Deterrence, Defense, Arms Race, Security Dilemma,...

Deterrence,Defense,ArmsRace,

SecurityDilemma,ArmsControl,and

theBalanceofPower

Iwan Sulistyo

Deterrence?

•  Deterrenceàmembuatpelbagaiancamanmiliteryangdigunakanuntukmencegahaktorlainmelakukan4ndakanagresif.

•  Deterrenceberupayamenghen4kansegala4ndakanyang4dakdikehendakisebelumterjadi.

•  Konsepdeterrencemencakupdenial(penyangkalan)danretalia;on(pembalasan).

Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations, MacMillan Press, London, 1987, p. 136. 2

h=p://www.en.ism.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/et_temp/BarryB-22880_200x200.jpg

Prof.BarryBuzanGuruBesar(Emeritus)IlmuHI,LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoli4calScience(LSE),theU.K.

Deterrence?•  Deterrencestrategyàmenghen4kanpihaklawandaripenggunaankekuatanpertamakaliyangdilakukannya,bukanmenggagalkansuatuserangansetelahseranganituterjadi.(Buzan,p.140.)

•  Prinsipdasaryangsederhanadarideterrenceà“oneactorpreventsanotherfromtakingsomeac3onbyraisingthela7er’sfearoftheconsequencesthatwillensue.”

(Buzan,p.163.)3

• Selaindeterrence,adajugakonsepdefensedanoffense.

• Terdapatperdebatandalampemahamantentangdefensedandeterrence.

(Buzan,p.135)

4

Offense,Deterrence,Defense?•  “Offensiveopera;onsareac3onsinwhichastateusesforcetoa7ackanotherstate’smilitaryornonmilitaryassetstoconqueritsterritoryorcompelcompliancewithpolicydirec3ves(imposeitswillontheotherstate).”

5K.R. Adams, ‘Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance’, International Security,

Winter 2003/04, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 53.

h=p://grizalum.org/imx/Events/charterday/2015/BioPhotos/KarenAdams.jpg

KarenRuthAdams,associateprofessorofpoli4calscienceattheUniversityofMontana,theU.S.

Defense?• Defensiveopera;onsà“ac3onsinwhichastateusesforceagainstanotherstate’smilitaryassetstorepelandlimitdamagefromthatstate’sa7ackstoretaincontrolofitsterritoryandavoidhavingtheotherstateimposeitswilluponit.”(Adams,p.53)


Winter 2003/04, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 53.

Deterrence?• Deterrentopera;onsà“ac3onsinwhichastatepreparestouseforceordemonstrateitsabilitytouseforcetoa7ackanotherstate’snonmilitaryassetstodeterthatstatefroma7ackingitortodeteritfromfurthera7acksonceawarhasbegun.”(Adams,p.53.)


Winter 2003/04, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 53.

•  Deterrenceà“keepinganopponentfromdoingsomethingbythreatofpunishmentorbypossessingcapabili3estheadversaryknowswillblockordenyanysucha7empt.”

•  Extendeddeterrenceà“threatsdesignedtodeterandprotectothercountriesfromana7ackbyacommonenemy.”

•  Defenseà“programsandcapabili3esdesignedtorepelordeteranenemya7ack.”

•  Warfigh;ngà“theapplica3onofviolencetoachieveone’spoli3calandmilitaryobjec3ves.”

8P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics, 5th edn, (New Jersey: Pearson, 2013, p. 308.

MutualAssuredDestruc<on(MAD)?

• “anucleardeterrencedoctrinethataimstoavoidwarbyreciprocalthreatofpunishmentthroughanunacceptablelevelofdestruc4on.”


MinimumorFiniteDeterrence?

• “adoctrineinwhichastatemaintainsarela4velysmallnumberofnuclearorotherweaponsofmassdestruc4onforuseinmakingdeterrencethreat.”


ForcePosture?

“numbers,types,loca4ons,andotherqualita4vefactorsconcerningastate’smilitaryforces.”


ArmsRace?•  Didalamlingkunganinternasionalyang

sifatnyaanarkis,terciptarasasalingtakutantarnegara-bangsakarenaadanyapemahamanyangkeliru.

•  Dengankondisisalingcurigaitu,dimensisecuritymenjadiprioritasutamasehingga4ap-4apnegara-bangsaakanberusahameraihsertamemperkuatkeamanandengancarameningkatkanmilitaryexpenditure(belanjamiliter)-nya.

•  Selainitu,upayaagarkianungguldarisegikemampuanmiliterjuga4dakdapatdilepaskan.

12J.H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 1950, pp. 157-158. Lihat juga J.H. Herz, International

Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p. 231.

