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Negative Blocks

Hegemony causes terrorismInnocent and Carpenter 9 [Malou, foreign policy analyst at Cato,and Ted, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato,"Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exit Afghanistan."

Contrary to the claims that we should use the U.S. military tostabilize the region and reduce the threat of terrorism, a 2008study by the RAND Corporation found that U.S. policiesemphasizing the use of force tend to create new terrorists. InHow Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaida,Seth Jones and Martin Libicki argue that the U.S. military should

generally resist being drawn into combat operations in Muslimsocieties, since [a U.S. military] presence is likely to increaseterrorist recruitment. 22 Some policymakers claim the war isworth waging because terrorists flourish in failed states. But thatargument cannot account for terrorists who thrive in centralizedstates that have the sovereignty to reject external interference.23 That is one reason why militants find sanctuary in neighboring,nucleararmed Pakistan. In this respect, and perhaps mostimportant, is the belief that our presence in the region helpsPakistan, when in fact the seemingly open-ended U.S. presence inAfghanistan risks creating worse problems for Pakistan. Amassingtroops in Afghanistan feeds the perception of a foreignoccupation, spawning more terrorist recruits for Pakistani militiasand thus placing undue stress on an already weakened nation.

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Consequentialism not valid for punishment

Duff, Antony, "Legal Punishment", The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy(Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

.

The most familiar objections to consequentialist penal theoriesare objections to purely consequentialist theories which hold that

only the consequences are relevant to question of justification (fortwo simple examples of such theories, see Wilson 1983; Walker1991). For, critics argue, it could turn out that manifestly unjustpunishments (the punishment of those known to be innocent, forinstance, or excessively harsh punishment of the guilty) wouldefficiently serve the aim of crime prevention, andconsequentialists must then regard such punishments as inprinciple justified: but such punishments would be wrong, justbecause they would be unjust (see e.g. Hart 1968, chs. 1-2; Ten

1987; Primoratz 1999, chs. 2-3).There are some equally familiar consequentialist responses to thisfamiliar objection. One is to argue that such unjust punishmentswould be justified if they would really produce the bestconsequences (see e.g. Smart 1973: 69-72; Bagaric &Amarasekara 2000)to which the critic will reply that we cannotthus put aside the moral significance of injustice. Another is toargue that in the real world it is extremely unlikely that suchpunishments would ever be for the best, and even less likely thatthe agents involved could be trusted reliably to pick out thoserare cases in which they would be: thus we, and especially ourpenal officials, will do best if we think and act as if suchpunishments are intrinsically wrong and unjustifiable (see e.g.Rawls 1955; Hare 1981, chs. 3, 9.7)to which the critic willrespond that this still makes the wrongness of punishing a knowninnocent contingent on its effects, and fails to recognise the

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intrinsic wrong that such punishment does (see e.g. Duff 1986:151-64; Primoratz 1999, chs. 3.3, 6.5). Another response is toargue that a richer or subtler account of the ends that thecriminal law should serve will generate suitable protection against

unjust punishments (see Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, especially 71-6, on dominion as the end of criminal law): but the objectionremains that any purely consequentialist account will make theprotection of the innocent against injustice contingent on itsinstrumental contribution to the system's aims (on Braithwaite &Pettit, see von Hirsch & Ashworth 1992; Duff 1996: 20-25; Pettit1997).