bbm%3A978-1-4020-4519-6%2F3%2F1 Arne Naess

8/15/2019 bbm%3A978-1-4020-4519-6%2F3%2F1 Arne Naess

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/bbm3a978-1-4020-4519-62f32f1-arne-naess 1/21

Notes

Chapter I: Descriptions of Maximally Comprehensive Perspectives

1. “We use the term world pictures to refer to that which for human beings has

object character, that which confronts the mind and is conceived of as expres-

sions of the power of the mind. World pictures are capable of being described

as something objective in the same way as rooms or houses; spiritual kinds of

views have such pictures as their essential form of expression and their neces-

sary condition, but the nature of the forces creating worldviews is such that it

does not always express them as object-directed, they are also expressed as

value hierarchies” (Jaspers, 1919: 161).

2. This quotation from Koestler (1949: 68) is used by Polanyi in a similar con-

text (1952: 218).

3. A Cretan says: “All Cretans always lie.” Is this sentence true?

4. Russell’s antinomy concerns the class of all classes that are not members of

themselves. Is this class a member of itself? If it is, then it is not, and if it is

not, then it is. Hence it both is and is not a member of itself: a contradiction.

5. For a criticism of the doctrine that different logics can be described in the

way attempted by some social scientists, see Naess, et al. (1956: 203 ff.).

6. See chapters 1–4 of Outlines of Pyrrhonism in Sextus Empiricus (1933–44).

Most authors connect the word scepticism with Academic scepticism, or more

pertinently, negativism. The Pyrrhonic sceptic, however, can subject all of

his own arguments and their presuppositions to examination. But he may

participate in the presupposition-research that thereby results without pre-tension of (true) knowledge of what the presuppositions are—indeed with-

out beforehand denying (with claim to truth for the denial) that a philosopher

who says that not everything has presuppositions may be right.

The one who does research seeks. The one who seeks can stop and ask

himself, Exactly what am I looking for? If it is a thumbtack, the answer is

rather simple. But if it is the “presuppositions of all questioning,” it is not

simple. If he stops long enough, he gets at least one new task of research.

For the external spectator, it may often seem as if the questioner, by us-

151



ing certain distinctions in the question-formulation itself, presupposes that

certain answers are definitively decided, but the questioner does not need to

have a definite answer, he may have a questioning (not-definitively-deciding)

basic attitude, an attitude characterized by the fact that any answer with him

seems to acquire a nondefinitive status. For example:

Sceptic: Is perleungetunge a kind of cactus?

Dogmatist: Aha, you presuppose the existence of perleungetunge !

Sceptic: I read about them. I have neither time nor capacity to take

a definitive standpoint to the truth of everything that I read. But

I have much trust ; that much I grant you willingly.

7. See Jaspers (1919); the fourth edition (1954) has an interesting foreword con-

cerning the evolution of Jaspers’s ideas.

8. For an example of such a debate, see the discussion between Naess and Sir Al-

fred Ayer on Empiricist vs. total views in “The Glass Is on the Table,” which

originally appeared in Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind , edited by

Fons Elders (1974 [in SWAN VIII]).

9. A method for successively more adequate— and therefore complicated—

presentation of an ethical system is described in chapter 3 of my Gandhi and Group Conflict (1974 [SWAN V]).

10. Page references to the work of Nordenstam refer to his unpublished doctoral

dissertation, “An Analysis of the Traditional Sudanese Virtues” (1968b).

11. Translation of “Erscheinungen für uns.” The formulation of Hegel’s system

follows in the main Ueberweg (1898–1903, vol. 4).

12. Formulated in all essentials in accordance with the formulations in Ueber-

weg (1898–1903, vol. 4).

Chapter II: Comparison of Different Total Views

1. Generally, this cannot be claimed entirely, since the near-total systems per-

ceive the other within the system (in the widest sense), and therefore do not

reach “all the way” out to the outsider.

2. It is essential to believe that when one looks at the first page of the Ethics andreads the first sentence, one is confronted with “Spinoza’s doctrine itself.” It is

merely required that one understands Latin.

3. On the different substance concepts of Descartes and Spinoza and their rela-

tionship to the things they derive, see an interesting but somewhat unclear

note by J. Bennett (1965: 379–80).

4. Leibniz employs two of the Aristotelian substance criteria— substance as the

place of change and substance as logical subject— but adds a concept of non-

composedness. In the first paragraph of the Monadology he defines monad as

NOTES TO PAGES 25–79

152



“nothing but a simple substance . . . ; simple, that is to say, without parts.”

Elsewhere, Leibniz has stated that Spinoza would have been right if there

were no monads and he also probably intended to stress the need for a sub-

stantial basis in the things different from God (see Leibniz’s “Refutation of

Spinoza” in Leibniz [1908]).

Chapter III: Metaphysics as Exposure of Presuppositions

1. This section makes extensive use of David Rynin’s article “Donagan on Col-

lingwood: Absolute Presuppositions, Truth, and Metaphysics” (1964), inwhich Rynin convincingly repudiates Alan Donagan’s (1962) narrow-minded

criticism of the prolific and discerning British philosopher R. G. Colling-

wood. Donagan criticizes Collingwood’s Essay on Metaphysics (1940) on the

basis of a kind of naive empiricism seldom encountered among philosophers

since John Dewey’s glory days. According to Donagan, systems can be veri-

fied or falsified by comparing them with experience: “The principle of theo-

retical simplicity enables us to subject not only answers to questions, but

whole complexes of questions and answers, to the verdict of experience.