JohnHerz,ascholarofinterna4onalrela4onsandlaw,CityCollegeofNewYork.h=p://rzv039.rz.tu-bs.de/isw/sandra/lexikon/cmsimpleplus/images/herz_john_klein.jpg

ArmsRace?•  Alhasil,terjadilahperlombaansenjataantarnegara-bangsa.Dengankatalain,manakalasuatunegaramencobameningkatkankekuatanmiliternya,makanegarayanglain,secepatitupula,jugaakanberupayamelakukanhalyangsama.(Herz,p.231)

•  Dengandemikian,padakondisiinilah4apnegaraterjebakdidalamsuatudilema,yangkemudiandisebutsebagaidilemakeamananberupaperlombaansenjata(armsracing).(Herz,p.231)

13J.H. Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma’, World Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, 1950, pp. 157-158. Lihat juga J.H. Herz, International

Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p. 231.

Armsrace?• PerlombaansenjataàmerupakanimplikasidariperkembanganteknologimiliterdalamHI.(Buzan,p.69)

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Armsrace?•  Perlombaansenjataadalahsuatukondisiyangabnormal,terutamadalamkaitanantaraaspekrefleksinegaraataspersaingan/kompe4sisecarapoli4kdanaspekperasaansalingtakutterhadappotensikekuatanmiliternegaralain.(Buzan,p.70)

•  Di44kini,persoalanyangmunculadalahbagaimanamembedakankondisiyangabnormalinidarinormaperilakuself-defensedibawahsuatustrukturyanganarkis?Alhasil,batasanantaranormaldanabnormalpunmenjadisuatukonsepyangambigu.(Buzan,p.70)

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Armsrace?•  Armsdynamic(dinamikapersenjataan)menjaditerminologiyangdigunakandalammenggambarkankeseluruhanrangkaiantekananyangmenyebabkan4apnegara-bangsamembangunkekuatanmiliter,termasukmengubahjumlahataupunmutunya.(Buzan,p.73)

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Armsrace?•  Didalamis4lah‘armsdynamic’terkandungaspekarmsracedanmaintenanceofthemilitarystatusquo(gambarankondisiyangnormaldaridinamikapersenjataan,yangjugadapatbereskalasimenjadiperlombaansenjata),yangberbedadarisegiderajatnya.(Buzan,pp.73-74)

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ArmsRaceGame(Prisoners’Dilemma)

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(PaulD.Williams,p.47)

TigaModeldidalamArmsRace•  Dalamperlombaansenjata,ada3modelyangsalingmelengkapiyangdapatmenjelaskanprosessuatunegaradalammeningkatkankekuatanangkatanbersenjatanya:

1. Modelaksi-reaksi;2. Modelstrukturdomes4k;dan3. Modelimpera4fteknologis

20(Buzan,p.74)

1.ModelAksi-Reaksi• Negara-negaramengupayakanpenguatanpersenjataanmerekakarenapersepsiancamanyangdirasakandarinegaralain.Dengankatalain,modelinimenjelaskanbahwafaktoreksternalsebuahnegaraadalahpendorongutamadaridinamikapersenjataan.(Buzan,pp.74-76).

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SecurityDilemma•  Prak4s,kondisiseper4demikianakanmemunculkanapayangkemudiandisebutsebagaisecuritydilemmakarena4apnegara-bangsa4dakmudahmengambillangkah-langkahdalammeningkatkankekuatannyatanpamembuatnegaralainmerasakurangaman.

•  Konsepsecuritydilemmapertamakalidibangunolehparapemikirseper4HerbertBu=erfield,JohnHerz,danRobertJervis.

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Prof.ShipingTang,GuruBesarpadaSchoolofInterna4onalRela4onsandPublicAffairs(SIRPA),FudanUniveristy,Shanghai,China,menelaahdankemudianmemetakandengancukupbaikperbandingankonsepsecuritydilemmayangdikemukakanolehke4gapemikirtersebutàLihatselengkapnyapaparanS.Tang,ATheoryofSecurityStrategyforOurTime:DefensiveRealism,PalgraveMacmillan,NewYork,2010,pp.33-96.

ModelAksi-Reaksi(lanjutan)

•  Karenamodeliniterlihatsederhana,tetapirumitdalamimplementasinya,makaditengahkesulitandalamupayamengiden4fikasihalyangsangatspesifikdariprosesaksi-reaksi,Buzanmemberikananjurandenganmelakukanbeberapatahapanyangpatutdigunakan.(Buzan,p.84)

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•  Dibagianawal,bisamemulainyadenganmengujiidiom(ungkapan)dariaksi-reaksi.Ar4nya,jenis-jenisaksiatau4ndakanyangdilakukanolehnegaradalamproses.

