Det jeg bare mener er, at det viser jo, at det godt kan lade sig gøre. Så er der så nogle

teknikaliteter. Men det illustrerer for mig, Greenpeace er jo også et rigtig stærkt brand i verden og

igen de har alle de her, jeg går ud fra de har enorm mange smslister i forvejen på deres medlemmer

og sindssygt dygtige pressemedarbejdere, alt hvad der skal til for at køre den, og så tror jeg altså

ikke det er særlig svært. Men nej det er ikke for Hr. og Fru Jensen, men for etablerede

interesseorganisationer og partier også. Jeg kunne godt forestille mig også at vi kommer til at se det

her også som en måde man kunne lægge politisk pres. Du kan sige ’Parlamentet opfordrer

Kommissionen til at indføre skat på finansielle transaktioner og vi har i øvrigt også lige lavet et

borgerinitiativ – vi har faktisk nærmest selv spurgt de europæiske borgere og der er altså en million,

der har ’nu skal I forholde jer til det her’’. På den måde kunne jeg godt forestille mig, at man

kommer til at se det brugt. Også partipolitisk.

SM: Din holdning til ECI, det er en form for styrkelse af demokratiet eller er det EU?

LLG: Det har jeg ikke rigtig nogen holdning til. Jeg tror ikke rigtig jeg køber præmissen. Jeg synes

der er så mange mellemregninger før man kan sige… Jeg tror godt jeg kan købe, at der er et

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demokratisk underskud i EU på en eller anden måde, men jeg er ikke sikker på, at jeg synes, at det

er det her, der gør den store forskel enten eller. Men jeg synes, det er interessant, fordi jeg er en EU

nørd og fordi jeg arbejde med det, det er et nyt instrument i værktøjskassen, som vi ikke rigtig

kender virkningen af. Det er også mange gange, hvordan vi som offentlighed modtager det. Bliver

det Breaking News i DR, at der er blevet lavet et borgerinitativ?

SM: Hvis jeg tager de positive briller på, så kunne jeg godt forestille mig, at det kunne ændre folks

opfattelse af demokratiet i EU, hvis det bliver meget branded.

LLG: Ja og måske kan det være, at får dem til at få lyst til at deltage mere. Og i så fald er det jo

indirekte. Så køber jeg det fuldstændig. Men altså jo, lad os sige det, at det skaber et engagement.

Det kunne være at folk ’nu har jeg været med til at skrive under, nu er det pludselig i nyhederne,

også i Frankrig, jeg skulle være med til at skrive det her under, sammen med en eller andet nede i

Tyskland og pludselig skal Barosso faktisk forholde sig til det’. Hvis det er det, der kommer ud af

det, så helt klart. Men igen så er det en afledt effekt. Det er ikke selve mekanismen i sig selv. Men

hvis det er det, den fører til, og det ved vi jo så ikke endnu, så helt klart! Så synes jeg det er fedt.

Hvis det kan skabe noget mere engagement og skabe noget pres også på Kommissionen, som er et

ret tungt apparat, hvis det ku’ få dem til nogle gange lige at skulle reagere lidt hurtigere og være lidt

mere, at det hele ikke er vi’ for gamle og sådan noget. Fedt, helt klart! Bare lige for at sige igen, det

er også derfor jeg tror, at her med den irske platform, at der er helt sikkert mange, der lurer på

ideen. Jeg tror, at når det træder i kraft, så tror jeg altså, at vi vil se en del organisationer, som har

noget liggende i skuffen.

SM: Vi snakkede med Carsten Berg for et par dage siden, Campaign Director for ECI, han siger

også, at han allerede taler med mange, som prøver. Men at der også er nogle teknikaliteter, som gør

det lidt svært, der er nogle specifikke områder.

LLG: Ja, det er simpelthen for dumt at sætte det i gang og så bliver det… Det vil kræve, at man

læser på lektien. Der vil jeg nærmest tro, at man skal have noget juridisk bistand. Det er jo bare ikke

sådan noget igen, at Hr. og Fru Jensen bare lige sidder og screener en traktat, om det er EU

kompetence. Men det er jo ikke fordi det er umuligt. Det er jo ikke umuligt, hvis man er

Socialdemokraterne eller Greenpeace. Men helt klart, det kræver noget arbejde. Men det gør en god

underskriftindsamling i Danmark også. Der er ikke nogen, der går ud og samler en masse

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underskrifter her uden at have en klar kampagnestrategi og et budskab. Så fair nok. Ja, så jeg glæder

mig bare til at se, hvad som kommer ud af det.

SM: Vi blev lidt enige om, at det mest er NGOer, for eksempel, der mest kan bruge det og så

politiske partier. Opfatter du NGOer som en eller anden form for repræsentanter for befolkningen?