When one whole complex is rejected in favour of another, its absolute pre-

suppositions are rejected along with it; like the answers contained in that

complex, they are rejected as false” (1962: 82). Here it is presupposed that

when empirical tests are conceptually articulated, system differences will not

result in articulation differences.

2. On the relevance of differences in truth definitions, truth criteria, and

methodology, I have expressed my opinion in connection with the question

of whether we know that norms cannot be true or false; see Naess (1962 [in

SWAN VIII]).

Chapter IV: Can There Be, Ultimately, Only One Valid Total System?

1. If this is correct, one may say that Aristotle is about to make his basic view

analytic. Perhaps it is a tendency of precisely the deepest premises that they

seem obvious because they are analytical (for that purpose), while they simul-

taneously pretend to constitute the point of departure of a philosophy as a

synthetic statement. If the statement is perceived as synthetic by opponents

who question it, it is defended by being interpreted in such a direction that it

becomes analytic. The tendency, however, can also be the reverse: one per-

ceives something as analytic because it appears evident and fundamental.

Chapter V: Cultures Construed as All-Embracing Systems

1. Because Barth’s (1977) article is only five pages long, I have omitted page

numbers in the many references that follow.

153

NOTES TO PAGES 79 –10 9



2. In “Reflections About Total Views” (1964 [in SWAN X]), I try to show that

whatever one asserts (or denies), be it ever so modest, one presupposes a total

system in doing so.

3. The example is taken from Geertz (1973: 121), where the sentences in ques-

tion are related to the conception, in cultures, of the basic nature of reality.

NOTES TO PAGES 109 –117

154



References

Books or articles appearing in the Selected Works of Arne Naess are identified by(SWAN XX) at the end of the entry, where XX refers to the pertinent volumenumber.

Ayer, Sir Alfred and Arne Naess. 1974. “The glass is on the table.” In Reflexive Wa-ter: The Basic Concerns of Mankind , edited by Fons Elders. London: SouvenirPress. (in SWAN VIII)

Barth, Fredrik. 1975. Ritual and Knowledge Among the Baktaman of New Guinea.Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

———. 1977. “Et samfunn må Forstås ut fra egne fortutsetninger (A society must beunderstood on the basis of its own assumptions).” In Sosialantropologi, A mimeo-graphed collection of articles for students. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp. 5–9.

Bateson, Gregory. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind . San Francisco: Chandler Pub-lishing Company.

Bennett, Jonathan. 1965. “A note on Descartes and Spinoza.” Philosophical Review74: 379–80.

Brandt, Richard. 1959. Ethical Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Bruemmer, Fred. 1981. “Eskimos are warm people.” Natural Histor y 90: 42–49.

Cassirer, Ernst. 1906–07. Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (The problem of knowledge), 2 vols. Berlin: B. Cassirer.

———. 1963. Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (The individ-ual and the cosmos in Renaissance philosophy), translated and with an intro-duction by Mario Domandi. New York: Harper and Row.

Castberg, Frede. 1966. Retten og staten (Justice and the state). Oslo: Universitetsfor-laget.

Christie, Nils. 1978. Hvor tett et samfunn? (How tight a community?) Oslo: Univer-sitetsforlaget.

155



Cohen, Felix S. 1939. “The relativity of philosophical systems and the method of systemic relativism.” Journal of Philosophy 36: 57–72.

Collingwood, Robin G. 1940. An Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Dahl, Ottar. 1956. Om årsaksproblemer i historisk forskning; forsøk på en vitenskaps-teoritisk analyse (Problems of causation in historical research). Oslo: Univer-sitetsforlaget.

Dammann, Erik. 1981. Talofa Samoa!: gjensyn med sydhavsøya som forandret vår tilværelse (Hello Samoa!). Oslo: Gyldendal.

Descartes, René. 1649. Les passiones de l’âme (The passions of the soul). Amsterdam:chez Louys Elzevier.

———. 1931. The Philosophical Works of Descartes, translated by Elizabeth S. Hal-dane and G.R.T. Ross, 2 vols., 2d ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Donagan, Alan. 1962. The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood . Oxford: ClarendonPress.

Durant, Will. 1938. The Story of Philosophy. Garden City, NY: Garden City Pub-lishing.

Elders, Fons, ed. 1974. Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind . London: Sou-venir Press.

Evans-Pritchard, Edward E. 1937. Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande.Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fink, Eugen, 1934. Die phänomenologische Philosophie Edmund Husserls in der gegenwär-tigen Kritik, with foreword by Edmund Husserl. Berlin-Charlottenburg: Pan-verlagsgesellschaft.

Fløystad, Guttorm. 1967. “Problemet om personlig identitet.” Norsk FilosofiskTidsskrift 4.

Galtung, Johan, and Arne Naess. 1955. Gandhis politiske etikk (Gandhi’s politicalethics), 2d ed. Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum (1968).

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. London: Hutchinson.

Hall, Everett W. 1960. Philosophical Systems: A Categorical Analysis. Chicago: Uni-versity of Chicago Press.

Hallett, Harold Foster. 1957. Benedict de Spinoza: The Elements of His Philosophy. Lon-don: University of London, Athlone Press.

Hegge, Hjalmar 1967. “Noen vitenskapsteoretiske spørsmål belyst ved Goethesnaturvitenskapp.” Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 2.

