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    Hans-Ger t Poe t ter ing, M E P, C ha irman o f t he Group

    o f t he European Peop le's Par t y

    and European Democra ts ( E P P- E D ) in t he European Par l ia

    men t

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    Konrad denauer's polic

    on Europe

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    Konrad denauer's polic y on Europe

    Konrad Adenauer's

    polic y on Europe

    Konrad Adenauer's policy on Europeand the challenges of European unification today

    Hans-Gert Poettering MEP, Chairman of the Group of the European People's Partyand European Democrats (EPP-ED) in the European Parliament as well asChairman of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the rural county (Landkreis)of Osnabrck

    and the challenges of European unification today

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    Konrad Adenauer'spolicy on Europe

    and the challenges of European unification today

    Hans-Gert Poettering

    The goal of Konrad Adenauer's policy on Europe may be summed up in a

    single sentence, which he formulated neatly for everyone in his Colognedialect: "Europa muss jeschaffen werden" ("Europe must be created").Behind this sentence of Adenauer's lay the experience of two world warsand of the traditional enmity between Germany and France, which he, asa Rhinelander, found particularly distressing. Creating peace and freedom,removing the divisiveness of national borders and achieving reconciliationbetween yesterday's enemies were only possible through the bond of

    European integration. Moreover, no neighbour need fear Germany if itwere a member of the European family. Adenauer saw Europe as poten-tially more than an economic community. It was a union of States thatwere bound together by the common aim of nurturing political unificationand overcoming historical conflicts. When he resigned from office on 15October 1963 at the age of 87, he had guided post-war Germany from astate of economic and moral collapse, developing its domestic and forei-gn policies to pave the way for a better and more peaceful future.

    As the days leading up to his 125th birthday on 5 January 2001 give us theopportunity to review his political life and achievements, we cannot fail torecognise that Adenauer, through his European policy, had a decisiveimpact on Germany's position and prestige in Europe and the world.Neither German unity nor Germany's influence within Europe would havebeen conceivable without his political pragmatism, his patience, his stam-ina and the confidence that his consistency inspired in the governments of neighbouring European countries. 3

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    Historical foundations

    Until the middle of the 20th century, foreign policy in Europe wascharacterised by coalitions of the Great Powers and counter-coali-tions, by force and retaliation. Adenauer, who was born into thenewly unified Germany of the late 19th century, was decades aheadof this conception of politics. His great political interest in Europewas not only a consequence of his confrontation with the effects of the Second World War on Germany. He was remarkably open tomodern European solutions to the problems of his day as well asbeing a strikingly resolute advocate of a reshaping of relationsamong the democracies of Western Europe. Back in 1919, when, asMayor of the City of Cologne, he officiated at the reopening of Cologne University, he expressed the view that "the great work of fos-tering durable international reconciliation and a community of nations for the good of Europe" had to be encouraged. In the earlytwenties, he saw the creation of a 'West German republic' within theGerman Reich but separated from Prussia as a means of defusingthe Franco-German conflicts that had surfaced in 1919/20 and in1923/24 and of satisfying the French concern for security. Even atthat time he was already convinced that lasting European unity couldonly be built on the basis of Franco-German friendship and the poo-ling of the two countries' economic potential. This interdependence,he believed, would not only breed common economic interests butalso common political interests.

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    Adenauer had the courage to articulate his ideas on a united Europeat a time when they were far less popular than they are today. And heremained true to this ideal. However, by the time he spoke in hispolicy statements in 1946 of the "United States of Europe", theconcept of European integration had taken on a new dimension inhis mind. Besides offering a new beginning for Franco-German rela-tions, European integration had, in his eyes, become a symbol of thestruggle against growing Soviet influence and hence of the GermanQuestion too.

