A Framework for the Analysis of Peace Agreements and Lessons Learned: The Case of the Sudanese...

A Framework for the Analysis of Peace Agreementsand Lessons Learned: The Case of the Sudanese

Comprehensive Peace AgreementOsman Antwi-Boateng

University of Delaware

Geraldine Maria O’MahonyUniversity of Wisconsin-Madison

Using a ‘Metrics Framework for Accessing Conflict Transformation andStabilization’ developed by the United States Institute of Peace, thisstudy analyzes the effectiveness of the 2005 Sudanese ComprehensivePeace Agreement in dealing with the underlying causes of conflict. Weaim to draw out and develop several important lessons for futureinternational mediators. These lessons are: the recognition that goodtiming is essential for a successful outcome; the importance of acompletely neutral and independent mediator; the clear definition of therole of international parties in order to prevent abuse by parochialinterests; the necessity of identifying all aggrieved parties and issuesfor inclusion in the process; the importance of an international presenceon implementation mechanisms; the provision of overarching reviewmechanisms; the inclusion of specifics on key issues such as theintegration of ex-combatants; and, finally, the need to apply lessonsidentified and learned.

This article examines the effectiveness of the 2005 SudaneseComprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in tackling the underlyingcauses of the Sudanese civil war, in providing mechanisms/institutionsfor their enforcement, and in establishing a framework for peaceand stability. To do so, we utilize a modified version of the ‘MetricsFramework for Accessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization,’developed—under the auspices of Dr. Michael Dziedzic—by the UnitedStates Institute of Peace (USIP). The study is organized according to thefollowing criteria set out by the USIP (2007, 4): political moderationand stable democracy, internal and external security, the rule of law,economic sustainability, and social well-being.

Politics & Policy, Volume 36, No. 1 (2008): 132-178. Published by Blackwell Publishing Inc.© The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement—Sudan

After two-and-a-half years of painstaking internationally sponsorednegotiations between the main protagonists in Africa’s longest civilwar—the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the rebel SudanPeople’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)—the Sudanese CPAwas signed on January 9, 2005. At its core is a six-year interim periodwith democratic elections by 2009, and an autonomous Southerngovernment to be followed by a self-determination referendum for theSouth in 2011. As part of its interim provisions, the CPA establishespower- and wealth-sharing arrangements aimed at ending the decadesof political and economic marginalization of the South—one of themajor causes of conflict—and guarantees proportional representationin Sudan within federal government institutions (International CrisisGroup 2006, 1).

The death of John Garang, the new vice president of the post-peaceagreement government who died in a plane crash three weeks after theCPA was signed, has complicated the political picture in Sudan and theprospects for a sustained peace. Over the previous 20 years, Garangsuccessfully united the many disparate political and ethnic groups ofthe South to form a cohesive opposition force to the North’s use ofmanipulation to exacerbate differences among groups. This force alsohelped create the ‘hurting stalemate’ which brought both sides to thenegotiation table and eventually led to the peace agreement. Garangwas a unifying force for the South, providing a sense of national identityfor southerners based on their common opposition to the North and theIslamist and Arabic character of the government. Garang provided astrong Southern voice, which could speak in opposition to the excessesof the Northern leaders from within the government, a voice whichthe state as a whole now lacks. His death also removes a potentialvoice within the new unification government supporting the Darfurrebels. Although his death places further strain on the tenuous peaceagreement, preexisting weaknesses indicate that the peace wouldnevertheless have suffered regardless of his continued involvement.

The Road to NegotiationsInternal as well as external factors played a significant role in the

willingness of the NCP-led Sudanese government to negotiate with the

Antwi-Boateng/O’Mahony The Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement 133

SPLM/A and vice versa. Internally, all parties engaged in the civil warhad come to a position of a ‘hurting stalemate.’ A hurting stalemateis a situation where each side in a conflict comes to the determination,following a cost/benefit analysis, that outright military victory isunlikely or impossible and so there is more to be gained from a cessationof hostilities and engagement in the negotiation process thanmaintaining the status quo of violent conflict. While the Sudanesegovernment remained ‘the most powerful and best organized politicalforce in the Sudan’ (International Crisis Group 2006, 18), it found itselfin a contentious situation as it struggled to hold its political base in theNorth, which was under siege from Islamic hardliners and contain theDarfur rebellion in the West. At the same time, the Dinka-led SPLM/A,which had reunited with its Nuer allies after the latter had waged adeadly war of attrition against it throughout the 1990s with the supportof the Khartoum-based government, realized the threat to its leadershipin an open-ended conflict. ‘The conflict during the 1990s between theDinka-dominated mainstream SPLM/A and various Nuer-dominatedSPLM/A factions produced more bloodshed, and many more civiliandeaths, than the battle against the Khartoum government’ (Branch andMampilly 2005, 4).

Externally, Khartoum had increasingly become a pariah stateafter harboring Osama bin Laden in the 1990s and for its support ofterrorism. A desire to end its pariah status and normalize its relationswith the West, and initially, a fear of potential U.S. reprisals afterSeptember 11th due to its links to Islamic terrorism was a catalyst forthe Sudanese government to opt for a peace process. In addition,United States’ resolve to fully engage in conflict resolution in globalhotspots in the aftermath of 9/11 put the Khartoum government onnotice that it needed to pursue a negotiation track or face the wrath ofWashington.

The SPLM/A never fully recovered from the loss of operationalbases in Ethiopia when the Mengistu regime, which had providedfinancial and military support, was overthrown in May 1991 byKhartoum-backed rebels. ‘[T]he new regime was composed of rebelgroups which were backed by the Sudanese government . . . theywere hostile to the SPLM/A and Garang was left with no choice butto evacuate his military base’ (Waihenya 2006, 71). Although theSPLM/A was a motivated force, its military campaign was heavily

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dependent on external support and the loss of Ethiopia’s support wasa reminder that dependency could not sustain an open-ended war. Inaddition, regional sympathizers of the SPLM/A, such as Kenya andUganda, exerted pressure to pursue a negotiated path. Kenya’s retiringPresident Moi, who had been very accommodating to the SPLM/A, wasbent on bequeathing a legacy of brokering peace in Sudan. This isevident in his appointment of one of his closest aides, Lt. Gen. LazaroSumbeiywo, as the mediator in the negotiations and offering to host theprocess. President Museveni of Uganda was deeply embroiled in theDemocratic Republic of Congo conflict, in addition to its militaryassistance to the SPLM/A, and as such saw a peace process as awelcome relief.

Political Strategy–Political Moderation and Stable Democracy

The objective of the international community for any politicalstrategy of a peace agreement is to ensure that the competition forpower and political grievances that degenerated into conflict is beingaddressed through nonviolent processes and participatory institutionsunder continuous and sustainable international oversight. The long-term objective is to ensure that political and participatory processes aretransparent and operate effectively without the need for internationaloversight over the competition for power (Waihenya 2006, 7). Thefollowing goals, set out by the USIP (2007) for this category, providegood nodal points for the subsequent discussion in this section.

GoalsDiminish the Drivers of Conflict (If present, were these factorsdiminished?)• Political Grievances• Competition for Absolute Power• External Destabilization

Strengthen Institutional Performance (If weak or non-existent, how werethese factors strengthened?)• Peace Settlement• Delivery of Essential Government Services1

• Governmental Legitimacy, Responsiveness, and Accountability


• Political Parties and Electoral Process• Respect for Minority Rights• Citizens’ Participation and Civil Society• Free and Responsible Media (USIP 2007)

Political Grievances—Who or What Was Excluded?In principle, the political grievances of both sides of the conflict

(vis-à-vis the unity of Sudan for the government and the right toautonomy and eventual autonomy for the SPLM/A) were addressedby the CPA. However, it was only agreed by two factions. Not allaggrieved parties (e.g., Northern opposition parties such as theNational Democratic Alliance, Sudan National Labor Party, andthe Sudanese Women’s Association) were invited to participate in thenegotiations. The CPA thus ignored intra-regional differences andassumed that the NCP-led government and the SPLM/A represented ahomogenous bloc in the regional divide. ‘The emergence of a rebellionamong the Muslim African population of Darfur in the west has furtherput into question the primacy of the North–South divide’ (Branch andMampilly 2006, 12). Furthermore, the Darfur rebellion can serve as astark warning about the future if those aggrieved parties neglected, whowere at the negotiating table, decide to act as spoilers through violence.

The prospects of Southern independence emanating from a futurereferendum can serve as a double-edged sword. While the prospectsof Southern independence assuage SPLM/A concerns, it could set adangerous precedent for other regions of Sudan with grievances againsteither the NCP-led government in Khartoum or Southern tribes—suchas the Nuer and the Equatorian tribes that have traditionallycomplained about the dominance of the Dinka in the SPLM/A. Afeeling of insecurity about a Dinka-led independent government in theSouth could fuel more conflict amid calls for secession.

Additionally, the CPA failed to bind the NCP government and theSPLM/A to internal democratic principles in order to ensure that achange in leadership would not affect implementation. A similarneglect in the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement proved costly as themilitary junta that overthrew the Nimeiri regime abrogated the wholeagreement. Indeed, Johnson noted in 2004 that ‘Southern Sudanese,having gained the right to self-determination, still have to decide howto govern themselves, and who is to govern. Northern Sudanese have


been denied a similar right to freely choose whether or not they wantan Islamist state’ (Johnson 2004, 126). Currently, a tenuous unity existsamong the leadership of the SPLM/A under a complex tribal arithmeticin which former Nuer renegade Riek Machar is now second incommand to Salva Kiir. With no internal democratic structures for thechange of leadership, any leadership shuffle could awaken old intra-Southern wounds or unbalance the Islamist coalition and jeopardizeimplementation.

