Tax corruption tii

96
Tax Corruption Disiapkan oleh Yustinus Prastowo Center for Indonesia Taxation Analysis

Transcript of Tax corruption tii

Page 1: Tax corruption   tii

Tax Corruption

Disiapkan olehYustinus Prastowo

Center for Indonesia Taxation Analysis

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Agenda• Tax Revenue• Sekilas Diskusi Korupsi• Role of Government vs Role of the Markets• Pajak• Irisan Baru, Arah Baru?• Diskursus Kebijakan Publik• Terang Filsafat (Politik)• Sekedar Tanggapan

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Background: Tax Revenue

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Poin-poin Penting:Penerimaan pajak berkontribusi sebesar 72 – 75 %

terhadap total penerimaan negara.Penerimaan pajak belum digunakan untuk sebesar-

besarnya kemakmuran rakyat.Setiap tahun penerimaan pajak selalu tidak

mencapai target yang ditetapkan.Indonesia merupakan negara lower – middle

income dengan tax ratio terendah, berkisar 12,3% (Pusat) san 13,3% (Pusat dan Daerah).

Perlu ada perbaikan yang lebih substansial terhadap kebijakan perpajakan di Indonesia.

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Penerimaan Pajak (Revenue) tidak terkait langsung dengan Belanja Public

(expenditure)

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perkembangan teknologi ≠ perkembangan politik, ekonomi, sosial, budaya, etc

(diagram teoretik)

t

perkembangan politik, sosial, ekonomi, kultural, hukum, etc.

Sumber: BHP & YNR, 2009

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Asupan teknologi mutakhir VS Indeks Pembagunan Manusia (HDI)

Sumber: Yanuar Nugroho, 2012 (diolah dari Human Development Index (2010) dan Internetworldstats (2010))

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Anggaran Pengentasan Kemiskinan vs Angka Kemiskinan

Sumber: Menkokesra, BPS

1823

42

51

6366

94

16,7 16 17,8 16,6 15,4 14,2 13,3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Anggaran Pengentasan Kemiskinan(in triliun rupiah)

Angka Kemiskinan(% penduduk)

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BELANJA PEMERINTAH PUSAT2012-2013(miliar rupiah)

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Struktur Penerimaan Pajak

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SUMBER PENERIMAAN NEGARA

Total Penerimaan Negara:Rp. 1.210,56 Triliun

Total Penerimaan Negara:Rp. 1.358,13 Triliun

Sumber: Kemenkeu, 2011 - 2012

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PERKEMBANGAN PENERIMAAN NEGARA

Sumber: Kemenkeu berbagai tahun (diolah)

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TARGET PENERIMAAN NEGARA DALAM APBN-P 2013

Sumber Penerimaan Negara APBN - P 2013 Persentase

Penerimaan Pajak 1,139.34 76.55

Penerimaan Sumberdaya Alam 201.70 13.55

Bagian Laba BUMN 35.45 2.38

PNBP Lainnya 83.83 5.63

Pendapatan BLU 23.49 1.58 Hibah 4.48 0.30

TOTAL 1,488.29 100.00 Sumber: Kemenkeu, APBN – P 2013

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PERKEMBANGAN PENERIMAAN PAJAK

658.70 619.92

723.30

873.85

1,016.20

1,139.34

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 APBN - P 2013

Penerimaan Pajak (Rp. Triliun)

Sumber: Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, 2008 - 2013

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PERKEMBANGAN PENERIMAAN PAJAK DALAM NEGERI

Sumber: Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, 2007 - 2012

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PERKEMBANGAN PENERIMAAN PPh NON MIGAS

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PERKEMBANGAN PENERIMAAN PAJAK PERDAGANGAN INTERNASIONAL

Sumber: Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, 2007 - 2012

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PERKEMBANGAN PENERIMAAN PAJAK DAERAH

Sumber: Badan Kebijakan Fiskal, 2007 - 2012

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REALISASI PENERIMAAN PAJAK, 2011 – 2013

No Jenis Pajak 2011 2012 2013

Realisasi

(Rp. Triliun)

Target(Rp.

Triliun)

Pencapaian(%)

Realisasi

(Rp. Triliun)

Target(Rp.

Triliun)

Pencapaian(%)

Realisasi*

(Rp. Triliun)

Target(Rp.

Triliun)

Pencapaian(%)

1 PPh Migas 73.09 65.23 112.05 83.46 64.59 129.22 80.06 70.76 113.15

2 PPh Non Migas 358.02 366.74 97.62 381.29 445.73 85.54 416.14 459.98 90.47

3 PPn dan PPnBM 277.80 298.44 93.08 337.58 335.24 100.70 369.70 423.70 87.26

4 PBB 29.89 29.05 102.89 28.96 29.68 97.57 25.79 27.34 94.31

5 Cukai 77.01 68.07 113.13 95.02 83.26 114.12 101.86 103.72 98.21

6 Pajak Lainnya 3.92 4.19 93.56 4.21 5.26 80.04 5.06 5.40 93.75

7 Pajak Perdagangan Internasional

54.09 46.93 115.26 49.65 47.94 103.57 41.71 48.42 86.14

Total 873.82 878.65 99.45 980.17 1,011.70

96.88 1,040.32

1,139.32

91.31

Keterangan: * Hasil estimasi Prakarsa, 2013Sumber: Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, 2011 - 2013

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ESTIMASI PENERIMAAN PAJAK 2013

Keterangan: * Realisasi dari hasil estimasi Prakarsa **Target yang ditetapkan dalam APBN – P 2013Sumber: Hasil Estimasi Prakarsa, 2013

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REALISASI PENERIMAAN PAJAK, 2011 – 2013 No Jenis Pajak 2011 2012 2013

Realisasi(Rp.