    Adenauer's strategy for Europe

    By the late forties, the French policy of safeguarding France by wea-kening Germany politically and economically had been definitivelyabandoned. The joint approach of the Western Allies was now tokeep Germany stable and harmless by encouraging its economicand political reconstruction and its integration into sound anddurable institutions. The Statute of Occupation enacted by the Alliesin 1949 regulated the balance of sovereignty between the threeWestern occupying powers and the Federal Republic of Germanyunder its new Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. The West German core

    State was prohibited from exercising sovereignty in certain impor-tant areas of domestic policy and more especially of foreign policy.So Adenauer's freedom to pursue his own foreign policy was tightlyrestricted. In these circumstances the main aim was to re-establish

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    external security, sovereignty and equality of status for the FederalRepublic of Germany. In Adenauer's view, this could only be achie-ved if the Federal Republic were more closely integrated intoWestern Europe. This integration was also intended to prevent thevictorious powers from concluding a peace settlement at theexpense of the German nation, which was one of the Chancellor'sconcerns from 1949 to 1954 and determined his course of actionduring that period.

    It was Adenauer's aim to work with the victorious Western powers tolaunch a policy that would lead the Federal Republic gradually out of its present state of dependence towards greater political influence,stronger decision-making powers and equality of status within thecommunity of nations. Part of this policy involved using Germany'srestored freedom to bind it into international organisations, therebyhelping to create a common set of political and economic interests.It was clear to Adenauer that this could only be achieved throughreconciliation with former enemies in the East and West, especiallywith France. The foremost precept underlying every action in thefield of foreign policy was the desire to regain the trust of Germany'sneighbours. In this situation, Adenauer was prepared to make poli-tical concessions and to keep taking the first step, even though thisapproach occasionally met with humiliating rebuffs from the Alliesin the early stages. He hoped that this practice would lay the foun-

    dations for genuine partnership with the Western Powers and secu-re the sovereignty of the Federal Republic. His hope would ultimate-ly prove to have been justified.

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    Adenauer's first step in this direction was German accession to theInternational Ruhr Authority. This gave the Federal Republic theunreserved right to participate in the work of the Authority andsecured recognition of its independence in the form prescribed bythe Statute. Adenauer advocated accession even though it meantrecognising Allied control of industry in the Ruhr district. TheAllies made reciprocal concessions. The dismantling of Germanindustrial plant was cut back, the restrictions on Germanshipbuildding were eased, and the gradual re-establishment of consular relations by the Allies was announced. The results of these concessions were enshrined in the Petersberg Agreement of 22 November 1949.

    Adenauer's calculations proved correct. Less than three years later,on 25 July 1952, the day of the entry into force of the TreatyEstablishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the RuhrStatute and all Allied control in the domain of coal and steel wereabolished, and the International Ruhr Authority was dissolved. Asimilar process took place in the negotiations on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Council of Europe. On 30March 1950, the Federal Government received an invitation tobecome an associated member, rather than a full member, of theCouncil. Adenauer assumed that the Allies only intended to main-tain this discriminatory arrangement for a relatively short time,

    provided the Federal Republic demonstrated willingness to engagein European cooperation. On 15 June the Bundestag voted foraccession to the Council of Europe, after Adenauer had won overthe Cabinet by means of a memorandum. In August 1950, the

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    Federal Republic of Germany became an associated member of theCouncil of Europe, and shortly afterwards, on 5 May 1951, it acce-ded to full membership.

    On 9 May 1950, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schumanannounced the plan that bears his name for the creation of aEuropean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The French had nogreat confidence in the existing Allied mechanisms for the control of Germany. For that reason, France sought new ways of controlling theGerman coal and steel industries. Adenauer supported the Frenchproposal without reservation. The Treaty Establishing the EuropeanCoal and Steel Community was signed on 18 April 1951 by France, theFederal Republic, the Benelux countries and Italy. Together withRobert Schuman and Alcide de Gasperi, Adenauer became one of theinitiators of a development which led in 1957 to the establishment of the European Economic Community and laid the foundations for theEEC to evolve into the European Union of the present day.