Competition for Absolute PowerOne of the main areas of concern for the CPA was the problem of

absolute power. The GoS had been a one-party government, excludingvoices of mediation and opposition and marginalizing southerners, thusfueling the conflict. Throughout the course of the conflict, both sidessaw their differences as irreconcilable and thus found little incentive tonegotiate, preferring to engage in force to attain their goals. The agreedprinciples of the CPA set out to diminish the specter of a zero-sum gameby simultaneously recognizing two crucial areas of concern to bothsides: territorial integrity and Southern grievance of political, economic,and cultural discrimination. The CPA states that ‘the unity of theSudan is and shall be the priority of the Parties and it is possible toredress the grievances of the people of South Sudan and to meet theiraspirations within such a framework’ (Johnson 2004, 152). Thisaddresses the territorial integrity concerns of the government, which hascontinuously claimed that it was waging a war against a secessionistinsurgency. The SPLM/A’s key demand of regional autonomy andself-determination was also captured in the CPA, which recognized theright of Southern Sudanese to ‘control and govern affairs in theirregion and participate equitably in the National Government’ with theright to eventual ‘self-determination inter alia, through a referendumto determine their future status’ (Waihenya 2006, 152). Whereas thegovernment can claim victory by securing the territorial integrity ofSudan, the SPLM/A can also claim the same by securing the right toregional autonomy and, in the long run, the possibility of independencevia a referendum.

The peace deal poses a real threat to many groups associated withthe NCP regime that signed the CPA under some duress to both deflectinternational pressure over Darfur and strengthen its domestic power


base by securing a partnership with the SPLM/A. Most membersrecognize that the free and fair elections required in 2009 would likelyremove them from power. Many also fear that the self-determinationreferendum will produce an independent South, thus costing Khartoummuch of its oil and other mineral wealth. There are signs that the NCPseeks to undercut implementation through its use of the militias(SSDF), bribery, and tactics of ‘divide and rule.’ It actively encourageshostility between Southern groups, with the hope that intra-Southfighting will prove sufficiently destabilizing that the referendum can bepostponed indefinitely.

External DestabilizationThroughout the over two decades of the Sudanese conflict, both

sides were heavily aided militarily and financially by external forces,particularly neighboring countries. For a long time, the Northern-basedSudanese government was supported by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,Iraq, Libya (for a brief period), and later Iran, while the SPLM/Aenjoyed the support of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya. The CPAacknowledged this and introduced provisions to diminish suchcontentious influences by stipulating that ‘parties appreciate the threatand menace that the foreign insurgency groups pose on the security andstability of the Sudan and neighboring countries’ (USIP 2005, 14). Itconsequently called on the parties to ‘work together to disarm,repatriate or expel these groups as soon as possible’ (14). However,during the negotiations, these regional players, who helped fuel theconflict, were not invited to participate directly or even as observers.Their presence could have solicited some commitment in the form ofconcrete provisions in the CPA, legally binding them to stop theirdestabilizing support of any party.

Strengthening the Peace SettlementThe CPA includes detailed and unambiguous provisions that call

for monitoring and verification of various components of the peaceagreement. The Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC) is the politicaldecision-making body mandated to strengthen the peace settlement.Key among its mandates is to ‘provide a political forum for continuousdialogue between the Parties and the international community’ (USIP2005, 15). Its strength is its inclusiveness, composed of representatives


of the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A and complemented by astrong international presence from the Intergovernmental Authorityon Development (IGAD) and membership of the UN SpecialRepresentative or his deputy (14). The advantage of having regional/international presence in this important commission is that they canhelp settle peacefully any disagreement that might arise between the twoparties. Also, the presence of the international community helps fosteran atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation among the two partiesas both sides would not want the international community to blamethem for reneging on their agreed responsibilities. Nevertheless, theexclusion of other factions—such as the Eastern Nuba Mountaingroups, SLA, or JEM—could undermine the peace settlement if theydecide to act as spoilers over their exclusion. Another strengtheningmechanism for the success of the CPA is the mode of decision makingby the national executive, which calls for a ‘partnership and collegialdecision-making process within the institution of the Presidency inorder to safeguard the Peace Agreement’ (Waihenya 2006, 161). Theadvantage of such a process is that it builds consensus and trust amongthe political elites and eliminates one faction’s dictatorship that has longbeen a grievance of the Southern Sudanese.

Citizen Participation and Civil SocietyThe two parties are eliteven and led by their respective “strong

men.” The negotiations were largely seen as between two men, Garangand Sudanese Vice President Taha without any attempt to involve thegrassroots. This may prove problematic in the future when thereis a leadership change in any of the parties and new interpretations ofthe CPA emerges. Already there are signs of trouble brewing withSalva Kiir, the new leader of the SPLM/A, who is seen as being morecommitted to independence and less committed to the notion of oneSudan—unlike his predecessor John Garang. There could also be anincentive for the NCP or the SPLM/A to return to war if either sidesuffers significant electoral losses in the 2009 elections or does not makethe gains they anticipate.

One mechanism that can strengthen the peace process by being awatchdog and educative tool to the grassroots on both sides is a viablecivil society. However, years of oppressive rule in the North saw mostcivil society groups outlawed and decades of instability in the South


hardly presented the opportunity for the emergence of any civilorganizations because all attempts were focused in rallying around theSPLM/A.

Until the 1980s, Sudan had a relatively strong and well-developedcivil society based primarily in the north of the country. However,politically engaged civil society organizations like trade unionshave increasingly been restricted by the state or supplanted by newwelfare-based or issue-based organizations encouraged by theregime or by international development and relief agencies.(Hassan 2006)

Although it would have been useful to see provisions for the supportof civil society on both sides, there was no one at the negotiating tableto make the case for civil society. After the first major breakthrough innegotiations that culminated in the signing of the Machakos Protocol,for instance, the Sudanese Women’s Association in Nairobi wrote to themediator, Gen. Sumbeiywo: ‘[w]e confirm our willingness and ourability to play a crucial and useful role in this process and believe thatIGAD will support the effective participation of women in the peaceprocess for the Sudan’ (Waihenya 2006, 92). However, their offer wastreated as an attempt to jump on the bandwagon of success, given thatthey had not forcefully advocated for inclusion at the onset ofnegotiations, and hence they were rebuffed (92-3).

Another major obstacle to the success of the peace agreement isthe political memory and culture of Sudan. In the five decades sinceindependence, the transfer of power has been characterized by the coupd’etat rather than peaceful transition. Should the peace agreementsurvive the challenges of the interim period and a new unity governmentbe formed, the new administration would be the state’s fourthtransitional government. The previous transitional governments tookpower after independence, after the 1964 coup, and again after thedownfall of Nimairi. Following such a long period of political instability,confidence and trust in the government will be difficult for any rulingparty to build among what is largely a disillusioned population.

Free and Responsible MediaIn order to have an active, participatory and vibrant civil society,

there is the need for a free and responsible media. Although GoS


maintains repressive media laws that stifle political dissent, the CPAmakes provision for impartial dissemination of its contents. As partof provisions outlining the duties of the Government of NationalUnity (GNU), there is a stipulation that ‘the GNU shall implementan information campaign throughout Sudan in all national languagesto popularize the Peace Agreement, and foster national unity,reconciliation and mutual understanding’ (USIP 2005, 162). Thisprovision is crucial in creating public ownership of the CPA, therebylimiting the potential for distortions and misinformation that might beinimical to peace.

Respect for Minority RightsAddressing Southern marginalization concerns in the area of

government jobs, the CPA called for a new national service that isrepresentative of the people of Sudan and that ‘to create a sense ofnational belonging and address imbalances in the National CivilService, a National Civil Service Commission shall be established’(Waiheya 2006, 163). In addition, linguistic discrimination againstSouthern languages was recognized and addressed with a clearprovision that ‘all indigenous languages are national languages, [that]shall be respected, developed and promoted’ (163). This provisionrequires a census, given one has not been taken in decades. One wasslated for 2006 but never occurred.

While the CPA guaranteed the right of exemption for southernersfrom some of its Islamist prescriptions, non-Muslims in the North donot have that same right. Not only does the CPA treat both areas asbeing ethnically and religiously homogenous, it also discounts thepossibility of variations among beliefs and practices of Muslims andthe fact that not all Muslims in the North subscribe to the strict,conservative vision of Islam implemented by the GoS. Islamist politicsand parties have a strong position within Sudan and have a profoundimpact on the entire state, Islamic or not. The Islamist parties,therefore, while based in the North and seen in opposition to the South,do not represent the whole North, leaving parts of the populationeffectively disenfranchised. The North is not a unitary block with asingle identity, but it is dominated by minority Islamist parties whocontrol both the region and the state. Thus, while the CPA guarantees


minority rights geographically, it fails to address the rights of minoritieswithin the regional divide.

Governmental Legitimacy, Responsiveness, and AccountabilityA census was scheduled for 2006, two years from the signing of the

peace accord, as the last census was taken in 1982. As of November2007, the census has not yet taken place and there is no clear date set.This census will make it possible to hold general elections halfwaythrough the transitional period in 2009. Two other protocols, signed inMay 2004, provide for interim regional administrative systems forAbyei state, on the frontier between Bahr-al-Ghazal and Kordofan, forthe Nuba mountains and the Southern Blue Nile province. Theseregions have mixed Arab and African populations and, although in theNorth, have been the targets of SPLM/A incursions. The last protocolswere signed at Naivisha, Kenya on December 31, 2004 and amended anumber of provisions of the agreement on security arrangements andthe timetable for the implementation of the other protocols.

The main shortcoming of these protocols is a result of the nature ofthe signatories. The regime is the direct descendant of the IslamicNational Front (INF), a fundamentalist Muslim movement that took7 percent of the vote in the last free elections (April 1986). Evencrediting the regime with a peace dividend, it is hard to believe that itrepresents more than 15 percent of the electorate. Furthermore, theSPLM/A, which is designated as the sole political partner of the regime,is far from being in control of the whole of the South. Thisnondemocratic approach continues to alienate large numbers of thepopulation who have no voice in the central government and who areroutinely ignored by political and economic legislation. Wars andregional division have further split the state between those who arerepresented and those who are not.

This division has, in many ways, forced those not in power into analliance of necessity, giving them a wider support base across what areotherwise separately identified ethnic and cultural groups, particularlyin the South. The Southern political parties that existed in 1986 haveremained in the background, yet they potentially represent a significantforce. The anti-SPLM/A militias that have been long used by thegovernment are much more than just organizations of collaboratorswithout local backing. The SPLM/A—whose ethnic base is mostly


Dinkas in the Bor region—is hardly popular with the major Nuer ethnicgroup nor among the tribes of the equatorial zone. Even if displacedpersons and refugees are included, given that the South accounts foronly 25 to 30 percent of Sudan’s total population, the signatories of theaccords have the backing of only about 30 percent of Sudanese people.The remaining 70 percent clearly represent a major unknown factor forthe elections. Should the elections return members of other parties asthe winners, this could provide a major incentive for a return to conflict,as there would no longer be a stalemate.