Triliun)

Target(Rp.

Triliun)

Pencapaian(%)

Realisasi

(Rp. Triliun

)

Target(Rp.

Triliun)

Pencapaian

(%)

Realisasi*

(Rp. Triliun)

Target(Rp.

Triliun)

Pencapaian(%)

1 PPh Migas 73.09 65.23 112.05 83.46 64.59 129.22 80.06 70.76 113.15

2 PPh Non Migas 358.02 366.74 97.62 381.29 445.73 85.54 416.14 459.98 90.47

3 PPn dan PPnBM 277.80 298.44 93.08 337.58 335.24 100.70 369.70 423.70 87.26

4 PBB 29.89 29.05 102.89 28.96 29.68 97.57 25.79 27.34 94.31

5 Cukai 77.01 68.07 113.13 95.02 83.26 114.12 101.86 103.72 98.21

6 Pajak Lainnya 3.92 4.19 93.56 4.21 5.26 80.04 5.06 5.40 93.75

7 Pajak Perdagangan Internasional

54.09 46.93 115.26 49.65 47.94 103.57 41.71 48.42 86.14

Total 873.82 878.65 99.45 980.17 1,011.70 96.88 1,040.32 1,139.32 91.31

Keterangan: * Hasil estimasi Prakarsa, 2013Sumber: Direktorat Jenderal Pajak, 2011 - 2013

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TAX RATIO RENDAH, RUANG FISKAL SEMAKIN SEMPITTax Rasio Tahun

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012Total Penerimaan Pajak Pusat + Daerah 14.1 11.9 12.0 12.6 13.3A. Pajak Pusat 13.3 11.1 11.2 11.8 12.3

1. Pajak Dalam Negeri 12.6 10.7 10.8 11.0 11.7 PPh 6.6 5.7 5.5 5.8 6.2o PPh Orang Pribadi 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.2o PPh Badan 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.3o PPh Lainnya 3.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8

PPN 4.2 3.4 3.6 3.7 4.1 Pajak Lainnya 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.4

2. Pajak Perdagangan Internasional 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.6B. Pajak Daerah 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.0

Sumber: Direktorat Jenderal Pajak dan Badan Kebijakan Fiskal, 2008 – 2012 (diolah) Tax Ratio= perbandingan penerimaan

pajak terhadap PDB

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PERBANDINGAN TAX RATIO INDONESIA DENGAN NEGARA – NEGARA LAIN

Keterangan: *Hasil kalkulasi Prakarsa dengan Pendekatan Tax Ratio dalam arti luasSumber: IMF 2011 (diolah)

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Mengapa Tax Ratio Rendah?

Indikator belum optimalnya kinerja pemerintah.Representasi rendahnya kesadaran dan partisipasi

warganegara.Tingginya tax gap (selisih antara potensi pajak

dengan realisasi pemungutan pajak non-filing (tidak lapor), underreporting (melapor lebih kecil), underpayment (membayar lebih rendah).

informal economy berkontribusi 30-40% PDB ( lk. Rp 3.000 trilyun) blm. terpajaki.

aggressive tax avoidance, transfer, treaty shopping.

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Mengapa Penerimaan Pajak Meningkat tetapi Ketimpangan Tinggi?

Grafik 3 Indeks Gini Indonesia 1996-2010, sumber: BPS

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Relasi Penerimaan dan Ketimpangan

• Mengapa penerimaan pajak terus meningkat tetapi ketimpangan justru semakin lebar?

• Fungsi redistribusi tidak berjalan?• Paradox of Redistribution (kelas menengah

menyubsidi kelas kaya)?• Keadilan pajak yang semestinya membayar

pajak lebih besar nyatanya belum melakukannya bukti: struktur penerimaan PPh Orang Pribadi Pasal 25/29 < PPh Pasal 21 < PPh Badan

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  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

WP Badan

1,608,337

1,760,108

1,929,507

2,136,014

2,218,573

WP Orang Pribadi

13,861,253

16,880,649

19,881,684

22,131,323

23,082,822

WP Bendahara

441,986

471,833

507,882

545,232

555,995

Total

15,911,576

19,112,590

22,319,073

24,812,569

25,857,390

Sumber: DJP, 2013

Jumlah Wajib Pajak Terdaftar

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FaktaWajib Pajak masih didominasi orang pribadi

karyawan.Ditjen Pajak menargetkan pencapaian hingga

50 juta wajib pajak pada 2014. Data BPS pencapaian Ditjen Pajak masih

jauh dari optimal. Jumlah UMKM 51,3 juta unit dengan kontribusi terhadap PDB mencapai 61,9%. Badan usaha menurut BPS 22,3 juta

Versi Ditjen Pajak baru sekitar 2 juta WP badan dan yang menyampaikan SPT Tahunan tidak lebih dari 500 ribu wajib pajak.

