Catherine Guisan 2011

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From the European Coal and Steel Communityto Kosovo: Reconciliation and Its Discontents* jcms_2152 541..562

CATHERINE GUISAN

University of Minnesota

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the scholarly and public debates onthe often-invoked but undetermined European Union reconciliatory identity. First,it articulates an interpretative analysis of the founding of the European Coal and SteelCommunity (ECSC) and civil society initiatives in post-World War II westernEurope, which draws its conceptual framework from Paul Ricoeur and HannahArendt’s hermeneutics. Second, it discusses whether the reconciliatory practices thusdetected are still relevant for countries in conflict on the path to EU membership.Former EU Commission President Jacques Delors and Polish Member of the

European Parliament Bronislaw Geremek affirm that this is the case for the WesternBalkans. This article explores what this might mean in terms of policies andgrass-roots initiatives between Kosovo and Serbia today.

Introduction

Reconciliation has become a leitmotif of European Union (EU) public rheto-ric since the end of the cold war and serves to legitimize the project of

European integration. This is new. For almost four decades, the consensus

* The author thanks Chris Borgh, Bashkim Iseni, Leigh Payne, Kathryn Sikkink, the members of theCollaborative on Transitional Justice at the University of Minnesota and the anonymous reviewers for theirhelpful comments. Thanks also to the interviewees for their invaluable contribution to this research, whichis forthcoming in an expanded form in the author’s A Political Theory of Identity in European Integration(Routledge, 2011).

JCMS 2011 Volume 49. Number 3. pp. 541–562

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2010.02152.x

© 2011 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 MainStreet, Malden, MA 02148, USA



among decision-makers was that Europe would be built on ‘tangible founda-

tions’ such as the productivity index, trade and investment. Only brief refer-ences to peace, prosperity and democracy in treaty preambles signalled largerambitions, and there were few public debates (Glucksmann, 1997). Eventoday, the concept of reconciliation remains ‘undetermined’. Understandably,this ideal must ‘fluctuate’ under changing circumstances, but undeterminedconcepts quickly morph into empty clichés that excite cynicism rather thaninvolvement (Mink and Neumayer, 2007, pp. 252, 19).

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the scholarly and publicdebates on the often-invoked but vague EU reconciliatory identity in twoways. First, it articulates an interpretative analysis of the founding of theEuropean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and civil society initiatives inpost-World War II western Europe, which draws its conceptual frameworkfrom Paul Ricoeur and Hannah Arendt’s hermeneutics. Second, it discusseswhether the reconciliatory practices (rather than values) thus detected are stillrelevant for countries in conflict on the path to EU membership. Former EUCommission President Jacques Delors and Polish Member of the EuropeanParliament (MEP) Bronislaw Geremek affirm that this is the case for the

Western Balkans (Delors, 2000a, b, 2006; Geremek, Interview, 13 March2008, Strasbourg). This article explores what this might mean in terms of policies and grass-roots initiatives between Kosovo and Serbia today.

Arendt and Ricoeur are both indebted to Husserl’s phenomenologicalanalysis of human consciousness. Phenomenological interpretations, and thebroader tradition of philosophical hermeneutics, probe how various aspects of the human condition are experienced by people and what can be said/is beingtold about these experiences (Madison, 1999). They detect practices ratherthan opinions, values or cultural concepts. Here someone has acted: what can

we understand? What is the meaning of their action? This approach seemsespecially well suited to a reflection on EU reconciliations. The enterprisewas and still is an experiment in progress. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics suggeststhat only by taking seriously the self-understanding of the actors directlyinvolved in a political process can we understand its meaning(s), and there-fore derive some sense of identity from it (Ricoeur, 2006). This article’soriginality lies in confronting the sayings of political theorists and actors (inlong interviews) to interpret the phenomenon of EU reconciliation, albeit with

Arendt’s caveat that ‘understanding is unending and therefore cannot producefinal results’ (Arendt, 2005, p. 308).On the second day of the Nato bombing of Serbia and Kosovo in March

1999, Jacques Delors was asked whether Hannah Arendt’s discussion of political forgiveness and promise had any explanatory purchase on the earlyEuropean reconciliations. And were forgiveness and promise, as Arendt

542 CATHERINE GUISAN

© 2011 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd



understood them, still needed today, especially in the Western Balkans?1

Delors (Interview, 25 March 1999, Paris) answered that:Even perhaps without having read Arendt, the European Founding Fathersimplicitly applied her maxims. As recently as 1995, when one spoke aboutEurope with the giants of history [Mitterrand and Kohl] who were finishingtheir careers, they responded, ‘never again war between us’, which impliesa promise and a forgiveness.

However, he responded negatively to the second question: ‘The logic of hateand rejection of the other took over the Arendtian logic’. One year later,

however, in two major speeches (the second celebrating the 50th anniversaryof the 1950 Schuman Declaration proposing the ECSC), Delors stated that if Europe had remembered its ‘treasure’, the ‘virtues of promise and forgivenessborrowed from Hannah Arendt’, it would have dealt with the Balkans issuequite differently. Arendt illustrated, he said, the thought and action of FrenchForeign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman even though she wrote eight yearsafter he acted:

Forgiveness without forgetfulness, promise to allow the other not to sink

into despair or revenge. Let’s think of what strength these maxims mightcarry if they were applied in Bosnia and Kosovo [. . .]