    Adenauer suffered a disheartening setback when the plan for aEuropean Defence Community was rejected by the French NationalAssembly on 30 August 1954. On 24 October 1950, the French PrimeMinister Ren Pleven had proposed the creation of a European armyunder a European Minister of Defence a kind of Schuman Plan inthe realm of defence. France saw this primarily as a means of

    delaying the start of German rearmament and of preventing theestablishment of German divisions and their integration into NATO.To these ends, the Pleven Plan also contained a number of discrimi-natory provisions. What was planned in essence was the incorpora-

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    tion into the European army of contingents at the level of the smal-lest possible unit from the national forces of the participating States.Only the German troops were to be recruited by a European HighCommissioner. In addition, all of the participating countries exceptGermany were permitted to keep their own General Staff andDefence Minister. Adenauer agreed to the Pleven Plan in principle,on condition that the Federal Republic should enjoy full equality.This sovereignty was to be assigned to the Federal Republic in theBonn Convention of May 1952 on Relations between the ThreePowers and the Federal Republic of Germany, which was to takeeffect when the Treaty Establishing the European DefenceCommunity entered into force. On 27 May 1952, the foreign minis-ters of the six ECSC Member States signed the Treaty Establishingthe European Defence Community. The EDC, however, was stillborn,extinguished by the French decision of 30 August 1954. There wereseveral reasons why the French National Assembly was unwilling toratify the Treaty and why the whole project of a European army wasthrown out by the very country that had initially been the most com-mitted proponent of the idea. One of the main reasons was surelythat the United Kingdom was not a signatory of the EDC Treaty. Thismeant that the Federal Republic of Germany would have been thestrongest power in the European Defence Community after France.

    Only a short time later, on 23 October 1954, the Paris Agreements

    were signed in the French capital by the participating Western States,ending the occupation regime in the western part of Germany andpaving the way for West German membership of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO). Nevertheless, Adenauer regarded the

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    collapse of the EDC proposal and the fact that it meant the aban-donment for the time being of the plan for political union as one of the "greatest disappointments" of his chancellorship, to quote hisown words. The enormity of this setback is illustrated by the fact thatthe idea of a European defence force in the form of a rapid-reactionforce of 60,000 troops has only now started to become a reality.

    For his willingness to press ahead with precisely those projectswhich seemed to all outward appearances to be mere instruments inthe French quest for hegemony and security, Adenauer repeatedlycame under heavy fire in Parliament. The Opposition of the daystrongly doubted whether, only a few years after the war, the'arch-enemy' France would really be prepared to pursue a policy of conciliation and cooperative European partnership.

    For all that Adenauer unequivocally pursued the aim of the closestpossible cooperation among the States of Europe, however, he wasindifferent to the creation of European institutions. He did empha-sise in his Cabinet guidelines of 19 January 1956 that a communityhad to be created in such a way as to ensure that the political will andaction of the members moved in the same direction, that integrationshould be encouraged by every feasible method, that common insti-tutions should be created if possible in order to bind all parties firm-ly to the common goal and that these institutions had to be designed

    in a way that guaranteed continuity of development. But Adenauerfeared the emergence of Brussels centralism, which explained hisreluctance to give Europe strong institutions. He often criticised the'hyper-Europeans' who wanted to push ahead too hastily and too

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    fast. Even during the negotiations on the establishment of aEuropean political community as an umbrella for the defence com-munity, he was opposed to the idea of investing a EuropeanParliament with extensive powers. He believed it was too soon forsuch a measure. He also voiced his opposition to the right of Parliament to sit permanently and to deal with the whole range of political issues. A European Parliament, he said, could not be direct-ly elected; there were not enough qualified parliamentarians. In thisrespect, he did not foresee the developments of the eighties.