Jumlah warganegara potensial menjadi wajib pajak sebesar 64 juta orang (PTKP, pendapatan per kapita)

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DISTRIBUSI PENDAPATAN

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Struktur Penerimaan PajakTabel I Perbandingan Penerimaan PPh dan PPN terhadap Penerimaan Pajak

Dalam trilyun Rp.

Uraian 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2011 % 2012 %

Penerimaan Pajak 409 490 658 619 743 839

 1016

 

PPh

165 40

194 40

250 38

267 43

306 41

360 43

 

445

 

44

PPh Pasal 21

31 19

39 20

51 20

52 19

55 18

62 17

 

89

 

20

PPh Pasal 25/29 OP

2 1,1

2 0,8

4 1,4

3 1,2

4 1,2

4 1,0

 

5.6

 

1.0

PPh Badan

65 39

80 41

106 42

120 45

131 43

166 46

 

191

 

43

PPN

123 30

154 31

209 32

193 31

262 35

309 37

 

336

 

33

Kelas Menengah menyubsidi “Orang Kaya”?

 

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Grafik Struktur Penerimaan Pajak 2006 – 2012

0.00

200.00

400.00

600.00

800.00

1,000.00

1,200.00

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Penerimaan Pajak

PPh

PPh 21

PPh 25/ 29 OP

PPh Badan

PPN

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Tax Ratio Sektoral 2008-2012Klasifikasi

Lapangan UsahaTahun

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Pertanian, Perkebunan, Kehutanan 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2

Pertambangan dan Penggalian 12.6 5.7 8.1 8.1 6.3

Industri Pengolahan 9.7 10.8 11.2 12.5 12.6

Listrik, Gas dan Air Bersih 15.5 14.0 19.1 20.0 13.5

Konstruksi 4.3 3.6 3.5 3.8 3.2

Perdagangan, Hotel dan Restoran 9.7 9.5 9.6 10.4 10.3

Pengangkutan dan Komunikasi 10.6 8.4 7.9 7.5 7.1

Keuangan, Real Estate & Jasa Perusahaan 19.4 19.7 19.8 18.3 18.0

Jasa-jasa 5.4 5.3 4.5 4.5 4.2

TOTAL MENURUT SEKTOR 8.9 7.9 8.1 8.5 8.0

Sumber: Direktorat Jenderal Pajak dan Badan Kebijakan Fiskal, 2008 – 2012 (diolah)

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Diskusi Korupsi

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Sekilas Diskusi KorupsiDefinisi bukanlah segala-galanya, tetapi segalanya

melibatkan definisi (BHP:2013).Tipologi definisi:

1. ‘definisi jabatan-publik’ (public office-centered definitions),

2. ‘definisi pasar’ (market-centered definitions), dan3. definisi kepentingan publik’ (public interest-centered

definitions)Evolusi Pengertian Korupsi:

1. Zaman Klasik: Keutuhan Kondisi Asali2. Zaman Modern: Korupsi Tubuh-Politik3. Zaman Kontemporer: Dari Pembangunan ke Efisiensi

Pasar

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“Quotes”“the government exists not for turning life on earth into a paradise but for preventing it from turning into a complete hell. -N. Berdyaev

“the government does not solve problems, but finance them.” – Ronald Reagan

“The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works.” – Barack Obama

“Laissez-faire is all well and good until something goes wrong.” - John Gutreund

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The Role of the Government• Abad ke-20 ditandai dg. meningkatnya peran negara

(pemerintah) dlm ekonomi (Tanzi:2011).• Pasca PD II, negara-negara Barat mengalami peningkatan

signifikan dalam belanja publik terhadap GDP, tax ratio, social contribution, dan cakupan bidang yang diurus negara.

• Perubahan paradigmatik administrasi publik: Weberian (OPA) Welfare State New Public Management New Public Service (Good Governance).

• Persoalan baru: Ketimpangan, tingkat kemiskinan tinggi, problem ekologis, terorisme.

• Fenomena Globalisasi: 1. Compensation hypothesis Public spending as a risk absorber more open, more expanded (Rodrik).2. Efficiency hypothesis high level of public spending, reduce country ability to compete globally

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The Role of the Government• Big (ger) governments with their higher level of public

spending not favorable to generate better social and economic indicators (Tanzi:2011, 232-233).

• There is a lack of a positive relation between public spending levels and HDI rankings. High spending countries, on average, don’t generete a better HDI ranks.

• Although in many countries public spending is neither efficient nor well focused, all govt’s spend much of their energies in replacing the market because of its presumed “failures” rather than in making the market work better.

• Public Sector Performance Indicator (PSP) indicators shows that “small” government can deliver their services better than “big” governments. (Tanzi:2011,243).

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The Role of The Market• The role of MNEs: national-border and sovereignty

issues.• OECD in this year released a document titled BEPS (Base

Erosion and Profit Shifting) to tackle the aggressive tax avoidance issue.

• Driven by tax-shifting, there is a significant increasing on the role of the MNEs (Apple, Starbucks, Google, Amazon, etc.)

• Private sector (represented by MNEs) treated as an enemy by both developed and developing countries.