Heidegger, Martin. 1927. Sein und Zeit (Being and time). Halle: M. Niemeyer.

REFERENCES

156



———. 1949. Über den Humanismus (Letter on humanism). Frankfurt: Kloster-mann.

Høffding, Harald. 1926. Etik: en fremstilling af de etiske principer og deres anvendelse og deres anvendelse paa de vigtigste livsforhold . Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghan-del Nordisk Forlag.

Horton, Robin. 1970. “African traditional thought and western science.” In Ratio-nality, edited by Bryan R. Wilson. Evanston and New York: Harper and Row,pp. 131–71.

Huizer, Gerrit, and Bruce Mannheim, eds. 1979. The Politics of Anthropology: FromColonialism and Sexism Toward a View from Below. The Hague: Mouton.

Husserl, Edmund. 1959. Recueil commémoratif publié à l’occasion du centenaire de la nais- sance du philosophe, edited by the Committee of Phaenomenologica, H. L. vanBreda, president. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

Jarvie, I. C., and Joseph Agassi. 1970. “The problem of the rationality of magic.” In Rationality, edited by Bryan R. Wilson. Evanston and New York: Harper andRow, pp. 172–93.

Jaspers, Karl. 1919. Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Psychology of worldviews).Berlin: Springer.

Kant, Immanuel. 1781. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of pure reason). Leipzig:

P. Reclam (1878).Keesing, Roger M. 1974. “Theories of Culture.” Annual Review of Anthropology 3:

73–97.

———. 1976. Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective. New York: Holt,Rinehart, and Winston.

Kierkegaard, Søren. 1941. Concluding Unscientific Postscript , translated by D. F.Swenson and W. Lowerie. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kneale, W. M. and Martha Kneal. 1962. The Development of Logic . Oxford: Claren-don Press.

Koestler, Arthur. 1949. Untitled essay in The God That Failed , edited by RichardH. S. Crossman. New York: Harper, pp. 15–75.

Lange, Friedrich. 1925. History of Materialism and Critique of Its Present Importance.New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.

Ledang, Ola Kai. 1981. “Afrikansk musikk idag: eit globalt kraftsentrum”(“Afrikan music today: A global hub) Forskningsnytt 26: 18– 23.

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. 1908. “Refutation of Spinoza, c. 1708.” In The Philo- sophical Works of Leibnitz, edited by George Martin Duncan. New Haven, CT:Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, pp. 264–73.

157

REFERENCES



———. 1925. Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings, translated by RobertLatta. London: Oxford University Press.

Lukes, Steven. 1970. “Some problems about rationality.” In Rationality, edited byBryan R. Wilson. Evanston and New York: Harper and Row, pp. 194–213.

Mannheim, Karl. 1936. Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowl-edge, translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils. New York: Harcourt Brace.

Marx, Karl, 1938. Die Deutsche Ideologie (The German ideology). London: Lawrenceand Wishart.

Mates, Benson. 1968. “Philosophical scepticism and the logical antinomies.” In Proceedings of the 14th International Congress of Philosophy, Vienna. Vienna:Herder.

Naess, Arne. 1936. Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches verhalten (Science as behavior),Ph.D. diss. Oslo: Norwegian Academy of Sciences.

———. 1953. Interpretation and Preciseness: A Contribution to the Theory of Communi-cation. Oslo: Jacob Dybwad. (SWAN I)

———. 1962. “We still do not know that norms cannot be true or false: A reply toDag Österburg.” Theoria 28: 205–09. (in SWAN VIII)

———. 1964. “Reflections about total views.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re- search 25: 16–29. (in SWAN X)

———. 1974. Gandhi and Group Conflict . Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. (SWAN V)

———. 1980. History of Philosophy, 2 vols. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Naess, Arne, Jens Christophersen, and Kjell Kvalø. 1956. Democracy, Ideology, and Objectivity: Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Contro-versy. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Natorp, Paul. 1893. Die Ethika des Demokritos. Marburg: N. G. Elwert.

Nordenstam, Tore. 1968a. Sudanese Ethics. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

———. 1968b. “An Analysis of the Traditional Sudanese Virtues,” Ph.D. diss.Universities of Bergen and Khartoum.

———. 1972. Empiricism and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction. Oslo: Universitets-forlaget.

Pepper, Stephen C. 1942. World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence. Berkeley: Universityof California Press (1961).

Polanyi, Michael. 1952. “The stability of beliefs.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3: 217–32.

Quine, W. V. O. 1953. From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress.

REFERENCES

158



Rescher, Nicolas, and Robert Brandom. 1980. The Logic of Inconsistency. Oxford:Blackwell.

Roberts, John M. 1964. “The self-management of cultures.” In Explorations in Cul-tural Anthropology, edited by Ward H. Goodenough. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 433–54.

Russell, Bertrand. 1937. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz. London:G. Allen & Unwin.

Russell, Bertrand, and Frederick Copleston. 1957. En samtale om Guds eksistens (A

conversation on the existence of God). Oslo: Cappelen.Rynin, David. 1964. “Donagan on Collingwood: Absolute presuppositions, truth,

and metaphysics.” Review of Metaphysics 18: 301–33.

Schutz, Alfred, 1962–66. Collected Papers, 3 vols, edited and introduced by MauriceNatanson, with a preface by H. L. van Breda. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

Sextus Empiricus. 1933–44. Sextus Empiricus, 4 vols., translated by R. G. Bury.Cambridge, MA and London: Loeb Classical Library.