We must therefore find in the Balkans, on both sides, men and womenwhom we could trust to face the principle of forgiveness and developtogether a promise, of course, with the support of nearby countries, amongothers Bulgaria and Romania. But this was not done because the little light– the treasure I spoke about – is no longer shining. (Delors, 2000a, b)

More ‘prosaically’ Delors asked why one of the ‘recipes’ of the ECSC – the

pooling of economic resources – was not applied to Kosovo and its neigh-bours, which would compel them to develop common institutions to admin-ister their material exchanges. He concluded that forgiveness and promisetogether form a ‘project’, which is part of the ‘legacy’ left to the Europeanpeople (Delors, 2000a, b). Delors has not developed this idea in more detailsince, although he has mentioned it repeatedly and refers to Arendt (Delors,2006).

For Delors, European reconciliation did not originate with the Franco–German Treaty of 1963, as is often argued, but with the treaty on the Euro-

pean Coal and Steel Community of 1951, making it a multilateral processfrom the start. Bronislaw Geremek regrets also that during the EU’s 50th

1 Theorists of reconciliation cite Arendt frequently, although she did not use this term to describe attemptsat conflict resolution (Shriver, 1995). I will return to her discussion of political forgiveness and promiselater.

FROM THE ECSC TO KOSOVO 543




anniversary celebrations of the 1957 Treaties of Rome, the very ‘origin of

European integration was left in the shadow’:After all, 1950 preceded 1957. In the German–French rapprochement, themost important work, which matters historically, was not the will to buildaround coal and steel, but the transcending (dépassement ) of recent memo-ries. [. . .] The EU has paid little attention to issues of reconciliation inKosovo, which has been handled as a political issue and a question of international law. Reconciliation cannot be imposed by decree. But the EU’soffer of accession to both Serbia and Kosovo implies a future made possibleby reconciliation. (Geremek, Interview, 13 March 2008, Strasbourg)

Interpreting the ethos of technocratic programmes, such as the first EuropeanCommunity, is a difficult act, which the remainder of this article undertakes.It probes to what extent the ‘Arendtian logic’ Delors mentions explains thereconciliatory ethos of the ECSC, and whether this hermeneutical enterprisehas any relevance for the current conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. Thenext section briefly reviews analyses of reconciliation in EU literature inorder to set the argument within its broader context. A discussion of Ricoeur’sconcept of testimony and Arendt’s categories of action, forgiveness and

promise follows, which recast the ECSC foundation in theoretical terms. Thisnarrative of reconciliation highlights the twin role of state and grass-rootsinitiatives, which reinforced each other, albeit without deliberate co-ordination. The third and last part of the article discusses the current conflictbetween Serbia and Kosovo and suggests one policy inspired by ECSC‘practices’. It discusses also some grass-roots and elite initiatives laying theground for reconciliation in both communities today.

I. Comparative Analyses of Peace and Reconciliation

Peace, once achieved, is ‘quiet’, which may explain why ‘one of the EU’sfundamental achievements and core legitimating values [. . .] the develop-ment of a “peace community” entailing reconciliation between formerenemies’ has been under-analysed (Gardner Feldman, 1999a, p. 66). This mayalso be why some dub the process as ‘easy’ (Attali, 1994, p. 10). This articleargues that, on the contrary, founding moments of European integration holduseful lessons for the present because they were fragile and fraught with

difficulties. In conflict resolution literature, ‘peace’ is usually defined as theelimination of war as a means for solving international conflicts, and it refersto changes in structural/institutional conditions and learning processes;whereas ‘reconciliation’ refers to an affective process involving the healing of emotions and the elimination of resentment (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004, pp. 72,





76–80). In the brief 1950 Schuman Declaration, which made public

the French offer to Germany to create jointly a European Coal and SteelCommunity, the words ‘peace’ and ‘peaceful’ appear five times, but not‘reconciliation’. The preambles of major European treaties have included thereference to peace ever since. Lily Gardner Feldman, however, like manyother Europeanists, uses the two terms almost interchangeably while estab-lishing another useful distinction between ‘pragmatic’ reconciliatory policiesthat serve state interests and security, and the ‘moral’ programmes thatbreak age-old animosities (Gardner Feldman, 1999a, p. 70). At the state level,the plan for the ECSC proposed structural changes: ‘de facto economicsolidarity’ and supranational institutions rather than the healing of emotionsand amity (Fontaine, 2000, p. 36). Meanwhile grass-roots movements soughtthe healing of memories and promoted reconciliation, manifesting a ‘spon-taneous reconciliatory tendency’, which has been observed at other important

junctures of the European integration process (Mink, 2007, p. 34). Thereforereconciliation is understood here to entail both structural and affectivechanges. Arendt (1970, p. 51) called peace ‘an absolute’ – that is, an end initself; but reconciliation need not mean the end of conflict. Rather conflicts

are now ‘articulated as differences that can be managed rather than existentialthreats’; they become ‘productive contention in a shared and co-operativeframework’(Rumelili, 2007, p. 107; Gardner Feldman, 1999a, p. 337). Think-ing through past European reconciliatory processes (rather than peace) andtheir continuing relevance is the main focus of this article.