Political Parties and Electoral ProcessAlthough the CPA is very strong on the recognition of minority

rights and provides a vast improvement over the status quo ante, itsfocus is on group rights along the regional and ethnic divide. It doesnot, however, provide a mechanism for group representation (such asthrough political parties). Rather, the CPA provides slots in thegovernment to be occupied by the major parties without regard to howthey are filled. This is evident in the CPA’s overwhelming emphasison the NCP-led Sudanese government and the SPLM/A as the major“political parties” competing for political power. For instance, inpending elections, the CPA allocates seats to various parties in thelegislature of Southern Sudan through ‘an inclusive, constituentlegislature comprised of the SPLM[/A], which will be represented by70 percent, the NCP 15 percent, and the other Southern political forces,15 percent’ (Waihenya 2006, 166), but there is no mechanism tostrengthen the capacities of these parties. These parties do not have atrack record of internal democracy that promotes democraticcompetition to elect its leaders and, as such, one would have expectedlanguage in the CPA establishing domestic and internationalmechanisms that would assist in developing and nurturing democraticpolitical parties.

In addition, because of the regional/ethnic dimension of the conflict,the two dominant parties do not have an inclusive membership and aremainly organized along ethnic and tribal lines. The CPA provides noincentive for the two major political parties to attempt to organize onuniversal principles and on issues instead of on narrow parochialinterests that might lead to zero-sum politics by the elites. Yet theDinka-led SPLM/A has been compelled to enter into a delicate political


alliance with its arch-Southern rivals the Nuer by ceding the secondleadership position in the Southern government to Riek Machar, aNuer. This may be seen as a marriage of convenience aimed atsurmounting a major foe in Khartoum, but the question that mayarise is: what happens the day after a potential Southern Sudaneseindependence? A society that is not used to the concept of inclusivepolitical parties could succumb to the temptation of a one-party systemor partisan politics with disastrous consequences.

Nevertheless, to the credit of the CPA, it does provide a mechanismfor establishing an independent National Electoral Commission to be setup by an all-inclusive National Constitutional Review Commission.Such an institution will be crucial in organizing and ensuring the integrityof the much-anticipated referendum on the status of Southern Sudan.

Delivery of Essential Government ServicesAccording to the provisions of the CPA, the onus for the delivery

of essential government services and development in the South lieswith the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) which ‘shall dischargeits obligations and exercise such rights and powers in regard toadministration, financial security and development issues as is set for inthe Southern Sudan Constitution, the Interim National Constitution,the Peace Agreement and any other agreement relating to thereconstruction and development of the Southern Sudan’ (Waihenya2006, 167). As much as this provision is laudable in that it empowers theSouth to take their destiny into their own hands, it fails to provide amechanism to address the institutional deficiencies that the new GoSSwas about to inherit. During the war, ‘there was a minimal level ofadministration in the government controlled garrison towns, and evenless in most of the SPLM/A-controlled South, leaving little in the way ofstructures upon which to build the new government’ (InternationalCrisis Group 2006). This situation will seriously hamper the capacity ofthe Southern government to deliver much needed essential services. TheCPA should have made provision for concerted approaches by theinternational community to assist rapidly in the restoration of somebasic amenities in the short term to enable the government to providebasic services (roads and health clinics). The mechanism is needed inaddition to the vast presence of the international NGOs currentlyencamped in Southern Sudan. Furthermore, part of the wealth-sharing


provisions acknowledges the huge infrastructural disadvantage of theSouth vis-à-vis the North and calls for construction/reconstruction to be‘brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and publicservices standard as the [n]orthern states’ (170). One major failing of theCPA, and a recurring theme throughout the agreement, is the lack ofspecificity on what constitutes ‘basic services.’

Political Economy Strategy–Sustainable Economy

The objective of an economic strategy of a peace agreement shouldbe the transformation of an illicit economy into a formal one in order tocut off sources of funding for conflict and eliminate war profiteering bywarring groups with international support. The long-term goal is toensure that the government is able to collect revenues and provideservices and eventually rejoin the world economy (International CrisisGroup 2006, 44).

GoalsDiminish the Drivers of Conflict (If present, were these factors diminished?)• Political Impact of Illicit Wealth• Economic Incentives for Conflict• Economic Inequality among Groups and Regions• Effects of Economic Decline• External Drivers of Conflict

Strengthen Institutional Performance (If present, were these factorsstrengthened?)• Infrastructure• Fiscal Integrity• Regulatory and Corporate Governance Framework• Financial Institutions• Employment• Private Sector• Management of Natural Resources• Economic Performance and Self Reliance (USIP 2007)

The Road to a Wealth-Sharing AgreementSudan’s oil resources, which are heavily concentrated in the South,

have been viewed as one of the fuels behind the duration of the conflict


and a continued source of contestation. ‘[P]etroleum revenues arethe major source of income for the Sudanese state constitutingapproximately 15 percent of national government revenue in 2002 andexpected to constitute as much as 60 percent of revenue in 2005-7’(Tellnes 2006, 2). There was little hope for peace when, in 1999, theSudanese government started to export oil and strengthen its financialbase amid protestations from the SPLM/A. However, in December2003, the government signed a protocol on wealth sharing, whichprovides for the regulation of land issues, administration of the financeministry, the establishment of a dual banking system (Islamic in theNorth and conventional in the South), and control of the customs andtaxation system. At the core of the Wealth-Sharing Agreement is theprovision for the equal sharing of oil revenues between the twoprotagonists. The Wealth-Sharing Agreement states that ‘50 percent ofnet oil revenue from oil producing wells in Southern Sudan is to beallocated to the Government of Southern Sudan as of the signing of theCPA’ (International Crisis Group 2005, 18). Before an oil revenue-sharing agreement was reached, both sides agreed not to share oilrevenues from the North or to establish transfers from the federalgovernment. They also agreed that no differentiation was to be madebetween ‘new’ and ‘old’ oil contracts, but instead to share revenues fromoil produced in Southern Sudan after allocating 2 percent of the net oilrevenue to the oil-producing states. This means that the GoSS wasentitled to revenue emanating from the South and that it hadrelinquished any claims to revenues emanating from the North.However, the North was entitled to a 50-50 split in national revenues—including different taxes and non-oil revenues—collected in the South(Tellnes 2006, 3).

The oil revenue-sharing agreement was acceptable to the SPLM/Abecause it signified a symbolic breakthrough and recognition by thegovernment that the oil belonged to the Southern Sudanese, therebymaking it easier to sell the whole agreement to their constituents. Also,a history of broken promises by Khartoum had convinced the SPLM/Athat they were better off without the promise of revenue transfers fromthe former (Tellnes 2006, 3). The GoS can also claim that it won on theoil agreement because ‘it sees the oil in the South as a national resource,hence its claim that a significant part of Sudan’s national revenues hasbeen shared with the [S]outh in the final agreement’ (Tellnes 2006). By


getting a share of Southern oil revenue, Khartoum can also point to itsconstituents that it was able to maintain its long-held principle of anindivisible and unified Sudan. Nevertheless, there are some Northerngroups, even within Bashir’s party, who claim that this represented anegative, that the North had actually given away something theypreviously had and given too much leeway to the South. The differentperspectives on the agreement of each side also points to potentialproblems with how the agreement is to be understood and thusimplemented.

Economic Incentives for Conflict—What It Includes and ExcludesIn agreeing on the Wealth-Sharing Agreement, the SPLM/A

secured a trade-off with the Sudanese government whereby the formeragreed to respect already-negotiated oil contracts in exchange for theright to take remedial steps if contracts were found to have negativesocial and environmental consequences. This was a hard-foughtcompromise that addressed the concerns of the SPLM/A, while alsorecognizing the need not to jeopardize the private sector of the Sudanesegovernment as far as the energy sector was concerned.

The CPA focused extensively on the division of oil revenues, whichwas the main focus of all the elites at the negotiation table because of thepotential hard currency involved. Meanwhile, issues of water and landrights—which directly affect the livelihoods of the vast rural populationof Sudan—were ignored (Jooma 2005, 2). This deliberate neglect isexpressed in a provision of the Guiding Principles in Respect of anEquitable Sharing of Common Wealth, which states ‘[w]ithout prejudiceto the position of the Parties with respect to ownership of land andsubterranean natural resources, including in Southern Sudan, thisAgreement is not intended to address the ownership of those resources.The parties agree to establish a process to resolve this issue’ (USIP2005). This may pose a serious challenge to the success of the CPAas it could result in the return of refugees and displaced people to theiroriginal settlement, which may be occupied by other groups. Thechallenge is summed up by an anecdote that narrates the ordeal of areturning refugee from Uganda who goes to the land that he used tofarm on before his displacement, only to find a Dinka living in hishouse. Upon hearing the returnee’s demand to return the land, theDinka points to a date inscribed above the doorway, which was


revealing. ‘On this date, I liberated this house from the Arabs’ andadds, ‘where were you?’ (Branch and Mampilly 2005, 1). In a situationwhere some of the smaller rival Southern tribes feel a sense ofdeprivation by their much more dominant Dinka allies, a sense ofhelplessness could lead to an organized violent rebellion, furtherjeopardizing the CPA.

Although neither side got all it wanted under the Wealth-SharingAgreement, the agreement reached is significant because it diminishesthe economic incentive for conflict, whereby a party feels deprived of thebenefits of real or perceived economic opportunity. As a result of therevenue-sharing agreement, the two factions have less incentive to fightover the control of economic resources because there are significanteconomic guarantees for the two major parties that render the resortto violence unattractive. Another provision of the CPA that greatlydiminishes future incentive for conflict is the stipulation that oil-producing states are entitled to 2 percent of oil revenues even beforethe GoS and GoSS get their share. This greatly assuages local fearsof economic marginalization that often leads to local violence andsabotage against the staff of oil companies and their facilities. However,the benefits of this agreement are dependent upon both partiesremaining in positions of power. The looming 2009 election thereforerepresents uncertainty because the prospect of losing power andtherefore the economic incentives written into the CPA could actuallyincentivize potential further conflict.