Spinoza, Benedictus de. 1914. Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata. The Hague:M. Nijhoff.

Stalin, Joseph. 1940. O dialekticheskom i istoricheskom materializme (Dialectical andhistorical materialism ). New York: International Publishers.

Ueberweg, Friedrich. 1898–1903 (9th edition). Grundriss der geschichte der philosophie (A history of philosophy from Thales to the present time), 4 vols. Berlin:E. S. Mittler and Son.

Vaihinger, Hans. 1911. Die Philosophie des Als-Ob (The philosophy of “as if”). Berlin:Reuther and Reichard.

van Breda, H. L. and J. Taminiaux, eds. 1959. Husserl et la pensée moderne. Husserl und das Denken der Neuzeit. Actes du deuxième Colloque international de phénoménologie,

Krefeld, 1- 3 novembre 1956. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.

Walsby, Harold. 1947. The Domain of Ideologies. Glasgow: W. MacLellan.

Wedberg, Anders. 1958–66 Filosofins historia (History of philosophy), 3 vols. Stock-

holm: Bonniers.Wilson, Bryan R., ed. 1970. Rationality. Evanston and New York: Harper and Row.

Wolfson, Harry Austryn. 1934. The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning , 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wyller, Egil A. 1960. Platon. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

159

REFERENCES



Absolute, the, 32, 33, 34, 47absolute presuppositions, 83, 85–86, 89,

153n1absolutization

of logic and truth-concepts, 138–39of models, 30of one’s own culture, 134– 40, 141of world pictures, 28– 32, 33

Academic scepticism, 2, 21– 22, 151n6Agassi, Joseph, 110analytic statements, 60–61, 153n1

in logical antinomies, 19Anselm, 63

anthropology. See cultural anthropologyantinomies, logical, 19, 151n3, 151n4a priori, concepts of, 60– 61Aquinas, Thomas, 6, 46, 65, 116, 145Aristotle’s system, 6, 21, 36, 54

as all-inclusive, 145Collingwood and, 83, 90fundamental ontological distinction in, 96 –

98, 153n1integration of, 116other systematizers and, 52, 57semantics in, 105Spinoza’s concepts and, 63substance in, 152n4

assumptions

implicit, of systems, 5, 14– 17, 25 See also presuppositions

atomic theoryancient, 30, 59modern, 100, 110

Avenarius, Richard, 73Averroes, 63Avicenna, 63axiology, 45

Ayer, Alfred, 152n8Azande culture, 123, 135, 141

Baktaman cultureanthropologist’s understanding of, 123contact with other cultures, 141experience of, 112–13initiation in, 117– 18, 119–22, 132– 33ontology of, 125–27, 132

Barth, FredrikBaktaman cultural change and, 141on Baktaman initiation, 119, 120, 121,

133

culture concept of, 108–09, 110, 113, 115, 132,153n1

on method in anthropology, 124, 136, 137Bateson, Gregory, 131Beethoven, Ludwig van, 111beholding type of world picture, 32, 35being, 33, 77, 97–98

See also existence; ontologybelief, 22Bennett, Jonathan, 152n3Berkeley, George, 8, 73Brandom, Robert, 98Breda, H. L. van, 74Brandt, Richard, 43, 44Bruemmer, Fred, 135

Bruno, Giordano, 26Buddha, 33Buytendijk, 73

Carnap, Rudolf, 22, 49Cassirer, Ernst

on Cusanus, 41– 42on Hume, 66– 68

Castberg, Frede, 23

161

Index



categories in systems, 21equivalence of systems and, 98Hall’s sense of, 22– 23, 45, 101presuppositions as, 84in total systems, 54

causationhistorians’ concepts of, 72in Kant’s system, 84, 86presuppositions about, 84– 85, 86Russell vs. Copleston on, 37in Spinoza’s system, 63– 65

Chiricahua Apache culture, 107, 108Christie, Nils, 126Church, Alonzo, 45cognitive affinity, 58, 59Cohen, Felix S., 93– 94, 95Collingwood, Robin G., 83– 90, 153n1Columbus, Christopher, 102combinatorics of systems, 60, 61commonsense world, 71, 72–73, 102–03, 135concepts of a system, 22–23

identity of, between systems, 77–79in presuppositions, 84

conceptual frameworks. See frames of reference;presuppositions

contradiction. See principle of contradiction

Copleston, Frederick, 37Crescas, 63cultural anthropology

Collingwood’s system concept and, 90cultural differences and, 123, 124definitions of culture in, 108–09, 113–16,

135in different cultures, 136–37, 139, 141–42frames of reference in, 135–36, 137, 145structure vs. content and, 110– 11, 112, 113, 139–

40, 147cultures

absolutization of one’s own, 134– 40, 141as all-inclusive, 145–46changes in, 140, 141, 146, 148classification of, 147conflicts within, 144definitions of, 108–09, 113 –16, 135differences between

comparison and, 132, 135– 37, 147depth of, 125–30, 131, 132– 34in experienced content, 111limits to, 137–38, 147– 48translatability and, 122–25

general statements about, 148as information economies, 106–08, 113, 115,

117–20, 125, 132norms of, 111, 115, 117, 122, 132

conflicting, 144reality and, 148

ontologies of, 110, 125–27, 132vs. philosophical systems, 105– 10, 115

branches of philosophy and, 125– 26communication of knowledge and, 119, 120,

121–22

conclusions on, 143–49differences and, 125, 126, 131–34familiarization and, 112integration and, 116–18, 126premises and, 109–10

possible vs. actual, 148presuppositions of, 85, 89, 137reality and

experience of, 111, 133, 134, 147, 153n3interpretation of, 109, 110, 111, 140, 1

48relativity of values of, 144–45as total views, 110, 143, 144world pictures of, 110, 111, 123, 132, 140