•  Kemudian,variabel-variabeldalampolaresponyangdapatdiiden4fikasi,terutama:magnitude(besaranatauukuran),;ming(pilihanwaktu),danawareness(kesadaran)dariparaaktoryangterlibatdidalamproses.– Magnitudeàproporsireaksiapayangmenunjanguntukmemicuterjadinyaaksi;

–  Timingàkecepatandanurutaninteraksi;–  Awarenessàsejauhmanapihakyangterlibatdalamprosesmenyadaridampaksatudenganyanglain,danapakahmerekamengaturperilakumerekasendiri.

(Buzan,p.84)

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• Selainke4gavariabeltadi,hallainyang4dakdapatdilepaskanialahaspekmo<f.Disini,mo4fantar-aktoryangbersaingmemilikiimplikasiyangutamadaripadavariabellaindalamprosesaksi-reaksidanakhirnyaaspekmo4fjugasulituntukdiduga.(Buzan,pp.89-90)

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•  Idiom-idiomdalamaksi-reaksi–apakahterkaitekonomidanpoli4kataubahkanmiliter–dapatterlihatdalampelbagaibentuk,misalnyaperbedaansistempersenjataan,atausistemperlengkapanseper4an4-kapalselam,an4-pesawattempuratausisteman4-misilversuskapalselam,sertapengebomdanmisil.

•  Variabel-variabelyangdianalisisinipunlebihrumitdaripadamodeldasarnya.(Buzan,pp.79-80and82-84)

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2.ModelStrukturDomes<k•  Gagasandasar:dinamikapersenjataandihasilkanolehkekuatandidalamnegara,yangmencakupkekuatanatasdinamikapersenjataandalamkaitandengandimensiekonomi,organisasi,danpoli<knegara-negara.(Buzan,p.74andp.94)

•  Pelembagaanrisetmiliter(theins3tu3onaliza-3onofmilitaryresearchanddevelopment)memainkanperanyangsangatpen4ng.

•  TidakadanegarayangdapatmenjadinegarayangsepenuhnyaindependendalamhalmemproduksipersenjataantanpabasisR&Dyangdimilikinya.(Buzan,p.96)

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3.ModelImpera<fTeknologis•  Terkaitdenganbagaimanacaramemaknaidinamikapersenjataandalamkonteksproseskualita4fyangumumdalamkemajuanteknologi.(Buzan,p.74)

•  Lebihmenekankandimensiteknologidaripadakontekspoli4k.Modelinihadiruntukmengiden4fikasiaspekindependendaridinamikapersenjataansecaramenyeluruh,yangmemang4dakmendapatsorotandidalammodelaksi-reaksidanmodelstrukturdomes4k.

•  Teknologimiliter4dakdapatdilepaskandariberagamunsurilmupengetahuan,sertakeahlianteknik,pengembanganmaterial,danelektronik.(Buzan,p.105)

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BalanceofPower?

• Sebuahkonsepkuncididalamparadigmarealisyangsecaraumummenunjukkansuatukondisiataupunkecenderunganyangseimbangantarnegara.

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•  Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), Part 4. •  P.R Viotti dan M.V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity, 3rd edn,.(New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), p. 44.

•  Namun,konsepbalanceofpowerinimasihsangatluas.

•  Adais4lahlain,yakni‘strategicstability’,yangmenggambarkanperimbangankekuatanantarnegaradenganlebihjelas.

•  Is4lahstrategicstabilityinisendirimemangberlatar-belakangPerangDinginantaraduakekuatanadidaya,ASdanUniSoviet,dimanayangmenjadifokustelaahadalahsenjatanuklir.

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StrategicStability“Strategicstability,regardedtechnicallystrictlyinmilitaryterms,wasdeemedtoresideinacontextwhereneithersidecouldsecureamajoradvantagebystrikingfirst.Inthecontemporaryjargonofdefenceanalysis,astablecontextwasoneinwhichthefirst-strikebonuswaslowornegligible.Suchacontextwassaidtobe‘crisisstable’.ThemostpopularthesisintheWestwasthatstrategicstabilitywasensuredbythemutualabilityofthesuperpowerstoinflictunacceptabledamageuponeachotherinanyandallcircumstances.Thisstrategic–perhapsan3-strategic–condi3oncametobeknownasmutualassureddestruc3on(MAD).Therolesofsocietyweretopayforthenucleararmedforcesandtoserveuncomplaininglyashostagetotheprudentandsoberbehaviorofitspoli3calleaders.”

32C.S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 213.