LLG: Det kan vi i hvert godt fald godt lide at sige vi er. Folkelige organisationer. Så jo, det er vi

vel. Men vi er jo også interesseorganisationer ligesom alt muligt andet. Man kan sige, at forskellen

mellem en NGO, i virkeligheden er en virksomhed jo også en NGO, hvis det var, Non-Govermental

Organisation, men altså NGOer kan i hvert fald godt lide at afbillede sig selv som det, som forener

dets medlemmer og det det repræsenterer i befolkningen er et eller andet, som er i almen interesse,

frem for, hvis man er i Dansk Industri, eller LO, så er man jo en interesseorganisation, som

varetager en hel bestemt gruppe menneskers interesser. Sådan mere egen-interesseret. Hvor vi vil jo

sige sådan noget med, at vi repræsenterer, vi giver verdens fattige din stemme. Det er selvfølgelig

også interessevaretagelse, men det er sådan mere idealistisk. Så på den måde er det jo helt klart, at

det her passer perfekt ind i NGOers fortælling om sig selv. Men jeg kan huske da jeg var til debat,

den der debat, som jeg tror I har fundet mig igennem, der var Søren Søndergaard der jo også. Og

han er jo meget EU-skeptisk. Og det han sagde var, at det der kommer til at ske med det her er, at

du vil se industrien, altså de store medicinalvirksomheder og sådan noget, de har jo så mange

penge, så de kommer bare til at pumpe initiativet ud. Det er jeg lidt i tvivl om det er rigtigt, for jeg

tror ikke, jeg tror, at hvis jeg nu var spindoktor sådan et sted, politisk strateg, så tror jeg, at jeg ville

lige præcis sige ’det her, det er mod narrativen om industrien i samfundet’. Altså jeg tror faktisk det

kan være med til, for så får man præcis den der, jeg tror der er rigtig mange ude på gaden, der så vil

tænke ’hvad er det lige for noget, at Novo Nordisk vil have mig til at skrive under på noget

medicinal?’. Det passer ikke ind i vores billede af dem, hvorimod det passer meget bedre med en

der har en Greenpeace hat på, og siger vi vil redde chimpansen. Så på den måde kan man sige, det

ligger mere, og her igen, det er jo ikke nogen institutionelle juridiske ting, her er vi ovre i noget

politisk normativt. Der ligger det her super meget til NGOer.

SM: Man kan også lidt firkantet sige, at det også er mest venstreorienterede bevægelser, de gode

sager, de politiske korrekte sager?

LLG: Jo, men kunne man ikke også forestille sig… Ej, men der er faktisk også nogle lidt bedre

eksempler, nu fik jeg fremstillet ham måske lidt uretfærdigt, Søren Søndergaard. Hvad med sådan

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noget, et burkaforbud for eksempel? Det er eddermanme lettere at skaffe en million underskrifter

eller et forbud af Islam i offentlige rum? Det tror jeg også, I vil komme til at se.

NS: Det ligger garanteret på national politisk niveau, mere end EU politisk.

LLG: Men der er jo nogle utroligt stærke fraktioner. Dansk Folkeparti står jo ikke alene med deres

EU skepsis og deres…

NS: Nej, det var mere, at Kommissionen må ikke lovgive på national politisk niveau.

LLG: Nej nej, der er jo så nogle teknikaliteter i det. Det var faktisk noget af det, den her debat. Jeg

ved ikke om den blev streamet, den kunne være meget interessant for jer at se, for jeg mener at de

diskuterede det. Ham, der var der fra Kommissionen, som jo faktisk er dansker, der har siddet og

kørt det ind, han sagde ’slap af, det der kan EU slet ikke lovgive om’. Det er bare for at sige, at de

skal lave den samme øvelse med at finde tingene. Jeg vil ikke afvise, at man kan finde et eller andet

nationalistisk tiltag.

SM: Ja, det snakkede vi også med Carsten Berg om. Han mente, de rådgav også i, hvad man så kan

gøre. Og det kan godt være EU ikke kan lovgive om et burkaforbud, men så kan man så lave nogle

forslag, der skubber i retning af det.

LLG: Ja præcis. Du kan også bare lave symbolpolitik. Og så har jeg det også sådan, at hvis vi ikke

kan acceptere det, så accepterer vi jo heller ikke mekanismen, så det må man jo ligesom også tage

med. At de der ting kan blive rejst. Og så igen, hvis det kan få os til at tage en debat om det her, kan

få nogen til at reagere, jamen så fint med mig. Det er der jo folk der mener i Europa, og det, jeg er

jo meget uenig personligt, men det ville være udemokratisk at sige, at det må det ikke handle om, så

forsvinder ideen jo for eksempel.

SM: Vores fokus er nu meget på, hvem der arbejdede for og hvem der gerne ville have ECI til at

ske, og hvem der ikke så gerne ville have det til at ske.