Nevertheless, there are some vital economic issues that the CPA didnot address. For instance, ‘delineation of the border in the oil-producing areas was not addressed during the CPA negotiations’(International Crisis Group 2005, 18). This thorny issue was put offbecause disagreement over the North–South boundaries threatened toderail the peace process. The Sudanese government has traditionallymanipulated Southern borders found to have oil deposits by classifyingthem as Northern. This is in spite of the fact that under the peaceaccords, North–South borders are defined on the basis of those drawnat the time of independence, but Khartoum continues to dispute theseboundaries. Both parties agreed that a Border Commission be set up todetermine the line of 1956 (18).

Related to boundaries is the issue of ownership of subterraneannatural resources and surface land. The SPLM/A claimed ownership on


the principle of community-based ownership, whereas the Sudanesegovernment rejected that approach, arguing that ‘the centralgovernment is best suited to distribute revenues equitably relative to theneeds of the different regions’ (Tellnes 2006, 1). The two parties agreedto allow the National Petroleum Commission (NPC) to ‘controloil resources and handle rights to subsurface land, functioning as anational body which would ensure that the interests of all Sudanesepeople were served’ (Tellnes 2006). In the event that the GoS continuesits policy of redefining Southern territory with oil as “Northern,” andthe NPC is unable to mediate accordingly, the economic incentive forwar could dramatically increase and threaten the CPA.

Political Impact of Illicit WealthThe Wealth-Sharing Agreement between the SPLM/A and the GoS

minimizes the undue financial advantage that the latter had in beingable to augment its military arsenal. Citing a June 2006 report byRefugee International in a Senate testimony on China, Eric Reevespointed out that the China National Petroleum Corporation hadsupplied Chinese-made tanks, fighter planes, bombers, helicopters,machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, firearms, and ammunition tothe Sudanese military and its allies. This is in addition to establishingthree arms factories in Sudan (Reeves 2006, 3). This gave the GoS anunmatched aerial advantage over the SPLM/A in the war, which wasparticularly evident when the GoS indiscriminately bombed fleeingSouthern refugees from Ethiopia when the Mengistu government fell in1991. Similarly, there have been reports of aerial bombardment ofDarfur villages by Sudanese government forces and their allies, furtherdemonstrating the impact of undue or illicit financial advantage thatcomes with a monopoly of oil revenues. Thus, the CPA’s provision foroil revenue sharing between former bitter enemies has the potential ofminimizing the effect of illicit wealth on the GoS’s capacity to wage war.This is because, for the first time, the CPA is requiring oil revenues to bechanneled through verifiable legal channels.

Economic Inequality among Groups and RegionsDeep-seated feelings of economic inequality and marginalization

were among the main grievances of the South that led to the protractedwar with the Northern-led Sudanese government; ‘for nearly two


centuries access to resources, economic opportunities and power hasbeen mediated through exclusionary central government policies.Ethnicity (‘Arab’ versus ‘African’) and religion (Muslim versus those ofother faiths) have been politicized in the service of regime security’(Jooma 2005, 5). If this status quo of Southern marginalization had beenallowed to remain, the CPA would never have materialized. Thus, thepolitical autonomy granted to the South and the Wealth-SharingAgreement that gave the GoSS the right to 50 percent of oil revenueputs the onus on the latter to pursue an endogenous economicdevelopment agenda independent of Khartoum. While this greatlydiminishes a main source of conflict between the South and the North,the exclusion of other aggrieved parties in Sudan, such as the Darfurregion, from the Wealth-Sharing Agreement could motivate them torebel as well, against either of the signatories. The Darfur rebellion istherefore not a coincidence. An attempt to address selectively theeconomic inequality of one of several aggrieved parties further leads tomore discrimination by default that can manifest itself violently, as isbeing witnessed in Darfur.

External Drivers of ConflictWhereas much has been reported on the direct role and impact of

regional actors in fueling the Sudanese conflict, the role of externalpowers, motivated by the lure of Sudanese oil resources, is nowunfolding. ‘Almost unnoticed by the outside world, China has becomethe key player in Sudan’s oil industry. Beijing has invested £8 billionin Sudanese oil through the China National Petroleum Company(CNPC), a state-owned monolith. The cost of Khartoum’s new refineryalone was about £350 million’ (Blair 2005, 1). While China may have hita jackpot in Sudan’s oil resources and is aggressively exploiting it incollaboration with a willing ally in Khartoum, it is guilty by associationbecause as William Ezekiel, editor of the Khartoum Monitor posited,‘[t]he crisis in Sudan is being fueled by the issue of oil . . . the governmentis ready to ally with Satan if it can protect its own interests’ (2). As aresult of China’s pursuit of its national interests in Sudan, it assumedthe role of the preeminent underwriter of the Sudanese government’swar efforts against the SPLM/A by trading weapons and hard currencyfor oil. China’s role not only provided Khartoum with financialresources to maintain a military edge over its adversaries, thereby


arguably delaying the option of pursuing a peace process. It also gavethem international immunity.

The Wealth-Sharing Agreement could be seriously tested if theGoSS decides to invoke its rights to challenge pre-CPA negotiated oilcontracts under the guise of environmental and social considerations,even though the latter has agreed to respect existing oil contracts. In theworst-case scenario, China is likely to back the devil it already knowsin Khartoum at the expense of the SPLM/A, and this backing couldprove very destabilizing. Old intra-Southern feuds could be reignitedfollowing the cancellation of the oil contract of White Nile Ltd. andtheir expulsion out of the ‘disputed Block Ba in Southern Sudan basedon the orders of Salva Kiir following a deal by the two major partnersin the government of the national unity’ (‘White Nile Oil CompanyLoses Drilling Rights in Sudan Oil Field’ 2007, 1). This is seen as a slapin the face of Riek Machar, the number two man in the GoSS, who issuspected of illegal dealings when signing the contract before the CPAcame into effect. The real challenge will be how Salva Kiir and RiekMachar will react if ongoing investigations into the signing of the WhiteNile contract turns up incriminating evidence against Riek Machar.

Effect of Economic DeclineThe CPA’s power-sharing agreement also gives regional political

autonomy to the South in a major attempt to empower SouthernSudanese to take their economic destiny into their own hands in orderto initiate policies that will halt the economic decline. The Wealth-Sharing Agreement, and particularly the provision on revenue-sharing,provides the South with the financial wherewithal to pursue anendogenous economic agenda that will address the economicinequalities it faces. This is because, unlike the 1972 agreement, theGoSS will not be dependent on central government money transfers,which were not forthcoming for development purposes. However,making provisions to halt the economic decline in the South is only onepiece of the puzzle, because in Deng’s view ‘reconciling the North/South divide was only one of many economic crises facing the Sudan’(Deng 2004) as there ‘are a number of other peripheral regions in theNorth that are also in need of economic growth and integration, asevidenced by the catastrophic events in Darfur’ (Deng 2004). Thus, inthe event that Southern Sudan turns out to be a model of economic


revival, other regions in Sudan that were excluded from the CPA couldtake up arms to press for similar concessions from the Sudanesegovernment.

InfrastructureTo say that Southern Sudan lacks adequate infrastructure is an

understatement. Over two decades of war coupled with a history ofcentral government neglect has left Southern Sudan with a decrepitinfrastructure. Recognizing this problem, the CPA called for theestablishment of a Southern Sudan Reconstruction and DevelopmentFund. Its mandate is to ‘solicit, raise, and collect funds from domesticand international donors and disburse such funds for the reconstructionand rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the South’ (Waihenya 2006,180).

The CPA also caters for the reconstructions of war-affected andleast-developed areas in the North via the National Reconstructionand Development Fund, which is to be established by the Treasury(Waihenya 2006). If the two bodies mandated with reconstructionare able to attract the necessary funds and execute accordingly, it willhave the added benefit of ameliorating the unemployment situation,particularly for returning refugees, displaced persons, and demobilizedsoldiers. In addition, a well-funded reconstruction program will inspireconfidence among refugees and displaced people, thereby encouragingthem to return to participate in the reconstruction effort. Visible resultsof a well thought-out reconstruction program will help reduce thetendency for such people to migrate to relatively better-off urbancenters with its attendant overcrowding and health risks.

Fiscal IntegrityA key mechanism mandated by the CPA to ensure the fiscal

integrity of government monetary transactions is the Fiscal andFinancial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC). Its taskis to ensure ‘transparency and fairness both in regard to the allocationof nationally collected funds to the states/regions and the GoSS’(Conciliation Resources 2007, 8-12). This body is to be ‘comprised ofexperts nominated by the various states/regions, the Government ofSouthern Sudan and the National Government’ (ConciliationResources 2007). Among the key duties and responsibilities of the


FFAMC is to ensure that agreed-upon grants from the Nationalrevenues are released promptly to the various levels of government andto ensure transparency and fairness in the allocation of resources to theGoSS and states/regions as agreed while also ensuring the properutilization of resources.

The strength of this body is the inclusiveness in its composition,which comprises three representatives each of the GoS and GoSS witha single representative from all the finance ministers in all states/regionsof Sudan. This is a marked improvement upon the over concentrationof most of the CPA’s provisions to between the SPLM/A and the GoS.However, one can argue that these parties still dominate with threemembers each compared to just one representative each from otherregions of the country, further raising questions about the need foradequate representation based on regions and population. In addition,much as it is commendable that the CPA empowers the partiesrepresented on the FFAMC ‘to work out its own rules and procedures’subject to presidential approval, it does not give room for third-partyrepresentation, such as an observer from the international community,which could be relied upon to mediate in the event of a stalemate orconflict.

Financial InstitutionsIn line with the agreed-upon political autonomy for the South, the

CPA made provisions for new institutions, which will mirror the newpolitical order. Both parties agreed to the establishment of a dualbanking system during the interim period to be made up of an Islamicbanking system in the North and a conventional system in the South.The CPA mandated the creation of a Bank of Southern Sudan (BOSS)as a branch of the Central Bank (CBOS) with the former providingconventional banking services for the South, while the latter rendersIslamic banking functions. The dual banking system is significantbecause it recognizes and addresses the cultural and religious concernsof the non-Muslim South, which have long resisted the nationalinstitutionalization of Islamic concepts such as Shari’a. Similarly, thefact that the BOSS is still subordinate to the Central Bank of Sudan(CBOSS) and that the latter was recognized as the sole executor ofmonitory policy in Sudan, upholds the GoS long-held position of aunitary Sudan. While this satisfies some of the previous concerns of each


group, it still marginalizes large numbers of the population in both theNorth and South and does not give any of them democratic or freechoice. That is a potential stumbling point for the CPA and an incentivefor other groups to rebel.