• Private sector (represented by SME’s) be a focus of advocacy, to bring new economic era “social entreprises”.

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Tugas Filsafat (Politik)• Refleksi filosofis: Apakah dari yang deskriptif (what it

is) dapat ditarik simpulan normatif (what ought to be)?• Filsafat Politik Mencari pengait (nexus) antara yang

deskriptif dengan yang normatif, lalu menemukan pengungkit (leverage) yang memungkinkan gerak timbal-balik menuju “yang ideal”.

• Jika korupsi – setidaknya sebagai ide dalam sejarah – ingin dipahami, kita perlu menemukan perangkat yg memadai untuk memahaminya di sungai sejarah.

• Pajak adalah instrumen yang mungkin untuk memahami sejarah ide, termasuk evolusi konsep korupsi.

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Mengapa Pajak?• Pajak telah ada sejak zaman Mesopotamia dan

Babilonia, lalu Mesir dan Yunani, Romawi, Eropa Modern hingga era kontemporer ini (Charles Adam:1983).

• “Petir peradaban hanya bisa dipahami jika kita mengerti sejarah perpajakan dengan baik” (Schumpeter:1944).

• Mengaitkan “yang publik” dan “yang privat”• Relasi timbal-balik “negara-warganegara”• Koeksisten dengan aktivitas ekonomi-politik manusia.• Tidak ada yang menyukainya rawan penyimpangan.

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General ConceptsTax Evasion, Tax Avoidance, Tax Planning

For internal discussion only 41

Tax Avoidance vs Tax EvasionPractically, it is unclear definiton and sometimes very

depend on the tax authority interpretation. It seems as a nuance that need to be scrutinized into details.

There are some approaches to tax evasion concept:1. Economic approach2. Legal approach3. Political approach4. Philosophical approach

• Many literatures and experts usually use economic/legal approach and just to calculate the loss of revenue and penalties.

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Tax Evasion

• the efforts by taxpayers to mitigate taxes by illegal means. What can be defined as legal or illegal depends on the national laws.

• the taxpayer avoids the payment of tax without avoiding the tax liability, so that he escapes the payment of tax that is unquestionably due according to the law of the taxing jurisdiction and even breaks the letter of the law. (Russo et. al, 2007)

• An intention to avoid payment of tax where there is actual knowledge of liability. It usually involves deliberate concealment of the facts from the revenue authorities, and is illegal. (Rohatgi: 2007).

• There is a correlation but still seems ambiguious that legal tax avoidance can push the public motive to evade the tax obligation (Neck and Schneider, 2011).

• Philosophically, tax evasion also correlate with any other aspects of socio-political dimension (McGee,2007).

For internal discussion only 42

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Some common example of tax evasion• The failure by a taxable person to notify the tax authorities of his presence or

activities in the country if he is carrying on taxable activities.• The failure to report the full amount of taxable income.• The deduction claims for expenses that have not been incurred, or which

exceed the amounts that have been incurred.• Falsely claiming relief that is not due.• The failure to pay over to the tax authorities the tax properly due.• The departure from a country leaving taxes unpaid with no intention to paying

them.• The failure to report items or sources of taxable income, profit or gains, where

there is either a general obligation in the law to volunteer such information.

For internal discussion only 43

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Tax Avoidance

• Tax avoidance is not tax evasion. Many have to try to formulate an exact definition but still unclear enough.

• The art of dodging tax without breaking the law (Justice Reddy, McDowell & Co vs CTO, 1985)

• The minimisation of one’s tax liability by taking advantage of legally available tax planning opportunities. (Black’s Law Dictionary).

• An arrangement of a taxpayer’s affairs that is intended to reduce his liability and that although the arrangement could be strickly legal is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to follow. (OECD).

For internal discussion only 44

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What OECD saidOECD just provides three elements of tax

avoidance:(1) almost invariably there is present an element of artificially to

it or, to put this another way, the various arrangements in a scheme do not have business or economic aims as their primary purpose’

(2) secrecy may also be a feature of modern avoidance: and(3) Tax avoidance often takes advantage of loopholes in the

law or of applying legal provisions, for purposes for which they were not intended.

OECD Model (2000) the prevention of tax avoidance is one of the purposes of double tax treaties.

For internal discussion only 45

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Tax Planning• Many countries make a distinction between

acceptable tax avoidance and unacceptable tax avoidance.

• Unacceptable TA is achieved by transactions that are genuine and legal but involve deceit or pretence or sham tax structures. (Lord Goff, Rohatgi:2007)

• Contrary, Acceptable TA (tax planning) reduces the tax liability through the movement (or non-movement) of persons, transactions or funds, or other activities that are intended by legislation also called tax mitigation.

For internal discussion only 46

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Categorizing Tax Planning

For internal discussion only 47

Illegal Tax Evasion(Tax Fraud)

Transaction Tax Avoidance(Fraus Legis)

Legal

Tax Planning

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Skema International Tax Planning

Sumber: PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2007.