The 1993 Copenhagen criteria for EU accession, which clarified EUvalues officially (respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of lawalongside administrative capacity and a market economy) left ‘peace’ and‘reconciliation’ unmentioned. Yet public days of remembrance that mark

chosen traumas and glories are multiplying and link EU citizens acrossMember States in frequent ‘symbolic rituals’ (Manners, 2006a). Europeanintegration is acknowledged as a major reconciliatory project, but with littleanalysis the project remains devoid of content (Rosoux, 2007). In spite of intensive inquiries into the relationship between EU norms and democraticlegitimacy since the difficult ratification of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (see,inter alia, Manners, 2002; Morgan, 2005; Parsons, 2003), the reconciliatorydimension of European integration attracted little scholarly attention at

first, with a few exceptions (Gardner Feldman, 1999a, b; Guisan, 2003, 2005;Pond, 2002). This is changing as Ian Manners’ discussion of ‘sustainablepeace’ demonstrates (Manners, 2006b, 2008). Some political scientistshighlight the reconciliatory deficit in EU policies: neither in the case of Cyprus, nor in the Israel–Palestine case have conflicts become de-securitized,although this has not altered EU self-perceptions as a ‘force for good’ (Diez





and Tocci, 2009; Pace, 2007; Tocci, 2005). At the same time, there is growing

evidence that the prospect of EU membership encourages reconciliatoryprocesses (Pond, 2002, 2006). Bahar Rumelili (2007) discusses the impact of EU ‘bordering practices’ on the Greek–Turkish conflicts. Without minimizingdomestic factors, she shows how the fact that Turkey became a candidatecountry to the EU in 1999 altered institutional and identity borders withGreece and encouraged conflict-reducing perceptions and policies on bothsides. In zones of conflict already ‘in’, such as the island of Ireland, the EUdoes not have the same ‘constraining impact’. The Irish experience illustratesthe importance of the social dimension of reconciliation – that is, programmesof economic development bringing partners together around commoninterests (Hayward, 2007, p. 682).

There is frequent mention of the French–German reconciliation as aprecedent and ‘inspiration’ (Diez et al., 2008, p. 4; Rumelili, 2007, p. 120;Hayward, 2007, p. 679), but this is not a literature about memory or a political‘tradition’. Neither the interviewees nor the interviewers exhibit familiaritywith the lived experience of French and German actors of reconciliation, andthere is little sense of what past experiences might transmit beyond a sense of

possibility (admittedly important). This may be one reason why ‘EU pacifism’provided scant ‘guidance in how to deal [. . .] with ethnic cleansing in theBalkans and the religious fanaticism of the Near East’ (Jarausch, 2007, p. 11).

II. Hermeneutical Analyses

‘Understanding’ with Hannah Arendt and Paul Ricoeur

The lack of remembrances of reconciliatory practices strikes one as odd given

the already long history of European pacifism. Arendt, however, might nothave been surprised by these lacunae in pacifist discourses. She attributed thefailure to tap into important political experiences less to the failings of actorsthan to the paucity of political theorizing, which did not turn founding actsinto political concepts available for the next generations, and she mournedthese political ‘lost treasures’ (Arendt, 1990, pp. 219–21). Arendt’s exercisesin ‘understanding’ are not the privilege of the well educated, but accessible toall those willing to reflect in order to act (Arendt, 2005, p. 308). At best,interpreting historical precedents provides ‘exemplars’ of goodness, wisdom

or courage (not ready-made solutions or replicable patterns), which prod theimagination and stimulate novel action (Arendt, 1998, p. 76).

Like Arendt, Paul Ricoeur stresses the power of founding stories to groundpolitical communities. These narratives that may consist of fictional or his-torical accounts remain open for rectification and retelling (Kearney, 2004).





What is striking in the case of European integration is that the accounts are

almost entirely missing. Where are the ‘stories’ of the Coal and Steel Com-munity or of the enlargements? There is little memory, although there ishistory. What is the difference? For Ricoeur, the work of memory is an‘ambition’, an attempt to be ‘faithful to the past’, an action-oriented respon-sibility of citizenship, whereas history, the task of professional historians,aims at factual truth and causal relationships. Both are needed, and what linksthem is the testimony of those who can say, ‘I was there! Believe me or not.And if you do not believe me, ask someone else!’ (Ricoeur, 2006, pp. 55,163–5, 497). Ricoeur wishes for a ‘happy memory’ – that is, a memoryreconciled to the tragic roots of all political foundings, which are born outviolence.2 Such a memory is a hard-won gift, granted to those who have donethe work of mourning and moved beyond melancholia, a paralysing denial of loss, which Freud analysed in Mourning and Melancholia. It makes the‘capable human being’ (Ricoeur, 2006, pp. 21, 82, 148, 460).

In EU studies the words of ‘testimonies’ have often been viewed as a kindof propaganda, which should only concern proponents of integration politics(Milward, 1992, pp. 318–44). Indeed there is a certain naïveté in recalling

stories as their ‘heroes’ tell them: such narratives unavoidably serve self- justification (Dosse, 1997, p. 626). Yet memoirs, essays and interviews of European leaders and citizens constitute a rich source of information regard-ing the European tradition of reconciliation. This is not to argue that Europeanintegration should be understood as a purely idealistic project, nor domost testimonies make such a case. Yet the fact that six former enemynation-states could negotiate the ‘pooling’ of production and marketing of coal and steel half a decade after the end of a murderous conflict is too oftentaken for granted or justified by economic calculations only (Milward, 1992;

Moravcsik, 1998). Such accounts do not question adequately how the initia-tors of the ECSC dealt with their historical memories of war, invasion andmutual exploitation as they attempted to put the resources necessary to warunder shared supervision.