    Adenauer Europe and German unity

    Adenauer's policy on Europe was hotly disputed in Germany, espe-cially in the years from 1949 to 1956. Blinkered anti-Communism andthe pursuit of a European policy centred on Cologne Cathedral wereamong the criticisms levelled at Adenauer. The controversy over hiscommitment to European integration was fuelled in particular byKurt Schumacher, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) at that time, who accused him of "selling Germanydown the river" with his foreign policy. Schumacher was a tirelesscampaigner for German unity, even at the price of pan-German neu-

    trality, if need be. He believed that the course of Western integrationand the emergence of the Western European institutions on the onehand, and the establishment of the Council for Mutual EconomicAssistance (Comecon) on the other, would perpetuate the confron-

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    tation between the two power blocs and create an ever-wider gulf between the three Western zones of occupation and the Easternzone. He saw Adenauer's policy of Western integration as a sort of renunciation of German unity. He claimed that Adenauer had no realinterest in the Eastern zone, especially after the latter had rejected aproposal for reunification with non-aligned status in 1952. Adenauershrugged off that charge. A reunified neutralised Germany wouldhave had to waive the right to the protection of a collective securitysystem. There was a danger that it could be ground down betweenthe two blocs. Moreover, genuine neutrality presupposes the abilityto safeguard the integrity of the national territory by military means.This, however, would lead to renewed international friction and toinstability within the developing community of European States. Soif there were to be unification, it would have to be achieved withinthe stable framework of a European security system.

    "No German reunification if the price is neutrality." This maxim of Konrad Adenauer's continued to determine the political rationale of the Federal Republic of Germany in the decades that followed. Hisfar-sightedness with regard to the quest for security within an allianceand the integration of the Federal Republic into NATO were the basisfor the negotiations on German unity between Helmut Kohl andMikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Although Gorbachev no longer questio-ned the principle of German reunification at that point in time, the

    status of the future united Germany was hotly debated. InGorbachev's view, although Germany as a whole should formallybelong to NATO, de facto membership should only extend to the ter-ritory of the old Federal Republic. The five new federal states and

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    Berlin, he asserted, should not be covered by NATO's protectiveshield. Helmut Kohl, on the other hand, rejected the idea of differentlevels of security within the German State. It would be tantamount,he said, to a continued division of Germany if only part of the coun-try were covered by NATO. Besides, the creation of a special securi-ty status for Germany would have destroyed the efforts to develop aEuropean foreign and security policy, thereby striking at the veryheart of the European unification process and hampering or evencrippling it. In addition, Kohl did not want to let even the slightestinkling of a suspicion develop among his allies and partners that theunited Germany might intend to go its own way on security and mili-tary alliances. In the light of these considerations, the only accep-table results of the negotiations in the Caucasus in the spring of 1990 for Helmut Kohl were the full sovereignty of the unifiedGerman State and its unrestricted membership of NATO.

    Today we can say that, in the end, it was Helmut Kohl who faithfully rea-lised Konrad Adenauer's ideal of German unity within a unifying Europe.

    German unity and European unification are two sides of the samecoin. We are familiar with this sentence from keynote speeches onEuropean affairs by Helmut Kohl, by Wolfgang Schuble and byAngela Merkel too. But this wording is not their own invention; it istaken from Konrad Adenauer.

    Adenauer saw no problem in pressing ahead on integration, eventhough it tended to make the resolution of the German Questionmore difficult in the short term, because he was quicker than others

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    to recognise that German unity was not possible without Europeanunification. "In Germany there were those who said that we couldeither have a policy for Europe or a policy for German unity. I regar-ded this 'either-or' as a very grave error ". Adenauer did not see hiscommitment to Western integration in any way as an abandonmentof the eastern part of Germany or of the cause of reunification.

    Once it became apparent to him that there was no short-term solu-tion to the German Question, he sensed it could only be toGermany's advantage if new foundations were built in WesternEurope in the meantime. In the face of the perceived threat from themajor power in the East, the Soviet Union, freedom had to be safe-guarded. For the Federal Republic of Germany, this implied the needto find a security solution that would protect the West German coreof the nation against any aggression from the Communist bloc. Theattraction and appeal of a strong European Community would thenpave the way at a later date for the German Question to be resolvedfreely and peacefully and for Germany to be reunited.