ColinGray,GuruBesarHubunganInternasionaldanKajianStrategispadaUniversityofReading,theU.K.

h=p://www.reading.ac.uk/web/Mul4mediaFiles/spirs-staff-colingray.jpg

Threats“Thethreatsfromnuclear,biologicalandchemicalweaponsarereal.Thepossibilitythatterroristsmightacquireandusenuclearweaponsisanurgentandpoten4allycatastrophicchallengetoglobalsecurity.Thereisbipar4sanagreementintheUnitedStatesthatthebiologicalthreatisasignificantconcern.Andwhilechemicalweaponsreceivesignificantlylessa=en4on,thehistoricalrecordshowsthattheyare,byfar,themostwidelyusedandwidelyproliferatedweaponsofmassdestruc4on.”

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h=p://www.n4.org/threats/

Anarchy?•  “Theabsenceofpoli4calauthority.Interna4onalpoli4csortheinterna4onalsystemissaidtobeanarchicasthereisnoworldgovernment—nocentralorsuperordinateauthorityoverstates,whichretaintheirsovereignrights.”

•  “Inaworldcharacterizedbyanarchy,thereisnoworldgovernmentorcentralauthority,muchlessonewiththenecessarypowertoconstrainstatesorotherorganizedgroupsfromusingforceorengaginginwarfare.Insuchaworld,somestatesmaychoosetouseforcetoachievetheirobjec4ves.Whentheseac4onsconfrontotherstates,armedconflictmaybetheresult.”


•  Didalamkondisiyanganarkis,4ap-4apnegara-bangsaakanterusberupayamemperkuatpower-nyadenganmempertangguhpersenjataannya,baikdarisegikualitasmaupunkuan4tas.

•  Kondisitersebutmemunculkanperlombaansenjatadansecuritydilema.

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• Pertanyaanyangmunculkemudian:Bagaimanamengendalikanperilakuagresifyangtanpabatastersebut?àMekanismedisarmamentdanarmscontrol

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Disarmament•  “Disarmamentisthemostdirect–andinasensethecrudest–responsetotheproblemofmilitarymeans.Itslogicisthatsinceweaponscreatetheproblem,thesolu4onistogetridofthem.Thislogiccanbeappliedtoallweapons–generalandcompletedisarmament(GCD)–ortospecificcategoriesofweaponsdeemedtobepar4cularlydangerous,suchasnuclearbombsandbiologicalwarfareagents.Itcanbeappliedunilaterallyormul4laterally,andcaninvolvepar4alorcompleteelimina4onofthespecifiedtype(s)ofweapon.Theconceptrefersbothtotheprocessbywhichmilitarycapabili4esarereduced,andtotheendcondi4onofbeingdisarmed.”(Buzan,p.237)

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ArmsControl•  “Likedisarmament,armscontrolisalsoconcernedwiththeimpactoftechnologyonthearmsdynamicanddeterrencestrategies.Althoughitsharesthisroot,armscontrolislessambi4ousandmoresophis4catedthandisarmament.Itdiffersfundamentallyfromdisarmamentintheprinciplesthatgovernitsapproachtotheproblemofmilitarymeans.”(Buzan,p.252)

•  “Theul4mateobjec4veofdisarmamentistorenderarmsracinganddeterrencebothunnecessaryandimpossible.”(Buzan,p.252)

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ArmsControlandDisarmamentAdayangmenyederhanakankeduakonseptersebutdenganpemahamanbahwa:

1.  Armscontrolàmengurangi,membatasi,mengendalikanpersenjataan4daksecaramenyeluruh.

2.  Disarmamentàmengurangisecaratotal/keseluruhan.

•  Keduacaradiatasbiasanyadilakukanlewattrea;esatauregimes(perjanjian/kesepakatanataurezim)olehduaataulebihnegara/aliansi.

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Pelbagaitrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament

•  BiologicalWeapons– Mul4lateral

•  Conven3onontheProhibi3onoftheDevelopment,Produc3onandStockpilingofBacteriological(Biological)andToxinWeapons(BTWC)

•  ProtocolfortheProhibi3onoftheUseinWarofAsphyxia3ng,Poisonous,orOtherGasses,andofBacteriologicalMethodsofWarfare(GenevaProtocol)

40h=p://www.n4.org/trea4es-and-regimes/trea4es/


•  ChemicalWeapons– Bilateral

•  India-PakistanAgreementonChemicalWeapons

– Mul4lateral•  Conven3onontheProhibi3onoftheDevelopment,Produc3on,StockpilingandUseofChemicalWeaponsandonTheirDestruc3on(CWC)