Historically, political foundings seem to result from action by smallgroups of initiators. This article defines leadership, as Arendt did, by thecapacity to initiate political action: political actors may be elected politicians,senior administrators or actively engaged citizens (Arendt, 1990). Emphasis

on common action rather than common culture shaped the Europeanfounders’ first initiatives (De Schoutheete, 2000). Like Arendt and Ricoeur –

2 Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas suggest that the lack of European memory may be due to an all toosuccessful exorcism of past conflicts (Habermas and Derrida, 2005, p. 8).





albeit in a very different manner – they were moved by an urgency born out

of tragedy, and this may explain the affinities between the theorists andactors.3

The ECSC: Reconciliation as a Structural Process

European reconciliation, so often invoked, is perhaps misunderstood becauseof its complexity. Testimonies, legal and policy texts, which provide empiricalevidence for this article’s interpretation, are kept sparse here given the brevityof a journal article. The reconciliatory process first deployed its effects in the

highly technical Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC, which Belgium,France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands signed in 1951. TheParis Treaty came out of a ‘web’ of human relationships, in which breakingwith the culture of blame, forgiving, promising, a fair reorganization of theeconomic relations between the parties and the benevolent involvement of an external political power together weaved the new. Arendt provides richtheoretical resources to interpret some of the ECSC constituting practices.Shocked by the ease with which ‘good’ Germans had shed their Christianvalues under Nazi rule, she stressed action rather than reconciliation.

However, with hard-headed realism, she understood the unpredictable andirreversible consequences of human action and proposed her own ‘remedies’:forgiving and promising. Forgiveness, which is not a feeling but a politicalcapacity, restores the ability to act anew, unconditioned by the past. Withthe faculty of promising, people create ‘islands of certainty’, which allowthem to treat the future as if it were the present. Their promises are almostalways written: laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances (Arendt, 1958,pp. 236–47).

Arendt, who supported the European Resistance movements’ post-warplans for a Germany reintegrated into a federal Europe, stressed the un-predictability of human action. French Foreign Affairs Minister RobertSchuman’s 1950 Declaration ‘surprised’ everyone with its proposal for acommon market for coal and steel, programmes of economic and socialdevelopment for miners and workers, common institutions and a suprana-tional executive and regulatory body (Schuman, 1964, p. 166). In contrast toArendt, the European founders did not distinguish sharply between principledpolitics and self-interested economics. Peace, a united Europe, the respect for

basic democratic rights and economic prosperity all hung together.

3 Arendt and Ricoeur are both survivors of Nazism: Arendt as a German Jew who escaped to Franceand then to the United States, and Ricoeur as a French prisoner of war in Germany for most of WorldWar II.





The French initiative can be interpreted as an act of forgiveness, a radically

new proposal for action in concert, and a promise, a treaty to be signed andratified for 50 years. It broke with the backward-looking culture of blame,which justifies the permanent exclusion of wrongdoers from new politicalcommunities. There was not one word of reproach in the Schuman Declara-tion, simply the acknowledgement that France’s 20-year-long effort topromote peace and a unified Europe did not succeed. And ‘we had war’(Fontaine, 2000, p. 36). When Robert Schuman and French philosopherJacques Maritain recognized publicly the historical wounds that their countryhad inflicted upon Germany (Schuman, 1964, p. 91; Maritain, 1993, p. 34),few of their fellow citizens endorsed these views. These did not negateGerman guilt and responsibility for World War II, but they made it psycho-logically and politically feasible to include the perpetrator on an equal footingin 1950. For his part, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer committed hisgovernment to a politics of atonement through reparations: between 1949 and2000 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) paid some US$70 billion towar victims in Europe and the state of Israel (Shriver, 1995, p. 89).

Forgiveness is controversial both in theory and in practice because it may

contradict the requirements of justice, on which the legitimacy of democraticorders rests. Yet it is precisely because of the ‘intractability of injustice evenin the best regimes that we should consider the appropriateness of forgiving’(Digeser, 1998, p. 707). Forgiving is a supplement to justice, not the oppositeof punishment. Max Kohnstamm, the Dutch first Secretary-General of theECSC, who was incarcerated by the Germans during the war for leading astudent resistance movement, states that the Nuremberg trials, the denazifi-cation programmes imposed by the occupiers and the sizable reparationsGermany paid to war victims satisfied the requirements of justice.4 Moreover,

the Germans proved they had changed by adopting a democratic constitutionand accepting the leadership of men like Adenauer who had not compromisedwith the Nazi regime. What mattered was promise and action in common(Kohnstamm, Interview, 19 March 1999, Brussels).

As Gardner Feldman argues, successful reconciliatory processes rest ontwo components: the pragmatic (or structural) aspect and the moral aspect(Gardner Feldman, 1999a, p. 70). Kohnstamm (Interview, 19 March 1999,Brussels) stresses the ‘rational’ aspect of the post-war collaboration with the

Germans as well as the Schuman Plan’s emotional appeal:

4 Kohnstamm prefers to speak of reconciliation rather than forgiveness: ‘Forgiveness is a personal act. Tospeak of forgiving the Germans in general is a dangerous abstraction. Moreover to find the guilty ones isa complex task [. . .] Europe was guilty’.





At first, there had been a very strong feeling of hate among prisoners in my

camp. But it did not last very long. No genius was required to understandthat we could not rebuild Europe without the Germans. The Netherlands,a de facto economic province of Germany, needed German industry.[. . .] When I read the proposal for the ECSC I was struck as if by thunder:it was the way out of a vicious cycle, which was not only economic, but alsoethical. Twice my generation experienced and inflicted terrible cruelties. Wecould not go on like that.