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Google(Pre-IPO)

Google Ireland Holdings

$Capital

Cost Sharing

Agreement

$Buy-In

Search + Advertising Technology – Europe, Middle East & Africa

Google Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich II - 2009

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Google(Pre-IPO)

Google Irelend HoldingsSearch + Advertising Technology Europe. Middle East &

Africa

Ireland Bermuda $$$

Google Netherlands BV(No Employees)

Google Ireland Ltd2000 Employees

European Affiliates & Customers

Middle East Affiliates & Customers

Africa Affiliates & Customers

Sharing Cost Agreement

$$Royalties

$$Royalties

License of Technology

Sub-License of Technology

$ Fees

$ Fees

$ Fees

($ Bilion Revenue 2009)

Google Double Irish / Dutch Sandwich II - 2009

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Apple Inc.(United States)

Apple Operations

International

Apple Operations

Europe

Apple Sales International

Apple Distribution

International (Ireland)

Apple Singapore(Singapore)

Apple AsiaIn-country

distributors

Apple Retail Holding Europe

(Ireland)

Apple Retail BelgiumApple Retail France

Apple Retail GermanyApple Retail Italia

Apple Retail Netherlands

Apple Retail SpainApple Retail Switzerland

Apple Retail UK

Country of Incorporation and Tax

Residence

These 3 subsidiaries are incorporatedin Ireland, but have no country oftax residence

100 percent owned by Apple Inc., company that receivesthis is a holding dividends from most of Apple’s offshore affiliates. It has no physical presence and has never had any employees.

A subsidiary of Apple Operations International, it had about 400 employees in 2012, and manufactured a line of specialty computers for sale in Europe.

Contracted with third-party manufacturers in China to make Apple products which it then sold to Apple Distribution International. Paid little or no tax on $74 billion in profit made from 2009 to 2012.

APPLE’S OFFSHORE SUBSIDIARIES

Apple’s Scheme

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2011 2010 2009 Total

Pre-Tax Earning

$ 22 billion $ 12 billion $ 4 billion $ 38 billion

Global Tax $ 10 million $ 7 million $ 4 million $ 21 million

Tax Rate 0.05% 0.06% 0.1% 0.06%

Global Taxes Paid by ASI (Apple Sales International), 2009-2011

Foreign Base Company Sales Income Tax Avoided Tax Avoided

2011 $ 10 billion $ 3.5 billion $ 10 billion

2012 $ 25 billion $ 9 billion $ 25 billion

Total $ 35 billion $ 12.5 billion $ 17 billion

Apple’s Scheme - Continued

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Vodafone UK

Vodafone Dutch

HK Shareholder

Cayman Co 1(Cayman Island)

Cayman Co 2(Cayman Island)

Maritius Co(Maritius)

Hutchison Essar (India)

Sold Cayman Co

2 shares

Vodafone’s Scheme

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No Consolidation Joint Taxation

MARKS & SPENCER

Subsidiaries are independent llegal and fiscal entities (separate)

UK

Intermediary

Netherlands

subsidiary subsidiary subsidiary

FranceBelgium Germany

subsidiary subsidiary subsidiary

FranceBelgium Germany

Company

Branch

UK

Netherlands

Marks & Spencer Case

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Starbucks Coffee Inti (USA)

Rain CityDutch

Partnership

Starbucks Holding BV(Netherland)

EnteraldDutch

Partnership

ALKI LPUK

Starbucks UK

Starbucks Mfg BV (Netherland)

Starbucks Trading (Swiss)

Royalty

Royalty Royalty

STARBUCKS’S SCHEME

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Kasus Indonesia (I)Asian Agri Group diputus MA bersalah melakukan tax evasion

dan dikenai denda Rp 2,5 T respondeat superior/vicarious responsibility.

Penerimaan Pajak masih di level 12,5% (tax ratio), bandingkan Korea (19%), Jepang (25%), rerata OECD 35%, Tanzania (16%).

Uang pajak sebagian besar masih digunakan untuk membiayai belanja birokrasi dan pelunasan utang, belanja sosial sifatnya residual.

Praktik penghindaran dan pengemplangan pajak hal yang jamak.

Warga yang ber-NPWP baru 22 juta UMKM 55 juta, penduduk potensial 110 juta.

Gayus mampu menyatukan lembaga penegak hukum dalam satu payung korupsi: Hakim Asnun, Jaksa Cyrus, Polisi Erani dan Edmond Ilyas, Penjaga Rutan Brimob, Petugas Imigrasi.

Kriminalisasi

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Fenomena Gayus

Mampu menyatukan lembaga penegak hukum dalam satu payung korupsi: Hakim Asnun, Jaksa Cyrus, Polisi Arafat dan Brigjen Edmond Ilyas, Penjaga Rutan Brimob, Petugas Imigrasi.

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Fenomena Regenerasi Koruptor Muda

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Mencontoh yang tua?

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Modus-modus Korupsi Pajak

• Model Percaloan (Arbitrage)• Model Abuse of Power• Collusion• Bribery• Gratification

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Kasus Indonesia (2) Kejahatan Kehutanan oleh Korporasi

• 124 kasus kejahatan kehutanan dan kerugian negara lk. Rp 691 trilyun (ICW:2013), menjerat pidana : 37 operator lapangan, 20 direktur perusahaan, 9 kepala dinas, 4 polisi, 6 anggota DPR, 2 gubernur, 2 bupati.