    Adenauer's assessment that the magnetic effect of a free and unitedEurope would be powerful and would ultimately weaken the Sovietposition has proved to be accurate. A number of peaceful revolu-tions have subsequently transformed the political structure of Europe, beginning with the uprising of the Polish shipyard workers

    in Gdansk in the early eighties and continuing with the develop-ments that led to German unification in 1989/90 and most recentlywith the democratisation of Yugoslavia. The forthcoming accessionof Central and Eastern European States to the European Union is the

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    Konrad denauer's polic

    on Europe

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    Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer

    General de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer

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    Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman

    Winston Churchill

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    logical consequence of these historic changes. And we need them,because, as Adenauer himself said, "We should also look eastwardswhen we think of Europe. Those countries, with their rich Europeanpast, are part of Europe too. They must also be given the opportuni-ty to accede. Europe must be large; it must have strength andinfluence, so that it can have its interests accepted on the interna-tional political stage". 1

    Just as Adenauer was especially devoted to reconciliation withFrance in the West, our particular obligation in the East today is tobring Poland into the European integration process as soon as pos-sible. The eastward enlargement of the European Union is not onlyanother step in the development of peace and security for us as wellas for the applicant countries. It also means an increase in theweight of Europe in the political arena and in global economic com-petition, a larger and stronger single market and, in the historicalcontext, justice and solidarity.

    Conditions for the enlargement of the European Union

    Not least in memory of Konrad Adenauer, it is the foremost task of

    the Group of the European People's Party and European Democrats(EPP-ED), with 232 MEPs the largest group in the EuropeanParliament, to play its part in ensuring that the history of theEuropean Union remains a success story beyond the forthcoming

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    1 - Speech in Madrid, 16 February 1967, shorthand transcript.

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    enlargement. If that is to happen, however, both the EU and theapplicant countries must meet a number of important conditions.

    To enable the applicants to accede to membership of the Union,the EU itself must be expandable. To that end, a comprehensiveprocess of internal reform is required. The Nice summit inDecember of this year will be based on the fundamental conceptsof the democracy, effectiveness and transparency of the EU. Itssuccess will stand or fall with the achievement of internal reform.The key reforms are the so-called 'leftovers' of Amsterdam, name-ly the extension of majority decision-making, the weighting of votes in the Council and the number of Commissioners in an enlar-ged EU. The summit is to negotiate these points and take finaldecisions on them. In the view of the EPP-ED Group, the Councilshould adopt the principle of majority decisions coupled withcodecision by the European Parliament as the general norm. Theprinciple of unanimity, on the other hand, should be restricted to afew precisely defined and circumscribed policy areas, if only toensure that a future EU with more than 20 Member States is ableto function effectively. In addition, a new formula must be foundfor the weighting of votes in the Council of Ministers to ensure thatvoting rights are distributed more democratically and that futuremajority decisions in the Council reflect a majority of the Europeanpopulation. In the European Commission, every Member State

    should still be represented by at least one Commissioner. It is of vital importance to the small Member States in particular and totheir confidence in the EU that they should each provide a mem-ber of the Commission. In this context, the proposal tabled at the