– Regional•  MendozaAgreement



•  Conven4onalWeapons– Mul4lateral

•  ArmsTradeTreaty(ATT)•  TreatyonConven3onalArmedForcesinEurope(CFE)•  TreatyonOpenSkies

•  NuclearSafety– Mul4lateral

•  Conven3ononNuclearSafety•  Conven3ononthePhysicalProtec3onofNuclearMaterial(CPPNM)

•  JointConven3onontheSafetyofSpentFuelManagementandontheSafetyofRadioac3veWasteManagement



•  NuclearWeapons–  Bilateral

•  India-PakistanNon-A7ackAgreement•  JointDeclara3onofSouthandNorthKoreaontheDenucleariza3onoftheKorean

Peninsula•  LahoreDeclara3on•  StrategicArmsLimita3onTalks(SALTI)•  StrategicArmsLimita3onTalks(SALTII)•  StrategicOffensiveReduc3onsTreaty(SORT)•  TreatybetweenTheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheRussianFedera3onon

MeasuresfortheFurtherReduc3onandLimita3onofStrategicOffensiveArms(NewSTART)

•  TreatybetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsonStrategicOffensiveReduc3ons(STARTI)

•  TreatybetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsonStrategicOffensiveReduc3ons(STARTII)

•  TreatybetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsontheElimina3onofTheirIntermediate-rangeandShorter-rangeMissiles(INFTreaty)

•  TreatybetweentheUnitedStatesofAmericaandtheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsonUndergroundNuclearExplosionsforPeacefulPurposes(PNETreaty)

•  TreatyontheLimita3onofAn3-Ballis3cMissileSystems(ABMTreaty)•  US-DPRKAgreedFramework


Contohtrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament

•  NuclearWeapons–  Mul4lateral

•  ComprehensiveNuclear-Test-BanTreaty(CTBT)•  Interna3onalConven3onontheSuppressionofActsofNuclearTerrorism•  TreatyBanningNuclearTestsintheAtmosphere,inOuterSpaceandUnder

Water(Par3alTestBanTreaty)(PTBT)•  TreatyontheNon-Prolifera3onofNuclearWeapons(NPT)•  TreatyontheProhibi3onoftheEmplacementofNuclearWeaponsandOther

WeaponsofMassDestruc3onontheSeabedandOceanFloorandintheSubsoilThereof(SeabedTreaty)

•  AfricanNuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone(ANWFZ)Treaty(PelindabaTreaty)•  Antarc3cTreaty•  CentralAsiaNuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone(CANWFZ)•  Nuclear-Weapon-FreeStatusofMongolia•  SoutheastAsianNuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone(SEANWFZ)Treaty(Bangkok

Treaty)•  SouthPacificNuclear-FreeZone(SPNFZ)TreatyofRarotonga•  TreatyfortheProhibi3onofNuclearWeaponsinLa3nAmericaandthe

Caribbean(LANWFZ)(TlatelolcoTreaty)


Contohtrea;esatauregimesyangberkaitandenganarmscontroldandisarmament

•  NuclearWeapons– ProposedMul<lateral

•  ProposedFissileMaterial(Cut-off)Treaty(FMCT)•  ProposedInterna3onallyLegally-BindingNega3veSecurityAssurances(NSAs)

•  ProposedNuclearWeaponsConven3on(NWC)•  ProposedPreven3onofanArmsRaceinSpace(PAROS)Treaty



•  SpaceArmsControl– Mul4lateral

•  AgreementGoverningtheAc3vi3esofStatesontheMoonandOtherCeles3alBodies(MoonAgreement)

•  Conven3onontheRegistra3onofObjectsLaunchedinOuterSpace(LaunchRegistra3onConven3on)

•  TreatyonPrinciplesGoverningtheAc3vi3esofStatesintheExplora3onandUseofOuterSpace,IncludingtheMoonandOtherCeles3alBodies(OuterSpaceTreaty)


ARMSDYNAMIC

•  disarmament•  armscontrol•  armsreduc4on•  armsmaintenance•  militarymoderniza4on•  armsbuildup•  armsrace

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ArmsDynamic

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• Disarmament• Armscontrol• Armsreduc4on• Armsmaintenance• Militarymoderniza4on• Armsbuildup• Armsrace

“Trust,butverify”

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Data?• Dataapayanglazimdijadikansebagairujukan/bahananalisisataurisettentangmiliter/pertahanan,perimbangankekuatanmiliter,sertapelbagaiisustrategislainnya?

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IISS(theInterna<onalIns<tuteforStrategicStudies)

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h=p://www.iiss.org/

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h=p://www.sipri.org/

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