Management of Natural ResourcesThe CPA provided the NPC, which has mandate for formulating

‘public policies and guidelines in relation to the development andmanagement of the petroleum sector . . . [and to] negotiate and approveall oil contracts for the exploration and development of oil and ensurethey are consistent with the NPC’s principles, policies and guidelines’(Conciliation Resources 2007, 5-12). The NPC is also mandated to‘negotiate and approve oil contracts for the exploration anddevelopment of oil and ensure they are consistent with the NPC’sprinciples, policies and guidelines’ (Conciliation Resources 2007). Itsmembership includes most of the stakeholders, the presidents of Sudanand GoSS as co-chairs and permanent members, four members of theNational Government, four permanent members from the GoSS, andnot more than three representatives from oil-producing states/regions(Conciliation Resources 2007, 5). A major weakness in the compositionof the membership of this important body is that once again it is heavilybiased in favor of the interests of GoS and GoSS, which couldpotentially become a source of grievance for other regional groups thatfeel unrepresented. Moreover, as much as it is empowering to havean all-Sudanese membership body, such as the NPC, it could proveproblematic in the event of conflict. Hence, an international presenceeven in an observer capacity could help in resolving conflict if one arisesin the future.

Security Strategy—Safe and Secure Environment

The objective of a security plan under a peace agreement is to ensurethat armed factions responsible for political violence have beenneutralized and reintegrated into society and that the government hasasserted legitimate control over security via lawfully constituted securitypersonnel assisted by ‘a sustainable level of involvement byinternational forces.’ The ultimate security objective is a government’sability to monopolize the legitimate use of force without operational


assistance of international forces, to maintain and protect existingand recognized international borders, and to create a safe and secureenvironment (USIP 2007, 19).

GoalsDiminish the Drivers of Conflict (If present, were these factors diminished?)• Political and Non-Political (Criminal and Petty) Violence• Threat from Ex-Combatants• Popular Support for Violent Factions• Use of Security Forces for Political Repression• Criminalization of Security Forces• External Destabilization

Institutional Performance (If present, were these factors diminished?)• Compliance with Security Agreements• Performance of Security Forces Strengthened• Subordination and Accountability to Legitimate Government

Authority• Consent for Role of International Security Forces

Security Provisions of the Comprehensive Peace AgreementThe Agreement on Security Arrangements laid out security

arrangements for the six-year interim period. During that period, JointIntegrated Units (JIUs) of 21,000 soldiers are to be formed with equalnumbers from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the SPLM/A. Theyare to be deployed to sensitive areas (particularly the three disputedareas) and will be commonly stationed but maintain separate commandand control structures. If, after the interim period, the South decides tosecede, the JIUs will unify into a 39,000 strong force. The agreementis lacking on details of what will happen following the interim period ifthe South does not vote to secede. The SAF and the SPLM/A will alsocontinue to operate as separate armies with both considered part ofSudan’s National Armed Forces in the context of a united Sudan. Eacharmy is to be downsized and the parties are to implement demobilization,disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) programs. No other armedgroup will be tolerated outside the umbrella of the three services.

There was to be a redeployment of 91,000 SAF troops from theSouth to the North within two years of the signing of the CPA, July 9,2007. The SPLM/A was given eight months to withdraw its forces from


the North. A permanent cessation of hostilities is provided for detailingdisengagement and the creation of various committees for enforcementand oversight. DDR and reconciliation are provided for througha number of commissions, each with representation from theSPLM/A and the GoS. Monitoring is to be carried out by a UN missionto support implementation. Various protocols cover securityarrangements and the status and treatment of the government-alignedarmed groups in the South gathered under the South Sudan DefenseForces (SSDF) umbrella. The agreement provides for elimination of theSSDF, since no armed groups other than the SPLM/A or the SAF arepermitted (USIP 2005, Ch. VI, article 7a). However, the SSDF is giventhe opportunity to qualify for integration into the security structures orcivil institutions of either party.2 The Final Ceasefire Agreement spelledout a clear timetable for SSDF demobilization. The parties agreed to setup a Collaborative Committee to deal with the other armed groups,with three representatives each from the government and SPLM/A, andone UN observer. This committee will determine the size and strengthof each of the other armed groups and by the six-month mark ascertainthe choices for integration of each group. By the end of the first year, theother armed groups are to be fully integrated into either the SPLM/A orSAF. This deadline has also passed without implementation.

As with the Addis Ababa Accords, the specifics of the securityarrangements are sketchy. The removal of government troops from theSouth and the SPLM/A forces from the North, set out in chapter VIarticle 2.1b, defines the border in terms of the 1956 border definition—which has proved contentious and a point of manipulation when itcomes to compliance. JIUs are intended to serve as the nucleus of apost-referendum army of Sudan should the result of the referendumconfirm unity; otherwise, they would be dissolved and the componentparts integrated into their respective forces (USIP 2005, Ch. VI,article 4). The character of these units (USIP 2005, Ch. VI, article 4.1)is to be defined by a common doctrine and unity, a symbol of nationalunity during the interim period, a tall order for former enemycombatants. One point of contention during the negotiations onsecurity arrangements was the capital, Khartoum. Although part of theNorth, Khartoum has been a main destination of Southern refugeesattempting to escape the conflict and poverty of the South. This meantthere was a push to have Khartoum’s security force representative of the


whole population of Sudan (USIP 2005, Ch. III, Part 2) and givenadequate training to be made sensitive to the cultural, religious, andsocial diversity of all Sudan.

Responsibility for national defense and security and protection ofnational borders is solely that of the GoS, with the ability to call on allSudanese National Armed Forces, theoretically including the JIUs andSPLM/A force, to act in a state of national emergency. The governmentalso maintained responsibility and control for other national bodies,such as the Criminal Investigation Department and police trainingand operational standards. These provisions, while reiterating theimportance and place of effective rule of law in post-conflictreconstruction, do not address the lack of trust in government forcesand agencies, which years of conflict have exacerbated. With separate,autonomous armed forces and administrations being established, oneobvious potential problem is with contradictions and disagreementsbetween the regions, a concern applicable not only to the securityarrangements but also to all component parts of the CPA. The languageof the articles is ambiguous, leaving unclear what issues would andwould not fall under regional versus national responsibility, who woulddetermine those decisions, and how.

Who or What Was Excluded? The South Sudan Defense ForcesThe SSDF is largely a creation of Khartoum’s longstanding ‘divide

and conquer’ approach to waging war, which has sought to maximizetribal and other parochial splits among the Southern population. Inmany ways, the SSDF is the odd man out in the peace accords,which recognized the SPLM/A as the sole armed force in the South. Itsfighters will be a threat to the CPA until they are fully demobilizedand reintegrated. The government-aligned SSDF remains theprimary vehicle through which the NCP could work to undermineimplementation. It might be able to keep its fingerprints fairly wellhidden while using these militia forces to produce the kind of internalfighting that would make the region ungovernable and unfit to hold aself-determination referendum.

Many SSDF leaders felt humiliated and cheated by John Garangwhile he led the SPLM/A and doubted his commitment to Southernself-determination. Although the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement wasto some extent just a device to bring Riek Machar into the government,


the forces loyal to him fought the SPLM/A not on behalf of the nationalgovernment but under the banner of Southern self-determination,which still has far more resonance for most southerners than Garang’svision of a ‘New Sudan.’ They resent the claim that their alliance withthe government makes them agents of the jellaba (Arab northerners)while the various agreements the SPLM/A has signed with Northernpolitical parties are justified as advancing Southern interests. SSDFdignity is also affronted by the term ‘government militia’ which theSPLM/A applies to them.

The SSDF presents the government with a number of real problems,however. Its expectations are high that many will be taken into thegovernment’s share of the JIUs in the South called for by the CPA.A failure to meet these expectations would cause disappointmentand anger. Under the CPA, however, the government’s entire armedpresence in the South is restricted to its 12,000 army troops in thoseJIUs. If it opts not to use SSDF personnel, it will have to redeploy anyarmy troop it integrates to the North. The ex-SSDF would not like thisand could well rebel, desert, and go home, or defect to the SPLM/A.Likewise, the government would have good reason to fear theconsequences should it use ex-SSDF to make up a large part of its shareof the JIUs. It worries that they might reach agreement with theirSouthern SPLM/A counterparts and even press for a unilateraldeclaration of Southern independence. The government has attemptedto limit SSDF-SPLM/A interaction for this reason for years.

There is good reason to conclude that the government and militaryintelligence have not decided how to deal with the SSDF. There isnevertheless ample evidence that they are not yet ready to renounceirrevocably the opportunity to use them for subversive military purposes.In addition to the attacks mentioned previously, there have been steadyreports that the army has expanded its positions in the South andrearmed allied militia, including those that have not been integrated intothe regular army. The SPLM/A alleges that in Southern Blue Nile, thegovernment recently distributed 3,000 weapons to the Fellata to fightagainst it. A recent report released by the Civilian Protection MonitoringTeam Sudan (CPMT Sudan 2005) found that the governmentsystematically armed and incited Lou Nuer against other communities inNorthern Upper Nile from March through June 2005. Since signing theCPA, the government has established at least nine new fortified garrisons


along the Sobat River, and it resupplied its Southern allies with weapons.An airplane full of new weapons and ammunition made an unscheduledemergency landing in Yambio on July 15, 2007. Although it is not yetclear for whom the weapons were intended, SPLM/A elements in theregion suspect government involvement.