Assessments of the economic benefits of the ECSC vary greatly (Steiner,2007). Some call it a success because production and trade in coal and steelincreased considerably among the six partners (Daltrop, 1982); others afailure because it did not succeed in dismantling the German steel cartel andin liberalizing trade in coal and steel fully. Scholars agree, however, that evenif ‘the ECSC actually delivered on only one of its promises’, it was ‘the mostimportant one’: it advanced the integration process and ‘substituted for apeace treaty with Germany’ (Gillingham, 1991, p. 154; Milward, 1984,p. 420). By creating a multilateral public space where European actors fromsix countries could learn to trust and act in concert, the treaty facilitated

the resolution of other thorny issues. The ECSC High Authority, on whichMember States had equal status, replaced the International Ruhr Authorityunder which the Germans chafed. The French annexation of the Saar territoryended peacefully with a 1955 referendum when the Saar population voted to

join the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Finally the American requestfor German rearmament, which the French feared above all, was satisfiedthrough German accession to Nato in 1955 (Guisan, 2003). It should also beremembered that the United States acted as a benevolent hegemon by askingRobert Schuman in September 1949 to make a constructive proposition

regarding the FRG, and then waiting until May 1950 without any guarantee of the outcome for the Schuman Declaration, which it supported against Britishopposition (Roussel, 1996, pp. 518–19).

European Reconciliation as a Cognitive and Affective Process

Forgiving and promising are political actions for Arendt, not feelings. For theEuropean founders also, the affective dimension remained secondary. Frencheconomist Jean Fourastié who worked closely with Jean Monnet, the author

of the Schuman Declaration and the first president of the ECSC High Author-ity, remembers a man focused on action, with no time to waste on abstractdebates (Fourastié, Interview by André Marès, 6 May 1981, Paris). WasMonnet’s reticence a way to deflect painful memories, with the unforeseenresult that it would also deflect the mourning that Ricoeur associates with





faithfulness to the past? In the years immediately following World War II,

it is grass-roots movements that provided the necessary affective underpin-ning to reconciliatory processes.5

Former prisoners of war founded the Bureau international de liaison and documentation and the Institut franco-allemand in Ludwigsburg, whichpromoted a ‘real political and cultural interpenetration’ between the twocountries (Bouvet, 1998, p. 16). So did the World Council of Churches, theInternational Fellowship of Reconciliation and Pax Christi. Youth meetingsinvolved ‘enthusiastic’ students and scouts (Herman, Interview, 8 March1999, Brussels; Rocard, Interview, 10 March 1999, Brussels). One of thelargest grass-roots organizations was Moral Re-Armament (MRA, today Ini-tiatives of Change). It relied on the work and gifts of hundreds of volunteersfrom all walks of life to bring together between 1946 and 1950, 1,983 Frenchand 3,113 German citizens, who confronted each other in difficult dialoguesof accusation, repentance and absolution at the Caux conference centre inSwitzerland (Luttwak, 1994, pp. 49–55). Because war ‘starts in the minds’,some French and German historians had set to work already in the 1920s todetoxify memories. After the war, colleagues revived the collaboration at the

Spire meetings. The crowning achievement of this long process was the 2006publication in French and German of the first of three volumes in a set of highschool history textbooks covering the 19th and 20th centuries and includingdivergent historical interpretations (Defrance and Pfeil, 2007).

To sum up, two kinds of initiatives, mostly unco-ordinated yet compatible,drove the first post-war European reconciliation: those of the state and those of civil society. The first addressed primarily material interests and state security,the second emotional issues and self-transformation. Thus the participation of French and German coal industry representatives from labour and manage-

ment in MRA meetings was strong and dovetailed with the launching of theECSC in a ‘classic case of serendipity’ (Luttwak, 1994, p. 51).

III. Remembering the ECSC to Think of Serbia and Kosovo

Remembering Reconciliatory Practices

As time passes, stories of action form a ‘tradition’. Yet when not remembered‘faithfully’, and argued over, their concreteness fades from memory and they

stop inspiring thoughtful action. Only ‘clichés’ remain: trite, stereotypedexpressions that by long overuse have lost their capacity to motivate, andbecome a political danger (Arendt, 2005, p. 308). Hermeneutic inquiries

5 The foundation of the ECSC enjoyed popular support, although it did not call upon civic participation of the many (Hewstone, 1986).





matter because they attempt to restore the authenticity of the original expe-

rience. The ideas offered below draw from memories to suggest new possi-bilities for action, but ‘understanding’ is never prescriptive. This articleshould not be misconstrued as an attempt to impose a singular content to theEU reconciliations: interpretative narratives offer resources for debates, notan end point.

There seems to be little similarity between France and the FRG in 1950,and Kosovo and Serbia in 2009. Yet, in 1950 the sovereignty of the FRG wasstill contested, as Serbia and Kosovo’s sovereignties are today. When theECSC treaty was negotiated, there was no peace treaty between the formerEuropean belligerents; Eastern Germany was under Soviet occupation and theSaar had become an economic province of France. An international admin-istration supervised the Ruhr Gebiet , and all European countries were strug-gling to recover economically from war’s depredation. The occupying powerswere deeply divided on the future of Germany, and the western allies couldnot agree on the partial rearmament of Western Germany, which the UnitedStates and United Kingdom supported and the French opposed, just as todaythere is no international consensus on the future of Kosovo.