Cusanus, Nicholas, 34, 41– 42

Dahl, Ottar, 72Dammann, Erik, 112, 115–16, 127, 128, 129Darwin, Charles, 5definiteness (or depth) of intention

in comparing systems, 24–25, 38, 61, 82of different logics, 139within systems, 24, 38in understanding cultures, 111in vernacular, 72 See also precization

Democritus, 6, 28, 59Descartes, René

Leibniz’s concepts and, 77, 96Spinoza’s concepts and, 63, 94, 96

on feelings, 38on substance, 77–79, 130–31, 152n3

system of, 6, 36, 54, 57determinism, of Democritus, 59Dewey, John, 54, 153n1dialectical materialism, 51, 52dialectical method, of Hegel, 55Dilthey, Wilhelm, 29, 49dogmatism, 4–5, 14

INDEX

162



Donagan, Alan, 153n1Durant, Will, 93

Einstein, Albert, 26Elders, Fons, 152n8empiricism

Ayer vs. Naess on, 152n8naive, of Donagan, 153n1synoptic formulation of, 49

vs. rationalism, 52–53 See also experience

Epicurus’s system, 41, 50, 52epistemology

cultural differences and, 126in synoptic systems, 45, 49, 50, 53system differences and, 131in total systems, 54 See also knowledge; scepticism

epoché (suspension of judgment), 61Eskimos, 135ethics

cultural differences and, 125, 126descriptive vs. deductive, 43– 44stepwise system construction in, 152n9in synoptic systems, 45, 49, 50, 53in total systems, 54

See also valuesEvans-Pritchard, Edward E., 123, 135, 141everyday speech, 24–25, 71–74, 81–82, 95existence

different concepts of, 77Spinoza on, 63–64 See also being; ontology

experiencecultural differences and, 111, 112–13, 133– 34culture as, 140, 147, 148presuppositions and, 84, 153n1in synoptic systems, 49, 50, 53system differences and, 133– 34, 147world pictures and, 26, 28, 29, 31, 33 See also empiricism

extrapolationfrom scientific worldview, 1of systems, 57– 61

Fechner, Gustav, 28Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 33Fink, Eugen, 73Floystad, Guttorm, 48formal world pictures, 32, 35

frames of reference, 14– 15, 16, 17for comparison of systems, 53–54, 61–62, 80in ideology research, 18of social scientist, 20supersystematic, 33–34 See also metasystems

free will, 19, 23– 24, 131Frege, Gottlob, 57

Galtung, Johan, 43Gandhi, Mahatma, 43, 152n9

Gassendi, Pierre, 58Geertz, Clifford, 114, 116–17, 153n3Gestalt psychology, 27God

causation and, 37, 63–64presuppositions about, 87, 88, 89Spinoza on, 63–64, 130substance and, 130, 152n4

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 29

Haeckel, Ernst, 28Hall, Everett W., 22– 23, 42, 45, 101Hallett, Harold Foster, 62–63, 64–65Hartmann, Nicolai, 5Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

on the Absolute, 33all-inclusiveness of system, 47, 145metasystems and, 96Newton and, 5traditional presentations of system, 36, 55–56,

152n11Hegge, Hjalmar, 29Heidegger, Martin, 20, 37, 71, 73Heraclitus, 33Herman, Imre, 19Herskovits, Melville Jean, 113historians

causation and, 72Collingwood’s system concept and, 89– 90

historicism, 31–32, 33Hobbes, Thomas, 21, 58Hoffding, Harald, 125Horton, Robin, 110Huizer, Gerrit, 137Hume, David

avoidance of technical terminology, 73didactic formulations of, 66– 67Kant and, 8, 67–70, 86logical antinomies and, 19

163

INDEX



Hume, David (continued)

rejection of system construction, 21world hypothesis of, 54

Husserl, Edmund, 71, 73– 74

Ibsen, Henrik, 110ideology research, 18– 19, 20, 137Indian philosophy, 48infinity, spatio-temporal, 26information economies, 106–08, 113, 115, 117–20,

125, 132

isothenia (state of mental suspense), 59

James, William, 11 Jarvie, I. C., 110 Jaspers, Karl

cultures and, 144metatheory of, 33on “the whole,” 46–47on world pictures, 12–13, 25 –36, 151n1,

152n7mental and cultural, 31–32metaphysical, 32–36sensible in space, 26– 31

on worldviews, 13, 35–36, 151n1

Kalabari culture, 110Kant, Immanuel

on the Absolute, 33on causation, 84, 86definitions and, 40education about, 120Hume and, 8, 67– 70, 86rejection of system construction, 21total view expressed by, 48world hypothesis of, 54

Keesing, Roger M., 113, 114, 115, 117, 135Kierkegaard, Soren, 2, 15, 132Kluckhohn, Clyde, 114Kneale, Martha, 46Kneale, W. M., 46knowledge

Aristotle on, 96–97cultural, 108, 118–22, 126, 133limits of, 148– 49 See also epistemology; scepticism