Political and Nonpolitical (Criminal and Petty) ViolenceThe CPA Security Arrangements Agreement provided for a ceasefire

between the SPLM/A and the GoS, thus diminishing the level of politicalviolence. However, the agreement did not include the SSDF and becauseof the North–South dichotomy on which the agreement was based, it didnot include discussion of political violence in other regions of thecountry. The agreement requires each of the signing parties to controltheir followers and reduce unlawful activities. However, the groupsexcluded from or ignored in the agreement are not bound by theseprovisions and are accused of being the cause of some of the nonpoliticalviolence. Thus, the agreement diminished political and nonpoliticalviolence but does not go far enough in recognizing all the parties involvedin the violence to really deal with the problem effectively.

Threat from Ex-CombatantsThe agreement puts in place mechanisms for integrating former

SPLM/A combatants into the Sudanese Armed forces through JIUsand the recognition of an SPLM/A armed force within the South. As theagreement only acknowledges two sides, other militia groups—and thusother ex-combatants—are excluded from the agreement. It is thusunclear how, or even if, these ex-combatants will be dealt with andconsequently if the threat they pose will be diminished. Hence theagreement does diminish the threat from ex-combatants from thegroups recognized within the agreement. Its weakness is in the limitedrecognition of groups involved in the conflict and the GoS’s desire tocontinue to have the option of utilizing such militia groups in futureactions within the South.

Popular Support for Violent FactionsThe CPA calls for elections by 2009. These elections provide a

deadline for each group to transition from armed forces into politicalforces, thus attempting to mitigate or diminish the support for violent


factions by presenting incentives for compliance with the agreementand the ceasefire. Yet, again, through the lack of recognition of armedgroups within the conflict, which have pockets of popular support, thesearrangements are not inclusive enough and thus have a limited impacton diminishing popular support for violent factions.

Use of Security Forces for Political RepressionThe agreement sets up not only integration of ex-combatants

into the Sudanese armed forces, but also a mechanism for the securityforces of Khartoum to reflect the population of the country as a whole,and not just the dominant North. Through the ideal of greaterrepresentation, the agreement does attempt to diminish the use ofsecurity forces for political repression. However, the GoS does retaincontrol of the security forces and thus the potential for the securityforces to be used for political repression still exists.

Criminalization of Security ForcesThe agreement seeks to integrate combatants from both sides of the

conflict within the security forces and includes details on the purpose,character, and makeup of the newly integrated force. Overall controland responsibility for the training and operational standards of theseforces rests with the GoS during the interim period. Thus, the agreementfails to address issues of mistrust between the general populationand the security forces. Without any real change in the oversightmechanisms of the security forces, it is unlikely that there will be anychange in the level of criminalization of the security forces. Reports overthe last two years have provided evidence of security forces complicitywith the transport and distribution of illegal arms, reinforcing the viewthat the agreement did not do enough to diminish the criminalization ofthe security forces.

External DestabilizationThe agreement provides for each group to maintain armed forces in

their region as well as JIUs shared between the two, thus diminishing‘external’ destabilization from one region to the other through theestablishment of zones of control and responsibility. However, the lackof inclusion of militias, such as the SSDF, means that the potentialdestabilization risk of such groups was not diminished. The agreement


also provides for the disintegration of the JIUs and the Sudanese armedforces should the South vote to secede in the 2011 referendum. Theagreement did not, however, tackle the relationship of each side tointernational actors who have financed and supported the political andarmed struggle over the course of the civil war. Without incorporatingsuch groups, which have had a large impact on the conduct anddirection of the conflict, the agreement has failed to deal with the threatposed by external destabilization.

Compliance with Security AgreementsThe agreement bears striking resemblances to the Addis Ababa

Accords of 1972 and thus does not generate confidence that thearrangements will be implemented more effectively the second timearound. It does include mechanisms for oversight and cooperationbetween the main protagonists, establishing joint commissions andgroups to oversee DDR and integration of armed forces, therebyincreasing institutions’ abilities to monitor and ensure compliancewith security arrangements. It nevertheless lacks the inclusion ofinternational observers on all these commissions and bodies, whichwould have helped strengthen the ability of these groups to ensurecompliance and prevent manipulation. The commissions also exclude ordiminish the role of other Sudanese groups or regions, which were notincorporated in the North–South dichotomy, thus weakening theinstitutional mechanisms.

Performance of Security Forces StrengthenedThe agreement reiterates the importance of oversight, training, and

coordination with the security forces, which in theory strengthens theperformance of the security forces. However, there is no internationalobserver provision and no linking of security forces’ performance tointernational or external standards.

Subordination and Accountability to Legitimate Government AuthorityThe agreement sets out the hierarchy of subordination and

accountability of the armed forces, attempting to maintain the principlesof national unity and sovereignty as well as regional autonomy.However, the agreement is unclear on how the determination is madeof where national versus regional authority takes precedence and what


happens in the case of a conflict or contradiction between the differentauthorities.

Consent for Role of International Security ForcesThe agreement established the principle of acceptance of the role of

international security forces to monitor the ceasefire between the twomain protagonists. However, the reality has been that the role ofinternational security forces has been seriously limited because of safetyconcerns, which has diminished their potential effectiveness.

Law and Order Strategy—Rule of Law

The objective of any rule of law component of a peace agreementshould be to fight impunity, criminalization of state institutions, andprotect human rights through an effective domestic judicial systemwith active international support. In the long run, the domestic justicesystem is expected to discharge justice independently, resolve disputeseffectively, and protect fundamental human rights according tointernational norms and standards (USIP 2007, 32). It is also expectedto find a form of law and order that reflects the culture and ideals of allcitizens, not just some, and that all citizens can recognize as beinglegitimate and can unite behind.

GoalsDiminish the Drivers of Conflict (If present, were these factorsdiminished?)• Impunity• Historical Injustice• Criminalization of State Institutions

Strengthen Institutional Performance (If present, were these factorsstrengthened?)• Public Order and Safety• Administration of Justice• Judicial Independence and Government Accountability• Respect for Human Rights• Equality Before the Law• Societal Support for Rule of Law


Historical Injustice/ImpunityOne of the most vexatious issues to Southern Sudanese has been the

role of Shari’a law in the legal system of Sudan. Southerners havelonged viewed the application of Shari’a by the Muslim and Arab-ledGoS as part of a policy of ‘Islamization’ that seeks to assimilate themforcefully into Islamic culture. Prior to signing the CPA, the NCP-ledgovernment has persistently applied Shari’a throughout places thatit directly controlled. To forge a compromise at the CPA, a “one-country-two-systems” legal system was adopted. Explaining how thissystem would function, Salva Kiir claimed it

accords the people of Northern Sudan their right to Shari’aIslamic Law, confining Shari’a to the North, and leaving it toNortherners to reconcile their demand to be ruled, by IslamicShari’a in the public domain while at the same time sharing thesame public domain with others. As for the Southern SudanShari’a Islamic law will not apply during the Interim Period;instead there will be established a secular democratic state.(Garang de Mabior 2005, 3)

While this appears to be a compromise, it does not address the statusof thousands of minority non-Muslims living in Northern Sudan,thereby putting them in a vulnerable position concerning theapplication of Shari’a law. Muslims are also affected. Not all Muslimsor Islamist political parties agree with the use of Shari’a in the Northand some agree with the Shari’a but not with the application or use ofhudud punishments. There is more variation in opinion, belief, andpractice than the CPA acknowledges. While the idea of the CPAwas to address and resolve a long-standing issue where Islamic lawhad been applied to the whole country, it also gave legitimacy to itsapplication in the North, which may not have been warranted orappropriate. Echoing this sentiment, the legal advisor to Salva Kiir,Paul Mayor, points out that ‘there were a number of outstandingissues regarding the application of Shari’a law, including where the lawwould be employed in the capital . . . and whether the CPA extendsexemption from Shari’a law to all non-Muslims in Sudan or only tonative Southern Sudanese’ (‘A Director’s Forum with H. E. SalvaKiir Mayardit, November 4th’ 2005, 1).


Public Order and SafetyAccording to the CPA, the maintenance of public order and safety

is the responsibility of the GoS and GoSS in the North and South,respectively. The CPA posits that ‘structures and arrangementsaffecting all law enforcement organs, especially the Police and NationalSecurity Organs shall be dealt with as part of the power sharingarrangements, and tied where necessary to the appropriate level of theexecutive’ (Waihenya 2006, 194). Although this is laudable, it isunrealistic to expect a highly militaristic society such as Sudan tomake the necessary transition to have a professional police force. Thesituation is even more acute in the South where the only familiarauthority the people have come to rely upon for public safety and orderare SPLM/A fighters—hardly the ideal police force. The internationalcommunity missed an opportunity during the CPA negotiations to offera concrete commitment of assistance in building a new professionalpolice force for both sides.

Administration of JusticeThe CPA attempted to address the role of religion in Sudan by

declaring that ‘Sudan is a multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-ethnic,multi-religious country and confirming that religion shall not be used asa divisive factor’ (Conciliation Resources 2002, 5). Although this is asignificant recognition, it falls far short of providing the institutionalmechanism to safeguard the aforementioned declarations. This isbecause there is an inherent contradiction between the declarations ascontained in the CPA and the classification of the Sudan as an IslamicState by the National Constitution that, according to the CPA, ‘shall bethe Supreme Law of the land’ (4).

The government has claimed that it cannot remove the Shari’a fromthe constitution; to do so would cause the regime’s downfall, either byan elite-led coup or a popular uprising. In buttressing how Islam asan instrument of power is vital for regime survival, the GoS’s Chiefnegotiator at the CPA, Vice President Ali Uthman Muhammadal-Taha, posited in 2001 that ‘anyone who believes that the governmentwill accept peace that dilutes Islam is deluded’ (Peterson 1999, 174).Maintenance of this Islamic principle within the Constitution becomesan issue of stability, and of peace building, as opposed to an exampleof having an unrepresentative Constitution. Others argue that


constitutional limits on Islamist parties, protection for human rights,and support for civil society and secular institutions would not beimpossible to integrate into the northern political dispensation. Forinstance, Articles 18 and 19 of the current Constitution exemptsoutherners from Shari’a but do not exempt non-Muslims residing inthe North. It assumes regional religious homogeneity where it does notin fact exist.