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    last summit in Biarritz by the five largest Member States Germany, France, the UK, Spain and Italy that the Commissionbe reduced in size to preserve its efficiency and that a rotation sys-tem therefore be introduced for membership of the Commissioninjected a degree of friction into the reform debate. The smallStates rightly fear that France and Germany, in particular, will cometo dominate the EU. We must take this concern seriously. Thereduction in the size of the Commission would mean that somecountries would not provide a Commissioner at certain times.Consequently, responsibility for major decisions would have to betransferred to the Council. This would not only lead to a considerableweakening of the Commission in favour of the Council but wouldalso be liable to deprive the small States of any means of defendingtheir interests. The small States are understandably unwilling torun such a risk. We must respect that. Our mission is therefore tostrike a balance between the legitimate interests of the large andsmall Member States. The Nice summit must also decide whetherpairs and groups of individual EU Member States and their institu-tions should be able to engage in closer cooperation in particularfields. Closer cooperation between individual Member States is alaudable idea in principle, but such cooperation must not take placeoutside the Community framework. In other words, the Commissionand the European Parliament must be fully involved in the enhancedcooperation. Likewise, Member States which do not engage in the

    intensified cooperation from the outset must be able to join in atany time. We resolutely oppose the creation of secretariats andintergovernmental structures that are designed to run parallel tothe Community framework. In an EU with more than 20 Member

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    States, flexibility is needed. This flexibility, however, must not meanthat individual Community members are free to follow an alterna-tive agenda, because Europe must remain the Europe of theCommunity with common institutions. It must not become astructure in which cooperation is confined to the intergovernmen-tal arrangements made by individual participating States.

    Another condition for the successful enlargement of the EU is thatthe applicants for accession must fulfil the Copenhagen criteria,namely a stable democracy, respect for human rights, primacy of therule of law and a socially and environmentally responsible marketeconomy.

    In addition, a number of transitional provisions and deadlines willhave to be laid down. Particularly in the domains of agriculture andenvironment policies and with regard to the free movement of labour, it is essential to establish rules that will enable the applicantcountries to make a smooth transition into the European Union.

    Prospects for the further unification of Europe

    Successful negotiation of the 'leftovers' at the Nice summit will laythe foundations for the expansibility of the EU. At the same time,however, it must not draw a line under the reform process within theUnion. On the contrary, the summit must issue mandates for a fur-

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    ther conference. Even now there are some extremely urgent tasks onthe agenda in the framework of the ongoing reform process. Weshould prepare a constitutional treaty with a clear division betweennational and European decision-making powers, because not everyproblem in Europe is a problem for Europe. At the same time, theremust be sufficient flexibility to ensure that the distribution of powerscan be adapted as necessary in the light of current requirements. Wemust also strengthen parliamentarianism in the Union. The result of the European elections should in future be reflected in both thechoice of the President of the Commission and the composition of the Commission. In connection with this reform, the position of thePresident of the Commission must be strengthened. He or sheshould be appointed by the European Parliament and not as hither-to by the Heads of State and Government assembled in theEuropean Council.

    Such restructuring, which would strengthen the EuropeanCommission as the executive branch of the EU, might create condi-tions in which the proposal for a rotation system, whereby not everyMember State would provide a Commissioner at all times, could beimplemented.

    Nor should we continue to tolerate the lack of transparency in theCouncil of Ministers. Council decisions should no longer be made

    behind closed doors. For the sake of transparency, the Council mustadopt the practice of meeting in public whenever it has legislativedecisions to take. Furthermore, there should be a wider time framewithin which national parliaments, by virtue of the control they exer-

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    cise over their respective governments, are able to influence thedecisions of the Council. This, however, has nothing to do with therecent widely discussed proposal for the establishment of a secondchamber of the European Parliament, comprising national MPs. TheEPP-ED Group rejects this. Such a body would undermine theurgently necessary thematic division of powers between the EU andthe national parliaments, because its members would have one footin each camp. What is important for us is that Europe should havepositive connotations for its people. This means, among otherthings, that citizenship of the Union should be perceptibly beneficialto the people of Europe. One step in this direction will be the intro-duction of euro banknotes on 1 January 2002, because the end of exchange rates will make travelling within the euro zone not onlyeasier but also cheaper. In addition, the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has been formulated under the chair-manship of the former President of the Federal Republic of Germany,Roman Herzog, is to be ceremonially proclaimed this year at thesummit in Nice and will make a vital contribution to the effort tobring Europe closer to its people. We in the EPP-ED Group are com-mitted to the contractual enshrinement of the Charter of Fundamental Rights so that these rights would be binding in law andany infringement of them would be actionable by citizens of theUnion.