The emotional wounds were very deep also. Arendt stressed in 1947 thata way out of ‘fanatical hatred’ had to be found, with some ‘model of howhuman beings can speak with each other despite the prevailing conditions of the deluge’ (Arendt, 2005, pp. 214, 216). During a 2005 seminar for Serb andAlbanian Kosovars organized in Strasbourg around the post-war French–German reconciliation, one participant remarked how the fact that ‘reconcili-ation is possible even after much suffering and hate’ gives ‘hope’. Anothernoted the similarities between Alsace-Lorraine and Kosovo’s histories, tworegions torn apart by major powers’ rivalries across several centuries: ‘This

contextualizes our own problems because we see that we are not the only onesleft in the world with such a history’ (Moll, 2008, p. 48). Nicolas Moll, oneof the organizers, describes the French–German experience as a ‘motivator’,not a model to emulate, whose remembrance impacts French and German,as well as Western Balkans actors when they dialogue about it (Moll, 2008,p. 40).

Remembering founding practices is to tell stories, which prompt theimagination. The ECSC experience might serve as a flawed ‘exemplar’

(somewhat like South Africa and its Truth and Reconciliation Commission)because of the Member States’ long chequered history and an intimate expe-rience of civil and international wars. ‘Witnesses’ share remembrances ‘of theespecially demanding and painful character of managing suffering and con-flictual pasts’ with fellow Europeans recovering from totalitarianism, for thesake of a ‘pacified memory’ (Lévy, 2007, p. 262).





A Contested History

There can be no thinking through of an historical legacy without someunderstanding of its inheritors’ circumstances. An historical reminder of recent events in the Western Balkans is in order (Blitz, 2006; Dérens, 2008;Iseni, 2008; Kurspahic, 2006; Pond, 2006; Samary, 2008), although no suchaccount can avoid controversies (Ramet, 2005), the first regarding when tostart.6 A major turning point was 1989 when Serb leader SlobodanMiloševic forcibly incorporated the autonomous province of Kosovo intothe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After resisting non-violently, Albanian

Kosovars set up an armed resistance movement (KLA) in the late 1990s,which provoked increased repression from Serbia. Confronting the expul-sion of the entire Albanian population from Kosovo, Nato started a contro-versial bombing campaign against Serb troops in March 1999 without UNauthorization (Roux, 1999, pp. 62–70, 106–9). After Miloševic withdrewhis troops, Albanian Kosovars returned to their devastated homes and inJune UN Security Council Resolution 1244 set up a civil administration– the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) – supported by a Nato-ledmilitary force (KFOR) to facilitate the transition of Kosovo to a final statusthat might satisfy both its Serb and Albanian populations. Several electionshave taken place in Kosovo since, largely boycotted by the Serb minority.Violent demonstrations in March 2004 involving 50,000 anti-Serb demon-strators increased the Serb exodus from Kosovo (Pond, 2006, p. 114;Dérens, 2008, pp. 238–44).

Internationally sponsored talks between the Serbs and Albanian Kosovarsmet with little success, and in March 2007 UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaarirecommended ‘independence’ for Kosovo, ‘supervised for an initial period

[. . .] by international civilian and military presences’ (Ahtisaari, 2007). TheUnited States and 22 EU Member States have since recognized Kosovo’sindependence, but not Russia or the EU Member States of Cyprus, Greece,Romania, Slovakia and Spain. In spite of its divisions, the EU Council underthe Slovenian Presidency ‘acknowledged’ the independence of Kosovo inFebruary 2008 and agreed to send EULEX, a force of 2,000 to organize thepolice, customs and the courts. However, the EU mission, which replacedUNMIK partially as of 9 December 2008 (not in Northern Kosovo), is‘status-neutral’ regarding Kosovo, much to the dismay of Albanian Kosovars

(Gallak, 2008). The UN International Court of Justice agreed to examinewhether Kosovo’s secession is legal, and the remaining 100,000 Serbsstarted developing parallel political institutions in northern Kosovo (Bancroft,

6 When to end is just as challenging. This article was accepted for publication in May 2009 and thus doesnot mention events beyond this date, with a few exceptions.





2008).7 Commentators (see authors cited above on Kosovo history) agree

that the prospect of EU accession may be the only way out of intractabledifferences.

Kosovo is the poorest country in Europe with a per capita income of €250a month. Half of its 1.9 million people are aged under 25, it has a weakadministrative capacity and there are few industrial resources except for thevast but dilapidated Trepça mining complex. At the time of writing Serbia,with a population of 10.8 million, was struggling to recover from the destruc-tion of infrastructure by Nato bombing and integrate the 97,000 Serb refugeesfrom Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo left from the half-million who came in the1990s. And in Kosovo there were still 245,000 internally displaced KosovarAlbanians. Both countries suffer from organized crime and a high level of unemployment (UN High Commission for Refugees report on South-easternEurope, 2007; Balfour, 2008).