Koestler, Arthur, 17, 151n2Kroeber, Alfred, 114

La Mettrie, Julien Offray de, 58Lange, Friedrich, 50

Lapland, 108, 126 Lebenswelt , 71, 73, 74Ledang, Ola Kai, 111Leibniz

on the Absolute, 33, 34vs. Descartes, 77, 96in se/in alio distinction and, 140on possible worlds, 101, 148Russell on, 22vs. Spinoza, 95, 96

semantics and, 40

on substance, 34, 39–40, 77, 94, 152n4total view expressed by, 48

Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 140Lévy-Bruhl, Lucien, 19, 138Lewin, Kurt, 99liar antinomy, 19, 151n3Linton, Ralph, 113Locke, John, 76logic

cultural differences and, 137–39different logics, 20, 45, 138–39, 151n5formal vs. natural, 138–39problems of total systems and, 13, 16, 24substance and, 45, 152n4in synoptic systems, 45, 52

in total systems, 24, 54 See also methodologies; principle of

contradictionlogical antinomies, 19, 151n3, 151n4logical positivism, of Rynin, 86Löwith, Karl, 73Lucretius, 54Lukes, Steven, 138

magic, 110, 123Maimonides, 63Mannheim, Bruce, 137Mannheim, Karl, 18, 19Maritain, Jacques, 42Marx, Karl, 103materialism

of Democritus, 59as general orientation, 21synoptic formulation of, 49– 50variants of, 58of world pictures, 33

Mates, Benson, 19meaning

culture and, 122, 135, 140, 142in individual’s world picture, 31

INDEX

164



in philosophical systems, 60–61, 81, 82, 105,140

synoptic formulations, 49, 50, 53real world and, 140 See also semantics

meaning of life, 109mechanical world pictures, 28, 29, 30, 33metaphysical presuppositions, 83– 90, 153n1metaphysical world pictures, 32–36metasystems, 42

for comparing cultures, 135– 36

for comparing systems, 42, 79, 80, 81, 82, 96of Goethe and Newton, 29

semantic, 24superficiality of, 33–34traditional presentations of systems and, 55 See also frames of reference

methodologiescomparison of systems and, 52, 53–54, 80, 90–

91, 131in synoptic systems, 52, 53in total systems, 16, 54 See also logic

modelsrelativity of, 30of the world, 100

Moore, G. E., 22Mounier, Emmanuel, 48Munch, Edvard, 13mythical world pictures, 12, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35

Naess, Arneon descriptive ethics, 43on different logics, 151n5Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches verhalten

(Science as behavior), 30Interpretation and Preciseness, 68on relativity of models, 30on total views, 152n8, 153n2on truth of norms, 153n2

Natanson, Maurice, 102Natorp, Paul, 59naturalism, 28, 33nature-historical world pictures, 28, 29nature-mechanical world pictures, 28, 29, 30, 33nature-mythical world pictures, 28, 29negative theologies, 32, 34– 35negativism. See Academic scepticismNewton, Isaac, 5, 21, 29, 68Nietzsche, Friedrich, 49, 57nonstandard worlds, 98

nonviolence, 44Nordenstam, Tore, 43–44, 61, 152n10norms

of cultures, 111, 115, 117, 122, 132conflicting, 144reality and, 148

of philosophical systems, 90– 91, 131– 32, 148truth or falsity of, 153n2

Nuer culture, 122–23

objects, represented by system, 20– 21, 22

Objectual, the, 12, 13, 31, 46, 151n1Ockham, William of, 88ontology

of Aristotle, 96– 98of cultures, 110, 125–27, 132of Democritus, 59in synoptic systems, 45, 49, 50, 52in total systems, 54, 131 See also being; existence

Opler, Morris, 108orientations, 21, 22

pan-logistic world pictures, 32, 33Parmenides, 33Pepper, Stephen C., 54–55

personal identity, 48phenomena, in Schopenhauer’s system, 56phenomenology, 27, 73

of philosophy, 95philosophical systems. See systemsphilosophical world pictures, 14, 28– 36Plato

on examined life, 11ontology of, 97system expresses personality, 6theory of forms, 21on ultimate reality, 33world hypothesis of, 54

pleasure, Democritus on, 59pluralism

about cultural anthropologies, 141of James, 11of Leibniz, 94about logics, 138–39about truth-concepts, 91, 139about worlds, 99–103

Polanyi, Michael, 151n2Porphyry, 63possibilism, cultural anthropology and, 141possible worlds, 148, 149

165

INDEX



pragmatism, 21precization

in comparing logics, 139in comparing systems, 39, 60– 61, 82, 95, 132of conceptual framework, 12of culture concept, 115of everyday speech, 71– 72, 73, 74, 81–82, 95of general statements about systems, 148of presuppositions, 24of system concept, 143 See also definiteness (or depth) of intention

presuppositionsabsolute, 83, 85–86, 89, 153n1of any assertion at all, 153n2Collingwood on, 83– 90, 153n1of commonsense world, 102common to all systems, 89conflicting, 23–24of a culture, 85, 89, 137experience and, 84, 153n1frames of reference and, 14– 15identification of, 46inside or outside of system, 84, 86–88vs. principles within system, 88–90Pyrrhonian scepticism and, 151n6in science, 2, 84–85

temporary suspension of, 3– 4, 12tensions within clusters of, 85–86, 90truth of, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89