LLG: Jeg synes hele diskussion af, hvad er det for en opfattelse, vi har af demokrati, og EU selv har

en opfattelse af, hvorfor gør det her os mere demokratiske. Det var i virkeligheden det jeg prøvede

på at starte med. Hvis man lige kradser lidt i overfladen. Det er interessant, at det virker så intuitivt

meningsfuldt for os alle sammen, ’yes, vi hvis vi laver et Borgerinitiativ, så bliver EU mere

demokratisk’. Sådan tror jeg også jeg tænkte, men hvis jeg lige tænker mig om to gange, hvorfor

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egentlig det? Altså det tror jeg siger mere om, hvad det er for en fortælling, vi har i vores hoveder

om, hvad EU er i udgangspunktet.

SM: Det er jo lige præcis den fortælling, EU prøver at lave om. Det demokratiske underskud

handler jo i lige så høj grad om, at befolkningen opfatter det som i demokratisk underskud.

LLG: Ja. Det er interessant, og det er også derfor, det er interessant, det vi sidder og taler om her.

Det ved vi jo egentlig ikke endnu. Vi har forskellige opfattelser, som garanteret afspejler, om man

er pro-EU eller mod EU og om man så tænker ’Yes, det bliver godt’. Men jeg tror det vigtige er at

holde fast i, at det ved vi i hvert fald ikke, men jeg er klart støtter, hvis det har den afledte effekt, at

folk opfatter eller bliver mere engageret i EU. Pointen er bare, det er for tidligt at sige. Men jeg

synes det er meget rigtigt formuleret. Det handler om, hvad det er for en opfattelse, folk har og om

det på en eller anden måde er en reaktion på det.

Appendix 5:AL – Written interview with Alain Lamassoure

Q: Who had the initial idea of the ECI?

AL: The idea has been suggested to Jürgen Meyer and myself at the European Convention by

representatives of the civil society and NGOs working on direct democracy. We both decided to

take it up to the Convention and the Convention approved it. It was one of its final decisions.

Q: Why was the ECI created?

AL: The idea behind this proposition was to bridge the gap between the citizens and the EU

institutions : by giving the citizens a way to seize the Commission directly, We thought that we

would ensure that the Commission will deal with matters that interest and concern the citizens

Q: Who do you deem the most important supporters and opponents to the ECI?

AL: There were no real opponents, some members of the European Parliament were a bit reluctant

at first for the fear of being kept out of the loop, but these fears were rapidly dismissed once the first

exchange of views took place in the Committee on Constitutional Affairs. A few Member States

were also a bit worried or did not feel the need for ECIs but they also changed their mind during the

negotiation process.

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Q: What was the role of the Commission when creating the ECI?

AL: The Commission was in charge of drafting a regulation to implement article 11 of the Treaty.

To this end, it organised a wide public consultation to gather stakeholders' views of how the ECI

could work in practice.

Once the formal draft regulation had been put forward, the Commission remained very involved in

the interinstitutionnal decision-making progress in accordance with the Treaty provisions on co-

decision. It was represented at every meeting and it has been listened to with great care as it will be

the main implementing institution for the ECI.

Q: Who will be able to make an ECI? Citzens, MEPs or NGOs?

AL: Only natural persons, i.e. citizens of the European Union, will have the right to launch an ECI.

Initially, the Commission had suggested that legal persons would also be entitled to launch ECIs but

the European Parliament felt that they have other means to communicate with the EU institutions

and that this instrument had to be kept in the citizens' hands.

MEPs will have the opportunity to join a citizens' committee launching an ECI but they will not be

counted within the seven citizens coming from seven different Member States that the committee

must gather. The Parliament proposed this restriction itself so that MEPs would not be able to make

use of this instrument and would leave it to the citizens.

Q: Will the Commission get more democratic legitimacy through the ECI?

AL: The ECI provides the Commission with an opportunity to address the issues that interest the

citizens on their day-to-day life. Hence, it gives it an opportunity to "reconnect" with the citizens

and to put an end to the impression that it is far away from them

But, anyhow, one shall bear in mind that, in accordance with the treaties, the Commission will be

the only one deciding to put forward or not a legislative proposal once an ECI will have succeeded.

As a result, there is a risk that it might be criticised if it decides not to draft legislative proposals too

often.

Q: Do you think the ECI will increase the citizen participation in the EU?

AL: I hope so and I am confident that it will. It might take some time for the citizens' to be aware of

the existence of the ECI and of the way to use it but I believe that the first successful ones will show

the path and will be followed by many others.

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Q: Will the ECI be able to create a feeling amongst the citizens of more democracy?

AL: It has been designed to give them a chance to be listened to, to make sure that their concerns

are being taken into account when drafting EU laws thus enhancing a better understanding of the

EU institutions and, hopefully, more confidence in them.

A study of how the European Citizens’ Initiative was created and how it is related to democracy

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