Pax Balkanica: State Initiatives and Structural Transformations

Scholars of the EU have noted its authoritarian approaches to countries itassists (Pace, 2007; Balfour, 2008), although consultants on the ground insist

on some conditionality to disburse aid, given the need to instil inter-ethnicco-operation (Largentaye et al., 2006). With cold-war-like tensions betweenthe EU, the United States and Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia’sproclamations of independence from Georgia, international pressures maygrow stronger. One major concern of the first European partners was to chartan original course that would limit excessive dependence on the two super-powers vying for hegemony, yet contribute to the security of all (Monnet,1955, p. 69). They had no model to follow for reconciliation: the ECSC was

their brainchild.Could there be a successful pax balkanica, once again initiated by thoseprimarily involved (Aligisakis, 1999)? If forgiveness is understood as a novelaction (rather than a feeling), breaking with the past and paving the way forpolitical (re)connection, what might correspond for Kosovo and Serbia todayto the post-World War II joint administration by six countries of coal andsteel, key resources for rearmament? Only Kosovars and Serbs can answerthese questions. Journalist Dan Bilefsky (2008) has noted that the Trepçamining complex could offer a ground for action in concert instead of remain-

ing an apple of discord. In the 1980s this complex included 40 mines,foundries and subsidiary plants, with vast mineral resources of coal, nickel,lead, zinc, cadmium and bauxite, spread between Northern and Southern

7 On 22 July 2010, the UN International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo’s declaration of independenceviolated no international law or UN resolution.





Kosovo; it employed a mixed Albanian and Serb workforce of 20,000 and

generated 25 per cent of the entire regional industrial production. Miloševicfired thousands of Albanian Kosovars, and the mines fell into disrepair afterthe Nato campaign; the complex resumed partial operations to cover main-tenance costs only in 2005 under UNMIK (Bilefsky, 2008). As of 2009 therewere two authorities directly involved in deciding its future: Kosovo’s Alba-nian authorities and the UN-run Kosovo Trust Agency, which oversaw priva-tization. There is still disagreement over the sell-off of the complex and howmuch of it should remain in state hands. Moreover, ‘agreement with Serbia isneeded’, and the leaderships of the two countries have little contact with eachother (Bytyci, 2008).8

Victims rather than perpetrators most often initiate reconciliatory pro-cesses. Both Serbs and Albanian Kosovars consider themselves to be victims(Moll, 2008, p. 36), so either could initiate Arendtian forgiveness by propos-ing an entirely new way. This type of political forgiveness – re-engaging withthe enemy in actions in concert in spite of the past – does not require feelingsof amity, or forgetfulness, which would make any attempt at ‘understanding’impossible. Also, ‘symmetry in responsibilities’ should not be confused with

‘symmetry in culpabilities’.9

Could the Trepça mining complex be jointlyadministered by independent and respected personalities from Serbia andKosovo? Could there be a ‘High Authority’ accountable to the parliaments of both countries, to supervise the fair management of the mines? Its budgetcould invest in retraining of and housing for workers, and be made up of asmall tax paid by the complex. Decisions of the Trepça mines’ High Authoritywould carry weight in Kosovo and Serbia, with a Court of Justice adjudicat-ing disagreements between institutions and the two governments.

The promise could consist of a Treaty on the Trepça mines, ratified by the

parliaments. Just as the French and German governments decided to bracketthe issue of the Saar temporarily, in a letter attached to the ECSC Treaty, asimilar device could be used to bracket the issue of Serbian sovereignty overKosovo, or of Kosovo over Serbian-majority parts of its territory. This issuecould be decided in a few years through new referendums supervised byinternational authorities, once habits of co-operation and trust have beenestablished and economic interests are clearly seen as being served by theTrepça Mines Treaty. Even if, as Bashkim Iseni (Interview, 28 November

2008, Lausanne) argues, Kosovo would never accept running the mines with8 The EU Commission Liaison Office to Kosovo announced in February 2010 that it had successfullycompleted two EU-funded projects of around €1.6 million to make the Stantërg/Stari Trg mine safer. Themine belongs to the Trepça Mining Complex and its final status is pending (see «http://www.delpern.ec.europa.eu/?cid=1,103,741»).9 I thank Bashkim Iseni for this important insight.





the Belgrade government as an equal stakeholder, he acknowledges that this

might be done with representatives of the Serb community in NorthernKosovo.

One way to interpret the American role in the late 1940s is that it used itshegemonic position benevolently to help open a space for forgiveness andpromise between Germany and France by supporting the Schuman Plan andproviding the first large loan to the ECSC (Guisan, 2003, pp. 34, 38; Roussel,1996, p. 519). What might the EU do to protect such spaces in the WesternBalkans today? The Brussels-based Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe,which steered over €25 billion toward the Western Balkans, stimulating amodest increase in intra-regional trade, is a partial answer to this question(Pond, 2006). The Pact was ‘transferred’ from Brussels to Sarajevo inFebruary 2008 through the creation of the Regional Co-operation Councilwith increased regional leadership and financing (Balfour, 2008). Moreover,Croatia and Macedonia are official candidates to the EU, and Albania,Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia have all signed pre-EU acces-sion agreements. The first state-sponsored reconciliation between France andGermany was not merely a bilateral process as it included Italy and the

Benelux countries; EU accession prospects guarantee that Serbia and Kosovoalso will not be left alone facing each other.

Civil Society’s Initiatives and Cognitive and Affective Transformations

Arendt and the ECSC founders kept affect out of politics and stressed actionin concert rather than justice. It is judicial procedures and civil society actorswho confronted openly the desires for revenge and clashing memories afterWorld War II. In a process reminiscent of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials,

justice is being delivered in fits and starts in the Western Balkans throughtrials. Radovan Karadžic, the infamous Bosnian Serb leader, is in the hands of the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), follow-ing Slobodan Miloševic and other Serbs. Only two major Serb perpetratorsremain at large: Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadžic. In 2005 former Kosovoprime minister Ramush Haradinaj surrendered himself voluntarily to theICTY and was later exonerated from charges of human rights violations andreleased. The Croatians delivered General Ante Gotovina to the ICTY; local