• Penghindaran atau manipulasi pajakContoh Kasus: Kasus PT. Permata Hijau Sawit (2007-2008), Asian Agri Group (2002-2005), PT Wilmar Nabati Indonesia (2009-2010)

• Pembiaran beroperasi tanpa izinContoh Kasus: Beberapa perusahaan sawit seperti Sinar Mas, Wilmar, BGA/ IOI, Musim Mas, dan Astra Agro Lestari di Kalimantan Tengah tidak memiliki izin pelepasan kawasan hutan (Laporan Hasil Investigasi Kasus Korupsi Perkebunan, ICW, 2011: 9)

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Kejahatan Kehutanan oleh Korporasi

Alih fungsi kawasan hutan dan Pemanfaatan hasil hutan tanpa izinContoh Kasus: Proyek Perkebunan Sawit Sejuta Hektar di Kalimantan Timur. Izin yang diberikan oleh Gubernur Kaltim Suwarna AF kepada 13 perusahaan sawit milik Surya Damai Group ternyata dimanipulasi. Citra satelit membuktikan hanya 3 dari 13 perusahaan yang menanam sawit. Sisanya diketahui hanya mengeksploitasi hutan.

Perolehan izin pemanfaatan kawasan dan hasil hutan secara tidak sahContoh Kasus: Berdasarkan Investigasi, untuk mendapatkan 1 (satu) izin lokasi di Kabupaten Seruyan , Pengusaha perkebunan dipungut biaya Rp. 4 milyar. Selain itu, ada pula suap berdasarkan luas perkebunan sawit yang dimintakan izin. Sawit Watch menyebutkan bahwa biaya penerbitan izin lokasi untuk setiap hektar kebun sawit sebesar Rp 500.000 – Rp 1 juta/ha, atau rata-rata Rp 750 juta untuk izin lokasi seluas 1.000 ha.

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Birokrasi kita?

• Berjumlah lk. 4 juta pegawai pusat dan daerah.• Mengurus Rp 1.657 trilyun/tahun.• Menguras:

Rp 241 trilyun untuk belanja birokrasi.Rp 518 trilyun transfer ke daerah, dan 50% dialokasikan

untuk belanja pegawai.Rp 171 trilyun untuk cicilan pokok dan bunga utang.Rp 299 trilyun untuk subsidi, Rp 143 trilyun subsidi BBM.

• Indeks Gini 0.41, semakin timpang.• Indeks Persepsi Korupsi: 114 dari 177 negara• Indeks Pembangunan Manusia: 121 dari 186 negara

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Perbandingan Indeks Pembangunan Manusia 2013

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Ada apa dengan birokrasi kita?

• Tidak ada perubahan paradigma.• Perubahan ideologi politik tidak mengubah corak

administrasi publik.• Reformasi kelembagaan tidak diikuti pengembangan

etika kelembagaan (TII, Prastowo dkk:2011).• Pembedaan tegas: elected and appointed.• Birokrasi tidak netral, tapi merupakan kelompok

kepentingan sendiri.• Reformasi Birokrasi 13 tahun, hasilnya?• Reformasi Birokrasi = Remunerasi naik.

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Pokok-pokok GagasanPajak mampu sekaligus membawa isu keadilan,

kesejahteraan, kesetaraan.Mengenali gejala korupsi melalui studi sistem dan praktik

perpajakan Pajak memiliki dimensi moral, ekonomi, politik, sosial,

hukum.Temuan-temuan penting:

Level penerimaan pajak berkorelasi positif dg demokratisasi.Level penerimaan pajak berkorelasi positif dg partisipasi publik.Tax Morale kepatuhan pajak berbanding lurus dg kualitas pelayanan

pemerintah.Tax Avoidance dan Tax Evasion perkembangan global, bahwa

penghindaran pajak yg agresif membahayakan pembangunan, masa depan negara berkembang, dan menimbulkan ketidakadilan.

Upaya bersama untuk menciptakan sistem perpajakan yang lebih baik.

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Konsepsi Baru KorupsiRelasi Principal-Agent semakin kompleks, menuju model

jejaring (network) negara, company, individu, MNEs, lembaga internasional (OECD, UN), CSO (Tax Justice Network, ChristianAid, Oxfam, etc.)

Nir-batas tegangan kedaulatan negara dengan ekspansi MNEs, pajak adalah driver utama tata-ekonomi baru. (73% MNEs melakukan transfer pricing utk menghemat pajak).

Sedangkan, dari 3 unsur modal, tenaga kerja tetap tertinggal soal mobilitas dibanding uang (capital).

Melalui pajak sbg “iuran wajib” dan “ekspresi akuntabilitas negara”, korupsi menjadi timbal balik, bersifat institusional.

Pertanyaan: ke mana arahnya? “Model” dan ‘Pola” korupsi?Respondeat superior/vicarious liability menjerat korporasi

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Irisan Baru: Paradigma Administrasi Publik• Birokrasi sering diperlakukan sebagai institusi netral dan nir-

kepentingan, faktanya mereka adalah kelompok kepentingan.• Perubahan paradigma Administrasi Publik dari OPA (Weberian)

Welfare-state NPM, menunjukkan tuntutan agar pemerintahan dijalankan dg mengadopsi sistem pasar: efisien, transparan, akuntabel, result-oriented. Lalu NPM NPS (Good Governance), menunjukkan menyerahkan sepenuhnya pd pasar berbahaya, perlu partisipasi dan kontrol demokratik.