Judicial Independence and Government AccountabilityAccording to the CPA, ‘the powers of the judiciary shall be

exercised by courts and other tribunals. The Judiciary shall beindependent of the Legislature and the Executive. Its independence shallbe guaranteed in the interim National Constitution’ (Waihenya 2006,164). This provision strengthens the concept of a separation of powersneeded to ensure that the judiciary does not receive orders from anybranch of government, particularly the executive. These provisions arelaudable, but they do not address the fact that the National SupremeCourt is still composed of Bashir’s appointees, whose judicialphilosophy and temperament are nonrepresentative of the entirecountry. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that the NationalSupreme Court will be able to exercise its independence and also holdthe GoS accountable, especially on highly contentious issues of disputebetween the GoS and GoSS.

Societal Support for Rule of LawAfter suffering from decades of breakdown in the rule of law as a

result of the civil war, it is natural that as part of the benefit of a peacedividend, Sudanese would yearn for the institutionalization of the ruleof law. However, there has been widespread disappointment with theinstitutionalization of Shari’a law in the North. Although the CPAexcludes the Southern region from the jurisdiction of Shari’a law,thousands of its citizens in the North are not exempted. Therefore, thereis no universal acceptance of the concept of law in Sudan by allstakeholders and this seriously undermines societal support for the ruleof law in general.

Respect for Human RightsThe CPA contains provisions which state that ‘[t]he Republic of the

Sudan, including all levels of Government throughout the country, shall


comply fully with its obligations under the international human rightstreaties to which it is or becomes party’ (Waihenya 2006, 157). Amongthese international treaties are the International Convenant on Civiland Political Rights, the International Convention on Civil andPolitical Rights, and the International Convenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural Rights. The significance of the CPA reaffirmation ofSudan’s commitment under these international human rights treaties isthat it binds the parties to the CPA to international law. This ultimatelyallows the international community to monitor their commitmentsaccordingly. However, there are critics who have argued that thecontinuous application of Shari’a law by the GoS, particularly againstpeople who object to its principles, provides a mechanism for the abuseof fundamental human rights.

Social Strategy–Social Well-Being

To ensure societal well-being, peace agreements should addressdemographic pressures that fuel conflict and create a conduciveatmosphere for the return of refugees and displaced persons. Asustained level of international assistance is needed to restore basicnecessities and social services. A process of reconciliation also needs tobe put in place to address past injustices and devise a long-term plan forrebuilding the society. The long-term objective is to eliminate societalcleavages and to have basic necessities restored equitably among allparts of society with active international involvement in consultationwith the host government (USIP 2007, 56).

GoalsDiminish the Drivers of Conflict (If present, were these factors diminished?)• Contentious Societal Cleavages• Demographic Pressures• Population Displacement• External Destabilization

Strengthen Institutional Performance (If present, were these factorsstrengthened?)• Accessibility of Basic Necessities• Accessibility of Basic Social Services• Ability to Reconcile Past Abuses and Promote Peaceful Coexistence


Contentious Societal CleavagesThere is some validity to the Western media portrayal of the

Sudanese conflict as between the Arab and Muslim North, whichhas dominated the government, and the marginalized South sinceindependence. Yet this is only one of the many divisions in Sudanesesociety. ‘There are a significant number of African-Christians, Muslims,and those adhering to traditional beliefs in the North, and a significantnumber of Muslims in the South’ (Branch and Mampilly 2005, 4).Moreover, Southern Sudan as a political space is fragmented andwhatever common identity exists among Southerners is based on ashared experience of repression by, and resistance to, the NCP regime(Branch and Mampilly 2005).

In spite of the heterogeneity of the regions in Sudan, the CPA wassolely restricted to the concerns of the NCP and the SPLM/A, which arenot representative of the North and South, respectively. The disregardof other groups across the regional divide during the negotiations andthe resultant agreement only reinforces social cleavages. Ironically, oneof the major frameworks of the CPA negotiations was to ensure theunity of Sudan. However, the reality is that the model of “one-country-two-systems” is hardly conducive for unity as it reinforces all kindsof societal cleavages that risk sending the conflict back into conflict.Therefore, while the CPA might have succeeded in addressinggrievances along geographic lines, it may well have inadvertentlyheightened minority consciousness within regions, putting a furtherstrain on Sudan’s already tenuous social cleavage. The CPA could bechallenged if opportunistic leaders emerge from these minority groupsand mobilize for an armed rebellion against the status quo on the basisof a real or perceived tyranny of the elite.

Population DisplacementOne of the realities of any post-conflict period is the return of

internally displaced persons and refugees to their prewar abodes. Thisphenomenon is seen as a positive development and used to measurepeoples’ confidence in a peace process/agreement. It nevertheless hasits own challenges, such as exerting population pressures which, leftunaddressed by a peace agreement, could thwart peace efforts. Theoveremphasis of the CPA on the concerns of the NCP led the Sudanesegovernment and the SPLM/A to neglect serious inter-Southern issues,


particularly concerning land ownership and returning refugees. Thisneglect is highlighted by an unrealistic solution of ‘[e]veryone will moveback to their original places’ (Branch and Mampilly 2005, 11) given bySPLM/A officials and NGO workers in response to how to managereturning refugees. This solution belies the ‘settlement of hundreds ofthousands of Dinka on land claimed by returning refugees’ (11) andignores history within Sudan, where such an approach met with seriousproblems following the end of the first civil war. As a result of the CPA’sfailure to address population displacement and its impact on conflict,the onus of addressing the situation now lies with the GoSS. The latter’scredibility and authority will be strengthened significantly if it is able toredistribute land to returning refugees in what the returnees consider tobe in a fair manner. Anything short of this that preserves the status quoof what other rival ethnic groups see as a Dinka landgrab could unravelthe SPLM/A political project in Equatorial and lay grounds forintra-regional conflict (Branch and Mampilly 2005).

External DestabilizationThe livelihood of most Southern Sudanese revolves around raising

cattle. This has led many cattle holders to become frequent targets ofrustlers who endanger cattle, property, and sometimes life. Most of theperpetrators are Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels who cross overfrom Northern Uganda and pockets of former Southern rebels formerlyaligned with the GoS. There are reports that these two categories ofraiders have the clandestine backing of the GoS who continue to use themto sow confusion in the South. Under such constant threat from raiders,the social well-being of the people of Southern Sudan is constantly underattack as well as their right to pursue a legitimate livelihood. The CPAexpects the GoSS to deal with such threats, but its failure to invite alldomestic and external drivers of the conflict (such as the LRA) or to leanheavily on its benefactor in Khartoum to sever ties with the formergreatly undermines attempts to effectively deal with the menace ofincessant cattle raids. The net effect of the insecurity caused by externaldestabilization is that it undermines the confidence of refugees to returnto their homes.

Ability to Reconcile Past Abuses and Promote Peaceful CoexistenceOne of the glaring weaknesses of the CPA is its lack of provisions to

deal with past injustices and human rights abuses. This is particularly


striking in that so many atrocities in the form of gross human rightsviolations were committed by both parties in the conflict and evenwithin the parties. It would be a mistake to think that an agreement suchas the CPA will instantaneously erase memories of past abuses amongvictims without avenues of redress. Regardless of whether a unifiedSudan is maintained or an independent Southern Sudan is achieved,past feelings of injustice and abuse will have to be addressed to ensurepeaceful coexistence among the regional divide in one Sudan or amongthe various tribes in a newly independent Southern Sudan. It is notcoincidental that past abuses were not addressed during the CPAnegotiations—it would not have been in the interests of the elites fromthe two parties who would have inevitably become the focus ofany proposed mechanism. Instead, the agreement provides a veryveiled provision which states that ‘the parties agree to initiate acomprehensive process of national reconciliation and healingthroughout the country as part of the peace-building process. Itsmechanisms and forms shall be worked out by the Government ofNational Unity’ (Waihenya 2006, 158).

The CPA also did not provide or strengthen any institution toaddress the issue of land redistribution. Instead, the only institution leftto tackle redistribution is the tribal court headed by a tribally definedchief and the land is seen as belonging to a tribal unit. A fair-mindedEquatorian tribal chief is supposed to distribute land exclusively amonghis own ethnic group according to prewar ownership, thereby displacingDinka settlers (Branch and Mampilly 2005, 12). The danger in thisapproach is that perceived Dinka ethnic privilege is replaced by anotherethnic privilege without any form of compensation, further politicizingethnicity as the privileged mode of compensating for historical injustice.This could spark tribal conflict if opportunistic local elites seize upon itto foment conflict and threaten peaceful coexistence (Branch andMampilly 2005).

Conclusions: Lessons Learned

Timing MattersThe successful negotiation of the CPA is a prime example of the

utility of the concept of a ‘hurting stalemate’ in creating the ripeconditions for successful mediation efforts. The concept suggests that


‘mediation efforts are more likely to bear fruits when neither side iscapable of imposing its will upon the other and the status quo issufficiently unpleasant that disputants are encouraged to move awayfrom the status quo’ (Grieg 2005, 249-66). As explained earlier, acombination of internal and external factors in the form of warfatigue and the post-9/11 dynamics such as the U.S “War on Terror,”3

respectively, pressed the warring parties to the realization that there wasmore to be gained from talking than from the status quo of conflict.When President Moi appointed Sumbeiywo as the mediator, both sideswere more than willing to commence the talks. The NCP GoS wasparticularly eager to talk because it could garner the backing of theIslamic radicals by pointing out that maintaining the status quo couldlead to a potential U.S. military attack that might deprive them of theIslamic system they enjoyed. Prospective international mediation effortsshould keep track of situations of ‘hurting stalemates’ in order to seizethe moment for successful negotiations to end conflicts—as happenedwith the CPA.

Wanted: Independent and Unbiased MediatorOne of the most important lessons emanating from the successful

negotiation of the CPA is that a good and credible mediator isinvaluable for attaining results. General Sumbeiywo was an unlikelycandidate for the job of mediator as he had no prior professionalbackground in diplomacy. The general earned the respect of all relevantparties throughout the negotiation process. He was seen as impartial,forthright, and somebody who was willing to stand up against anypotential obstruction to the peace process, even if it meant stepping onthe toes of the powerful countries who had observers at the negotiatingtable. Sumbeiywo is reported to have famously called the bluff of a U.S.representative during a negotiation session at Machakos when asked ifhe had checked with Washington before embarking on an initiative. ‘Iactually didn’t need to check with anybody, because I had been giventhe task and the mandate to negotiate a peace agreement’ (ConciliationResources 2006), he retorted.