judges in all Western Balkan countries are trying and convicting defendants of

their own ethnicities (Pond, 2006, pp. 117, 254–60).After World War II, civil society actors played an important role in sup-

porting elite efforts toward reconciliation. Retrospectively, it is tempting tomake light of the emotional and political pressures they confronted. IrèneLaure, a socialist member of the 1946 French Constituent Assembly, spoke





for many when she admitted ‘hating Germany so much that I had wished for

its complete destruction. [. . .] I never forgot the sight of the atrociouslymutilated bodies of my fellow resistance fighters exhumed from a commongrave’. Leif Hovelsen, a Norwegian student who spent four years in a Naziconcentration camp, took revenge by mistreating the German prisoners of warentrusted to his care after the liberation. Through much soul-searching, Laureand Hovelsen became involved in reconciliatory programmes towardGermany, braving the ire of some of their friends who could not understand(Marcel, 1971, pp. 141–56; Hovelsen, 1959, pp. 37–9).

Marek Antoni Nowicki, the international ombudsman who held UNMIKand local authorities accountable for human rights abuses from 2000 to 2005,notes that local populations in Serbia and Kosovo are not ready ‘to forgiveand be forgiven’ because ‘civil society [. . .] has not had the strength to facethe darkest parts of the past’ (Dérens, 2008, p. 9). This should come as nosurprise. Among EU citizens, facing up to the past and the healing of emo-tions has unfolded over several decades, even if stable peace was establishedmuch faster at the political level.

Yet there is evidence of grass-roots and elite involvement in reconciliation

efforts in the Western Balkans. The presence of observers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia in all EU institu-tions constitutes an important socializing process. The European Parliament(EP), especially, offers a space for non-violent confrontation: some of itsmembers sat down in May 2008 with Kosovo Parliament President JakupKrasniqi and Serbian Parliament Speaker Oliver Dulic to speak of the sharedfuture, immigration and visas, and the role of parliaments in European inte-gration. Dulic, a 32-year-old, stated: ‘For my generation and me, as for themajority in my country, the crucial regional stake is the process of historical

reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs’. Krasniqi responded that theprospect of EU accession was the common future (EP News Service, 2008).The EP is seeking training and education programmes initiated in the WesternBalkans that it can support (Interview with MEP Doris Pack, 13 March 2008,Strasbourg).

A ‘very small Western-oriented elite’ in Belgrade now argues explicitlythat Serbs must transform their mindsets and do more to acknowledge thepast. The young activists who work with the Belgrade-based Humanitarian

Law Centre and Helsinki Committee ‘are second to none in their zeal’ (Pond,2006, pp. 211–37). From Mitrovica, the ethnically divided city of NorthernKosovo, Community Building Mitrovica (CBM) has sponsored more than200 multi-ethnic, grass-roots-level reconciliation projects in the region. AliAhmeti, an Albanian Kosovar, runs the non-governmental organization(NGO) Peace Doves in Southern Mitrovica with a partner organization in the





North. They sponsor inter-ethnic dialogues, programmes of economic inte-

gration and services to women and children. The community policing forcefunded by UNMIK trains volunteers of different ethnic background to solvecommunity problems in 20 districts across Kosovo (Anstis, 2008; NDI,2008). Since 2000, the bilateral French–German Office for Youth hassupported over 200 training programmes, which discuss critically French–German reconciliation processes with thousands of students, teachers andNGO activists throughout the Western Balkans (Moll, 2008, p. 35).

Historians are also hard at work trying to confront clashing memories: theSoutheast European Joint History Project has published four workbooks foruniversity and secondary school use, translated into seven languages. TheThessaloniki-based Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in southeasternEurope supported the project with the collaboration of four dozen Balkanhistorians. For the Albanian language edition in Pristina and Prizren inFebruary 2009, 53 teachers attended two training workshops (Pond, 2006,p. 267; Interview with MEP Doris Pack, 13 March 2008, Strasbourg; «http:// www.cdsee.org/jhp/contact.html»). Arendt wrote of the ‘elementary repub-lics’, whose principled involvement supported democratic change: the labour

movement, the 1960s Civil Rights movement. Such elementary republics,like ‘oases in the desert’ (Arendt, 1990, p. 275) are present in Serbia andKosovo also.

Conclusions

This article has discussed the contribution of hermeneutic inquiries to under-standing European reconciliations. These interpretations should be construedas a complement to, not a replacement of, other theoretical models. Even if the concrete policy suggestions offered here do not convince,10 hermeneuticalreadings of history and memory have much to offer to politics, which requiresthe continuous injection of creative ideas. Reconciliatory processes are bothinnovative and learning processes. Studies on memory have so far ‘thrived oncatastrophes and trauma’, with a strong emphasis on the therapeutic aspect of recalling collective memories (Lebow et al., 2006, pp. 286–90). Perhaps it istime to retrieve the ‘lost treasure’ of European reconciliation.

10 How profitable the Trepça mines may be in the future is not clear. I thank Chris van der Borgh, professorat Utrecht University and consultant to the Dutch government on Kosovo, for this insight (email, 5September 2008). Other options considered in October 2010 include greater autonomy for the northern partof Kosovo or a territorial exchange. These eliminate neither the need for reconciliatory practices nor theincentive of shared material interests between Kosovo’s Albanian and Serb populations, and Kosovo andSerbia.





Correspondence:

Catherine GuisanVisiting Assistant ProfessorDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Minnesota1414 Social Sciences Bld., 277-19th Avenue SMinneapolis, MN 55455, USAemail [email protected]

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