• Pergeseran corak ideologi mengubah corak administrasi publik (Indonesia adalah anomali, perubahan politik tdk hasilkan perubahan corak administrasi publik).

• Privatisasi (diperkenalkan 1983) menjadi mantra baru Mencari model public-private partnership yang semakin baik Public good dijamin ketersediaannya.

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OPA NPM NPS DG

Perkembangan Paradigma Administrasi Public (Prasojo:2010)

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Ke arah:The Dynamic Governance ?

• “Sustained economic and social development takes place when there is leadership intention, cognition and learning which involves continual modification of perceptions, belief structure and mental models” (Neo and Chen, 2007)

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Character Dynamic Governance

• Menggabungkan prinsip-prinsip dalam The New Public Management dan The New Public Services

• “Respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interaction among them”

• “But Governments have been under pressure to become more entrepreneurial and to use less of is regulatory and coercive power”

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Tiga Elemen Penting DG

• Capabilities (Thinking ahead, thinking again, thinking across)

• Culture (Principles: incorruptibility, meritocracy, markets, pragmatism, Multiracialism. Beliefs: state activism, long term, relevance, growth, stability, prudence and self reliance)

• Change (innovative and adaptive policies)

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Pattern of Transformation DG

• Beyond Performance to Potentials (understand and develop person’s potential in deliberate manner)

• Beyond Result to Process (good results cannot be sustained without building process and systems)

• Beyond Least for output to Most for the input (recognizes the reality that there are more ideas than resources available, encouraging creativity for input)

• Beyond Improvement to Innovation (recognizes the need for public service to continually reinvent itself to serve the nation well)

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Pattern of Transformation DG

• Beyond Agency to Network (many significant problems and opportunities are independent)

• Beyond Coordinated action to Coordinated Vision (National perspective, share vision and autonomy of agencies)

• Beyond Management to Leadership (importance of clear vision, strong convictions and ethical values)

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Pengaturan Kelembagaan untuk Penyediaan Layanan Barang dan Jasa

1. Arrangers (policy makers): a. Pemerintah b. Swasta2. Produser (pengelola): a. Pemerintah b. Swasta3. Consummers: a. Society b.Government c. Swasta

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Model-model PPP (E.S. Savas:1988)• Government Service: Pemerintah sekaligus sebagai arranger dan produser.

Masyarakat membayar melalui pajak (pure public goods) atau fee (mixed goods).

• Intergovernmental Agreement: Suatu pemerintah (daerah) memberi wewenang kepada

pemerintah daerah lainnya dan menyediakan dananya untuk menyediakan suatu layanan barang atau jasa kepada masyarakat.

• Contracting-out: Pemerintah Memberi otorisasi kepada swasta dan membayar

swasta ybs untuk menyediakan barang/jasa tertentu.

• Franchise: Pemerintah memberi otorisasi kepada swasta untuk

menyediakan barang/jasa tertentu, dan konsumen yang membayarnya.

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Model-model PPP (E.S. Savas:1988)• Grant: Pemerintah memberi subsidi kepada swasta sebagai

produser. Biasanya untuk barang atau jasa yang didorong untuk dikonsumsi oleh masyarakat.

Grant-nya dapat berbentuk alokasi dana, pembebasan pajak, pinjaman murah atau penjamin pinjaman.

• Voucher: Pemerintah mensubsidi konsumen dan konsumen

mencari sendiri pelayanan yang diinginkan di pasar bebas. Konsumen mempunyai pilihan.

• Market: Konsumen mengatur barang atau jasa yang diinginkan,

menyeleksi dan membayar swasta yang menyediakan barang atau jasa tersebut.

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Paradoks Baru: Privatisasi atau Socialized-Market

• Apakah perdebatan privatisasi vs nasionalisasi masih relevan?• Lanskap baru perdebatan ideologis harus ditempatkan di tengah

fakta public spending membengkak (peran negara membesar), sekaligus secara global peran swasta meningkat.

• Perdebatan bukan “pasar atau non-pasar”, tetapi kinerja ekonomi pasar dilekatkan pada tata politik seperti apa menciptakan mekanisme kontrol, model partisipasi akuntabilitas sektor swasta.

• Merumuskan ulang makna “public” vs “privat” • Memperluas cakupan/definisi korupsi prinsip “superior

respondeat”/”vicarious responsibility” menyeret korporasi sebagai penanggung jawab.

• Soal pajak ciptakan instrumen efektif hindari tax avoidance/tax evasion.

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Mencari Arah Baru: Sekedar Tanggapan• Jika pembangunan selalu mengandaikan pembiayaan, maka pajak adalah

sumber utama. Maka, akuntabilitas sektor swasta paling mudah direpresentasikan dengan struktur penerimaan pajak “linkage” antara revenue – expenditure.

• “Service delivery” selalu menjadi persoalan, birokrasi lebih menjadi bagian dari masalah daripada solusi. Cara efektif adalah dg proliferasi “champion”, kepala-kepala daerah yang inovatif, kreatif, anti-korupsi sbg “breakthrough” dari kebuntuan.