“primitive” cultures, 20, 138, 142principle of contradiction

cultural differences and, 137– 38, 139in equivalent systems, 96, 97in synoptic systems, 49, 50, 53 See also logic; presuppositions, conflicting

psychologism, 31–32, 33Pyrrhonism, 2, 21–22, 151n6Pythagoras, 33

Quine, W. V. O., 45

rationalismas general orientation, 21synoptic formulation of, 52– 53

rationalistic world pictures, 32, 33rationality, cultural differences and, 138, 139reality

criteria of, 148of cultural anthropologist, 135culture’s experience of, 111, 133, 134, 147,

153n3

culture’s interpretation of, 109, 110, 111,140, 148

not apprehended by one person, 96referred to by systems, 105–06, 140, 146–

47in Schopenhauer’s system, 56singularity of, 98–100, 134, 140, 146–47social, 102– 03of system comparer, 90– 91vs. world, 134world pictures and, 33, 140, 147

real worldabstractions from, 27–28all-inclusiveness of, 140ambiguity of, 143criteria for, 148cultures and, 109vs. possible worlds, 148, 149 See also worlds

relativism, 81, 144–45 See also world pictures, relationality of

Rescher, Nicolas, 98Rickert, Heinrich, 45Roberts, John M., 107, 108, 113, 115Roman civilization, presuppositions of, 85Russell, Bertrand, 22, 37

Russell’s antinomy, 19, 151n4Ryle, Gilbert, 58Rynin, David, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 153n1

Samoan culture, 112, 115–16, 127–28, 129Sartre, Jean-Paul, 37scepticism, 2, 3, 4, 14, 21–22, 151n6Scheler, Max, 73Scholastic systems, 22–23Schopenhauer’s system, 56, 152n12Schutz, Alfred, 102science

cultural differences and, 147–48excluded from systems, 55Goethe’s view of, 29vs. magic, 110openness of, 146philosophical interpretation of, 2, 147presuppositions in, 2, 84– 85reality and, 148uncritical use of, 5worldview of, 1– 2

self-reference, 24semantic depth, 132

See also precization

INDEX

166



semanticsfor comparison of systems, 39– 40, 79cultural differences and, 123– 24in systems, 45, 50, 54of systems, 24–25, 105 See also meaning

Semiotic Triangle, 24, 79Sextus Empiricus, 21, 151n6social anthropology, 108

See also Barth, Fredrik; cultural anthropologysocial reality, 102– 03

Socrates, 22Spencer, Herbert, 5Spinoza, Benedictus de (Baruch)

all-inclusiveness of system, 145Berkeley and, 8on causation, 63–65Collingwood’s system concept and, 90deductive method of, 43– 44vs. Descartes, 63, 94, 96

on feelings, 38on substance, 77–79, 130–31, 152n3

essence and, 74on feelings, 38, 130Hall’s system concept and, 45inconsistency of system, 116

in itself/in something else distinction, 76, 86,88, 140

vs. Leibniz, 95, 96semantics and, 40on substance, 34, 39–40, 77, 94, 152n4

personality of, 6, 48presentations of his system, 7, 75, 76, 152n2presuppositions of, 86, 88semantics of, 39–40on substance

as the Absolute, 33, 34vs. Descartes, 77– 79, 130–31, 152n3Hallett on, 65vs. Leibniz, 34, 39–40, 77, 94, 152n4

world hypothesis of, 54worldview of, 35–36

spiritual world pictures, 33, 151n1Stalin, Joseph, 51Stirner, Max, 101Stoic philosophy, 41structuralism, 139–40substance

Aristotelian criteria for, 152n4Spinoza on

as the Absolute, 33, 34

vs. Descartes, 77– 79, 130–31, 152n3Hallett on, 65vs. Leibniz, 34, 39–40, 77, 94, 152n4

synonymity hypothesis about, 77– 79substance-directed world pictures, 32, 35synonymity, 53, 77synoptic systems, 42, 44–45

comparisons of, 52–53examples of, 49–51, 53explicitness of, 47philosophers’ personalities and, 47–49

topics included in, 45– 47synthetic statements, 153n1systems

vs. antisystematic orientations, 5, 21, 22basic concepts about, 20– 25classification of, 36, 147Collingwood’s concept of, 89– 90combinatorics of, 60, 61comparison of, 37–40

adequate representation and, 74– 79, 147debates between philosophers, 37, 39,

152n8definiteness of intention and, 24– 25, 38, 61,

82discontinuous character of, 68–70

everyday speech and, 24–25, 71–74, 81 –82,95

experience and, 133– 34, 147extrapolation in, 57–61frames of reference for, 53–54, 61–62, 80metasystems for, 29, 79, 80, 81, 82, 96methodologies and, 52, 53–54, 80, 90–91,

131personalities and, 6, 48pluralism of worlds and, 100–101semantics for, 39– 40, 79simple examples, 52–53simplified presentations for, 40, 41, 152n9structures and, 140, 147of total systems, 53–57, 68, 76, 81truth and, 40, 79–82, 90–91, 153n2world pictures and, 29, 81

concepts in, 22–23, 77–79, 84connections between things in, 11– 12contradictions in, 23–24vs. cultures, 105–10, 115

branches of philosophy and, 125– 26communication of knowledge and, 119, 120,

121–22conclusions on, 143–49

167

INDEX



systems (continued)

differences and, 125, 126, 131–34familiarization and, 112integration and, 116– 18, 126premises and, 109–10

deduction and, 43–44defined, 20–21, 105– 06definiteness of intention in, 24, 38definitions in, 40different

criteria for, 24–25

depth of difference, 130–31empirical verification and, 153n1understanding of, 8–9

dogmatic, 4–5, 14equivalence of, 89, 93–98extrapolation of, 57–61general orientations and, 21general statements about, 148Hall’s concept of, 22– 23, 42, 45, 101historical overviews of, 6 –9, 36 –37, 61 –