In a far less diplomatic tone, Sumbeiywo became increasinglyannoyed by the constant nagging of Jeff Milligton, an American official,about why the negotiating parties were being allowed to have whatseemed an infinite amount of time to ‘go on and on.’ He apparently


threatened to ‘shoot Millington and threw him out of his office’(Waihenya 2006, 126). Such indiscriminate boldness endeared him tothe two parties at the negotiation. This highlights the importance ofhaving mediators familiar not only with the background and historyof the country and conflict but also with the cultural values andunderstanding of the importance of consensus building, which is oftenderived from painstaking deliberation. Although as the mediatorGeneral Sumbeiywo strongly asserted his independence, he also knewwhen to court the international community and ‘still believes that thetalks would have gone nowhere without the United States and Britishsupport and certainly without the personal involvement of SenatorDanforth’ (147).

All Aggrieved Parties and Issues Should Be IncludedAlthough the NCP-led GoS and the SPLM/A were the two major

protagonists during the civil war, several other aggrieved parties withlegitimate concerns should have been officially invited to participate.For instance, at the time of the negotiations, the Darfur conflict wassimmering and one could argue that had the Darfur problem beenadded to the negotiation agenda, the current humanitarian crisis couldhave been averted. Certainly, admitting every group with grievancesposes its own risk of crowding out the substantive issues; hence,international mediators should conduct a thorough assessment ofconflict situations in order to identify and invite all the major playerswhose exclusions could turn them into spoilers. The conventionalwisdom is that once regional autonomy is granted to a group and not toothers as a settlement in a civil war or rebellion in a multiethnic countrylike Sudan, other aggrieved minority groups are emboldened to seeksimilar concessions. Hence, the GoS should not have vetoed the initialattempt at including the Darfur conflict on the CPA agenda. Even if oneaccepts the North–South dichotomy, which the agreement presents,there were still interested parties and groups excluded, such as theSSDF.

One major area of concern about the negotiations is how some verytough issues central to the conflict were left unaddressed. This isparticularly evident in the Wealth-Sharing Agreement where ownershipof oil-rich lands and border boundaries, inter alia, were deferred and leftto be tackled later by CPA-prescribed mechanisms. The danger with


such deferral is that once the momentum for peace cools down and thenegotiators return to their constituencies, they become liable to pressurefrom hardliners, making further concessions and compromise difficult.

The inclusion of a number of preconditions to the CPA negotiationsraises considerable concerns for its viability. Negotiations should takeplace in a spirit of openness, taking the opportunity to discuss allgrievances without preconditions and keeping all options open and onthe table. While the existence of the hurting stalemate enabled formerwarring parties to meet and come to an agreement on how to end theconflict, that in itself does not ensure the success of the agreement.Identifying the root causes of the conflict should help isolate potentialflashpoints as well as spoilers and help ensure a more lasting peacesettlement.

International Presence at Negotiations Should Be Clearly DefinedWhile international involvement in peace agreements is always

useful, and in most cases necessary, a mediator should clearly definethe role and involvement of international actors throughout thenegotiations. This is to ensure that the parochial interests of certaincountries do not get in the way of securing an agreement between thenegotiating parties. The GoS was very distrustful of dealing withAmericans at the CPA negotiations because the United Statesblacklisted the GoS as a state sponsor of terrorism. Consequently, whenthe idea of exchanging the signed agreements at the White House wasbroached, the GoS rejected it. The SPLM/A was also suspicious of theBritish because of a perception that the British preferred a unifiedSudan over an independent Southern Sudan.

In addition, international mediators should ensure that regionalcountries that have provided logistical, financial, and military supportto warring factions in a civil war like Sudan’s should be invited toparticipate in peace negotiations. This would enable regional countrieswith grievances against any of the parties to also seek redress inexchange for a cessation of assistance to any faction in a civil war.Unfortunately, this was one of the biggest weaknesses of the CPAnegotiations because regional countries supporting factions in theSudanese conflict (Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Egypt) were notofficially invited to give and sign undertakings to stop their support ofparties in the conflict. Other impartial countries, whose main interest in


getting involved in peace processes is altruistic, need to be courtedand included during peace agreement negotiations. These ofteninclude Scandinavian countries4 and although they do not have theinternational clout of the United States and the United Kingdom, theyare willing to fund the negotiation process without any interference. Itis imperative that peace mediators actively court such countries andinvite them as observers to peace negotiations.

Foreign Participation in Institutional MechanismsAlthough it is important to have implementation mechanisms that

ensure parties to the agreement are equitably represented, it is necessaryto have mutually acceptable third-party representation from theinternational community. To avoid the criticism of paternalism,international representation could be reduced to an observer status withno authority to participate or influence the deliberations of meetings.International representation in institutional mechanisms could beinvaluable in the area of conflict resolution when parties with decades ofmistrust hit an impasse. In addition, because countries emerging fromconflict have low institutional capacities, international representativesin institutional mechanisms established by peace agreements canserve as resource persons on technical issues, such as drafting legalagreements or border demarcation. International representation canhelp in institutional capacity building whereby parties to an agreementcan learn from their international counterparts and pass on institutionalknowledge to future officials/bureaucrats.

The role of any foreign representations should nevertheless be clearlydefined in the agreement to prevent abuse and later charges ofimperialism. Under the CPA, the political agreement does a better job byproviding for international presence on the institutional mechanismestablished to implement the political agreement. The CPC is the politicaldecision-making body mandated to strengthen the peace settlement by‘provide[ing] a political forum for continuous dialogue between theParties and the international community’ (USIP 2005, 15). Its majorstrength is that—apart from its composition of GoS and the SPLM/Arepresentatives—it is complemented by a strong international presencefrom the IGAD and membership of the UN Special Representative or hisdeputy. Regrettably, the Wealth-Sharing Agreement, which has more


contentious issues to deal with, did not make room for internationalrepresentation on the NPC.

The Importance of Overarching ReviewsSince the CPA was signed, there have been several deadlines relating

to the implementation of the peace agreement. Some have beenmet, demonstrating compliance with the peace agreement’s plans forimplementation. Others have been missed or allowed to slip. Such issuesof compliance or noncompliance are crucial to the continued success ofa peace agreement and its implementation. The conclusion here is thatregular reviews of progress should be built in to facilitate discussion ofproblems in meeting deadlines and to ensure the dissemination ofcorrect and current information on the state of implementation.

Integration of Ex-CombatantsAs with all peace agreements, the status of former combatants is

crucial to success. The mechanisms for the integration of ex-combatantswithin the CPA were short on detail and excluded some groups. Therewas also little information on how ex-combatants would be trained, howthey would be chosen or shown as being appropriate for the armed forces,how they would be ranked, and how former enemy fighters would beencouraged to work side-by-side. There was also scant information onwhat was to happen to those ex-combatants who either did not want, orwere not suitable, to join the national armed forces. Reintegration ofex-combatants into society is crucial for the success of a peace agreementand was largely ignored in the CPA. These issues have manifested ina number of problems in Sudan following signing of the CPA: thepersistence of nonaligned armed factions in the South; dissatisfactionamong former SPLM/A fighters at the position, rank, and location givento them within the armed forces; and social problems with former fightersreturning to villages and homes in the South. Specific mechanisms andparticular consideration need to be paid to the needs and concerns ofex-combatants and the communities they will be returning to.

Lessons Need to Be Identified and LearnedSudan has been through not only a number of conflicts and crises

since independence but also a number of different peace processes andagreements. The 2005 CPA built upon some but not all of the lessons


learned from previous peace agreements, such as the Addis AbabaAccords of 1972, and their evident failures. In a conflict where the issuesor grievances involved are long running and have spanned more thanone attempt at resolution, it is important to identify and gain aconsensus on what the strengths and weaknesses are and at howprogress can be identified and charted.

List of Acronyms

BOSS Bank of Southern SudanCBOS Central Bank of SudanCID Criminal Investigation DepartmentCNPC China National Petroleum CompanyCPA Comprehensive Peace AgreementCPC Ceasefire Political CommissionDDR Demobilization, Disarmament and ReintegrationFFAMC Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring CommissionGNU Government of National UnityGoS Government of SudanGoSS Government of Southern SudanIGAD Intergovernmental Authority on DevelopmentINF Islamic National FrontJEM Justice for Equality MovementJIU Joint Integrated UnitsNCP National Congress PartyNRDF National Reconstruction and Development FundSAF Sudan Armed ForcesSLA Sudan Liberation ArmySPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/ArmySSDF South Sudan Defense ForcesSSRDF Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development FundUSIP United States Institute of Peace

Notes

1 Following the USIP (2007), we take “essential government services” to mean good sources ofdrinking water, sanitation facilities, health clinics for the treatment of common ailments andmanagement of epidemics. As most of these facilities are nonexistent because of the destructiveeffects of war, the short-term goal is for the government to restore basic facilities to prewar levels.

2 See Articles 7a and 7b, ‘Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period,’September 25, 2003.


3 Khartoum had been blacklisted as a state sponsor of terrorism by Washington and feared that itcould be a target of U.S. military attacks, particularly because it had actually harbored Osama binLaden before.

4 Norway was one of the major financiers of IGAD, the secretariat that organized the negotiationprocess. Norwegian financial assistance was crucial for the payment of the mounting hotel, feeding,and communication bills of the numerous delegates to the peace process.

About the Authors

Osman Antwi-Boateng is a Ghanaian national and a doctoral candidatein Political Science and International Relations at the University ofDelaware. His dissertation is entitled The Role of the Diaspora in PeaceBuilding: The Case of the Liberian Diaspora in the United States. In2007, Osman served as a Conflict Resolution Graduate Assistant at theCarter Center. He holds two masters: International Affairs from OhioUniversity-Athens and Security Studies from Georgetown University’sSchool of Foreign Service in Washington, DC.Geraldine O’Mahony is a doctoral student from Ireland studyingPolitical Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, with a focuson Africa and the Middle East. She is a graduate of McGill Universitywhere she received an MA in Islamic Studies, and the University ofEdinburgh where she received an MA in Divinity. She studied Theologyand Religious Studies at Newnham College, Cambridge University. In2007, O’Mahony served as a Conflict Resolution Graduate Assistant atthe Carter Center.

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