• Perubahan paradigma Politik Anggaran earmarked system, tax expenditure, integrated incentive allocation.

• Model “public-private partnership” yang baik kompetitif, fair, efisien, akuntabel, result-oriented.

• Redefinisi dan perluasan pengertian dan cakupan “korupsi”, melampaui definisi sentrisme, ekonomistik, dan legalistik.

• Yang kita butuhkan bukan “big government” atau “small government”, tetapi “strong government” dg kepemimpinan yang kuat, baik, keberanian mengeksekusi.

• Penyelesaian “institusional”?• Korupsi adalah persoalan ekonomi, hukum, politik, agama, moral?• Siapakah “koruptor’?

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Skema Anti Penghindaran Pajak(Anti Tax Avoidance)

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PT A Tuan B

X Ltd.Laba setelah Pajak 2012

Rp.1.000.000.000,00

INDONESIA40%

40%

Pengaturan CFC Rule di Indonesia

Q

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DIVIDEN Perusahaan Induk

Laba Operasional 100

Anak PerusahaanLaba Operasional 50

Negara A

Negara B

Saham

1000

Pembiayaan dengan Saham

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Perusahaan IndukLaba Operasional 100Penghasilan Bunga 40 140

Anak PerusahaanLaba Operasional 50Biaya Bunga 40 10

Dividen

Negara ANegara B

Saham

200

Utang

800

Bunga5 %

Pembiayaan dengan Kombinasi Utang dan Saham

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X Ltd.

PT Y

Negara A

Indonesia

25% (hubungan istimewa)

Utang 1000

Remunerasi 10% laba tanpa batas waktu

Skema Interest Stripping

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Y Co.

Z Co.

PT X

Negara B

Negara A

Indonesia

100 %

100 %

P3B negara A dan negara B :

Tarif PPh Dividen 0%

P3B negara B dan Indonesia :

Tarif PPh Dividen 15%P3B negara A

dan Indonesia :

Tarif PPh Dividen : 10%

Conduit Company sebagai Bentukan PT A

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Z Co.

Y Co.

PT X

PT X

Negara A

Negara B

100 %

100 %

Indonesia

Indonesia

DividenPPh 15%

DividenPPh 10%

Tanpa Conduit Company Rule I

Dengan Conduit Company Rule I

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Y Co.

X Ltd.

PT X

Negara B

Negara A

Indonesia

100 %

95 %

Skema Conduit Company Rule II

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Y Co.

Y Co.

PT X

PT X

Negara A

Negara B

100 %

100 %

Tanpa Conduit Company Rule II

Dengan Conduit Company Rule II

Negara A

Negara B PT ZPenjualan 100% saham

X Ltd. Ke PT Z

PT ZPenjualan 100% saham X Ltd. Ke PT Z

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X Ltd.(user)

PT A(hirer)

Negara A

Indonesia

25% (hubunga

n istimewa

)

Skema International Hiring-Out of Labor

e

e

Melakukan pekerjaan di negara A

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PT A

PT B

Skema Hubungan Istimewa di Indonesia

PT C

PT D

50%

50%

25%

25%

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Case 1 : Tax Implications on Acquisition Preliminary Tax

AnalysisCayman Co PT A

Subsidiaries

PT B (Indonesia)

Mauritius Co

100.00%

Bondholders

PT C (Singapore)

100.00%

Dividends

US$[250]m + US$[50]m unwind equity + repay debt

Interest on US$[100]m loan

4

1

25% corporate tax deduction on interest, offset by 10% withholding tax on interest

2

1

Minimal corporate tax in Mauritius: (3% x (US$[50]m - US$[49]m)

3

Dividends from PT B, subject to 10% withholding tax

4

3

5

Offshore Indonesia

100.00%

US$[249]m + US$[51]m unwind shares + repay debt

US$[300]m bond+interest

5

2

No Singapore tax due to application of tax credits in Indonesia

0% withholding tax on bond

For internal discussion only 93

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Proposed Structure

For internal discussion only 94

Indonesia

Offshore (British Virgin

Island)

Offshore (Singapore)

PT A

Exchangeable bonds

1

2

BVI Ltd 1BVI Ltd 1 BVI Ltd 2BVI Ltd 2

Sing Co 1Sing Co 1Sing Co 2Sing Co 2

Indo Co 1 Indo Co 2 Indo Co 3

Mr A, B, CMr A, B, C Mr A, B, CMr A, B, C

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Proposed Structure A SPV set up in Singapore buy EB issued by the Singapore Co

For internal discussion only 95

Indonesia

Offshore (British Virgin

Island)

Offshore (Singapore)

PT A

Exchangeable bonds

SPV A

BVI Ltd 1BVI Ltd 1 BVI Ltd 2 BVI Ltd 2

Sing Co 1Sing Co 1Sing Co 2Sing Co 2

Indo Co 1 Indo Co 2 Indo Co 3

Mr A, B, CMr A, B, C Mr A, B, CMr A, B, C Mr DMr D

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Propose structure 1

For internal discussion only 96

Individual 1

SingaporeIndonesia

Mr A Mr B Mr C

IP Company ManagementCompany

PMA Company

PT. KHS PT. CP PT. SP Third Party