62implicit assumptions of, 5, 14– 17, 25incompleteness of, unavoidable, 16, 19–

20information content of, 107

introductory expositions of, 61–70norms of, 90– 91, 131–32, 148vs. other creative works, 49partial, 24, 42, 54personalities of philosophers and, 6, 47– 49pluralism of worlds and, 99– 103pyramidal reconstructions of, 40, 41– 42, 43,

67–68Pyrrhonism and, 21–22relativism about, 81, 144, 145science and, 5, 55, 146semantic characteristics of, 24– 25, 105structure vs. content of, 139– 40, 147synonymity and, 53, 77synthesis and, 5total views as, 21, 36, 37, 54– 55worldviews and, 35–36 See also metasystems; presuppositions; synoptic

systems; total systems or total views;world pictures

Taminiaux, J., 74Thales, 52

third system. See metasystemstotal systems or total views

absolutization of world pictures and, 29–30“artificial” combinations as, 57–61cannot describe everything, 46– 47, 55comparison of, 53–57, 68, 76, 81comprehensibility to outsider, 146consistency of presuppositions in, 24cultures as, 110, 143, 144defined, 20, 21, 24, 54–55vs. Empiricist views, 152n8

improvement of, 146include the outsider, 152n1logical problems of, 13, 16, 24personal identity and, 48possibility of, 16, 17– 18, 143–44, 145presupposed by any assertion, 153n2reality and, 146– 47scepticism toward, 2scientific research and, 1, 147social scientists and, 20striving for totality, 22system vs. view, 21traditional examples, 55–57as world hypotheses, 54–55 See also systems

translatability, 122– 25truth

Aristotle on, 97, 98in Baktaman culture, 133combinatorics of systems and, 61comparison of systems and, 40, 79–82, 90–91,

153n2cultural differences and, 138, 139liar antinomy and, 151n3of norms, 153n2of presuppositions, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89scepticism about, 2, 3, 4, 151n6in Scholastic systems, 22, 23in synoptic systems, 50, 53of systems, 105

Tylor, E. B., 113, 114

Ueberweg, Friedrich, 152n11, 152n12utilitarian ethics, 49

Vaihinger, Hans, 65values

cultural relativity about, 144–45

INDEX

168



Jaspers on, 27, 151n1reality of, 91in total systems, 54 See also ethics

vernacular. See everyday speech

Walsby, Harold, 18, 19Wedberg, Anders, 61Whitehead, Alfred North, 54Wilson, Bryan R., 142Winsnes, A. H., 42

Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef, 21, 22, 58Wolfson, Harry Austryn, 63, 65world hypotheses, 54–55world pictures, 12–14, 151n1

absolutization of, 28– 32, 33commonsense, 71comparison of systems and, 29, 81of cultures, 110, 111, 123, 132, 140defined, 12, 151n1formal, 32, 35 Jaspers’ typology of, 25– 36, 152n7

mental and cultural, 31–32metaphysical, 32–36sensible in space, 26– 31

mechanical, 28, 29, 30, 33mythical, 12, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35nature, 28, 29,30, 33pan-logistic, 32, 33philosophical, 14, 28–36reality and, 33, 140, 147relationality of, 12scientific, 1 –2, 147spiritual, 33, 151n1substance-directed, 32, 35

worlds

different, 99, 100, 109, 111, 134nonstandard, 98of philosophical systems, 100– 101possible, 148, 149real, 27– 28, 109, 140, 143, 148, 149vs. realities, 134 See also reality

worldviews Jaspers’ definition of, 13, 151n1magical, 110philosophical systems and, 35–36

Zeteticism, 2

169

INDEX



the natural world has continued throughout his life and is reflected in the

spirit of his work.

Naess currently lives in Oslo with his wife, Kit-Fai.

Harold Glasser, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies at

Western Michigan University in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He has been a vis-

iting Senior Fulbright scholar at the Center for Development and Environ-

ment and Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo; a Resource Person

for the United Nations University–Institute of Advanced Study; a visitingresearcher at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis; and

a lecturer at Schumacher College. He has written on environmental philos-

ophy, policy, and planning, as well as green accounting, education for eco-

cultural sustainability, and campus sustainability assessment.

Alan R. Drengson, Ph.D. is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the Uni-

versity of Victoria, in Victoria BC Canada. He is a former Director of Envi-

ronmental Studies and is currently an Adjunct Professor of Graduate Stud-

ies. He is the author of numerous articles, reviews, and books, as well as the

editor of three anthologies and the founding editor of two journals, TheTrumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy and Ecoforestry.

172



Designed by Tamotsu Yagi DesignComposed by Ralph Fowler and BookMatters in Garamond 3

Bound by Callenbach, Nijkerk in Elite and stamped with Colorit 922Printed by Krips, Meppel on Cyclus Offset 90 gr/m2

bbm%3A978-1-4020-4519-6%2F3%2F1 Arne Naess

Documents

Transcript of bbm%3A978-1-4020-4519-6%2F3%2F1 Arne Naess