    The enlargement that lies ahead of us is a huge challenge as well asbeing a great opportunity for all of us. That is what Konrad Adenauermeant when he said, "Europe is only possible if a community of theEuropean peoples is restored, in which each individual people ren-

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    ders its irreplaceable contribution to the European economy and cul-ture, to Western thought, literature and creativity". 2

    Within the general population, the prospect of enlargement isaccompanied by concern about rising crime and heavy pressure onthe job market. And yet there is no alternative to European unifica-tion. It is our political and moral obligation to be fully committed tothe unification of our continent. Further delay in the accession of thecandidate countries would breed uncertainty and discord, which arethe wrong ingredients for a reliable European Community policy. Wehave a unique opportunity to consolidate our common Europeanvalues and hence to strengthen Europe.

    Moreover, we in the Federal Republic of Germany should never for-get that the achievement of German unity ten years ago, on 3October 1990, was only possible because the peoples of Central andEastern Europe staged a peaceful revolution to discard Communismas their state ideology.

    History teaches us that the success of political processes dependsnot only on their rationale but also on the time frame within whichthey take place.

    Had Adenauer not eagerly embraced Western integration, the new

    Federal Republic would have faced lengthy isolation instead of rapidacceptance into the community of European democracies.

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    2 - Tr. from the statement of principles delivered by Konrad Adenauer as first chairmanof the CDU in the British zone, 24 March 1946.

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    The window of opportunity for the completion of German unificationwas also opened slightly for only a short time. It was right not to waitfor economic convergence processes to run their course beforesealing national unification.

    And so it is today with the enlargement of the European Union, forwhile it is only right and proper to insist on the candidate countries'compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, we must not let the acces-sion process drag on until the window of opportunity has beenblown shut again. This would not mean that people's concernsabout various aspects of enlargement, such as the associated free-dom of movement, could then be swept aside. Who is to say that thefailure of the enlargement process would not trigger a very conside-rable flood of immigrants who decided that, if the European Unionwould not come to them, they would just have to go to the EuropeanUnion?

    A few weeks ago, in response to an initiative taken by the EPP-EDGroup, the European Parliament expressed itself in favour of accept-ance of the first accession candidates by the year 2004, so thatthey would be able, as equal partners in the democratic andparliamentary Union, to take part in the next European elections,which are scheduled for that same year. In so doing, we have takenanother important step towards our common European future. The

    European Commission has subsequently endorsed this position.

    "Europe must be created." This sentence, like an inscription carvedin stone, comes back to me whenever I look at the portraits of

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    Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schuman in myoffices in Brussels and Strasbourg. When asked how one became agood politician, Adenauer once replied that one should study thehistory of these people. This is not something that can be expectedof every politician.

    Those who hold office in the present Federal Government inGermany should at least be reminded on the way to Nice of thewords spoken by Konrad Adenauer back in 1954: "The unity of Europe was the dream of a few. It became the hope of many. Todayit has become a necessity for all of us. It is necessary for our securi-ty, for our freedom and for our existence as a nation and as an intel-lectually creative community of peoples." 3

    This article was written on 9 November 2000

    Evaluation of the Nice summit, 7 to 10 December 2000

    The Nice summit from 7 to 10 December 2000 will not go down inEuropean Union history as an unqualified success. Although the

    European Parliament proposal under which the first candidate countrieswould take part in the forthcoming European elections in 2004 was adop-ted, no significant progress was made in terms of the European Unionscapacity to act. Yet this is how the summits success has to be measured.

    2 7

    3 - Government policy statement, tr. from the record of proceedings of the GermanBundestag, 15 December 1954.

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    2 8

    Majority voting in the Council of Ministers was not extended toinclude the key policy areas of taxation, asylum and immigration, ormajor services issues in the area of trade policy. These will continueto be decided by unanimity. Parliaments right to codecision was notstrengthened, nor was the hoped-for transparency achieved in theCouncil of Ministers. The outcome in this respect is not satisfactoryin terms of either the stipulation of the qualified majority or theweighting of votes. Procedures in the Council of Ministers will beco-me more complex.

    This summit was a disappointment when measured by the target of a communitarian Europe with strong institutions to guaranteepeace, liberty and law. Yet its unsatisfactory outcome must not delayenlargement of the European Union. We do not want to jeopardisethe admission of the peoples of central Europe to our Community,and we welcome the forthcoming enlargement. There should be nodoubt about this.

    The present method of reforming the European Union by anIntergovernmental Conference followed by a summit of the Heads of State and Heads of Government of the Member States of theEuropean Union has not proved successful. What has proved suc-cessful, on the other hand, is the Convention which was set up todraft the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and which consists of

    MEPs and representatives of national parliaments, the EuropeanCommission and national governments. The forthcoming post-Niceprocess, which must lead to further reform by 2004, should be gui-ded by this.

    K o n r a d A d e n a u er's

    p o l i c y o n

    E u r o p e

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    We call for the European Parliament to be closely involved in thepost-Nice process. It is not enough for it to be included in the plan-ned Convention. We also want the right to submit proposals on thetopics to be discussed. Parliament should make its final opinion onthe outcome of Nice dependent on whether or not it is involved inthis way. Even though a No by Parliament to the Treaty of Nice hasno binding effect in law, the importance of Parliament expressingthis view should not be underestimated, as it might give a lead tonational parliaments, which have to ratify the Treaty.

    2 9

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    Group of the European People's Party

    (Christian Democrats)

    and European Democrats in the European Parliament

    Editor: EPP-ED Group in the European ParliamentResearch-Documentation-PublicationsService

    Address: European Parliament60 rue Wiertz,1047 Brussels

    BelgiumTel: +322 284 22 26Internet: http://www.epp-ed.orgE-Mail: [email protected] by: Finlande Grafic Design

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    Konrad

    denauer's polic y pe

    The goal of Konrad Adenauer's policy on Europe may besummed up in a single sentence, which he formulatedneatly for everyone in his Cologne dialect: "Europa mussjeschaffen werden" ("Europe must be created"). Behindthis sentence of Adenauer's lay the experience of twoworld wars and of the traditional enmity betweenGermany and France, which he, as a Rhinelander, foundparticularly distressing. Creating peace and freedom,removing the divisiveness of national borders andachieving reconciliation between yesterday's enemieswere only possible through the bond of European inte-gration. Moreover, no neighbour need fear Germany if it were a member of the European family. Adenauer

    saw Europe as potentially more than an economic community. It was aunion of States that were bound together by the common aim of nurturingpolitical unification and overcoming historical conflicts. When he resignedfrom office on 15 October 1963 at the age of 87, he had guided post-warGermany from a state of economic and moral collapse, developing itsdomestic and foreign policies to pave the way for a better and more peace-

    ful future.

    As the days leading up to his 125th birthday on 5 January 2001 give us theopportunity to review his political life and achievements, we cannot fail torecognise that Adenauer, through his European policy, had a decisive impacton Germany's position and prestige in Europe and the world. NeitherGerman unity nor Germany's influence within Europe would have beenconceivable without his political pragmatism, his patience, his stamina andthe confidence that his consistency inspired in the governments of neigh-bouring European countries.

    Konrad Adenauer's

    polic y on Europeand the challenges of European unification today

    Hans-Ger t Poe t ter ing, M E P, C ha irman o f t he Group

    o f t he European Peop le's Par t y

    and European Democra ts ( E P P- E D ) in t he European Par l ia

    men t

    o n r a

    d A d e n a u e r ' s

    p o

    l i c y o n

    E u

    r o p e